

ALEX G. CUMMINS

DOCUMENTS  
OF  
SOVIET HISTORY

4

STALIN GRASPS POWER  
1926-1928



ACADEMIC INTERNATIONAL PRESS

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OF  
SOVIET HISTORY

EDITED BY  
ALEX G. CUMMINS



VOLUME 4  
STALIN GRASPS POWER  
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## APPRECIATION

*Special acknowledgment must be extended to  
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who has supported me endlessly and lovingly  
and assisted in the preparation of this volume.  
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in me the love of learning and curiosity.  
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**DOCUMENTS OF SOVIET HISTORY, VOLUME 4, STALIN GRASPS POWER, 1926-1928. Edited by Alex G. Cummins**

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## CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	<i>viii</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>xii</i>
<b>1 THE YEAR 1926</b>	
Letter to Comintern on Party Opposition and the Economic Situation in Soviet Russia. 13 January 1926	1
Chicherin, Soviet Government Agrees to Participate in League of Nations Commission. 16 January 1926	4
Party Resolution. Toward Strengthening of Socialist Elements in the National Economy. 25 February 1926	5
Stalin Proclaims Beginning of New, Second Period of NEP. 13 April 1926	12
Treaty of Berlin. 24 April 1926	25
Litvinov on the International Situation of the USSR. 24 April 1926	28
Stalin on Ukrainization. 26 April 1926	38
Many Obstacles to Greater Participation of Women in Soviet Life. 30 May 1926	41
Letter from Stalin on the Lashevich Affair and the Move Against Zinoviev. 25 June 1926	47
Trotskyist and Zinovievist Opposition. Declaration of the Thirteen. 14 July 1926	49
Party Resolution after the First General Soviet Elections Since End of the Civil War. 20 July 1926	53
Party Removes Zinoviev, Lashevich, and Others From Party Leadership Positions. 23 July 1926	62
Nonaggression Treaty With Lithuania. 28 September 1926	66
Fifteenth Party Conference of the CPSU—Reports and Debates. 26 October-3 November 1926	68
Rykov's Report	69
Miliutin's Speech	91
Rykov's Concluding Speech	95
Kamenev's Speech. Declaration of the Six	99
Zinoviev's Speech	118
RSFSR Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship. 19 November 1926	131
National Census of 1926. 17 December 1926	157
Krupskaia, Criteria for Children's Books. 23 December 1926	159
Stalin's Speech on Perspectives of the Revolution in China. 30 December 1926	161

## 2 THE YEAR 1927

Maiakovsky on Artistic Freedom Versus Control. February 1927	168
Litvinov on Worsening Anglo-Soviet Relations. 27 February 1927	170
Eisenstein's Films Battleship Potemkin and October. April 1927	174
Litvinov on the Peking Raid. 6 April 1927	176
Exchange of Notes Regarding Settlement of Existing Conflict With Switzerland. 14 April 1927	178
Stalin, Questions of the Chinese Revolution. 21 April 1927	179
Secret Soviet-German Military Agreement Regarding Poison-Gas Experiments. 23 April 1927. <i>Translated by Dr. Edmund Remys</i>	183
Voroshilov's Speech to the Fourth Congress of Soviets on the State of the Red Army. 25 April 1927	184
Obolensky-Osinsky's Speech to the World Economic Conference. Geneva, 4-23 May 1927	190
The Arcos Raid. 12 May 1927	194
Litvinov, Protest Note of the Soviet Government to the British Government. 17 May 1927	194
Mikoian, The Raid on the Trade Delegation of the Soviet Union in London. May 1927	197
The German Government Reevaluates Secret Military Relationship with the Soviet Government. Berlin, 18 May 1927. <i>Translated by Dr. Edmund Remys</i>	200
Obolensky-Osinsky Speech on the Results of the World Economic Conference. Geneva, 23 May 1927	202
Great Britain Severs Diplomatic Relations With USSR. 26 May 1927	204
Soviet Response to the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations. M. Litvinov's Note to British Charge d' Affaires. Moscow, 28 May 1927	206
Litvinov, Soviet Envoy to Poland, Assassinated. 7 June 1927	207
The GPU Uncovers British Espionage and Conspiracy With Russian Emigrés. 9 June 1927	208
Stalin on the War Scare of 1927, China Question and the Zinoviev-Trotskyist Opposition. 28 July 1927	211
Metropolitan Sergei's Epistle. The Russian Orthodox Church Reaches Accommodation with the Soviet State. 29 July 1927	228
Party Central Committee Censures and Warns Trotsky and Zinoviev of Expulsion. 9 August 1927	231
N. Semashko States that Soviet Health Services Meet Social, Political, and Medical Needs of Women and Children. 6 October 1927	236
The October Party Enrollment of 1927. 13 October 1927	238
Lunacharsky on the State of Educational and Cultural Development Since the October Revolution. 15 October 1927	240
Trotsky on Opposition Demonstrations During the Anniversary of the October Revolution. 7 November 1927	247
Litvinov on Total Disarmament. Geneva, 30 November 1927	249
Fifteenth Party Congress Resolutions. 7-19 December 1927	254

On the Central Committee Report. 7 December 1927	254
On the Directives on the Establishment of a Five Year Plan for the National Economy. 19 December 1927	259
On Work in the Countryside. 19 December 1927	267

### 3 THE YEAR 1928

Opposition Appeals to Comintern. January 1928	276
Stalin on his Visit to Siberia and "Emergency Measures." 15 January- 6 February 1928	277
From the Eight-Hour to Seven-Hour Working Day. Decree. 17 January 1928	281
Artists and Proletarian Realism. Declaration of the Association of Artists of the Revolution. February 1928	282
Litvinov on Partial Disarmament. Geneva, 23 March 1928	283
Stalin's Speech on Respite in Party Conflict, Success of "Emergency Measures," and the Shakhty Affair. 13 April 1928	286
New Rift in Party Leadership. Secret Meeting Between Bukharin and Kamenev. 11 July 1928	301
Stalin on the Comintern, "Emergency Measures," and the Shakhty Affair. 13 July 1928	304
Stalin on the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station. 31 August 1928	313
Comintern Manifesto on the New Program. 1 September 1928	314
Pravda Reports on the Celebration of the Centenary of Leo Tolstoy's Birth. 10 September 1928	319
Kuibyshev Calls for Rapid Industrialization and Attempts to Mollify the Technical Intelligentsia. 19 September 1928	321
Bukharin Criticizes Current Economic Policy and Calls for Moderation. Notes of an Economist. 30 September 1928	330
Stalin Moves Toward Rapid Industrialization, Collectivization, and Against Right Deviation. 19 November 1928	348
Party Approves Resolution to Enlist Writers and Artists in Socialist Construction. 28 December 1928	367
Litvinov on Soviet-Polish Relations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 29 December 1928	369
<i>Documents by Main Topics</i>	371
<i>Glossary</i>	376
<i>Sources Cited</i>	379
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	381
<i>Permissions</i>	381
<i>Indexes</i>	
Index of Personal Names	382
Index of Subjects	385
Index of Institutions	394
Index of Geographic and Place Names	396

## PREFACE

*Documents of Soviet History* attempts to meet the needs of researchers, be they scholars, students, journalists, government employees, or others seeking a single source for documentary materials on the history of the Soviet Union. Researchers previously hunted through many diverse works, usually specialized by time period, topic, or the organization which produced them. A successful search often requires considerable prior knowledge of the subject matter and about the particular document(s) needed. Even if researchers possessed considerable prior knowledge of the subject and of the particular document or documents needed, they may lack access to specialized sources found only in the largest and most specialized libraries. If found, many of the documents are incomplete, while others lack the contextual information needed by most readers today. Some important documents, of course, are available only in Russian.

*Documents of Soviet History* attempts to bring together major documents of Soviet history in a multivolume set which eventually will cover the period from 1917 to 1986. Thereafter *USSR Documents Annual* and *Russia and Eurasia Documents Annual*, also published by Academic International Press, carry on the task of collecting and publishing primary source documents by and about the Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasian states. It selects the most important documents, ones which best explain the development and policies of the Soviet Union. It includes not only documents pertaining to politics, but also those concerning culture and the arts, education, religion, the family, international relations, economics, military affairs, and other aspects of Soviet society and history. A distinct effort is made to go beyond government and Communist Party pronouncements, which all too often represent the sole content of document collections. At the same time, it is recognized that the latter materials are an exceptionally important part of the documentary record and are represented heavily. Given the nature of the Soviet system, certain leaders loom especially large and authoritative in some periods and their writings and statements are therefore frequent in the respective volumes. Both opposition and unofficial voices also play a role at times, and they too are represented.

Only contemporary documents are used, that is, those originating at the time. Memoirs and other retrospective writings, including "diaries" which were rewritten, are not included. In making the selections for *Documents of Soviet History* I have continued the approach used by my predecessor, Rex A. Wade, as editor of this collection, and attempted to select documents that (1) have long-run significance for understanding the Soviet Union in that they set forth fundamental

policies and principles, (2) mark important events of Soviet development and history, (3) illustrate the debates on major issues, or (4) suggest the temper of the times. No two people would make exactly the same selection from the literally thousands of documents available, but I believe that the majority would agree on the inclusion of most of those found in this collection and hope that all find the selection reasonable as well as valuable.

Each volume in *Documents of Soviet History* covers a differing number of years. Some years and periods produced a larger number of important debates, decisions and documents than did others, and therefore the time span of each volume depends on the number of important documents and their length in given years. This seems preferable to forcing the documents artificially into a uniform number of years for each volume. There are practical limitations on the size of this collection and space does impose its own restraints on selection; "importance" must be defined at least in part by the amount of space available. This collection is expected to run beyond the initially projected twelve volumes. Several future volumes will represent supplements to previous series of volumes in order to include new sources as well as materials originally omitted because of space constraints. In any case, a compromise is essential between the effort to include a larger number and wider range of important documents than any general collection has done hitherto, and the exhaustion of both editor and users. For the sake of clarity and consistency I have retained the presentation of documents used by my predecessor in the previous volumes.

The documents in this collection are arranged chronologically rather than grouped by topic. While each method has advantages, the chronological approach is preferred for a collection such as this. It gives a better sense of historical development and in many instances makes clearer how events and issues crowded upon one another, influenced each other, and how leaders grappled with many pressing problems simultaneously. Moreover, a single document often relates to several topics. For readers wanting material on a specific topic, the subject index should lead them to all documents on that subject as well as to shorter references within other documents. A listing of documents by main topics is also included for quick reference.

A headnote is provided for each document or series of documents for the purpose of placing the document in its historical framework, to indicate its significance and the more important issues it raises, and to make the necessary clarifications for readers. These headnotes are rather more extensive than in most document collections on the assumption that most readers lack knowledge of the historical context of the document.

One of the important principles guiding this collection is to publish each document in its entirety whenever possible. Deletion by editing for space can cause unintended shifts in meaning, and might exclude exactly those portions which a given reader needs. In some cases documents which simply are too long to be included in full, yet are too important to leave out, are edited in order to include

them. Such instances are noted in the headnote to each document and marked in the text by standard ellipses (...). Readers should be aware that some Soviet writers had a fondness for using ellipses for effect in their writings and so, to avoid confusing those with editor's excisions, abridgement of a document is always noted in the headnote. Some peripheral matter, such as the names of signatories of formal decrees, laws and treaties, usually are not included unless there is a special reason to do so. These were generally a formality and take up a great deal of space better used for additional documents. When the signature of a particular official is of importance, it either is included or indicated in the headnote.

All parenthetical references in the documents are those of the original author. I made very few editorial clarifications within texts and marked them by brackets with the initials AGC—[AGC]. All notes at the foot of the page are ones appearing in the original document. Many documents have passages in italics or bold print, and these are given as per the original. These were usually included in translations. I attempted to reinstate them where they were dropped by the translator from the Russian original, keeping in mind that in some instances there are different Russian versions. "Party" in editorial materials means "Communist Party."

Within documents, the spelling and usage of the original translators generally is retained. There seems to be little profit in trying to force general stylistic uniformity on translated documents. Some especially archaic or confusing usages, such as commissioner for commissar, workmen's for workers', etc., are replaced by the more common term. British and American spelling are retained according to the respective translators, except where the cold logic of the modern computer homogenized them beyond the intent of the editor. Minor corrections—obvious grammatical and spelling errors, archaic or confusing terminology, a word or two of retranslation, etc.—are made "silently", that is to say, without noting it in every instance. All substantial modifications of translations are noted.

Russian names and words in the headnotes are given in the slightly simplified Library of Congress transliteration style familiar to readers of English, with diacritical marks and hard and soft sign usually omitted, and the *sky* rather than *skii* ending for family names (Trotsky, Lunacharsky). Within the documents they are given generally according to the translators' usage except in instances where names were transliterated in an unusual manner. To alleviate possible confusion, variant name spellings are listed in the index with cross-reference to the standard spelling.

For the benefit of those unfamiliar with Russian and the variations possible when it is transliterated into the Latin alphabet, introduction to some of the more common ones might be helpful. One set of variations comes from two Russian letters, one of which is transliterated as *iu*, *yu*, or *ju*, and the other as *ia*, *ya*, or *ja*. Another common variation comes from the insertion of the letter *y*, most often before *e* to make *ye* or instead of *i* in connection with another vowel. Another common insertion is the letter *t* in front of *ch*. The apostrophe mark (') may be

used to indicate the Russian soft sign or it may be omitted. Most readers are familiar with the three main sets of variations of name ending: the -sky, -skii or -ski; the -ov (ev), -of (ef) or -off (eff); the use of -a or -aya in some family names to indicate a woman (Stepanov/Stepanova, Krupskii/Krupskaia), which translators may or may not use. There are other variations, but these are the most common ones and the ones most likely to bother a reader of this volume.

The various Communist Party and government names used by different Russian authors and translators deserve special attention. The government formed in October 1917 was called the Council of People's Commissars, but is often referred to by the Russian acronym *Sovnarkom*. It was approved by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which also created an executive body to act for the Congress between its meetings—the Central Executive Committee, which is often referred to in documents by its initials, CEC (English) or TsIK (Russian). It is also important to keep these initials distinct from the initials sometimes used for the Central Committee of the Communist Party (C.C. or CC in English and TsK in Russian). The term “soviet” means in Russian “council”; many authors retain the Russian word *soviet*, now familiar to English readers, but some use *council* in the title of institutions containing that term. The Glossary will help readers unfamiliar with these and other Russian terms of the period, as will the headnote to documents containing them.

Sometimes there are variant dates for documents, among them the date when a resolution was introduced and when it was passed, the sending and receiving dates of a document, or the date when a law was passed by the Council of People's Commissars, when it was published in the newspapers, and when it was published in the official collection of laws. Thus readers may find a given document dated differently in different sources. In most cases the earliest verifiable date when action was taken or a document was created is used.

Soviet officials used the slash (/) between dates to refer to the economic or fiscal year, beginning 1 October and ending 30 September. For example, 1926/27 represented the economic year 1 October 1926—30 September 1927. The dash (-) refers to the calendar year.

Many of the documents here are published for the first time in their complete form in English, and some for the first time in English at all, and yet others for the first time in a readily available source. The source for each document is given immediately following the document. A short form reference is used, and the reader who wishes can find the full citation in the list of sources cited. For some documents, both an English and a Russian language source are given. For a single document this means that an English translation existed but with some deletions and that the missing passages are added here from the Russian source to make the document complete. In a few instances where two documents are given under one heading the two source references—of language—refer to the different sources for the respective documents.

*Alex G. Cummins*



## INTRODUCTION

By 1926 a new Communist Party leadership emerged from the heated debates and power struggle among Lenin's heirs over the course of the New Economic Policy. The "triumvirate" of Grigorii Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and Joseph Stalin were replaced by a group consisting of Nikolai Bukharin, Stalin, Aleksei Rykov, and Mikhail Tomskey. As strong proponents of NEP, the members of this group and their numerous followers, impressed by the growth of the economy, wished to continue the steady development of industry through the accumulation of savings from and taxation of the peasants and through foreign trade. It also wanted to expand gradually the formation of "socialist" agricultural farms, the collective and state farms, and remain vigilant over the economic and political influence and expansion of the "capitalist" elements in the countryside, the so-called kulaks. Underscoring this policy were Bukharin's theory of equilibrium and Stalin's pronouncement that socialism could be built in a peasant-based country like the Soviet Union without waiting for a proletarian revolution in an industrialized country.

Although the new leadership prevailed over the Zinoviev and Kamenev forces at the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925, its hold on power was not absolute. Zinoviev and Kamenev, still members of the Political Bureau (Politburo), counted on significant support in the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Communist International (Comintern), and in many governmental and Communist Party organizations. Waiting in the wings was the indomitable and articulate Lev Trotsky, who had the support of many who advocated a commitment to rapid industrial development.

This volume chronicles the attempts of the opposition forces to assert themselves over the next three years and alter the policies of the Communist Party leadership, taking advantage of set-backs in domestic and international activities. The opposition forces were resilient and even brazen in their criticism and actions. They merged their forces and made an unsuccessful demonstration of their positions at the Fifteenth Party Conference in November 1926. The Communist Party leadership countered with warnings of expulsion for fractionalization, factionalism, splitting, and destroying Communist Party unity.

The merged opposition forces, the Trotskyist-Zinovievist Opposition, renewed their attacks against the Communist Party leadership in 1927 following setbacks in China and in Anglo-Soviet relations. The Communist Party leadership pursued the policy of the "united front" that entailed the linking of communist parties with labor and antiimperialist movements against the policies and actions of capitalist countries. The prime example of this policy was the link of the Chinese Communist

Party with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang group to prevail in the Chinese Revolution. What Stalin termed the Chinese Revolution was in fact a civil war in which foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, were trying to limit as well as exploit socio-economic instability and allying themselves with various factions. The Soviet Union provided military support and resources to Chiang Kai-shek's faction. Chiang Kai-shek eventually turned against the Chinese Communist Party in 1927, thus representing a defeat of the "united front" in China. The Communist Party leadership, through the Comintern, supported the general strike of 1926 in Great Britain, which was short-lived. As a consequence of this and other actions Great Britain severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in May 1927. These events and the assassination of the Soviet envoy to Poland in June 1927 supposedly led to the contrived "war scare" of 1927, namely, that capitalist powers, particularly Great Britain, were preparing for war against the Soviet Union.

Throughout 1927 the United Opposition of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others renewed their public and inner-Party criticisms of the Communist Party leadership. Events took a nasty twist when the United Opposition participated in demonstrations to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. Opposition supporters encountered public and physical confrontations with police forces and supporters of the Communist Party leadership. Enough was enough for the Communist Party leadership, which led a successful fight to expel members of the United Opposition from the Communist Party. Trotsky was exiled to Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan. Many of the United Opposition recanted and rejoined the Communist Party. By the end of December opposition to the Communist Party leadership largely was defeated.

Suddenly, at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928, the Communist Party leadership was confronted with a significant decline in the collection of grain, a deficit which threatened the supply of grain to the towns and the Red Army, and for foreign trade. Stalin initiated the so-called "emergency measures," which meant the use of government and Communist Party personnel to seize grain, in many cases forcibly, from peasant holdings and storage bins. Many abuses were reported. Stalin personally visited various locations in Siberia where the harvest reputedly was better than in other parts of the Soviet Union. He announced that the kulaks hoarded grain in anticipation of price increases and that Communist Party and government representatives were complacent and, in many cases, influenced by the kulaks. After the deficit was covered, he declined to promise never again to use "emergency measures."

The threat of a grain deficit loomed again in the summer, leading Stalin to propose "emergency measures." He also argued for intensified expansion of collective and soviet farms in the countryside and for rapid industrialization, particularly of heavy industry. Heated disagreements ensued between Stalin and his supporters, on one hand, and Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, on the other. An incensed Bukharin met in secret with Kamenev to gain his support or dissuade him from joining Stalin. For several months articles and speeches, though veiled, reflected the sharp disagreements. By the time of convening of the Communist Party

Central Committee late in November a compromise of sorts was reached. Bukharin had moderated Stalin's views about the "emergency measures" and rapid industrialization. The Party Central Committee approved a resolution against Right Deviation in the Communist Party that became the sword of Damocles hanging over Bukharin and his supporters. By the end of 1928 Stalin had grasped the levers of power and policy, defeating his former partners in the Communist Party leadership.

Underlying the inner-Party conflicts was the state of the Soviet economy. Soviet industry faced the problem of exhausting the stock and equipment inherited from the tsarist regime. Foreign trade was considered, though with reluctance, a key element for acquiring machinery for industrialization. A considerable gap existed between the high price of industrial goods and commodities, and lower-priced agricultural products. There also was a lack of industrial goods and commodities for rural consumers, referred to as the "goods famine." There was pressure for wage increases for industrial workers, the bedrock of the Soviet regime. In the countryside the formation of cooperatives, and collective and state farms was progressing slowly. There was concern the wealthier strata of the peasantry, the kulaks, were pushing the poor and middle-class peasants, a contrived categorization, toward private trade and capitalism. Private traders and middle men, the so-called "Nepmen," provided a necessary link in filling the gap between city and countryside. The possibility of setbacks in international affairs, trade, and harvests was constant. Competing interests within the Communist Party advocated different paths toward industrialization and building socialism in the countryside. In simplistic terms, the dividing lines within the Communist Party improved the pace toward industrialization and socialism, and the methods employed to achieve these goals.

One of the tenets of "socialism in one country" was predicated on the relative stabilization of international capitalism. In Europe, the Locarno agreements of 1925 between Germany and other states, Germany's subsequent entry into the League of Nations, and the improved economic situation created hope for the future. For the Soviet Union these developments meant a delay in international revolution and the possibility that capitalist states would unite and encircle the only socialist country. The Soviet Union expanded its relations with foreign countries through diplomatic recognition, trade negotiations, and nonaggression treaties. Germany's entry into the League compelled the Soviet government to request and obtain clarification of the Rapallo Treaty of 1922. The Soviet government joined and participated in League-sponsored organizations such as the Preparatory Disarmament Commission and the World Economic Conference. It developed a strategy of engaging in constructive work in these organizations, speaking publicly of its disdain for the League, taking the lead in calling for total disarmament, elimination of war debts and reparations, and other ideals. It expressed willingness to assist the League and other institutions in achieving peace, and called for the peaceful coexistence of capitalism and socialism.

The immediate military threat continued to be Poland. Although the Soviet government attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a nonaggression treaty with Poland, it sought such treaties with other neighboring states to protect its borders. The Soviet military was making gradual strides toward modernization with the help of secret German-Soviet programs. The Soviet Union lagged far behind the military preparedness of European powers, it nonetheless was confident about defending its borders against neighboring countries.

The flourishing of the arts continued under the tolerant New Economic Policy (NEP). World-wide acclaim was given to Sergei Eisenstein's films *Battleship Potemkin* and *October*. Maxim Gorky and Sergei Prokofiev, world-renowned writer and composer, respectively, returned to their native land after years of self-exile. The centenary of Leo Tolstoy's birth was celebrated in September 1928 with much publicity, pomp, and circumstance. Still there were ominous signs. Avant-garde artists and writers were losing their political and financial support. The trend was toward standardization, consensus, financial solvency, and mobilization of artists and other members of the intelligentsia to meet the Communist Party's needs for industrialization and the eradication of illiteracy.

The period saw the approval for the First Five Year Plan for the economy, the first comprehensive census of the population since tsarist times, renewed effort to increase workers' enrollment in the Communist Party at the expense of white-collar workers, the official introduction of the seven-hour working day, and revision of the 1918 marriage code to resolve the difference between civil and defacto marriage. The working conditions and opportunities for women were improving. Yet the tacit alliance between the non-Party technical intelligentsia and the Communist Party shattered in 1928 as a result of the so-called Shakhty Affair, leading to renewed efforts to develop Communist Party technical experts.

By the end of 1928 Stalin was consolidating his power and authority. Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, and their followers, soon to be labeled the Right Opposition, were still potential threats. Stalin and his followers were moving toward rapid industrialization and intervention in the countryside to maximize resources, expand collective and state farms, and reduce the influence of the kulaks and private traders. How Stalin would execute his policies, what unexpected problems or repercussions he would encounter, and how old and new opposition forces within the Communist Party would thwart or stop him, were unknown.



# 1 THE YEAR 1926

## LETTER TO COMINTERN ON PARTY OPPOSITION AND THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOVIET RUSSIA

13 January 1926

*The Fourteenth Party Congress represented the first major airing of the Zinoviev and Kamenev-led "Left Opposition" against the newly dominant leadership of Bukharin, Stalin, Rykov, and Tomsky. The Congress disavowed the lines advocated by the "Left Opposition." This letter was sent to Comintern sections throughout the world to clarify decisions made at the Party Congress and to prevent deviations, particularly in view of the fact that Zinoviev was chairman of the Comintern's Central Executive Committee. It emphasized the successful NEP economic policy and the possibility of building socialism in the Soviet Union without waiting for a communist revolution in industrialized countries. It also noted the delay of the international revolution and the relative stabilization of capitalism, and strongly encouraged what was known as the "united front" policy as a means to capture trade union movements and prepare the proletariat for international revolution. For details about the debate and resolutions of the Party Congress see the reports of the Congress at the end of Volume 3 of this work.*

### Results of Fourteenth Party Congress Information Letter Sent to All Comintern Sections by Party Central Committee

In view of the special interest which is to be observed among our brother parties with regard to the discussion that has taken place in our Party, and in view of the fact that the attitude of the opposition in the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Republics has naturally aroused great concern among the proletarians and Communists of the whole world, and finally, in view of the fact that the social democratic and bourgeois press are exaggerating our discussion in every possible way and systematically distorting the true state of affairs, the CC of the CP of the USSR has decided, through the medium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, to send this letter of information to all the sections of the Comintern.

The situation in which the differences of opinion in our Party have arisen consists in the *tremendously rapid growth of the economy of the Soviet Union and in the extreme complexity of the tasks* confronting the CP. The foreign comrades must clearly bear in mind that with us, under the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship, not only the entire attitude to the every day political questions is changing (for we are exercising the power which we have captured for the purpose of developing socialist construction, while our brother parties have still to pass through the revolutionary fight for power), but all our concrete tasks are becoming extremely complicated. Every word, every decision of the Party must mean a deed. Only thus can and must work a Party that is leading a victorious proletariat.

The past year was a year of great economic growth. Industrial and agricultural production almost reached the prewar level. The *socialist economic elements have developed very considerably* and their specific weight has increased. On the other hand, the contradictory *transition* character of our society, when the majority of the population consists of peasants, inevitably finds expression in that, along with the development of socialist economic

forms, the elements of capitalism, particularly in the sphere of commercial capital, and in the country in the form of the so-called kulak-undertakings, have grown stronger, even if not to the same extent. The sharpening of the social contradictions in the present state of development of relations, when in the village there exist a great number of superfluous peasant workers and in the town there exist unemployment and sections of semiskilled workers who are still poorly paid, which is especially the case with those who have come from the villages, confronts the Party with the *question of the concrete path of development of the Soviet country to socialism*.

The retardation of the international revolution and the relative stabilization of capitalism on the one side, and the strengthening of class antagonism within the country on the other, have created in the Party a certain feeling of depression. This mood has obtained a certain ideological form as a result of several assertions put forward by the opposition, and have become the object of differences of opinion.

They deal with the *question of the possibility of socialist construction in one country*, in spite of the technical backwardness of our country! Connected with this is the *estimation of the New Economic Policy* (whether the latter means nothing else than a retreat, or, from a definite moment, an offensive against capital), and further the question of the *character of our State industry* (whether this is socialist in its nature or whether it represents a sort of State capitalism), and finally, the question of the *attitude to the peasantry and its various groups*. From this great problem there arise several others, each of which possesses great importance.

Should one in the present period of development, from the standpoint of the class war of the proletariat in the village, restrict oneself merely to *neutralizing* the middle peasantry? Or is it necessary, in accordance with Lenin's plans, to conduct a *policy of firm alliance with the middle peasantry* in the common fight against the capitalist elements of the village, such as the kulaks, etc.? Can one, from the standpoint of positive socialist construction, confine oneself to neutralizing the main mass of the peasantry? Or must one, as Lenin emphasized, do everything possible *to win the middle peasantry by means of the co-operatives for socialist construction*? Can we in the fight against the kulaks restrict ourselves to organizing the *poor* peasantry *alone* against the kulaks, or must we at all costs at the same time win the main mass of the peasantry, that is to say the middle peasantry, in order to establish the alliance of the proletariat and of the village poor with the middle peasantry, for the purpose of isolating the kulaks, etc.

Of course we cannot go into these problems here in detail and in a concrete form. We only enumerate the most important in order to emphasize the whole complexity of the questions. We would ask the comrades who are interested in these questions to study them *most carefully on the basis of the available documents*. In our opinion, there should be *studied in the first place the Resolutions of the Party Congress, especially the resolution on the Political Report of the CC*.

The Party Congress recognized that

"the fight for the victory of socialist construction in the Soviet Union is the chief task of our Party, and that our country possesses everything necessary to build up a complete socialist society." (Lenin)

The Party Congress declared,

"that in this manner there is to be seen the economic advance of the proletariat on the basis of the New Economic Policy and the advance of the economic system of the Soviet Union in the direction of socialism."

The Party Congress declared that

"one of the most imperative conditions for the solution of these questions is the fight against the disbelief in the construction of Socialism in our country, as well as against the attempts to regard our undertakings, the undertakings of the consistent socialist type (Lenin) as state capitalist undertakings."

The Party Congress further declared that

"the chief means for the construction of Socialism in the village consists of the growing economic leadership on the part of the socialist State industry, of the state credit institutions and of the other dominating positions which are in the hands of the proletariat, of drawing the main masses of the peasantry into the cooperative organizations and of securing the socialist development of this organization by making use of, overcoming and pushing out its capitalist elements."

The Party Congress has emphatically condemned "the fear of the middle peasantry" and declares that this fear objectively leads to the undermining of the proletarian dictatorship.

The Party Congress explained that

"the struggle against the kulaks must be conducted by organizing the village poor against the kulaks, as well as by consolidating the alliance of the proletariat and the village poor with the middle peasants for the purpose of separating the middle peasant from the kulaks and isolating the kulaks."

The Party Congress emphatically condemned the deviation which consists of *underestimating the kulak danger*, as well as the deviation which fails to recognize the *importance of winning the middle peasantry and their cooperation in socialist construction*. The Party Congress especially emphasized the necessity of combating the last-named deviation, as the Party is better prepared for the immediate fight against the kulaks, while the latter deviation is based upon the failure to understand the complicated fighting methods and endangers the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and with it the whole work of reconstruction.

These are the most important answers of the Party Congress to the questions immediately connected with the discussion. The resolution on the Political Report of the CC is based upon the "*development and victory of the international proletarian revolution*," upon the strengthening of proletarian solidarity, and upon combating the hypocritical slogans of the League of Nations and of the Second International.

In the *resolution on the report of the Delegation of the CP of the USSR, in the ECCI*, the necessity of the fight for the correct Marxist line is expressly emphasized, the attitude of the delegation in the *German, Czechoslovak and Polish* questions is approved and the delegation is instructed to adopt the necessary measures for reorganizing the Communist International apparatus in the direction of a *greater participation of all the important sections in the leading work of the Comintern*.

Special stress was laid upon the *importance of capturing the trade unions and on the fight for trade union unity*. The CC of the CP of the USSR definitely repudiates all the counterrevolutionary talk with regard to the alleged intended affiliation of the trade unions of the Soviet Union with the Amsterdam Trade Union Federation, or with regard to the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations. The questions concerning the policy of our brother parties, there existed *no essential differences of opinion whatever* within the CP of the USSR.

The discussion on the inner questions has been *settled* by the decisions of the Party Congress. The Party Congress has not only adopted fundamental decisions with regard to the questions on the agenda, but has also directed a *special communication to the Leningrad Party organization* in which the behavior of the Leningrad delegation, which put up a coreporter on the political report of the CC and, in contradiction to the vote of confidence of the Leningrad district conference on the activity of the CC, voted *against* the confidence resolution of the Party Congress. The Leningrad delegation is now disavowed by the Leningrad proletarians and communists. With this unanimous support on the part of the Party masses of the whole country, including Leningrad, which has been given to the decisions of the Party Congress, *the unity of the Party is absolutely secured*. Under such conditions there is every reason for believing that the Party will, in a very short time, *overcome* the period of the temporary economic difficulties which have arisen as a result of the economic growth of the country and of which the enemies of the proletariat wish to take advantage.



*The CC of the CP of the USSR is completely unanimous in the belief that it is undesirable to carry the discussion on the Russian question into the ranks of the Comintern. The CC of the CP of the USSR is likewise unanimously of the opinion that the leadership of the Comintern will be granted and must be granted full confidence and support as hitherto. The CC of the CP of the USSR hopes that the brother parties, along with the CP of the Soviet Union, will proceed with closed ranks along their historical path under the banner of the Comintern.*

*International Press Correspondence*, VI, No. 6 (21 January 1926), 81-83.



CHICHERIN, SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREES TO  
PARTICIPATE IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS COMMISSION  
16 January 1926

*The Soviet government refused to join the League of Nations; nor was it invited to join. The admission of Germany to the League in 1925 caused concern within the Soviet government about future relations with Germany and further alienation from the world community that would lead, in the view of the Soviets, to economic or military "encirclement." The invitation from the League to join the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, which was meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, offered the Soviet Union an opportunity to reduce alienation and demonstrate to the world its advocacy of peace and disarmament. One obstacle remained before the Soviet government accepted the invitation—redress of grievances against the Swiss government for failing to deal adequately with the assassination of a Soviet official by a Russian emigre. Georgii Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, presented the official Soviet position in response to the League's invitation to participate in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission.*

Reply to Invitation from Chairman, League of Nations,  
to Take Part in Preparatory Disarmament Commission

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 12 December, containing an invitation to take part in a preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference. The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared that it attributes such great importance to any attempt to diminish the danger of war and ease the burden of armaments lying on the people, that it is ready to take part in any conference connected with this end.

In reference to the above-mentioned invitation I make here the same statement, at the same time emphasizing the fact that it in no way implies the adherence of my Government to the views of the League Council.

I am bound to state that if the Soviet Government, aspiring towards the easing of the position of all peoples, decides to be represented at such an assembly, convoked by the League of Nations, this by no means signifies that its unfavorable attitude to the latter has been in any way modified. We can only regret that the assembly setting itself such an extensive task as general disarmament, is convoked by the League of Nations, i.e., by an organization not recognized by many States. I feel bound to express great astonishment with regard to the fact that the Council of the League of Nations, while considering the participation of the USSR in the preliminary work of the disarmament conference, at the

same time appointed the place of convocation of its preparatory commission in Geneva, thus actually excluding all possibility of participation in this commission by the USSR.

The Council can scarcely fail to be unaware of the frequent declarations of the Soviet Government as to the impossibility of sending its representatives to Switzerland as long as its conflict with the Swiss Government, in connection with the murder of citizen Vorovsky, its representative at the Lausanne Conference, has not been settled.

It will be sufficient to remember that the Soviet Government refused to send its representatives to Switzerland for a preliminary conference on naval disarmament, which was consequently held in Italy.

The behavior of the Swiss Government in regard to the Soviet Government has considerably assisted the creation of such an atmosphere as made possible the acquittal of the murderer of citizen Vorovsky. The immunity of those who killed citizen Vorovsky and wounded members of his staff can only mean the outlawing of Soviet citizens and especially official Soviet delegates. It is perfectly obvious that the Soviet Government cannot send delegates to such a country, as long as the conditions there prevailing at the time of Vorovsky's murder, and still prevailing, are not changed. It is therefore to be regretted that the Council of the League of Nations did not take these facts into consideration when appointing the place of convocation of this commission. It is highly possible that, from the technical point of view, Geneva is the most suitable place for the League of Nations for the work of the commission. The League, however, can scarcely require that States invited to the commission should let their policy in regard to other States depend upon its technical convenience. It might be supposed that participation in a disarmament commission by such a big State as the USSR should outweigh arguments touching the technical convenience of the League of Nations.

I would once more definitely state, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, that the Soviet Government, welcoming any initiative and any attempt in the direction of disarmament, sincerely desires to participate both in the disarmament conference.

Barbusse, 128-130.



#### PARTY RESOLUTION. TOWARD STRENGTHENING OF SOCIALIST ELEMENTS IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

25 February 1926

*Faced with the prospects of exhausting the stock of capital inherited from the tsarist regime and the acute hunger for cheap industrial goods, the Plenum of the Party Central Committee adopted measures to acquire the capital needed to feed fast-growing industrialization. Among these measures were to pledge apparently reticent or benign Party members to concentrate attention on expanding cooperative farming among poor and middle peasants and on an influx of deposits and savings of peasants into credit and cooperative systems, reduce retail prices, fight against accumulation of private capital, increase wages, increase exports, and form a special reserve for the national budget. The Communist Party leadership was successful apparently in using direct administrative measures, such as increasing or reducing prices and credit, to maintain equilibrium between the industrial and*

*agricultural markets. The Plenum was frank about the numerous obstacles thwarting success, among them housing shortages, the significant gap between high prices for industrial goods and low prices for grain, stability of currency, and unreliability of grain harvests. Was this new phase in economic stability actual or a temporary lull before a storm, which the opposition forces were claiming?*

# ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE CP OF THE SOVIET UNION Resolution of the CC Plenum of the CPSU

## I

The fundamental fact which determined the strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship and the raising of the international importance of the Soviet is the rapid growth of the productive forces of the country in the direction of strengthening the preponderance of the socialist elements in the national economy. This growth was the result of the policy of the Party which, on the basis of the New Economic Policy, has led to the consolidation of the alliance between industry and agriculture and to the consolidation of the leading position of State industry in the whole economy. This development took place under disproportionate conditions, which had arisen historically, between the development of industry and agriculture and of the general economic backwardness of the country.

The center point of the New Economic Policy in its early years was the task of restoring agriculture as rapidly as possible as the starting point of the fight against economic devastation in town and country, the task of creating a basis of raw material and foodstuffs for the development of industry and the creation of a market for its products. Industry, which relies on the growth of agriculture and on the ever-increasing power of absorption of the peasant market and adapts itself to its requirements, increased its production in the economic year 1924/25 by 64 percent and in the current economic year by about 30-40 percent.

In spite of this growth of industry, the country still has to pass through a long period in which industrial production will be out of proportion to the demands on production and consumption which are growing more rapidly. The result of this phenomenon is the acute hunger for industrial goods. In this situation, the development of industry and the industrialization of the country altogether is the decisive task, on the successful carrying out of which depends the further development of the whole national economy on the road to the victory of socialism.

## II

The industrialization of the country and the increase of the store of industrial products at the stage of development of industry which has been reached, is at present meeting with specific difficulties. Industry has almost entirely used up the stock capital which had been left behind from the bourgeois epoch and, in its further development, is now faced by the necessity of reequipping the factories and of building new factories, which again depends entirely on the amount of accumulated means which can be invested in the interest of the extension of industry.

The expropriation of the unproductive classes (bourgeoisie and nobility) the annulment of the debts, the concentration of the income from industry, home and foreign trade and the whole system of credit in the hands of the State etc.—all this in itself provides the possibility of an accumulation of this kind within the country, which guarantees the pace of development of industry which is necessary for socialist construction.

This task however can only be fulfilled successfully in so far as the Party manages, on the one hand, to put into practice throughout the country a regime of strict economy and

a relentless fight against any superfluous unproductive expenditure and, on the other hand, to increase the influx of the private means of the population into every kind of credit and cooperative institution and to get hold of these means through State loans, so that the savings in question may be used for the further development of the productive forces of the country and above all of industry.

The rate of the increase of stock capital and of the reequipment of industry as well as the improvement of technique and the intensification of agriculture depends mainly on the successful development of our export activities and of the importation of the necessary machines, the necessary raw materials, the necessary semimanufactured goods for industry and of agricultural implements. For this reason, the increase of our exports is an indispensable condition for the industrialization of the country and the acceleration of the development of industry.

The Party and State must systematically take the necessary measures to free our economy from its dependence on the capitalist countries. This dependence became particularly noticeable in the present year when our national economy was approaching the end of its period of reconstruction and had used up the whole of the technical equipment which had remained behind from prerevolutionary times. Consequently we must, besides forcing the export of the products of agriculture and forestry and developing and improving industrial export (naphtha and other mineral riches, etc.), take particularly energetic measures to further those branches of industry in which our dependence on foreign countries is most keenly felt. The development of the production of cotton, sheep-breeding, the increase of copper-mining and of the production of iron and steel, development of the engineering industry etc. must receive particular attention.

The possibility of hindrances in foreign trade as well as the inevitability of disproportion between the individual branches of our industry, which, as a result of the existence of the market and the predominance of irregular elements in agriculture, is subject to frequent fluctuations of the market, demand that the State should hold sufficient reserves in its hands. This is one of the conditions necessary for the systematic conduct of the economic life of our country. For this reason such reserves must be provided in the State Budget, in foreign trade, in industry, in the supply of corn, in the defense of the country etc.

In the present period of the construction of new factories, special importance attaches to the development of the principle of systematical management and to carrying through a strict plan of discipline in the activities of all State functionaries. All activities with any degree of importance for the construction of new factories—whether of State or local importance—especially must be brought into harmony with the general economic plan. A stop must be decisively put to building construction undertaken simultaneously and individually, which leads to frittering away and uneconomical use of means and material. This part played by the functionaries of planned systematic economy must be increased in this field more than elsewhere.

At the same time as we combat separatism in our systematic economy and the irresponsible working out and carrying out of plans, we must see that the higher functionaries for systematic economy and the irresponsible working out and carrying out of plans, we must see that the higher functionaries for systematic economy are freed from the petty supervision of the accounts of the officials subordinate to them. Less attention should be paid than hitherto to questions of detail with regard to plans of exploitation, whilst on the other hand the responsibility of the functionaries who carry them out, should be increased. At the same time the number of departments through which the plans of operation must pass before they are finally confirmed, must be reduced and there must be a strict limitation of competence of the individual institutions for planned systematic economy which have the final decision on the various questions.

A higher quality of the plans drawn up, their timely confirmation and the concentration of the attention of the leading functionaries for planned systematic economy on the main tasks of planned systematic economy can only be achieved under these conditions.

The immediate tasks of economic development in the period before us consist in accelerating accumulation, in making an appropriate use of the means accumulated and in carrying out much more strictly than hitherto the principle of planned systematic economy.

### III

In addition to the general disproportion between the development of agriculture and industry, a disproportion can at present be observed, on the one hand, between the development of the transport system and of industry as a whole, and on the other hand, between the development of the individual branches of industry. The transport system has already become that link in the system of Soviet management, without the development of which a further increase of the traffic of goods within the country is impossible. The production of fuel, the metallurgy industry and the production of building materials are far behind the requirements of the market and the rate of development of industry. It is therefore necessary, in addition to regulating the transport of goods and to making a more economic use of the means of transport by land and water, above all to expand the means of transport in the metallurgy industry, the production of fuel and building materials and electrification in such a way that the difficulties in the supply to the other branches of industry, the increasing goods traffic and the building of houses can be removed.

In order to prevent a repetition of fuel difficulties in the future, we must today, apart from making better use of and rationalizing the existing fuel undertakings, devote more attention to the opening up of new coal and naphtha fields.

The Party and State must, in the coming period, deal with the housing question with particular care, as the housing crisis interferes with the further growth of industry and with the improvement of the material position of the workers.

### IV

The objective difficulties of the present period have been intensified during the current year by failures in the management of planned systematic economy which have found expression in exaggerated plans for collecting corn, for export, import, currency and credit, and in this connection also, of the program of the development of industry and of the investment of capital. These failures in the drawing up and carrying out of plans, have rendered the shortage of goods still more acute.

The general expansion of agricultural production, the increased surplus of agricultural products, the reduced taxation of the peasant population and the considerable rise in the price of corn—which is to be attributed largely to the mistaken forcing of the collection of corn—have produced a great increase in the demand made by the villages.

The tremendous growth of the demands made by the towns and by industry, to meet which money is forthcoming, is explained by: firstly the considerable increase of wages since the middle of 1925 (and a corresponding increase of the amount spent on social insurance), through which masses of new workers are attracted into production whilst the increase of the productivity of labor came to a standstill; secondly the enlargement of the staff and additional superfluous expenses on the part both of bodies financed by the State and of those on a commercial basis, including State trading and the Cooperatives; thirdly a start being made in carrying through the program of investments of capital, which will only yield an increase of the amount of goods at some remote time and the rapid development of heavy industry which brings about a further demand for manufactured goods.

Further, the influence of a certain increase of private accumulation has been felt in the field of goods traffic, especially in view of the disproportion between wholesale and retail prices and in the growth of the demands of the urban population which is able to pay.

The forcing of the urban demands which have swallowed up a large part of the increasing industrial-production, has had a disorganizing effect on the goods traffic between town and country, has diminished the introduction of industrial products into the village and thus reduced the supply of the products of peasant farming. All this together resulted in a rise in the general level of prices, a great increase of the difference between retail and wholesale prices, has rendered more difficult the carrying out of the plans for collecting corn and the plans for export and import connected with them, and has created difficulties in the circulation of money. The reduction of the plan for collecting corn, which was in the circumstances inevitable, involved cutting down the plan for export and import and thus made it questionable whether it would be possible to achieve a positive trade balance and finally solvency in the present year. This meant a danger for the stability of the currency, which was all the more serious, as we had an adverse trade balance last year.

The reduction of the plan for import and credit made it necessary to revise the plan for the development of industry also and to bring it into line with the means at the disposal of the State.

In certain branches of industry—especially those branches the activity of which is dependent on the import of raw materials from abroad, of semimanufactured goods and technical equipment—this resulted in a certain slackening of the pace of development in the current year.

The solution of the difficulties of the present economic year does not exclude the possibility of the occurrence of new difficulties in the future, especially when the new harvests are sold. At present we have not the necessary means at our disposal for determining the amount of the new harvests and to make even an approximate plan for their realization. It is, however, highly probable that State industry will again be insufficiently equipped after the new harvest and will be lacking in the necessary reserves of both raw materials and manufactured goods. In order to ensure a normal traffic in goods in the village at the time when the new harvest is realized, the CC Plenum commissions the Politburo to take supplementary measures of increasing the quantity of industrial goods, especially by extending as far as possible the import of raw materials for the textile and leather industry and, in the case of extreme necessity, by the import of ready-made goods.

In addition to these measures it is necessary, in the interest of the reduction of the general level of prices, that the working costs of the apparatus for collecting corn should be reduced as far as possible in all stages of the collection of corn.

As heavy industry cannot possibly, in the near future, entirely satisfy the demands for industrial products which could be paid for in ready money, it is necessary for the sake of alleviating the shortage of goods, to encourage in every way the development of provincial industry, both that of the State and of small private firms, especially those factories which are run on local sources of fuel.

Although the difficulties referred to exist, the growth of the importance of our industry and of the working class in the whole system of our economics is continuing in the current year. Industry indeed is growing much more rapidly than all the other branches of the economy in the Soviet Union. The total production of industry will increase by about 30-40 percent in proportion to the production of last year. For the first time, considerable means are being invested in reequipment and the building of new factories in industry, which will make it possible to extend industry in the subsequent years.

## V

The difficulties which have cropped up in the process of economic growth do not make the development of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry on the basis of cooperation between State industry and agriculture less urgent, but on the contrary, increase its urgency.

Industry will not overcome the difficulties which stand in the way of its further expansion and raise the necessary capital for that purpose, unless the further development of agriculture is assured.

For this reason, all the resolutions passed by the Party (Fourteenth Party Conference and Fourteenth Party Congress) and by the Soviet Power with regard to promoting peasant farming and improving the position of the masses of peasants, must be carried out in their entirety.

The increase of the productive forces in the village is proceeding through a contest between the various social groups of the peasantry. The inevitable increase of the strength of the kulaks in the present period of the New Economic Policy and the struggle of these elements to gain predominance in the village, places before the Party the task of consolidating and extending the economic and political cooperation of the proletariat with the large masses of the middle and poor peasantry. This task should be accomplished by: firstly consolidating the alliance between the proletariat and the village poor with the middle peasantry for the purpose of isolating the kulaks and, secondly, by giving material support to and organizing the village poor against the kulaks. Apart from possibly enlarging the special relief fund for the village poor which has started in the current year, and from liberating the poorest among the peasants from agricultural taxation, a system of wider measures for the support of the village poor must be worked out. The Party should study with special care the experiences made with labor in the villages and the development of conditions of tenancy, and must take measures to regulate the practice of labor and wages conditions, so as to put a check on the attempts at exploitation on the part of the kulaks, and to protect the interests of the village poor.

## VI

The stage which has been reached in the exchange of goods and money and the accumulation in the villages, as well as the necessity of regulating this accumulation in accordance with the interests of the proletarian State, demand that a system of taxation of the peasantry should be worked out which would relieve the burden of taxation of the poorer peasants, which, in its type, would approach most nearly to the system of income tax.

The following important changes are therefore necessary in the structure of the uniform agricultural taxation:

- a) The income on which the taxation is based, should be determined, not in kind but in money;
- b) sources of income of the peasant population (wine-growing, bee-keeping, gardening, market-gardening, if these occupations are carried on commercially, further money earned in other ways than by agriculture etc.) which were previously not counted at all or to an insufficient degree, must now be included as objects of taxation;
- c) the rates of assessment should be changed on the lines of a more progressive scale, so that the poorest groups are freed entirely and the burden of taxation is increased for the wealthy and kulak strata of the peasantry.

With regard to determining the sources of income apart from agriculture on which taxation should be based, a more important part should be assigned to the local functionaries who are best informed as to the peculiarities of their district.

The total sum of the comprehensive agricultural taxation can only be raised in proportion as the area under cultivation is enlarged, the field of objects of taxation is extended and the level of the yield of peasant farming is generally increased.

Out of the total sum of agricultural taxation, at least two-thirds should be left to the local Soviet functionaries (municipal, district and provincial functionaries) for satisfying local needs.

## VII

The development of *cooperative construction* in the village, in particular of agricultural credit cooperatives and of agricultural cooperatives, as well as the general improvement of the economic position of the broad masses of the peasantry afford the possibility of a further advance in enlisting the poor and middle classes of peasants in socialist construction.

*Socialist construction* must embrace all branches of industry, including agriculture. The organization of the socialist economy in the Soviet Union can therefore only be guaranteed if agriculture develops on the lines of consolidating its alliance with socialist industry, of strengthening the part played by the latter in the whole national economy and of the increase of the socialist elements in the village, the most important of which are the cooperatives.

The Plenum of the CC states that the Party's resolutions (Fourteenth Party Conference and Fourteenth Party Congress) with regard to cooperative construction in the village, have not yet been completely taken up or sufficiently carried out by the cooperative and Party organizations. The Plenum pledges all Party members to concentrate their attention on carrying out the Party resolutions referred to and in doing so to take the following tasks especially into consideration.

- 1) The enlistment of really broad masses of the peasantry in cooperative construction;
- 2) The interests of the middle and poor peasant masses should be well protected in the cooperatives and a fight carried on against the attempts of the kulak elements to exploit the cooperatives;
- 3) Unproductive expense in affairs concerning the cooperatives should be ruthlessly cut down;
- 4) The turnover of the cooperatives should be increasingly extended by reducing the part played by private capital, and by fighting resolutely for the reduction of retail prices.
- 5) Measures should be taken to ensure the influx of the deposits and savings of the broad masses of peasants into the credit and cooperative system.
- 6) Every means must be used to enforce stricter credit discipline.
- 7) The special forms of cooperatives which unite the peasants in the sphere of production and above all in the industrialization of agriculture should be established more firmly.

These tasks can only be fulfilled if there is a general improvement in the activity of the cooperatives, if their authority in the economic life of the peasant masses is increased and if the eligibility of their functionaries and their responsibility to the population is really guaranteed.

## VIII

On the grounds of the above arguments, the Plenum of the Central Committee calls upon all Party organizations to be guided by the following directions in solving the actual tasks of the immediate future:

- a) In the sphere of the money issue and credit policy: by the necessity of bringing about, in the course of the next few months, an appropriate relation between the money in circulation in the country and the masses of goods in circulation, and of only permitting an increase of issue in so far as results can be obtained by raising the purchasing power of the ruble.
- b) In the sphere of the turnover of goods: by the necessity of achieving a decided reduction in retail prices. In connection with the widening of the disparity between retail and wholesale prices, the questions of organizing the market and of fighting for a reduction of retail prices acquire unusual significance. Success in the collection of grain, and with it in carrying out the plan of export, an actual increase of wages, success in the fight against the accumulation of private capital, all these depend entirely on a further reduction of retail prices both of industrial goods and of agricultural products. The attention of the trade



unions, of State industry, of State officials, and above all of the cooperatives must be concentrated on this fight in the immediate future.

c) In the *sphere of wages policy*, the Plenum of the CC states that the measures taken at the beginning of the economic year for generally increasing wages, and the most recent measures of the Politburo (February 1926) for increasing wages in coal mining, transport and means of communication (post, telegraph, telephone etc.) were the right ones, and proposes that for the rest of the current year, we should be guided by the necessity of ensuring the rate of wages already attained. At the same time, it is necessary to take decisive measures for increasing the productivity of labor both through the rationalization of production, especially by more complete equipment, increasing the qualification of the workers, improving the organization in factories and works and, through making better use of the working day, enforcing a stricter discipline in work, fighting against loss of working time and so on.

The measures taken by the Party are directed towards actually ensuring the level of wages reached. In order that these measures should be carried into effect in correspondence with the general growth of the forces of production, the development of industry and the increase of productivity of labor, it is necessary to ensure a further increase of wages.

d) As regards the investment of capital in industry, the State Budget and the formation of a special reserve for the National Budget, the decisions of the Politburo of 25 February of this year should be carried out.

e) As regards the plan of import and export for the year 1925/26 and the formation of a reserve for foreign trade, the decisions of the Politburo of 21 January 1926 are authoritative.

*International Press Correspondence*, VI, No. 35 (29 April 1926), 535-38.



STALIN PROCLAIMS BEGINNING OF  
NEW, SECOND PERIOD OF NEP  
13 April 1926

*Stalin used the opportunity afforded by a meeting of the Leningrad Party leadership to identify 1926 as the beginning of a second phase of NEP, indicating a shift from primary emphasis on agriculture toward industrialization, and to criticize the "New Opposition" of Zinoviev and Kamenev. Zinoviev had a strong following in Leningrad, where he was Communist Party boss for many years. Stalin argued that industrialization depended on the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry because the only source of industrialization was from domestic savings, i.e., socialist accumulation, and that significant reserves were needed to support industrialization and insure the country against contingencies. He advocated constructive discussion of different views, but intimated that all must unite around a decision once made by the Communist Party.*

J. STALIN

REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE  
SOVIET UNION AND THE POLICY OF THE PARTY

Comrades, permit me to begin my report.

There were four items on the agenda of the April Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party.

The first item was the economic situation of our country and the economic policy of our Party.

The second item was the reorganization of our grain procurement agencies with a view to making them simpler and cheaper.

The third item was the plan of work of the Politburo of our Central Committee and of the Plenum of the Central Committee for 1926, from the view-point of working out the principal key questions of our economic construction.

The fourth item was the replacement of Yevdokimov as Secretary of the Central Committee by another candidate—Comrade Shvernik.

Leaving aside the last item—the replacement of one secretary by another—it may be said that all the others, which formed the main axis around which the discussion at the Plenum of the Central Committee turned, could be reduced to a single basic question—the economic situation of our country and the policy of the Party. In my report, therefore, I shall deal with this one basic question—the economic situation of our country.

# I

## TWO PERIODS OF NEP

The major factor determining our policy is that our country in the course of its economic development has entered a new period of NEP, a new period of the New Economic Policy, a period of direct industrialization.

It is now five years since the New Economic Policy was proclaimed by Vladimir Ilyich. The principal task which faced us, the Party, at that time was to lay a socialist foundation for our national economy under the conditions of the New Economic Policy, under the conditions of expanded trade. Today, too, this strategic task confronts us as our principal task. At that time, in the first period of NEP, beginning with 1921, we approached this principal task from the view-point of the development primarily of agriculture. Comrade Lenin said that our task was to lay a socialist foundation for the national economy, but that in order to lay such a foundation it was necessary to have a developed industry, because industry is the basis, the alpha and omega of socialism, of socialist construction, and in order to develop industry, it was necessary to *begin* with agriculture.

Why?

Because in order to expand industry under the conditions of economic disruption which we were then experiencing, it was necessary first of all to create certain prerequisites for industry in the way of markets, raw materials and food. Industry cannot be developed out of nothing at all; industry cannot be developed if there are no raw materials in the country, if there is no food for the workers, and if agriculture, which represents the chief market for our industry, is not developed to at least some extent. Consequently, in order to develop industry, at least three prerequisites were necessary: firstly, a home market—and our home market so far is predominantly a peasant market; secondly, it was necessary to have a more or less developed output of agricultural raw materials (sugar beet, flax, cotton, etc.); thirdly, it was necessary that the countryside should be able to provide a certain minimum of agricultural produce for supplying industry, for supplying the workers. That is why Lenin said that for laying a socialist foundation for our economy, for building industry, we should have to begin with agriculture.

There were many at that time who did not believe this. Objections on this score were raised especially by the so-called "Workers Opposition". How can that be? It said: our Party calls itself a workers' party, yet it is beginning the development of the economy with agriculture. How, it said, is that to be understood? Objections were also raised at that time by other oppositionists, who believed that industry can be built in any conditions, even if starting with nothing, and without taking the real possibilities into account. But the history of the economic development of our country in that period has clearly shown that the Party

was right, that in order to lay a socialist foundation for our economy, in order to develop industry, it was necessary to begin with agriculture.

That was the first period of the New Economic Policy.

Now we have entered the second period of NEP. The most important and most characteristic feature of our economy today is that the center of gravity has shifted to industry. Whereas at that time, in the first period of the New Economic Policy, we had to begin with agriculture, because it depended the development of the whole national economy, now, in order to continue laying the socialist foundation of our economy, in order to promote our economy as a whole, it is on industry that we must focus attention. Agriculture itself can now make no progress if it is not promptly supplied with agricultural machines, tractors, manufactured goods, etc. Consequently, whereas at that time, in the first period of the New Economic Policy, the development of the national economy as a whole depended on agriculture, now it depends, and has already depended, on the direct expansion of industry.

## II

### THE COURSE TOWARDS INDUSTRIALIZATION

That is the essence and basic significance of the slogan, of the course towards industrializing the country, which was proclaimed at the Fourteenth Party Congress, and which is now being put into effect. It was this basic slogan that the Plenum of the Central Committee in April of this year took as the starting point of its work. Consequently, the immediate and fundamental task now is to hasten the tempo of development of our industry, to promote our industry to the utmost by utilizing the resources at our disposal, and thereby to accelerate the development of the economy as a whole.

This task has become particularly urgent just now, at the present juncture, among other reasons because a certain discrepancy has arisen, owing to the way our economy has developed, between the demand for manufactured goods in town and country and the supply of those goods in town and country and the supply of those goods by industry, because the demand for industrial products is growing faster than industry itself, because the goods shortage we are now experiencing, with all its attendant consequences, is a reflection and outcome of this discrepancy. It scarcely needs proof that the swift development of our industry is the surest way to eliminate this discrepancy and to put an end to the goods shortage.

Some comrades think that industrialization implies the development of any kind of industry. There are even some queer fellows who believe that Ivan the Terrible was an industrialist, because in his day he created certain embryonic industries. If we follow this line of argument, then Peter the Great should be styled the first industrialist. That, of course, is untrue. Not every kind of industrial development is industrialization. The center of industrialization, the basis for it, is the development of heavy industry (fuel, metal, etc.), the development, in the last analysis, of the production of the means of production, the development of our own machine-building industry. Industrialization has the task not only of increasing the share of manufacturing industry in our national economy as a whole; it has also the task, within this development, of ensuring economic independence for our country, surrounded as it is by capitalist states, of safeguarding it from being converted into an appendage of world capitalism. Encircled as it is by capitalism, the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot remain economically independent if it does not itself produce instruments and means of production in its own country, if it remains stuck at a level of development where it has to keep its national economy tethered to the capitalistically developed countries, which produce and export instruments and means of production. To get stuck at that level would be to put ourselves in subjection to world capital.

Take India. India, as everyone knows, is a colony. Has India an industry? It undoubtedly has. Is it developing? Yes, it is. But the kind of industry developing there is not one

which produces instruments and means of production. India imports its instruments of production from Britain. Because of this (although, of course, not only because of this), Indian industry is completely subordinated to British industry. That is a specific method of imperialism—to develop industry in the colonies in such a way as to keep it tethered to the metropolitan country, to imperialism.

But it follows from this that the industrialization of our country cannot consist merely in the development of any kind of industry, of light industry, say, although light industry and its development are absolutely essential for us. It follows from this that industrialization is to be understood above all as the development of heavy industry in our country, and especially of our own machine-building industry, which is the principal nerve of industry in general. Without this, there can be no question of ensuring the economic independence of our country.

### III

#### QUESTIONS OF SOCIALIST ACCUMULATION

But, comrades, in order that industrialization may go forward, our old factory equipment must be renovated and new factories built. The distinguishing feature of the present period of development of our industry is that the mills and factories bequeathed to us by the capitalists of the tsarist period are already being operated to capacity, to the full, and in order to make further progress now the technical equipment must be improved, the old factories must be reequipped and new ones built. Unless this is done, it will be impossible now to go forward.

But, comrades, in order to renovate our industry on the basis of new technical equipment, we need considerable, very considerable, amounts of capital. And we are very short of capital, as you all know. This year we shall be able to assign something over 800 million for the fundamental cause of capital investment in industry. That, of course, is not much. But it is something. It will be our first substantial investment in our industry. I say it is not much, because our industry could quite comfortably absorb several times that sum. We have to advance our industry. We have to expand our industry as swiftly as possible, to double or treble the number of workers. We have to convert our country from an agrarian into an industrial country—and the sooner the better. But all this requires considerable capital.

Consequently, the question of accumulation for the development of industry, the question of socialist accumulation, has now become one of first-rate importance for us.

Are we able, are we in a position, left to our own devices, without foreign loans, on the basis of the internal resources of our country, to ensure for our industry such accumulation and such reserves as are essential for pursuing the course towards industrialization, for the victory of socialist construction in our country?

That is a serious question, to which special attention should be devoted.

Various methods of industrialization are known to history.

Britain was industrialized owing to the fact that it plundered colonies for decades and centuries, gathered "surplus" capital there, which it invested in its own industry, and thus accelerated its own industrialization. That is one method of industrialization.

Germany hastened its industrialization as a result of the victorious war with France in the seventies of the last century, when it levied an indemnity of 5,000 million francs on the French and poured these funds into its own industry. That is a second method of industrialization.

Both these methods are barred to us, for we are a land of Soviets, for colonial plunder, and armed conquest with the aim of plunder, are incompatible with the nature of the Soviet power.

Russia, the old Russia, leased out concessions and received loans on enslaving terms, endeavoring in this way gradually to get on the road to industrialization. That is a third

method. But it was the road to bondage, or semibondage, to the conversion of Russia into a semicolony. That road, too, is barred to us, for we did not wage civil war for three years and repel interventionists of every type only in order, after victory over the interventionists, to enter voluntarily into bondage to the imperialists.

There remains a fourth road to industrialization. That is to find funds for industry out of our own savings, the way of socialist accumulation, to which Comrade Lenin repeatedly drew attention as the only way of industrializing our country.

Well, then, is the industrialization of our country possible on the basis of socialist accumulation?

Have we the sources for such accumulation, sufficient to ensure industrialization?

Yes, it is possible. Yes, we do have the sources.

I might refer to such a fact as the expropriation of the landlords and capitalists in our country as a result of the October Revolution, the abolition of private ownership of the land, mills, factories, etc., and their conversion into public property. It scarcely needs proof that this fact represents a fairly substantial source of accumulation.

I might refer, further, to such a fact as the annulment of the tsarist debts, which removed a burden of thousands of millions of rubles of indebtedness from our national economy. There is not question that this circumstance has greatly facilitated the matter of accumulation.

I might point to our nationalized industry, which has been restored and is developing, and which yields a certain amount of profit necessary for the further development of industry. That is also a source of accumulation.

I might point to our nationalized foreign trade, which yields a certain amount of profit and which, consequently, also represents a certain source of accumulation.

One might also refer to our more or less organized state home trade, which likewise yields some profit and hence also represents a certain source of accumulation.

One might point to such a lever for accumulation as our nationalized banking system, which yields some profit and within the measure of its capacity supplies funds for our industry.

Lastly, we have such a weapon as the state power, which is in control of the state budget and which sets aside a certain sum of money for the further development of our economy in general, and of our industry in particular.

Those, in the main, are our chief sources of internal accumulation.

They are of interest because they provide us with the possibility of creating those necessary reserves without which the industrialization of our country is impossible.

But possibility, comrades, is not yet actuality. As a result of incompetent management a pretty wide gap may develop between the possibility of accumulation and actual accumulation. We cannot, therefore, rest content with possibilities alone. We must convert the possibility of socialist accumulation into actual accumulation, if we are really thinking of creating the necessary reserves for our industry.

The question therefore arises: how are we to conduct the business of accumulation so that our industry will feel its benefits; what key points of our economic life must we concentrate first of all in order that the possibility of accumulation may be converted into actual socialist accumulation?

There exists a number of channels of accumulation, and the chief among them, at least, should be mentioned.

Firstly. It is necessary that the surpluses from accumulation in the country should not be dissipated, but should be gathered together in our credit institutions—cooperative and state—and also by means of domestic loans, in order that they may be utilized primarily for the needs of industry. Naturally, the depositors should be paid a certain rate of interest. It cannot be said that in this field matters have been at all satisfactory. But the problem of improving our credit network, of enhancing the prestige of our credit institutions

in the eyes of the public, and of floating internal loans is certainly one of the immediate problems confronting us, and we must solve it at all costs.

Secondly. We must carefully plug up all those channels and orifices through which part of the surpluses from accumulation in the country flow into the pockets of private capitalists to the detriment of socialist accumulation. This makes it necessary to pursue a policy in regard to prices which will not create a gulf between wholesale and retail prices. All measures must be taken to reduce retail prices of manufactured goods and agricultural produce, so as to stop, or at least to reduce to a minimum, the seepage of surpluses from accumulation into the pocket of the private capitalist. That is one of the cardinal questions of our economic policy. It is a source of serious danger both to the work of our accumulation and to the chernovets.

Thirdly. Within industry itself and every one of its branches, certain reserves must be set aside for the amortization of enterprises and for their expansion and further development. That is a matter which is absolutely necessary and essential, and we must go ahead with it at all costs.

Fourthly. The state must accumulate certain reserves needed to insure the country against all kinds of contingencies (crop failure), to keep industry supplied, to support agriculture, to promote culture, etc. We cannot live and function nowadays without reserves. Even the peasant, with his small farm, cannot manage nowadays without certain reserves. Still less can the state in a big country manage without reserves.

We must above all have a foreign trade reserve. Our exports and imports must be so arranged that a certain reserve, a certain favorable balance of trade, remains in the hands of the state. That is absolutely necessary not only to insure ourselves against surprises in the foreign markets, but also as a means of supporting our chernovets, which so far is stable, but which may begin to fluctuate if we do not secure a favorable balance of trade. The task is to increase our exports and to adapt our imports to our export possibilities.

We cannot say, as used to be said in the old days: "We shall export even if we go short of food ourselves." We cannot say that, because our workers and peasants want a human standard of eating, and we fully support them in that. We could, nevertheless, without detriment to home consumption, adopt every measure so as to increase our exports, and so that a certain reserve of foreign currency remains in the hands of the state. If, in 1923, we were able to abandon the Soviet paper money for a firm currency, one of the reasons was that we then had a certain reserve of foreign currency, thanks to a favorable balance of trade. If we want to keep our chernovets firm, we must continue to manage our foreign trade in such a way as to leave us with a foreign currency reserve as one of the bases of our chernovets.

Lastly, we need a taxation policy which will shift the burden of taxation on to the shoulders of the well-to-do strata, and at the same time create a certain reserve at the disposal of the state in the sphere of the state budget. The course of execution of our 4,000 million ruble state budget indicates that our revenue may exceed our expenditure by about one hundred million rubles or more. To some comrades this figure seems enormous. But these comrades, apparently, have poor eyesight, otherwise they would have observed that for a country like ours a reserve of one hundred million rubles is a drop in the ocean. There are some who think that we do not need this reserve at all. But what if there should be a crop failure or some other calamity in our country this year? What funds are we to have recourse to? Nobody, surely, is going to give us help for nothing. Consequently, we must have something laid by of our own. And if nothing untoward happens this year, we shall use this reserve for the national economy, for industry in the first place. Rest assured, these reserves will not be wasted.

Such in the main, comrades, are the key points of our economic life which we must concentrate on first of all in order that the possibility of internal accumulation for the industrialization of our country may be converted into actual socialist accumulation.

## IV

THE PROPER USE OF ACCUMULATIONS.  
THE REGIME OF ECONOMY

But accumulation is not by any means the whole of the problem, nor can it be. We must also know how to spend the accumulated reserves wisely and thriftily, so that not a single kopek of the people's wealth is wasted and so that the accumulated funds are used for the main purpose of satisfying the vital requirements of the industrialization of our country. Unless these conditions are observed, we shall run the risk of our accumulated funds being misappropriated or dissipated on all sorts of minor and major expenditures which have nothing to do either with the development of industry or with the advancement of our national economy as a whole. The ability to expend funds wisely and thriftily is a most valuable art, and one which is not acquired all at once. It cannot be said that we, our Soviet and cooperative bodies, are marked by a great ability in this respect. On the contrary, all the evidence goes to show that things are far from satisfactory in this field. It is hard to have to admit it, comrades, but it is a fact which no resolutions can cover up. There are times when our administrative bodies resemble the peasant who saved up a little money and, instead of using it to reequip his farm and acquire new implements, bought a great big gramophone and—came to grief. I say nothing of the cases of downright misappropriation of accumulated reserves, of the extravagance of a number of agencies of our state apparatus, of embezzlement, etc.

A series of effective measures must therefore be taken to save our accumulations from being dissipated, misappropriated, dispersed into unnecessary channels, or otherwise diverted from the main line of building up our industry.

It is necessary, in the first place, that our industrial plans should not be the product of bureaucratic fancy, but that they should be closely coordinated with the state of the national economy, taking into account our country's resources and reserves. The planning of industrial construction must not lag behind the development of industry. But neither must it run too far ahead, losing touch with agriculture and disregarding the rate of accumulation in our country.

The demand of our home market and the extent of our resources—these are the foundation for the expansion of our industry. Our industry is based on the home market. In this respect the economic development of our country resembles that of the United States, whose industry grew up on the basis of the home market, in contrast to Britain, whose industry is primarily based on foreign markets. There are a number of branches of industry in Britain forty or fifty per cent of whose output is for foreign markets. America, on the contrary, still relies on its home market, exporting to foreign markets not more than ten or twelve percent of her output. The industry of our country will rely upon the home market—primarily the peasant market—to an even greater extent than American industry does. That is the basis of bond between industry and peasant economy.

The same must be said of our rate of accumulation, of the reserves available for the development of our industry. Among us there is sometimes a fondness for drawing up fantastic industrial plans, without taking our actual resources into account. People sometimes forget that you can build neither industrial plans nor any "broad" and "all-embracing" enterprises without a certain minimum of funds, a certain minimum of reserves. They forget this and run too far ahead. And what does running too far ahead in the matter of industrial planning mean? It means building beyond your resources. It means noisily proclaiming ambitious plans, drawing thousands and tens of thousands of additional workers into production, raising a great hullabaloo and later, when it is discovered that funds are inadequate, discharging workers, paying them off, incurring immense losses, sowing disillusionment in our constructive efforts, and causing a political scandal. Do we need that? No, comrades, we do not. We must neither lag behind the actual development of industry,

nor run ahead of it. We must keep abreast of the development of our industry and impel it forward, without however cutting it off from its base.

Our industry is the leading element in the entire system of the national economy; it draws with it and leads forward our national economy, including agriculture. It reshapes our entire national economy in its own image and likeness; it leads agriculture along with it, drawing the peasantry, through cooperative movement, into the channel of socialist construction. But our industry can fulfil this leading and transforming role with honor only if it does not get out of touch with agriculture, only if it does not disregard our rate of accumulation, the resources and reserves at our disposal. An army command which gets out of touch with its army and loses contact with it is not a command. Similarly, industry that gets out of touch with the national economy as a whole and loses contact with it, cannot be the leading element in the national economy.

This is why correct and intelligent industrial planning is an indispensable condition for the expedient use of accumulations.

It is necessary, in the second place, to reduce and simplify our state and cooperative apparatus, our budget-maintained and self-maintained institutions, from top to bottom, to put them on sounder lines and make them cheaper. The inflated establishments and unparalleled extravagance of our administrative agencies have become a by-word. It was not without reason that Lenin asserted scores and hundreds of times that the unwieldiness and costliness of our state apparatus were too great a burden on the workers and peasants, and that it had to be reduced and made cheaper at all costs and by every available means. It is high time to set about this in earnest, in a Bolshevik way, and to introduce a regime of the strictest economy. (*Applause.*) It is high time to set about this, if we do not want to go on allowing our accumulations to be dissipated, to the detriment of industry.

Here is a vivid example. It is said that our grain exports are unprofitable, do not pay. And why are they unprofitable? Because our procurement agencies spend more on procuring grain than they should. It has been established by all our planning bodies that the procurement of one pud of grain should cost not more than 8 kopeks. But it turns out that instead of 8 kopeks, they have been spending 13 kopeks per pud, an excess of 5 kopeks. And how has this happened? It has happened because every more or less independent procurement agent—whether Communist or nonparty—before proceeding to procure grain considers it necessary to inflate his staff of assistants, to provide himself with an army of stenographers and typists, and, of course, to provide himself with a car, and he incurs a heap of unproductive expenditure—so that later, when the accounts are made up, it is found that our exports do not pay. Bearing in mind that we procure hundreds of millions of puds of grain, and that on each pud we pay an excess of 5 kopeks, the result is tens of millions of rubles wasted. That is where the funds we accumulate are going and will continue to go if we do not adopt the strictest measures to stop the extravagance of our state apparatus.

I have given only one solitary example. But who does not know that we have hundreds and thousands of such examples.

The plenum of the Central Committee of our Party decided to simplify our procurement apparatus and make it cheaper. You have probably read the resolution of the plenum on this point—it was published in the press. We shall put that resolution into force with the utmost rigor. But that is not enough, comrades. That is only one tiny section of the inefficiency and shortcomings of our state apparatus. We must go further and adopt measures to reduce the size and cost of our entire state apparatus, both budget-maintained and self-maintained, of the whole cooperative apparatus and of the whole goods distribution network, from top to bottom.

It is necessary, in the third place, for us to wage a determined struggle against every species of extravagance in our administrative bodies and in everyday life, against that criminal attitude towards the people's wealth and state reserves which has been noticeable



among us of late. We see prevailing among us now a regular riot, an orgy, of all kinds of fetes, celebration meetings, jubilees, unveiling of monuments and the like. Scores and hundreds of thousands of rubles are squandered on these "affairs". There is such a multitude of celebrities of all kinds to be feted and of lovers of celebrations, so staggering is the readiness to celebrate every kind of anniversary—semiannual, annual, biennial and so on—that truly tens of millions of rubles are needed to satisfy the demand. Comrades, we must put a stop to this prolificacy, which is unworthy of Communists. It is high time to understand that, with the needs of industry to provide for, and faced by such facts as the mass of unemployed and of homeless children, we cannot tolerate and have no right to tolerate this prolificacy and this orgy of squandering.

Most noteworthy of all is the fact that a more thrifty attitude towards state funds is sometimes to be observed among non-Party people than among Party people. A Communist engages in this sort of thing with greater boldness and readiness. It means nothing to him to distribute money allowances to a batch of his employees and call these gifts bonuses, although there is nothing in the nature of a bonus about it. It means nothing to him to overstep, or evade, or violate the law. Non-party people are more cautious and restrained in this respect. The reason presumably is that some Communists are inclined to regard the law, the state and such things as a family matter. (*Laughter.*) This explains why some Communists do not scruple sometimes to intrude like pigs (pardon the expression comrades) into the state's vegetable garden and snatch what they can or display their generosity at the expense of state. (*Laughter.*) This scandalous state of affairs must be stopped, comrades. We must launch a determined struggle against prolificacy and squandering in our administrative bodies and in everyday life, if we are sincerely desirous of husbanding our accumulations for the needs of industry.

It is necessary, in the fourth place, to conduct a systematic struggle against theft, against what is known as "carefree" theft, in our state bodies, in the cooperatives, in the trade unions, etc. There is shamefaced and surreptitious theft, and there is bold-faced, or "carefree" theft, as the press calls it. I recently read an item by Okunev in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* about "carefree" theft. There was, it appears, a foppish young fellow with a moustache, who carried on his "carefree" theft in one of our institutions. He stole systematically and incessantly, and always without mishap. The noteworthy thing is not so much the thief himself, as the fact that the people around him, who knew him, who knew that he was a thief, not only did nothing to stop him but, on the contrary, were more inclined to clap him on the back and praise him for his dexterity, so that the thief become something of a hero in the eyes of the public. That is what deserves attention, comrades, and is the most dangerous thing of all. When a spy or a traitor is caught, there are no bounds to the indignation of the public, which demands that he be shot. But when a thief operates in the sight of all and steals state property, the people around him just smile good-naturedly and pat him on the back. Yet it is obvious that a thief who steals the people's wealth and undermines the interest of the national economy is not better, if not worse, than a spy or a traitor. Finally, of course, this fellow, the fop with the moustache, was arrested. But what does the arrest of one "carefree" thief signify? There are hundreds and thousands of them. You cannot get rid of them all with the help of the GPU. Another measure, a more important and effective one, is needed here. It consists in creating around such petty thieves an atmosphere of moral ostracism and public detestation. It consists in launching such a campaign and creating such a moral atmosphere among the workers and peasants as to prevent the possibility of thieving and to make life difficult and impossible for thieves and pilferers of the people's wealth—as one of the means of protecting our accumulations from misappropriation.

It is necessary, lastly, to conduct a campaign to put a stop to absenteeism at the mills and factories, to raise the productivity of labor and to strengthen labor discipline in our

enterprises. Tens and hundreds of thousands of man-days are lost to industry owing to absenteeism. Hundreds of thousands and millions of rubles are lost as a result, to the detriment of our industry. We shall not be able to advance our industry, we shall not be able to raise wages, if absenteeism is not stopped, if productivity of labor remains stationary. It must be explained to the workers, and especially to those who have only recently entered the mills and factories, that by absenteeism and by not helping to raise labor productivity, they are acting to the detriment of the common cause, to the detriment of the entire working class, and to the detriment of our industry. The task is to combat absenteeism and to fight for enhanced productivity of labor in the interests of our industry, in the interests of the working class as a whole.

Such are the ways and means that must be adopted to protect our accumulations and reserves from being dissipated and misappropriated, and to ensure that they are used for the industrialization of our country.

## V

### WE MUST CREATE

#### CADRES OF BUILDERS OF INDUSTRY

I have spoken of the course towards industrialization. I have spoken of the ways of accumulating reserves for the development of industrialization. I have spoken, lastly, of how the accumulations should be rationally used for the needs of industry. But all that, comrades, is not enough. If the Party's directive concerning the industrialization of our country is to be carried out, it is necessary, over and above all that, to create cadres of new people, cadres of new builders of industry.

No task, and especially so great a task as the industrialization of our country, can be accomplished without human beings, without new people, without cadres of new builders. Formerly, at the time of the Civil War, we were especially in need of commanding cadres for building the army and waging war—regimental, brigade, divisional and corps commanders. Without those new commanding cadres, who had come from the rank and file and had risen owing to their ability, we could not have built up an army and could not have defeated our numerous enemies. It was they, the new commanding cadres, who saved our army and our country in those days—with the general support, of course, of the workers and peasants. But we are now in the period of the building of industry. We have passed now from the fronts of the Civil War to the front of industry. Accordingly, we now need new commanding cadres for industry—capable directors of mills and factories, competent executives of trust, efficient trade managers, intelligent planners of industrial development. We now have to create new regimental, brigade, divisional and corps commanders for economy, for industry. Without such people, we shall not be able to advance one step.

The task therefore is to create numerous cadres of builders of industry from the ranks of the workers and the Soviet intelligentsia—that Soviet intelligentsia which has thrown in its lot with the working class and which, together with us, is laying the socialist foundation of our economy.

The task is to create such cadres and to bring them to the fore, giving them every assistance.

It has become customary of late to castigate business executives on the charge of moral corruption, and there is often a disposition to extend what are individual faults to business executives in general. Anyone who takes the fancy can come along and give a kick to a business executive and accuse him of all the mortal sins. That, comrades, is a bad habit, and must be dropped once and for all. It must be realized that the industrialization of our country and the promotion of new cadres of builders of industry is a task that requires not scourging our business executives, but rendering them every support in building our industry. Our business executives must be surrounded with an atmosphere of confidence and support, they must be assisted in the work of molding new people—builders of industry,

and the post of builder of industry must be made a post of honor in socialist construction. Those are the lines along which our Party organizations must now work.

## VI

### WE MUST RAISE

#### THE ACTIVITY OF THE WORKING CLASS

Such are the immediate tasks confronting us in connection with the course towards the industrialization of our country.

Can these tasks be accomplished without the direct assistance and support of the working class? No, they cannot. Advancing our industry, raising its productivity, creating new cadres of builders of industry, correctly conducting socialist accumulation, sensibly using accumulations for the needs of industry, establishing a regime of the strictest economy, tightening up the state apparatus, making it operate cheaply and honestly, purging it of the dross and filth which have adhered to it during the period of our work of construction, waging a systematic struggle against stealers and squanderers of state property—all these are tasks which no party can cope with without the direct and systematic support of the vast masses of non-Party workers into all our constructive work. Every worker, every honest peasant must assist the Party and the Government in putting into effect a regime of economy, in combating the misappropriation and dissipation of state reserves, in getting rid of thieves and swindlers, no matter what disguise they assume, and in making our state apparatus healthier and cheaper. Inestimable service in this respect could be rendered by production conferences. There was a time when production conferences were very much in vogue. Now, somehow, we don't hear about them. That is a great mistake, comrades. The production conferences must be revived at all costs. It is not only minor questions, for instance of hygiene, that must be put before them. Their program must be made broader and more comprehensive. The principal questions of the building of industry must be placed before them. Only in that way is it possible to raise the activity of the vast masses of the working class and to make them conscious participants in the building of industry.

## VII

### WE MUST STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS

But when speaking about raising the activity of the working class, we must not forget the peasantry. Lenin taught us that the alliance of the working class and peasantry is the basic principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That we must not forget. The development of industry, socialist accumulation, the regime of economy—all these are problems that must be solved if we are to gain the upper hand over private capital and put an end to our economic difficulties. But none of these problems could be solved in the absence of Soviet power, in the absence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And the dictatorship of the proletariat rests upon an alliance of the working class and peasantry. Consequently, all our problems may remain unsolved if we undermine or weaken the alliance of the working class and peasantry.

There are people in the Party who look upon the laboring mass of the peasantry as a foreign body, as an object of exploitation for industry, as something in the nature of a colony for our industry. These are dangerous people, comrades. For the working class, the peasantry can be neither an object of exploitation nor a colony. Peasant economy is a market for industry, just as industry is a market for peasant economy. But the peasantry is not only our market. It is also an ally of the working class. For that very reason, improvement of peasant economy, mass organization of the peasantry into cooperatives, and the raising of their standard of life, are prerequisites without which no serious development of our industry can be achieved. And, conversely, the development of industry, the production of agricultural machinery and tractors, and a plentiful supply of manufactured goods

for the peasants are prerequisites without which there can be no advancement of agriculture. That is one of the most important bases of the alliance of the working class and peasantry. Hence we cannot agree with those comrades who every now and then urge that greater pressure should be exerted on the peasantry in the shape of excessive increases of taxation, higher prices of manufactured goods, and so on. We cannot agree with them because, without themselves being aware of it, they undermine the alliance of the working class and peasantry and shake the foundation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And what we want is to strengthen, not undermine, the alliance of the working class and peasantry.

But it is not just any sort of alliance of the working class and peasantry that we advocate. We stand for an alliance in which the leading role belongs to the working class. Why? Because unless the working class plays the leading role in the system of the alliance of the workers and peasants, the toiling and exploited masses cannot defeat the landlords and capitalists. I know that certain comrades do not agree with this. They say: yes, the alliance is a good thing, but why also leadership by the working class? Those comrades are profoundly mistaken. They are mistaken because they do not realize that only an alliance of the workers and peasants that is led by the most experienced and revolutionary class, the working class, can be victorious.

Why did the peasant revolts of the time of Pugachev or Stepan Razin come to grief? Why did the peasants in those days fail to get rid of the landlords? Because they did not then have, and could not have had, such a revolutionary leader as the working class. Why did the French revolution end in a victory for the bourgeoisie and the return of the previously expelled landlords? Because the French peasants did not then have, and could not have had, such a revolutionary leader as the working class; at that time the peasants were led by bourgeois liberals. Ours is the only country in the world where an alliance of the workers and peasants has triumphed over the landlords and capitalists. How is this to be explained? By the fact that at the head of the revolutionary movement in our country there stood, and continues to stand, the battle-steeled class of the workers. The idea of leadership by the working class has only to be discredited, and the alliance of the workers and peasants in our country will be utterly destroyed, and the capitalists and landlords will return to their old nests.

That is why we must preserve and strengthen the alliance of the working class and peasantry in our country.

That is why we must preserve and strengthen the leadership of the working class in the system of that alliance.

## VIII

### WE MUST PUT

#### INNER-PARTY DEMOCRACY INTO EFFECT

I have spoken of raising the activity of the working class, of the task of drawing the vast masses of the working class into the work of building our economy, into the work of building our industry. But raising the activity of the working class is a big and serious matter. In order to raise the activity of the working class, it is necessary first of all to raise the activity of the Party itself. The Party itself must firmly and resolutely adopt the course of inner-Party democracy; our organizations must draw the broad mass of the Party membership, which determines the fate of our Party, into discussing the questions of our constructive work. Without this, there can be no question of raising the activity of the working class.

I lay particular stress on this because our Leningrad organization recently passed through a period when some of its leaders would not speak of inner-Party democracy except in sarcasm. I have in mind the period prior to, during and immediately after the Party congress, when the Party units in Leningrad were not allowed to assemble, when some of

their organizers behaved—pardon my bluntness—like policemen towards their Party units and forbade them to meet. It was by this, in fact, the so-called “New Opposition”, headed by Zinoviev, worked its own undoing.

If members of our Central Committee, with the help of the active in Leningrad, succeeded in the space of a fortnight in repelling and isolating the opposition, which was waging a struggle there against the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress, it was because the explanatory campaign on the decisions of the congress coincided with the urge for democracy that existed, that was seeking an outlet, and at last broke through in the Leningrad organization. I should like you, comrades, to bear this recent lesson in mind. Bearing it in mind, I should like you to put inner-Party democracy into effect sincerely and resolutely, raise the activity of the Party masses, draw them into the discussion of the fundamental questions of socialist construction, and convince them of the correctness of the decisions adopted by the April Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party. It is precisely to convince the Party masses that I should like you to do, because the method of persuasion is the basic method of our work in the ranks of the working class.

## IX

### WE MUST PROTECT THE UNITY OF THE PARTY

Some comrades think that inner-Party democracy implies freedom of factional groups. Well, comrades, in this respect I beg to differ. That is not the way we understand inner-Party democracy. Between inner-Party democracy and freedom of factional groups there is absolutely nothing in common, nor can there be.

What does inner-Party democracy mean? Inner-Party democracy means raising the activity of the Party masses and strengthening the unity of the Party, strengthening conscious proletarian discipline in the Party.

What does freedom of factional groups mean? Freedom of factional groups means disintegrating the Party ranks, splitting the Party into separate centers, weakening the Party, weakening the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What can there be in common between the two?

There are people in our Party whose one dream is to have a general Party discussion. There are people among us who cannot conceive of the Party not being engaged in discussion, people who covet the title of professional debaters. Heaven protect us from those professional debaters! What we need now is not an artificial discussion, nor the conversion of our Party into a debating society, but the intensification of our constructive work in general, and of industrial construction in particular, the strengthening of a militant, solid, united and indivisible party that can firmly and confidently direct our constructive work. Anyone who strives for endless discussions, anyone who strives for freedom of factional groups, undermines the unity and saps the strength of our Party.

Wherein lay our strength in the past, and wherein lies our strength today? In the correctness of our policy and the unity of our ranks. The Fourteenth Congress of our Party gave us a correct policy. The task now is to ensure that our ranks are united, that our Party is united and ready to carry out the decisions of the Party congress, come what may.

Such is the basic idea of the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party.

## X

### CONCLUSIONS

Permit me now to pass to the conclusions.

Firstly, we must promote the industry of our country, as the foundation of socialism and the guiding force which leads forward the whole of our national economy.

Secondly, we must create new cadres of builders of industry, as the direct and immediate operators of the course towards industrialization.

Thirdly, we must accelerate the pace of our socialist accumulation and accumulate reserves for the needs of our industry.

Fourthly, we must arrange for correct use of the accumulated reserves and establish a regime of the strictest economy.

Fifthly, we must raise the activity of the working class and draw the vast masses of the workers into the work of building socialism.

Sixthly, we must strengthen the alliance of the working class and peasantry and the leadership of the working class within this alliance.

Seventhly, we must raise the activity of the Party masses and put inner-Party democracy into effect.

Eighthly, we must protect and strengthen the unity of our Party, the solidarity of our ranks.

Shall we be able to accomplish these tasks? Yes, we shall, if we want to do so. And we do want to—everyone can see that. We shall, because we are Bolsheviks, because we are not afraid of difficulties, because difficulties exist in order to be contended with and overcome. We shall, because our policy is correct and we know where we are going. And we shall march forward firmly and confidently towards our goal, towards the victory of socialist construction.

Comrades, we were a tiny group in Leningrad in February 1917, nine years ago. Veteran Party members will remember that at that time we Bolsheviks constituted an inconsiderable minority of the Leningrad Soviet. Veteran Bolsheviks will remember how we were scoffed at by the numerous enemies of Bolshevism. But we marched forward and captured one position after another, because our policy was correct and we waged the fight with united ranks. Then that tiny force grew into a mighty force. We routed the bourgeoisie and overthrew Kerensky. We established the power of the Soviets. We routed Kolchak and Denikin. We drove the Anglo-French and American marauders out of our country. We overcame economic disruption. Lastly, we restored our industry and agriculture. Now we are confronted with a new task—the task of industrializing our country. The most serious difficulties are behind us. Can it be doubted that we shall cope also with this new task, the industrialization of our country? Of course, not. On the contrary, we now have all the requisites for overcoming the difficulties and accomplishing the new tasks set us by the Fourteenth Congress of our Party.

That is why I think, comrades, that on the new front, the front of industry, we are certain to win (*Stormy applause*).

Stalin, *Works*, VIII, 124-151.



## TREATY OF BERLIN

24 April 1926

*Uneasy about future relations with Germany following its entry into the League of Nations and signing of the Locarno agreements with Britain and France, the Soviet government persuaded the German government to review the Treaty of Rapallo of April 1922. See Volume*

*2 of this work for the terms of the Rapallo Treaty. Germany assured the Soviet Union of its adherence to Rapallo and added that it would oppose energetically and refuse to participate in any actions against the Soviet Union by the League, providing the Soviet Union was not considered the aggressor against a third country. The documents below are the treaty and exchange of notes.*

#### RUSSO-GERMAN TREATY OF 24 APRIL 1926

The German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, inspired by the desire to take every step which may contribute to the maintenance of general peace and in the conviction that the interest of the German people and of the peoples of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics requires a constant cooperation in a spirit of mutual confidence, have agreed to strengthen the friendly relations existing between them by a special treaty, and for this purpose have nominated as plenipotentiaries, for the German Government, the Reich Foreign Minister, Herr Gustav Stresemann; and for the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, M. Nikolai Nikolaevich Krestinsky; who, after the exchange of their credentials, found in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions:—

##### Article 1.

The basis of the relations between Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics remains the Treaty of Rapallo.

The German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics will remain in friendly touch with one another in order to bring about an understanding with regard to all questions of a political and economic character jointly ("gemeinsam") affecting their two countries.

##### Article 2.

Should one of the contracting parties, in despite of its peaceful attitude, be attacked by a third party or by several such parties, the other contracting party will observe neutrality during the entire duration of the conflict.

##### Article 3.

Should, as a result of a conflict of the kind mentioned in Article 2, or at a time in which neither of the contracting parties is involved in warlike complications, a coalition be formed between third parties for the purpose of imposing upon one of the contracting parties an economic or financial boycott, the other contracting party undertakes not to adhere to such coalition.

##### Article 4.

This treaty is to be ratified and the deeds of ratification are to be exchanged in Berlin.

The treaty comes into force with the exchange of the deeds of ratification and is valid for the period of five years. The two contracting parties will come to an understanding in good time before the expiry of this period as to the form their political relations shall take in the future.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed this agreement.

Done in duplicate in Berlin on 24 April 1926.

STRESEMANN  
KRESTINSKY

#### *Exchange of Notes*

*(No. 1)—To the Ambassador of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in Germany.*

With reference to the negotiations upon the treaty signed today between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, I have the honor to make the following observations in the name of the Government:—

1. In the negotiation and signature of the treaty, both Governments have proceeded in agreement from the conception that the principle laid down by them in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the treaty, of an understanding on all questions of a political and economic character jointly affecting the two countries, will contribute materially to the maintenance of general peace. In any case, the two Governments will conduct their deliberations from the point of view of the need for the maintenance of general peace.

2. In this spirit also the two Governments have discussed the fundamental questions which are bound up with the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. The German Government is convinced that Germany's membership of the League cannot constitute an obstacle to the friendly development of the relations between Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. The League of Nations is designed, according to the basic of its foundation, for the peaceful and equitable settlement of international disputes. The German Government is determined to collaborate in the realization of this idea to the best of its ability. If, however,—though the German Government does not anticipate this—there should at any time take shape within the framework of the League efforts which, in contradiction with that fundamental idea of peace, are directed exclusively against the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, German would most energetically oppose such efforts.

3. The German Government proceeds upon the assumption that this fundamental attitude of German policy towards the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics cannot be adversely influenced by the loyal observance of the obligations (arising out of Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant of the League and relating to the application of sanctions) which would come into existence for Germany as the consequence of her entry into the League of Nations. By the terms of these articles, the application of sanctions against the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics would come into question (apart from other considerations ("abgesehen von weiteren Voraussetzungen") only if the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics entered upon a war of aggression against a third State. In connection herewith it is to be borne in mind that the question whether the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is the aggressor in the event of an armed conflict with a third State could only be determined with binding force for Germany with that State's own assent; and that, therefore, an accusation in this sense made by another Power against the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and regarded by Germany as unjustified would not oblige Germany to take part in measures of any kind instituted under Article 16. With regard to the question whether, in a concrete case, Germany would be in a position to take part in the application of sanctions at all, and to what extent, the German Government refers to the note of the 1 December, 1925, on the interpretation of Article 16, addressed to the German Government on the occasion of the signing of the treaty system of Locarno.

4. In order to create a secure basis for disposing without friction of all questions arising between them, the two Governments regard it as desirable that they should immediately embark upon discussions for the conclusion of a general treaty for the peaceful solution of any conflicts that may happen to arise between the two parties, in which discussions attention shall in particular be given to the possibilities of procedure by arbitration and procedure by conciliation.

(No. 2)— *From the Embassy of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Berlin, 24 April 1926.*

Your Excellency,

In acknowledging receipt of the note which you have addressed to me with regard to the negotiations concerning the treaty signed today between the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the German Government, I have the honor to make the following reply in the name of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics:—



1. In the negotiation and signature of the treaty, both Governments have proceeded in agreement from the conception that the principle laid down by them in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the treaty, of an understanding on all questions of a political and economic character jointly affecting the two countries, will contribute considerably to the maintenance of general peace. In any case, the two Governments will conduct their deliberations from the point of view of the need for the maintenance of the general peace.

2. In regard to the question of principle connected with Germany's entry into the League of Nations, the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics takes note of the explanations contained in the paragraphs numbered 2 and 3 in your note.

3. In order to create a secure basis for disposing without friction of all questions arising between them, the two Governments regard it as desirable that they should immediately embark upon discussions for the conclusion of a general peace treaty for the peaceful solution of any conflicts that may happen to arise between the two parties, in which discussions attention shall in particular be given to the possibilities of procedure by arbitration and procedure by conciliation.

*British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part II, Series A, 295-299.*



## LITVINOV ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF THE USSR

24 April 1926

*Maxim Litvinov, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, delivered a succinct description of the Soviet Union's relations with countries of the world, its view about the League of Nations and the Locarno agreements, and its influence on world affairs. He discredited the League and the Locarno agreements and remarked that both masked the inherent conflicts among capitalist countries. He offered specific examples of the increased economic and diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Germany. He pointed out positive successes with France, Italy, Japan, and Baltic, Scandinavian, and Middle Eastern countries. He singled out continuing problems with China, Britain, and the United States. In sum, Soviet influence in the world was growing.*

M. LITVINOV

### REPORT TO CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF THE USSR

In surveying recent international events one cannot help dwelling upon the most outstanding fact—the unsuccessful conclusion of the last session of the League of Nations and of the Council of the League of Nations, which thoroughly discredited the League itself and struck a serious blow at the Locarno policy of the powers concerned.

The interested powers could not come to an understanding with regard to the composition of the Council of the League, and as a result the carrying out of the Locarno agreements was adjourned to the Fall, with the outcome in the Fall left in doubt. Thus, the formation of a united front has failed to materialize, for the time being, at least. This situation is an evidence that the great powers are still separated by radical disagreements, and that neither the Locarno Conference nor the “peace-creating” atmosphere of the League of Nations was able to remove, or even to weaken them.

In the face of these differences, which were by no means fully disclosed at Geneva, the attempt of the League of Nations to call a Disarmament Conference promised little success even if the Soviet Union should have been admitted to participation in the conference.

The decision of the Council of the League to keep the Soviet Union from participation in the preparatory commission, and consequently from the Disarmament Conference itself, a procedure effected through the choice of a place to which the Soviet Government definitely and categorically refused to send its delegates, shows that the failure of the conference is the conscious aim of the policy of the powers heading the League of Nations.

It is useless to dwell in detail upon our correspondence with the League of Nations on that subject, and upon our explanations as to the Soviet Government's inability of sending delegations to Switzerland. I may state only that to our detailed arguments the League of Nations was unable to oppose a single reason in favor of maintaining Geneva as the seat of the Conference, if we leave aside the ridiculous and childish motives attributed to the League by the bourgeois press, such as the difficulties of transferring the technical apparatus, i.e., the pens and the inkstands, from the Secretariat of the League to another city, or the "unwillingness to give into the Soviets."

Thus we will have to take notice of the fact that while inviting us to collaborate with it, the League of Nations does not deem it possible to accede even to the most reasonable request if it emanates from the Soviets, though this request does not infringe upon anybody's interests or upon anybody's convenience.

I wish to add that after the first Soviet note was sent to the League of Nations we informed the governments of some countries closely connected with the Council of the League of Nations that the rejection of our proposal to hold the conference outside of the boundaries of Switzerland would be considered by us as a conscious exclusion of the Soviet Union from participation in the Conference, and as a challenge which would render difficult any further collaboration of the Soviet Government with the League of Nations, even such as is carried on by us within the present modest scope despite our general attitude of opposition to the League. If, nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations, which had among its members representatives of governments that were forewarned by us, again confirmed the decision of maintaining Geneva as the seat of the Conference, then this decision and the motives which prompted it can be judged only as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs judged it in his last note to the League.

It was not difficult to foresee beforehand that the most unscrupulous among our adversaries would not resist the cheap temptation of representing our rejection of Switzerland as a sham covering our hidden desire to disengage ourselves from participation in the disarmament question. We may quietly disregard such insinuations which will not be able to deceive any one. It is common knowledge that our Government not only constantly expressed its readiness to collaborate in the question of disarmament, which it was the first to bring forward as one of the most important tasks of the Genoa Conference, 1922, and which it tried to put into concrete shape at the Moscow Conference, but that in a still more general way, during the entire duration of its existence, it always set forth as the aim of its foreign policy the maintenance of peace, collaboration for the upbuilding of peaceful relationships and the development of friendly relations with all other nations.

#### The Soviet-German Agreement

In pursuance of this policy of peace we have been proposing to all countries for a long time the conclusion of agreements which would exclude the possibility of attacks and of participation in hostile activities, and which would assure mutual neutrality in the case of armed conflicts with third parties. A few months ago we signed such an agreement with Turkey. It is with great satisfaction that I am in a position to inform you now that a similar agreement was concluded with Germany and signed today in Berlin.

In signing the agreement the plenipotentiary representatives of both countries exchanged notes or declarations, in which Germany, on her part, declares that the agreement concluded will facilitate the maintenance of general peace, and that in the given case both governments, in their negotiations mentioned in Section 1 of the agreement, will be guided by the point of view of the necessity of general peace.

Subsequently, Germany presents her point of view with regard to the League of Nations. She declares that the fundamental idea of the League of Nations is the peaceful and just settlement of international differences and that from this point of view the agreement is not in contradiction to the idea of the League. The German Government announces what may likely be its attitude in case tendencies in contradiction to this fundamental idea of peace should develop in the League of Nations and be directed exclusively against the USSR.

The German Government also explains its point of view as regards the well-known Articles 16 and 17 of the Constitution of the League of Nations. You know that in the event of a conflict these articles provide for international sanctions, of international reprisals should the League of nations declare one of the countries the aggressor. The German Government declares that the question as to whether the Soviet Union is the attacking party in an armed conflict with a third country, can be decided by the League of Nations with binding power with regard to Germany only with Germany's agreement, as stated by her in the well-known declaration in Locarno.

Subsequently a proposal is made for the conclusion of a separate convention which provides for the settlement of conflicts between the two countries by peaceful methods, i.e., by arbitration or conciliation commissions. We answered this note by taking cognizance of the statement of the German Government, and by declaring that on our part we also saw in the preservation of general peace the aim of the agreement, and that the conclusion of a separate convention concerning arbitration or conciliation commissions was agreeable to us.

It will not be beside the point to declare right here that everything that was signed today in Berlin will be fully published, and that no secret agreements nor secret protocols or supplements to the agreement were signed.

The agreement is a supplement to, or rather a more exact restatement of, the Treaty of Rapallo, and is fully in keeping with those friendly relations which have been established between the Soviet Union and Germany, and which both parties are anxious to preserve for the future. The Rapallo Treaty was at the time of its conclusion dictated both by the desire of both countries to establish friendly relations, and by the community of interests and the dangerous international situation in which both countries found themselves at that time, surrounded as they were by a world of enemies. Since that time many changes have, of course, taken place in international relations. I don't know whether Germany has at present many friends among the European countries, whether after Locarno and Geneva she considers her relations with other European countries sufficiently settled and consolidated, whether she considers herself free from all dangers. This is Germany's affair. As regards the Soviet Union, we must say that in spite of the improved relations with a number of countries and its *de jure* recognition by them, it must nevertheless consider that its position is still threatened to a great extent and that the general hostility towards it on the part of the western countries still persists. Under such circumstances general or combined attacks against the Soviet Union cannot be considered as completely out of the question. For this reason it is the aim of Soviet diplomacy to reduce the danger of the formation of antiSoviet blocs and combined attacks, and reduction of this danger naturally increases the prospects for general peace.

To the policy of other countries, as far as it took shape recently in well-known agreements, such as for instance the Polish-Romanian agreement concerning military alliance and mutual military assistance, to the policy aiming at the formation of military alliances and combinations such as those which led to the great war of 1914, the Soviet Union opposes the policy of concluding agreements aiming at nonaggression, at the preservation of

peace and at the nonintervention in armed conflicts of third countries. If this policy is also carried on consistently by other countries, I venture to believe that its results towards securing general peace, and at least, towards avoiding the possibility of major wars or a world war, would undoubtedly be greater than the results of all the measures which, as far as we know, have been undertaken by the League of Nations, and of those which it would be likely to undertake in the future.

European diplomacy and its press was recently pondering over the question whether the Soviet-German agreement is opposed to the so-called spirit of Locarno. The question and the reproaches are of course not addressed to us, for we have preserved our full liberty of action and are bound neither by Locarno nor by any other agreements.

But, speaking objectively, the answer to this question depends upon the aims which Locarno has set itself. If Locarno, as its authors endeavor to convince, really aimed at the pacification of Europe and at the real improvement and consolidation of relations between European countries, then the partisans of Locarno, it would seem, should have welcomed enthusiastically the conclusion of the Soviet-German agreement as a new step towards the consolidation of the friendship between two great nations. If, however, one of the aims of Locarno—as we have always suspected—is the formation of a single antiSoviet front and the isolation of the Soviet Union, then it must be admitted that the agreement signed today is indeed opposed to the spirit of Locarno, and we can only be glad that to a certain extent we succeeded in depriving Locarno of its anti-Soviet sting. I say “to a certain extent” because judging from the angry and furious attacks with references to Locarno which were directed against Germany on account of the conclusion of this agreement, we cannot help declaring that Locarno still remains a menace directed against the Soviet Union.

Another favorable indication of the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, in addition to the conclusion of the agreement, is the law passed recently in Germany concerning Government guaranty of a certain part of the 300,000,000 Mark credits granted our country. The German Government has judged correctly the importance of the present moment for the consolidation of its economic position in the field of economic relations with the Soviet Union for the immediate future. Guarantees amounting to 60 percent have already been given, partly by the German Federal Government and partly by the German local governments (Saxony, Prussia, etc.). The actual advancement of the credits has unfortunately been impeded because the German banks, eager for great profits, are asking a rate of interest which is too high and unacceptable to us. Apparently the banks do not know that we are not looking for credits at any price, but for convenient credits. If the terms are not convenient, we will prefer to do without credits, all the more so as in a number of countries large firms have offered us considerable credits on terms which are more acceptable than those asked by German banks.

Our friendship with Germany does not in any way prevent us from working towards the establishment of friendly relations with other countries. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that our general and special agreements with German were facilitated by the fact that the German Government, as far back as at the time of the Rapallo Treaty, placed the general interests of the whole nation above the private interests of separate groups and persons and gave its agreement to a mutual annulment of financial claims. Unfortunately the governments of other countries have not yet adopted this point of view as to national interests, and the financial claims seriously complicate our relations with a number of countries with which we have the desire and the ability to establish relations of complete friendliness.

#### Relations with Italy

Touching upon the relations with Italy, Mr. Litvinov pointed out that in spite of the fact that the question of mutual claims has been left open, the Soviet Union was in a position to establish and to consolidate enduringly friendly relations with Italy.

These relations have not been disturbed by anything up to the present and, it is to be hoped, will not be disturbed in the future. The treaty of 1924 stimulated the development of our trade relations with Italy. Soviet exports to Italy during the past year surpassed the prewar figure.

#### Negotiations with France

The negotiations with France have only now entered the stage of practical discussions. An encouraging factor is the circumstance that the delegations are simultaneously considering the question of the recognition of debts and of the advancement of credits. With regard to these two questions, which are inseparably connected with each other, concrete decisions are being elaborated at present. For the time being the concrete proposals of the two countries are quite far apart. We believe that both parties will be greatly benefited by an agreement.

France has become a highly industrial country. An understanding with the USSR, which would open possibilities for a broad development of economic relations, would be a great step forward not only for us but also for France. The prospects of collaboration with France, in case an agreement is reached at the conference, will be of great significance and will become an important link in the chain of international events favoring the consolidation of universal peace.

#### Relations with England

As regards our relations with England, there are unfortunately no changes to be reported. We declare as absolutely untrue and mendacious the assertion that the Soviet Government is conducting a hostile and aggressive policy against England. The real situation, in fact, is quite the opposite. Wherever we encounter English diplomacy we see it conducting actively a systematic political struggle against our country, combining her enemies and threatening her safety. When the Labor Government was in power we considered it one of our most important diplomatic tasks to reach an agreement with England with regard to all the important international problems. Since the Conservative Government has been in power we have never omitted an opportunity to declare that we are ready to negotiate with it all the questions at issue between the two Governments, and in particular the question of the financial claims put in the forefront by our adversaries in England. We still attach great importance to the problem of coming to an understanding with, or at least, of improving our relations with England. Recently, however, symptoms may be distinguished which point to a development in England which is quite favorable to us. I have in mind first, the debates in the English parliament concerning the extension of export credits to the USSR, when even part of the Conservatives voted against the Government as represented by the Under-Secretary of the Board of Trade who took up the negative point of view in this question and when the government majority fell to 89, i.e., considerably lower than usual. Second, the remark made by Churchill as to the favorable attitude towards our Government in the debt settlement question. We can not say by any means, that we agree in principle with Churchill's statement which, of course, is entirely unsatisfactory, all the more so as he mentioned even the war credits which the British agreed to cancel at the time when Lloyd George was Prime Minister, but nevertheless the mere fact that Churchill spoke of the desirability of coming to an understanding is not devoid of symptomatic significance.

The third fact is the answer of the British Foreign Office to the London Chamber of Commerce which asked for the abrogation of the agreement of 1921. In its answer the Foreign Office pointed out that the conclusion of the debt settlement agreement would be accompanied by the granting of British credits. In this case again we cannot accept without changes the point of view of the Foreign Office, but we cannot help noticing in it the manifestation of a development in our favor.

Public statements of responsible members of the British Government do not always agree with each other as to tone and content. Repeatedly it was pointed out in these statements that it was necessary that the USSR should make some preliminary declarations prior to the starting of the negotiations. We cannot accept this point of view. We consider it highly desirable to start practical negotiations with the British Government concerning the settlement of the questions at issue. The granting of credits on the part of England we do not consider at all as a favor or a kindness, for credits mean the placing of large orders in England, which will greatly benefit the industry of that country.

The first step would be the exchange of proposals by the established method, through the diplomatic representatives. We are still waiting for the English Government to express its opinion on our concrete proposal with which it is familiar and which at the time of the MacDonald Government took the shape of a preliminary agreement. This is, of course, not a question of prestige, of who will make the first step. As soon as the English Government enables us to convince ourselves that it is just as sincerely prepared as we are to start practical negotiations and to carry them on to a favorable conclusion, we will do everything that is necessary to move the question from its present deadlock.

#### The Soviet Union and the United States

The enormous power of the United States of America towers above all the great powers of Europe. From a great many sources we have received information that the trend towards an understanding with the Soviet Union is constantly growing. True, the American Government apparently maintains its previous attitude. It could not be asserted that our points at issue with the United States are of particular importance. From unofficial and semiofficial sources we have heard repeatedly that the American Government's condition for the resumption of relations with us is the recognition on our part of the loan contracted by the Provisional Government of Kerensky, the American Government being prepared to consider favorably our just counterclaims.

Such a formulation of the question would not create any difficulties in the case of direct negotiations. On its part, the Soviet Government has declared repeatedly that it is ready to start immediate negotiations with the American Government, and I am repeating it at present from this platform. If some members of the American Government demand that the disputed questions or the points of issue between us should be decided in their favor in advance, this request must be declared as entirely exceptional, as entirely unusual and unacceptable to us. I venture the opinion that a highly optimistic attitude could be assumed towards the results of the negotiations once they were started. We have to wait until the American Government expresses the same willingness. I am in a position now to express my strong conviction that the objective course of events will inevitably bring both countries before long to an understanding to be followed by the closest economic collaboration.

#### Obstacles in the Way of a Rapprochement with Poland

We attribute great importance to a durable and lasting agreement with our near Western neighbors, particularly with Poland, and to the elimination of all disputed questions between us. I would like to remind the adversaries of an agreement between Poland and us who are continuously crying about the eastern menace to Poland, that the establishment and consolidation of Poland's independence would not have been possible without a complete victory of the November Revolution over Tsarism. Even the Kerensky Government assumed an ambiguous and even chauvinist attitude towards Poland, Finland and the other countries. This is still the attitude of the "White" emigres, although for tactical reasons they sometimes conceal it. According to materials published lately by the Central Department of Archives concerning Polish-Russian relations during the war, it appears that Polish

bourgeois politicians (some of whom are even now occupying the most prominent positions in Poland) were ready to conclude any compromise with the Tsarist ministers, were ready to accept even the most restricted autonomy, and did not dare even to dream of Polish independence at that time. The Bolsheviks alone, during the most reactionary period of Tsarism, proclaimed the principle of national self-determination and even of secession. Since conquering power they have carried out and are carrying out this principle.

Everybody is aware of the formidable economic and financial crisis and unemployment now in process in Poland. It is quite obvious that the financial crisis is a consequence of the general economic crisis, and that the economic crisis was caused by the exhaustion of the domestic, particularly of the peasant market, and by the fact that the country has no access to foreign markets. Some of her imperialist protectors are availing themselves of this difficult situation of Poland in order to enslave her economically under the pretext of assistance, and in order to use her and her army as an instrument of their foreign policy in Eastern Europe. On the other hand the Soviet Union could become a vast market for a considerable section of Polish industry that is idle now. In spite of all difficulties, even now, quite recently, our orders enabled some large textile factories in Lodz to resume their operations, thus giving employment to thousands of textile workers. Unfortunately, the traditional policy which is firmly established among the ruling spheres of Poland and which is supported by her foreign "well-wishers," prevents these spheres from entering courageously and consistently upon the road of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, up to the present, all our endeavors to bring about a durable understanding with Poland have been frustrated by the tendency of the Polish Government to play, so to speak, the role of the director of the foreign relations of all Baltic countries. We are looking towards an understanding with Poland, while Poland absolutely insists upon speaking in the name of all Baltic countries which, as far as we know, have not given her any powers to that effect.

We do not recognize and are not going to recognize an open or concealed protectorate of Poland over the Baltic countries. The stubborn unwillingness of the Polish Government to speak only in the name of its own country is frustrating all our endeavors directed towards a rapprochement. The information received as to the extension, though in a changed form, of the Polish-Romanian agreement is also to a certain extent reducing our hopes of an understanding with Poland. This is holding off the conclusion of a trade agreement which could be convenient to both parties only in the case if it should constitute part of a broad agreement. On the other hand, the Soviet Government is interested in the development and the consolidation not only of the goodneighborly relations with Poland, but also in a rapprochement with her. The Soviet Union's general policy of peace, in particular with regard to the neighboring States which were formed at the downfall of Tsarism, renders this rapprochement entirely possible. The economic interests of the masses inhabiting the Soviet Union which are demanding the import from abroad of certain industrial products which could be imported from Poland and advantageously as from other countries, renders a rapprochement with her particularly desirable.

The establishment in the near future of durable mutual relations which are in the interest of both countries and their populations, depends solely upon a decisive change in Poland's policy with regard to the Soviet Union.

#### Relations with the Baltic Countries

We are offering to the Baltic countries guaranty agreements with each of them separately or with some of them collectively. Estonia and Latvia are very important to us economically on account of the transit trade conducted across these countries. Politically, we are endeavoring to consolidate friendly relations with them so as to render our frontiers safe in this part of the Union. Up to the present this has been prevented partly by outside influences. In addition to this, we have, unfortunately, no reason to be entirely satisfied with

the attitude of the Latvian Government with regard to the attack upon our diplomatic couriers. The investigation is not being conducted with anything approaching that energy and attention which we are entitled to expect, and for this reason it has given practically no results up to the present. In many respects the assurance given us by the Latvian Government after the attack has not yet been lived up to. The manner of conducting the investigation, as well as a number of small incidents, make as a whole the impression that Latvia is going to become another Switzerland as far as we are concerned, thus creating the impression that jointly with outside influences certain groups or parties are seriously working towards a rupture of the existing relations and towards a defeat of our endeavors to bring about closer relations. I suppose that the Latvian Government is likewise aware of this danger and that it will in time take the necessary measures towards its elimination.

I may point out that our relations with Lithuania are particularly friendly. We assume that in the interest of peace in Eastern Europe a consolidation of our relations with Lithuania will be a very useful factor.

It may likewise be mentioned that our friendly relations with Finland are constantly improving and being consolidated. Up to the present we have concluded with Finland thirty conventions regulating all the aspects of our neighborly relations.

#### The USSR and the Scandinavian Countries

We are also greatly interested in maintaining and developing the existing friendly relations with the three Scandinavian countries. During the past few years Sweden has been occupying quite an important place in our foreign trade and her present exports to the USSR have greatly surpassed the prewar level.

With Norway we recently concluded a trade agreement which settled a number of disputed questions and created the possibility of mutual satisfaction of the economic needs of both countries. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with these two Scandinavian countries we have had neither frictions nor conflicts with them.

#### No Concessions in Exchange for Recognition

Normal relations have not been established as yet between the Soviet Union and a few European countries, such as Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, Belgium, Holland, etc. We appreciate friendly relations with all countries, irrespective of their geographical situation, and are therefore sorry that some of them still harbor illusions that they will be able to impose upon us any preliminary terms of recognition. It would do them good to realize once for all that our Government is firmly determined, in exchange for recognition not to grant to these countries any facilities, not to assume any obligations, and not to give any promises. It will wait patiently till the governments and the peoples of these countries realize that the establishment of normal relations with a nation of 150,000,000 inhabitants is not less valuable and convenient to these countries than to the Soviet Union, and that the discussion of the disputed questions can begin only after recognition and by no means on the eve, or on the day of recognition.

#### The Principles of Soviet Policy in China

By no means the least reason of the British Government's unfriendly attitude towards us is the development of the national-revolutionary movement in China which the leading English politicians consider, or rather pretend to consider, as a product of our alleged propaganda and our alleged instigation.

The recent period, beginning approximately with the Fall of last year, could be designated as the period of systematic attack on the part of aggressive imperialism in the Far East, English diplomacy playing a leading role in this policy. The development of the internal forces of the Chinese Revolution has, of course, not been arrested, but lately, in connection with the fact that the Chinese problem has been taken up in its entirety by the



imperialist governments, the international situation has become incomparably more difficult for the development of the national-revolutionary movement in China. The struggle of the militarist groups with their episodic successes and defeats is not deprived of importance for the development of the internal forces of the Chinese national-revolutionary movement in China. In particular, the success of the national armies in the past year is a matter of great significance, because these armies helped the development of the social forces of the national-revolutionary movement, as well as the creation of favorable conditions for the development of a labor and peasant movement, and removed the danger of a sanguinary suppression of the national-revolutionary mass movement.

It is therefore obvious that world reaction has set itself the task of creating a united front against the national armies. At present this situation must be reckoned with, with a full recognition of the fact that the movement aiming at the national emancipation of a people of 400 million will infallibly continue to progress.

We do not conceal our sympathy with the movement whose program demands the creation of a revived, free, fully sovereign, democratic China, and our government is strictly adhering to the principle that every people should shape its own destiny. We believe that the realization of China's national tasks is the concern of the Chinese people themselves. In this case, as well as in other cases, the fundamental principle of our diplomacy is non-interference with the affairs of other countries. Bona fide and correct relations with the Chinese Government—both with the central administration of the Chinese people and with all local authorities—are the guiding principles of our policy in China, as faithfully expressed by our diplomatic representative, Karakhan. We indignantly refute the insinuations of those who recently endeavored to make a distinction between our diplomatic representative in Peking and our government, trying to represent his policy as different from the policy of the Central Government.

We are certainly pleased to see that the local authorities of Canton are greatly benefiting the population by carrying out a policy resulting from the program of the Kuomintang party. As regards the character of this policy, you will permit me to have this question answered by the London Times which characterizes the policy of the Canton Government: "Whatever label may be attached to the Canton Government, it is more like a real government than all the governments that have existed in Canton during the last few years. It has again united the Huandun Province, it conducts a definite policy and has apparently firmly decided to put an end to bribery in office—this real Chinese Plague. Canton has been kept clean and quiet and it has been able to do without Hongkong for six months." This is the policy to which we extend our sympathy.

#### Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway

On the other hand we are endeavoring to establish normal friendly relations with the local authorities of Manchuria which borders on the Soviet Union. Two years ago the representative of Manchuria appeared at the agricultural exhibition in Moscow and presented the flag of his country. We would like to maintain friendly relations with Chang Tso-lin, the ruler of Manchuria, provided he will not render this impossible through hostile acts or a hostile policy. I am glad to be able to inform you that a recent untoward incident has now been favorable settled.

I have in mind the note of the Central Diplomatic Department of Mukden containing attacks as printed in the Harbin papers, directed against Karakhan, the Soviet representative in China. Mr. Serebriakov, who was sent by us to Manchuria, reports that after short negotiations with Chang Tso-lin they both signed the following statement:

"The representative of the Central Diplomatic Department of the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) on the one hand, and the Consulate General of the USSR in Mukden on the other hand, taking into consideration the circumstances under which the correspondence

between the Central Diplomatic Department and the Consulate General took place during the period 9-12 April 1926, as expressed in the exchange of notes of the Consulate General under No. 228 of 9 April and under No. 235 of 11 April and under note of the Central Diplomatic Department under No. 58 of 12 April have decided to return to each other the above mentioned notes."

The question of Manchuria is of particular importance to us owing to the fact that the Chinese-Eastern Railway, the chief artery of rail connection with the Far East, passes through that territory. In this question we stand by the execution of the agreement of 1924. We consider it indispensable to observe in the strictest manner the sovereign rights of China through whose territory the Chinese-Eastern Railway passes, and we consider that it is necessary to eliminate anything that would violate these sovereign rights. We consider the railway as a commercial enterprise in which we take part in China on the basis of equal rights. We consider it necessary to use the greatest care in elaborating a regime which would secure all the legitimate claims of China, and at the same time would safeguard our rights upon the Chinese-Eastern Railway which we secured by agreement, and which would also protect Russian workers and other employees against arbitrary proceedings.

From the international point of view, Manchuria plays a particularly important part for the additional reason that we are encountering there the political and economic interests of Japan, which we are ready to meet, as far as possible. We consider that Japan's role in world politics is of exceedingly great importance and we are doing all that is in our power to come to an understanding with her. Insofar as the objects of our negotiations are situated on Chinese territory we consider it indispensable that China, as represented by the Central Government and the local authorities, should take part in the negotiations. Friendly relations with Japan constitute one of the fundamental tasks of our diplomacy. Our negotiations with Japan concerning concessions on Sakhalin have come to a favorable conclusion. At the present time we are conducting negotiations with Japanese citizens concerning timber concessions in the Russian Far East, and a fisheries agreement is now being worked out. But we would like to go further. We would like to settle the disputed questions with Japan to such an extent as to place our mutual friendly relations on a solid and durable basis.

#### The USSR and the Near Eastern Nations

In Turkey the entire policy of the Kemal Government is directed towards the protection of the Turkish people against their subjection to the economic domination of foreign capital. Thus there is a serious antagonism between the policy of Turkey and the ambitions of the great powers.

Our heartfelt sympathies are with the endeavors of the Turkish people to free themselves from that domination.

Politically, our friendship with Turkey, which for a long time had been based upon agreements and upon our common need to defend our independence, was reasserted in the agreement signed in Paris, concerning neutrality, nonaggression and nonparticipation in hostile combinations.

In Afghanistan we welcome the growing stabilization of the power of the present government which represents the policy of the Afghan National Party and the program of the creation of a modernized, progressive, nationally-emancipated Afghanistan.

We have stated repeatedly that the creation of constituent Soviet Republics in Soviet Central Asia, organized along national lines, does not in the slightest imply the aim of creating any complications with the neighboring countries. On the contrary, the establishment of entirely normal relations with local nationalities, in Soviet Central Asia, on the basis of the creation of local republics, should in general have a favorable effect upon our relations with the states bordering upon Soviet Central Asia. At any rate, we must protest

against all kinds of insinuations of the hostile press attributing annexationist tendencies to us or to the constituent republics. The swift solution of the Urta-Tugai Island question (Soviet-Afghan incident) by referring the matter to a mixed commission, showed how easily accidental and temporary incidents may be settled without leaving a trace, if the fundamental policy of both countries is a desire to avoid conflicts.

#### Growth of the Influence of the USSR

In concluding the survey of the international situation, I wish to state that the part played by, and the influence of, the Soviet Union is growing incessantly both in the West and in the East. Our diplomacy will, as heretofore, continue to follow carefully all the moves of our open and secret adversaries, to frustrate their insidious plans and to unmask their hostile machinations. While endeavoring to enhance the safety of our country, we do not intend to hurt the interests of other countries with which we are entertaining normal and friendly relations. The fundamental factor of our diplomacy was and remains the endeavor to extend the friendly relations with other nations, to establish them on a firm basis, and simultaneously to help the cause of universal peace, not only with words but also with deeds.

#### Resolution of the Central Executive Committee

After the conclusion of the speech of Mr. Litvinov the Central Executive Committee adopted the following resolution:

"After hearing the report of Mr. Litvinov, Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, concerning the activity of the Government in the field of foreign policy, the second session of the Central Executive Committee fully endorses this activity."

*Russian Review*, IV, No. 10 (June 1926), 1398-1445.



#### STALIN ON UKRAINIZATION

26 April 1926

*It was a delicate balance in Soviet Russia between encouraging the language and culture of the nationalities and maintaining political control from Moscow, where Russian language and culture were the dominant force. This was particularly the case for the Ukraine, which contained strong Ukrainian and anti-Russian forces. Stalin knew that there was a large anti-Ukrainian population in the Ukraine, of which a significant portion was Russian. His solution at the time, indicated by the letter below, was to proceed slowly by preventing extremism in Ukrainization or Russification, appointing acceptable Ukrainians to responsible Party positions, and letting nature take its course. Ukrainization should be a lengthy, spontaneous, and natural process.*

J. STALIN

#### LETTER TO COMRADE KAGANOVICH AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE UKRAINIAN PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

I have had a talk with Shumsky. It was a long talk, lasting over two hours. As you know, he is dissatisfied with the situation in the Ukraine. The reasons for his dissatisfaction may be reduced to two main points.

1. He considers that Ukrainization is progressing far too slowly, that it is looked upon as an imposed obligation and is being carried out reluctantly and very haltingly. He considers that Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian intelligentsia are growing at a rapid pace, and that if we do not assume control of this movement it may by-pass us. He considers that the movement should be headed by people who believe in Ukrainian culture, who are or want to be acquainted with it, who support and are capable of supporting the growing movement for Ukrainian culture. He is particularly dissatisfied with the conduct of the top leadership of the Party and trade unions in the Ukraine, which, in his opinion, is hindering Ukrainization. He thinks that one of the principal faults of the top leadership of the Party and trade unions is that it does not draw Communists who are directly linked with Ukrainian culture into the direction of Party and trade-union work. He thinks that Ukrainization should be carried out first of all within the ranks of the Party and among the proletariat.

2. He thinks that if these shortcomings are to be corrected, it is necessary in the first place to alter the composition of the Party and Soviet top leadership with a view to its Ukrainization, and that only on this condition can a change of sentiment in favor of Ukrainization be brought about among the cadres of our functionaries in the Ukraine. He proposes that Grinko should be appointed to the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Chubar to the post of Political Secretary of the CC, Ukrainian CP(B), that the composition of the Secretariat and the Politburo should be improved, and so forth. He thinks that unless these and similar changes are made, it will be impossible for him, Shumsky, to work in the Ukraine. He says that should the Central Committee insist, he is prepared to return to the Ukraine even if the present conditions of work are left unchanged, but he is convinced that nothing would come of it. He is particularly dissatisfied with the work of Kaganovich. He thinks that Kaganovich has succeeded in putting Party organization work on proper lines, but he considers that the predominance of the organization element in Comrade Kaganovich's methods renders normal work impossible. He is convinced that the effects of the organizational pressure exerted by Comrade Kaganovich in his work, of his method of relegating higher Soviet institutions and their leaders to the background, will make themselves felt within the very near future, and he cannot guarantee that these effects will not take the form of a serious conflict.

Here is my opinion.

1. As regards the first point, there is some truth in what Shumsky says. It is true that a broad movement in favor of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian public life has begun and is spreading in the Ukraine. It is true that a number of Communists in the Ukraine do not realize the meaning and importance of that movement and are therefore taking no steps to gain control of it. It is true that a change of sentiment must be brought about among our Party and Soviet cadres, who are still imbued with an ironical and skeptical attitude towards Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian public life. It is true that we must painstakingly select and build up cadres capable of gaining control of the new movement in the Ukraine. All that is true. Nevertheless, Shumsky commits at least two serious errors.

Firstly. He confuses Ukrainization of the apparatus of our Party and other bodies with Ukrainization of the proletariat. The apparatus of our Party, state and other bodies serving the population can and should be Ukrainized, a due tempo in this matter being observed. But it is impossible to *compel* the mass of the Russian workers to give up the Russian language and Russian culture and accept the Ukrainian culture and language as their own. That would be contrary to the principle of the free development of nationalities. It would not be national freedom, but a peculiar form of national oppression. There can be no doubt that with the industrial development of the Ukraine and the influx into industry of Ukrainian workers from the surrounding countryside, the composition of the Ukrainian proletariat will change. There can be no doubt that the composition of the Ukrainian proletariat will become Ukrainized, just as the composition of the proletariat in Latvia or Hungary,

say, which was at one time German in character, subsequently became Latvianized or Magyarized. But this is a lengthy spontaneous and natural process. To attempt to replace this spontaneous process by the forcible Ukrainization of the proletariat from above would be a utopian and harmful policy, one capable of stirring up anti-Ukrainian chauvinism among the non-Ukrainian sections of the proletariat in the Ukraine. It seems to me that Shumsky has a wrong idea of Ukrainization and does not take this latter danger into account.

Secondly. While quite rightly stressing the positive character of the new movement in the Ukraine in favor of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian public life, Shumsky fails to see its seamy side. Shumsky fails to see that, in view of the weakness of the indigenous communist cadres in the Ukraine, this movement, which is very frequently led by non-communist intellectuals, may here and there assume the character of a struggle to alienate Ukrainian culture and public life from general Soviet culture and public life, the character of a struggle against "Moscow" in general, against the Russians in general, against Russian culture and its highest achievement—Leninism. I shall not stop to prove that this is becoming an increasingly real danger in the Ukraine. I only want to say that even certain Ukrainian Communists are not free from such defects. I have in mind such a generally known fact as the article of the Communist Khvilevoi in the Ukrainian press. Khvilevoi's demand for the "*immediate* de-Russification of the proletariat" in the Ukraine, his opinion that "Ukrainian poetry must get away from Russian literature and its style as fast as possible," his statement that "the ideas of the proletariat are known to us without Moscow art," his infatuation with the idea that the "young" Ukrainian intelligentsia has some kind of Mesianic role to play, his ludicrous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics—all this and much else like it sounds (cannot but sound!) more than strange nowadays coming from the mouth of a Ukrainian Communist. At a time when the proletarians of Western Europe and their Communist Parties are in sympathy with "Moscow", this citadel of the international revolutionary movement and of Leninism, at a time when the proletarians of Western Europe look with admiration at the flag that flies over Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvilevoi has nothing better to say in favor of "Moscow" than to call on the Ukrainian leaders to get away from "Moscow" as fast as possible. And that is called internationalism! What is to be said of other Ukrainian intellectuals, those of the non-communist camp, if Communists begin to talk, and not only to talk but even to write in our Soviet press, in the language of Khvilevoi? Shumsky does not realize that we can gain control of the new movement in the Ukraine in favor of Ukrainian culture only by combating extremes like Khvilevoi's in the communist ranks. Shumsky does not realize that only by combating such extremes can the rising Ukrainian culture and public life be converted into a *Soviet* culture and public life.

2. Shumsky is right when he asserts that the top leadership (Party and other) in the Ukraine should be Ukrainian. But he is mistaken about the tempo. And that is the main thing now. He forgets that there are not enough purely Ukrainian marxist cadres for this as yet. He forgets that such cadres can be reared only in the process of work, and that this requires time.... What should be the effect of appointing Grinko to the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars at this moment? How might such a step be assessed by the Party in general and the Party cadres in particular? Will they not take it to imply that our line is to depreciate the weight and prestige of the Council of People's Commissars? For it cannot be concealed from the Party that Grinko's Party and revolutionary standing is considerably lower than Chubar's. Can we take such a step now, in the present period of the revitalization of the Soviets and of increasing weight and prestige of the Soviet bodies? Would it not be better, both in the interest of our work and in the interest of Grinko himself, to forego such plans for the time being? I am in favor of the Secretariat and Politburo of the CC, Ukrainian CP (B.), as well as the top Soviet bodies, being reinforced with Ukrainian elements. But it is wrong to represent matters as if there were no Ukrainians in the leading organs of the Party and Soviets. What about Skrypnik and Zatonsky,

Chubar and Petrovsky, Grinko and Shumsky—are they not Ukrainians? Shumsky's mistake is that, while his perspective is correct, he disregards the question of tempo. And tempo is now the main thing.

Stalin, *Works*, VIII, 157-163.



## MANY OBSTACLES TO GREATER PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN SOVIET LIFE

30 May 1926

*For all its pronouncements and best intentions, the Soviet Union encountered significant obstacles in establishing equality between men and women, particularly in the workplace. During a session of Comintern's International Women's Conference held in Moscow—the Soviet delegate and Director of the Women's Department (Zhenotdel) of the Central Committee Secretariat, Aleksandra Artiukhina, described the many obstacles. Lack of skills among women, reluctance of women to work in industry, family responsibilities and working conditions that prevented women from working, and male prejudice. Artiukhina's report showed surprising successes for women in cooperative farms, certain industries such as the textile industry, and local judicial and executive organizations. Artiukhina attributed these successes to the efforts of the Communist Party, formation of periodicals, groups, and clubs to disseminate information and advice, and improvement of working conditions, to entice women to factories and cooperative farms. Her statistics showed that women now were working in industry in greater numbers than during the tsarist years preceding and during the First World War.*

## THE WORK OF THE CPSU AMONG THE WORKING WOMEN OF THE SOVIET UNION REPORT

I have been instructed to report on our Work among the Working Women of the Soviet Union.

We, together with the whole Party, take into consideration the conditions in which we live and the difficulties confronting us when we judge the achievements and defects of our work.

The first and foremost question is that of women labor in industry. During the last two years there has been a definite tendency to keep women workers in the factories, whereas a few years ago there was a movement against woman labor in industry. We brought up this question for discussion in our Party and trade unions, with the result that woman labor is now firmly established in a number of branches, thanks to our joint efforts. We also brought to the notice of the Party the necessity of extending Party influence to scattered groups of working women. Hitherto our work was mainly limited to working and peasant women. Lately our attention was drawn to the necessity of capturing for the Party also other sections of the female population—workingmen's wives, domestic servants, teachers, office workers, etc.

I would now like to say something about our successes in regard to women's position in industry. In 1922-23 the number of women employed in industry decreased in comparison with the prewar period. In 1912 30.4 percent of labor employed in industry was woman labor, in 1916, i.e. during the war, woman labor constituted 38.7 percent. *The percentage*

of woman labor in industry on 1 January 1926 was 28.4 percent. Thus in comparison with 1912, the difference is not very great and shows a downward tendency. If we turn our attention to the various branches of industry, we notice even an increase of woman labor in comparison with the prewar period. In 1912 woman labor in the metal industry constituted 4.8 percent, whereas in 1926 it constitutes 9.8 percent, i.e. double that of the prewar period. The textile industry is a particularly characteristic example: In 1912 woman labor constituted 54 percent of the total labor power, today it constitutes 57.8 percent which means that the prewar level has been exceeded.

But the more important fact is, that not only the *percentage* of woman labor has increased in a number of branches of industry, but also the *total number of women employed* there. Formerly the number of women employed was 606,000 whereas today it is nearly 676,000. However, the total number of men employed in industry has risen in the course of the last few years, from 5,000,000 to 7,000,000, so that the increase of woman labor power is not keeping pace with the general increase of the number of workers. Absolute figures have certainly increased, but we are still two percent short.

Above all it should be pointed out that among many of our economists, the tendency still prevails to look upon *woman labor as of smaller value and as less remunerative*. If one takes into consideration that protection of woman labor, of motherhood and childhood, is on a very high level with us in the Soviet Union, one cannot help asking oneself if, and in how far, this protection of woman labor is a burden on the industry, is bringing it a loss. This question was not raised until quite recently and there is as yet no definite material available to show to what extent the cost of production is increased through our legislation for the protection of motherhood and childhood. But on the strength of the preliminary results of this investigation, one can assume that in spite of the special legislative protection of woman labor, the latter is not more expensive than man labor. Thus in this sphere, we have to contend with prejudices which must be overcome.

Another very important point in connection with drawing women into industry is the *low qualification of woman labor power*. In the present development of our industry, first consideration is given to the unemployed registered in the labor exchanges. But a study of the lists of unemployed women shows us that we have hardly any qualified labor forces among women. Even in Moscow, the main industrial center, qualified women working can be literally counted on the fingers of one's hands. It goes without saying that the number of qualified men workers is much higher. This is the chief explanation for the inclination to draw men into industry in preference to women.

Even a casual investigation of the ranks of women workers already drawn into production shows that the low qualification of woman labor is a great determining factor. However, a certain improvement in the qualification of woman labor has been noticeable during the last two years. It is certainly very small: According to the statistics of the People's Labor Commissariat the improvement amounts to 2.5 percent in regard to skill labor and 1.5 percent in regard to semiskilled. Thus there is a definite upward tendency, but the progress is very slow. This is a great impediment in our work against which we will have to struggle a good many years. We must endeavor to raise the qualification of the women already employed in industry, in order to deprive our economists of the argument that women are not skilled enough to be given much consideration in connection with the extension of our industry.

Skilled women workers constitute only 16 percent of labor power employed in industry, and semiskilled 36 percent, which means that there is over 40 percent of unskilled labor power. Because of this proportion we have set ourselves definite tasks in connection with raising the qualification of woman labor. Our work is manifold. We have first of all factory apprenticeship schools where the number of women pupils increases from year to year: in January 1925 their number was 52,000 or 17.7 percent; in 1926 the percentage of women

pupils increased considerably; in that year twice as many girls were admitted as in the preceding year. In the trade schools too the number of women pupils has increased. They came from young working women's ranks and most of them were quite young girls. Apart from this, definite work is carried on to raise the qualification of adult workers. During the last two years we have begun to give less qualified but better gifted labor forces higher quality work, placing assistant women workers in charge of looms. Isolated attempts have also been made to introduce group training for women workers, etc. These are only our first steps in this direction, and we draw the attention of our men comrades to this work.

Just a few more words on *women's unemployment*. It is considerable, and this is one of the greatest obstacles to our work among women. Moreover unemployment among women does not show any signs of diminishing. It remains stationary and in some places it tends to increase. Of course unemployment here is of a different character than in Western Europe where working women are dismissed wholesale. There are no mass dismissals of women workers here. The explanation for increased unemployment among women is, that we have a great influx of unskilled labor power from the rural districts.

I will deal now with the *general conditions of working and peasant women*. In the course of the last few years it has been possible to create favorable premises for the introduction of women workers into the process of production. In connection with this I draw attention to a considerable increase in the number of factory creches and similar institutions. We have at present 778 factory creches, 521 children's consultation centers, 276 consultation centers for pregnant women and 103 mother and child homes.

The construction of dwellings is one of the most important questions among the general tasks connected with economic development. Cooperative building societies are increasing: in *Moscow, Tula*, in the *Don Basin*, in *Ivanovo-Voznesensk* and in a number of other towns workers' dwellings, and whole workers' colonies are being constructed. The Women's Department sees to it, that in connection with these building operations, the requirements of working women are considered, i.e. that public laundries, dining halls, central kitchens, creches, etc., are also put up. In regard to this our Women's Department insists on efforts being made to make women's lives easier, to free them from the drudgery of house-work.

I must draw your attention to *toiling women's active participation in the cooperative movement*. 1,085,000 peasant women are organized in cooperatives, whereas the number of women workers cooperators is 1,558,000. Women workers constitute 25 percent of the cooperative membership, peasant women 16 percent. Peasant women's and women workers' participation in leading cooperative organs is very satisfactory: They participate in managing committees, auditing commissions, etc; women's membership of cooperatives is not only important in itself—through their active participation it will be possible to raise the standards of life of working and peasant women and to bring more sections of the population into the cooperatives.

I will deal now with *Trade Unions*. In regard to the two main features of our activity—raising women workers qualification and their standard of life (child care, feeding, housing) the best part of the work devolves on the trade unions. In this respect the trade unions give us as much support as they themselves receive from the Party. As far as recruiting of active trade unionists from working women's ranks is concerned, trade union statistics show that there are almost as many women as men in the unions; the number of unorganized women workers constitutes only 4.5 percent.

A considerable number of women workers take an active part in trade union work in Trade Councils, trade union committees and factory councils. A considerable percentage of women workers take an active part in the work of labor protection, education and production commissions. A very large number of women are active as workshop delegates. Women workers constitute 28 percent of the total number of workers in industry, women



delegates 21 percent of the total number of delegates, so that in regard to participation in minor trade union work women workers keep pace with men workers. Matters are less satisfactory in regard to the higher trade union organs. In the Central Trade Union Council women constitute 13 percent and in Trade Union Committees 15 percent of the membership; on the other hand there are fewer women workers in the managing committees of the guberniia sections.

I am coming now to the question: *Party and women workers*: In regard to this we have come to the conclusion that women workers are not a uniform body to whom one and the same methods of work can be applied. As there are distinctly three different sections of women, the Party should have different methods of work for each of them. There is first of all a section of active women workers already at work in trade unions, Soviet cooperatives, even in their executives, auditing commissions, etc. This cadre of active women workers is growing and is helping the Party to permeate the mass of women workers with Communist ideology. This cadre of active women workers collaborates not only with our Party, but also with organizations with which it is connected. The next section is that on which we concentrate our work at present, namely, women delegates attending elementary political education circles, etc.

The third section comprises backward women workers who have still to be captured and organized by us. It is of the utmost importance to approach this section correctly because just at present many women are drawn into industry who come from the rural districts and do not know anything about factories and factory life. They too must be brought under the influence of the Party.

A few words about *Delegate Meetings*. There are at present 78,500 women delegates, whereas in 1925 there were only 60,000, which means an addition of over 18,000 this year. Election statistics of 1925 showed that through delegate elections a considerable number of working women were captured by us. But in spite of this we think that we captured only about one-half of the total number of the working women, although the election campaign was carried on energetically with the support of the Party and the trade unions. We are endeavoring to raise the political education level of a certain section of women delegates, but our main efforts are in the direction of training them for trade union and other public work. Through the delegates we get in contact with the mass of working women. Delegate meetings work is the center of our activity.

If we sum up our activity among working and peasant women we can say that our cadre of active workers, the upper stratum of working women belonging to the Party, has greatly developed with the help of the delegate meetings. We can safely say that we should not have made such progress in our work if we had not applied the method of working women's delegate meetings. Therefore our delegate meetings are at present the center of our activity among the working and peasant women of the Soviet Union and of a whole series of our Eastern regions. This point requires maximum attention on the part of the Party. Delegate meetings are the best school of Communism, the best method for the education of working women for public activity.

I will deal now with delegates' work. With the help of our delegate we keep in contact with ten working women, as one delegate is elected to every ten working women. She conveys to her electors the knowledge which she has acquired at the delegate meeting, particularly in regard to practical work. We have organized a series of sections for practical work with delegates; the trade union section, the cooperative section, the section of institutions for raising the standard of life of working women. In Moscow we have an industrial section where working women acquire the rudiments of factory management. Just at present we are engaged in summing up and propagating the experiences of this work, in order to be able to form cadres of working women also for economic work.

Another achievement is the organization of a juridical section of the *Moscow* delegate meetings. A considerable number of working and peasant women are acting as jurors. To

be able to do justice to this responsible work, women should have a knowledge of court procedure, the construction of the court, etc. In our juridical section women delegates acquire practical knowledge of court procedure. In connection with this I would like to point out that a great many questions which come up for discussion in the people's courts are closely connected with working and peasant women's interests. That is why we want women versed in law as judges and jurors, and the juridical section is to help us in this. The first trial is made in Moscow, and we will let the other republics have the benefit of the experience gained here.

*Education circles* claim also special attention. In this respect *Leningrad* keeps ahead of other towns. These circles have done good work with respect to getting hold of sections of active working women who do not participate in delegate meetings. There are about 1,000 such circles throughout the union. Full statistics will not be compiled till the autumn. 36,000 working women participate in these 1,000 circles. What are the results of this work? The most active elements have joined the Party and work in Soviet organs. This form of work enables us to capture large sections of working women.

The third section is the remaining mass of working women. The educational level of these women is very low: The number of illiterates is considerable, even among delegates, so that our first and foremost task is to teach these women to read and write. The YCL is helping us with this work, and the more advanced working women too organize reading and writing courses. But in spite of all this we are unable to cope with all the illiterates. With the help of trade union and Party organizations slow but sure progress is made with this work. The main and the most difficult task to which the Party and the trade unions should pay maximum attention is: To draw the mass of backward working women into the reading and writing courses, into our organizations and above all into the delegate meetings, transferring them from there to other organizations after careful training.

A few words about *club work*. Club membership statistics show that the percentage of women members corresponds with the general number of working women employed in industry. However, only the younger women join clubs. Our clubs are still not paying enough attention to women workers burdened with young children and family cares; they do not do much to meet their requirements, be it even through the organization of a club nursery, a women's corner, social evening for proletarian women, etc.

I will deal more fully with our *press*, as this constitutes one of our main achievements during last year's work. We have four central periodicals for women: 1. "*The Woman Communist*," leading organ for functionaries working among peasant and working women. This periodical is published by the CC of the Party; its circulation is 25,000. 2. "*The Woman Worker*" intended for the mass of women workers, for the active cadres of the two first sections, for the more or less educated women workers (circulation 78,000). 3. "*The Peasant Woman*" with a circulation of 45,000. 4. "*The Woman Agricultural Laborer*," published by the Agricultural and Forest Laborers' Union, circulation 26,000. We have also here in Moscow a periodical for the mass of working and peasant women in the Moscow guberniia, the "*Woman Delegate*" with a circulation of 45,000, as well as several periodicals in a number of national republics published in Russian and also in the vernacular of the national minorities. The circulation of these periodicals is mostly by subscription: working and peasant women subscribe to these periodicals and pass them along after they have read them.

A large number of women workers and peasant women *correspondents* are attached to these periodicals. Their total number is about 1600 and in addition, there are 1493 women contributors to the Moscow periodicals. In comparison with the general workers correspondents movement this number is certainly small, but one should take into consideration that the correspondents movement among women is a yet in its initial stage, and that the number of non-Party women is very large. Our periodicals perform definite work among the working and peasant women correspondents; their letters are tilted and published. Our

periodicals are mostly composed of such letters and can be therefore considered as mass periodicals.

I must say something about *activity among workers' wives*. In connection with the general development of the activity of all the sections of the working population one can say that our work among these circles of women has also made considerable progress. We draw workers' wives (differentiating between them and housewives in general) into delegate meetings, taking care that maximum influence is secured for working class element, that workers' wives do not give the meetings the imprint of their ideology, but that they should be brought under the influence of the delegate meetings and should profit by them. Taken all together, 30,000 workers' wives participate in delegate meetings, but in relation to the general number of delegates they constitute only 10-18 percent.

Workers' wives are also drawn into Soviets. Unfortunately I have no general statistics at my disposal, but we know, for instance, that in *Turkestan* and in the *Ukraine* workers' wives constitute 10 percent of the membership of Soviets. As workers' wives have comparatively much leisure (more than women employed in factories) we are endeavoring to draw them into practical work in various social institutions, first and foremost in cooperatives and in institutions fighting against child vagrancy.

In regard to our *work among peasant women* the organization of peasant women delegate meetings occupies first place. Just as in the towns, delegate meetings are the center of our work also in the rural districts. However, it is only during the last two years that this work has been given definite form. The delegates are elected by the peasant women, they keep in close contact with their electors, carry on practical work in Soviets, cooperatives, mutual aid committees, etc. Here too, the number of delegates has increased. In 1924-25, there were 121,000 peasant women delegates. In 1925-26, 246,800, and at the end of 1926, their number will probably exceed 300,000. This mighty army of peasant women organized in the delegate meetings, this school of Communism, based on a combination of practical training and political education work, is one of the big achievements of our Party.

We have also achieved considerably success in regard to *the standard of life of peasant women*; for instance the number of creches in rural districts has considerably increased and is continuing to increase. In our work among the women of the rural population we do not limit ourselves to delegates, Soviet members, the active of peasant women who work in cooperatives, mutual aid committees, etc., we also work among the masses. In connection with this, village reading rooms play an important role. Special peasant women days are organized, women's literature, the periodical "*The Peasant Woman*", etc., are always available in these reading rooms.

A special branch of our work is *work among the women of the East*, i.e. in our border regions,—*Kazakhstan, the Caucasus*, etc.,—considerable success has been achieved. This work is under the control of the CC of our Party. The method of work which is most successful in the East and has given positive results, is the Club. In 1925 there were 61 Red Corners with 4000 members and 51 Clubs with 15,000 members. At present the number of Women's Clubs, Red Corners, and Women's Departments of Village Clubs is steadily increasing. Apart from club work, delegate meetings adapted to the conditions of life of Eastern women are particularly successful. They sprang up at first in towns, but are gradually spreading to the villages (Kishlaks and Auls).

In the East too, good results have been achieved through delegate meetings. In spite of the prejudices of which there are so many in the life of Eastern women, in spite of impossibility for them to move about freely in the streets, and in spite of the general seclusion of women and of the difficulty to get in contact with them, delegate meetings have proved to be a real and expedient method of work. In 1924-25 there were in the East 25,000 women delegates, in 1924-25 very nearly 18,000 who were drawn into Soviet work. At present our main task in this sphere is the training of functionaries.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words on *women's admission to the Party*. The number of women members is increasing in the Party, and their social composition is improving. In 1925, there were 76,494 women members—10.3 percent of the total membership, in 1926 there were 128,817 women members—12.8 percent. The social composition of the women members is as follows; 59 percent of the total number are women workers, which is an improvement on the working class percentage among men members. All this goes to show that our delegate meetings and our activity among women workers have led to definite results. 15.2 percent are peasant women and women office workers, other categories 25.8 percent. The conditions of Party membership are the same for us as for the Party as a whole, i.e. our task is to capture for the Party first of all women workers and peasant women who have already participated in delegates meetings, etc. Moreover, this increase of women workers and peasant women will reduce the percentage of women office workers in the Party which is considerable.

Special work is done for the *preparatory and continued training of women functionaries* for work among women. Special courses were organized for this purpose. This work is carried on by us jointly with the Agitprop.

In conclusion, just a few words about the *apparatus and executive of the Party*. Our apparatus for work among women is gradually improving qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Women workers and peasant women take more and more part in our work. Our task is: to draw more women workers and peasant women into active work, as they know best the conditions of life of working women.

A great change has taken place in our apparatus from the CC down to the nucleus. Our entire work is under the control of the Party; we are an integral part of the Party apparatus. All our decisions are made in agreement with the Party. Everything is done through the competent Party executive. The Party is better informed than before about the needs and requirements of the masses and exercises more control over our work than ever before. What we have to do now is: to establish this control consistently down to our lowest nuclei—workshop nuclei of big enterprises and village nuclei. Control by the Party must be fully established also in regard to our minor work. Our foremost task is the training of new cadres of women Communists for our activity among women workers and peasant women in general, and working women in the East in particular.

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#### LETTER FROM STALIN ON THE LASHEVICH AFFAIR AND THE MOVE AGAINST ZINOVIEV

25 June 1926

*Stalin used the so-called Lashevich Affair to escalate the attack against Zinoviev and eventually remove Zinoviev from the Politburo and his position as chairman of the Comintern's Executive Committee. Lashevich, Deputy War Commissar and Candidate Member of the Central Committee, was Zinoviev's friend and supporter. He was discovered holding secret meetings with sympathizers of the Opposition and, consequently, was removed from his military post and expelled from the Central Committee. In the letter below to Molotov, Bukharin, Rykov, and others, Stalin strongly recommended using the Lashevich Affair to link Trotsky,*

*Zinoviev, and others, and to prevent disruption of Communist Party work, and described the reasons and steps for accomplishing this.*

J. STALIN  
LETTER TO MOLOTOV, RYKOV,  
BUKHARIN, AND OTHER FRIENDS  
Sochi

I have long pondered the matter of the Lashevich affair, going back and forth, linking it with the question of the opposition groups in general; several times I came to various opinions and have finally settled on the following:

1) Before the appearance of the Zinoviev group, those with oppositional tendencies (Trotsky, the workers' opposition, and others) behaved more or less loyally and were more or less tolerable;

2) With the appearance of the Zinoviev group, those with oppositional tendencies began to grow arrogant and break the bounds of loyalty;

3) The Zinoviev group became the mentor of everyone in the opposition who was for splitting the party; in effect it has become the leader of the splitting tendencies in the party;

4) This role fell to Zinoviev's group because a) it is better acquainted with our methods than any other group, b) it is stronger in general than the other groups and has control of the Comintern ([Zinoviev is] chairman of the Comintern Executive Committee), which represents a serious force; c) because of this it behaves more arrogantly than any other group, providing examples of "boldness" and "determination" to those with other tendencies;

5) Therefore the Zinoviev group is now the most harmful, and the blow must be struck precisely against this group at the plenum;

6) Not only should Lashevich be removed *from the Central Committee*, Zinoviev should be removed from the *Politburo* with a warning that he will be removed from the Central Committee if he does not cease his work in preparing a schism;

7) Either we strike this blow now with the calculation that Trotsky and the others will once again become loyal, or we risk turning the Central Committee and its bodies into nonviable institutions incapable of work, and we will very soon have to deal with a tremendous fuss in the party that will harm the cause and our unity;

8) It's possible that after this, Zinoviev will submit his resignation from the Comintern. We should accept it. At any rate, after being removed from the Politburo, Zinoviev can no longer be chairman; after all the member parties will understand that and will draw the necessary conclusion *themselves*. In the Comintern, we will then shift from a system with a chairman to a system with a secretariat. This will disarm the Zinoviev group and liquidate Zinoviev's arrogance in preparing the schism (remember what was said about Stockholm at the Congress!);

9) I assure you that in the party and the country this affair will get by without the slightest complications—no one will feel sorry for Zinoviev, because they know him well;

10) Previously I had thought that a *broad* resolution on unity was needed *at the plenum*. Now I think that it would be better to leave such a resolution for the [XV] *Conference* ([where we could provide] a theoretical foundation and so on) or for the *Congress*. At the plenum, we can and should limit ourselves to a *brief* resolution on unity in the narrow sense of the word *in connection with the Lashevich affair*, citing Lenin's resolution on unity at the Tenth Congress. This resolution should say that Zinoviev is being removed from the Politburo not because of differences of opinion with the Central Committee—there are no less profound disagreements with Trotsky, after all, although the issue of removing Trotsky from the Politburo is not on the agenda—but because of his (Zinoviev's) policy of *schism*.

I think this will be better: the workers will understand it, since they value party unity, and this will be a serious warning for the other opposition groups. Dzerzhinsky can be brought into the Politburo to replace Zinoviev. The party will take this well. Or the number of Politburo members can be raised to ten by bringing in both Dzerzhinsky and Rudzutak. Obviously, with a *broad* plenum resolution (the previous plan), we would be forced to *unite* Zinoviev and Trotsky *officially* in one camp, which is perhaps premature and strategically irrational now. Better to break them individually. Let Trotsky and Piatakov defend Zinoviev, and we will listen. At any rate that will be better at this stage. Then we'll see.

We'll speak in more detail when I come to Moscow. I think I'll be in Moscow three or four days before the plenum. What do you say to that?

P.S. I don't know about you, but I think that with the Lashevich affair, the Zinovievites have cut their own throats, especially if this affair is linked with the Guralsky affair. *And indeed it must be linked.*

Best regards,  
J. Stalin.

Lih, Naumov, and Khlevniuk, 115-17.



TROTSKYIST AND ZINOVIEVIST OPPOSITION  
DECLARATION OF THE THIRTEEN  
14 July 1926

*Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others, faced with condemnation from the prevailing Communist Party leadership for acts of factionalism, prepared a statement of their case hoping to gain support from Communist Party membership. Stalin's concern about the open merging of Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev was bearing fruit. The statement of this "United Opposition," edited, abridged, and translated by Robert Daniels from the Trotsky Archive, shows the Opposition's frustrations, defense of its "conspiratorial" actions, and its lack of any clear program other than criticism of and hostility toward the Communist Party leadership. The two dominating themes emerge over the direct connection between world revolution and the success of socialism in the Soviet Union, and the view that bureaucraticism prevailed over tenets of inner-Party democracy and caused fear and conformity.*

...1. *Bureaucratism as the Source of Factionalism*

The immediate cause of all of the sharpening crises in the party is in bureaucratism, which has grown amazingly in the period following the death of Lenin, and continues to grow.

The Central Committee of the ruling party has at its disposal for action upon the party not only ideological and organizational, i.e., not only party means, but also governmental and economic means. Lenin always took into account the danger that the concentration of administrative power in the hands of the party would lead to bureaucratic pressure on the Party. Precisely from this arose Vladimir Ilyich's idea about organizing the Control Commission, which, while it had no administrative power in its hands, would have all the power essential for the struggle with bureaucratism, for the defense of the right of a party member to

express his convictions freely and to vote according to his conscience without fearing any punitive consequences....

Meanwhile, in fact—and this must be said here before anything else—the Central Control Commission itself has become a purely administrative organ, which assists the repression conducted by other bureaucratic organs, executing for them the punitive part of the work, prosecuting any independent thought in the party, any voice of criticism, any concern expressed aloud about the fate of the party, any critical remarks about certain leaders of the party....

An official show prevails in the meetings, together with the apathy which is unavoidably connected with it. Frequently only an insignificant minority remains at the time of voting; the participants in the meeting hasten to leave so that they will not be compelled to vote for decisions dictated earlier. No resolutions anywhere are ever adopted otherwise than “unanimously”. All this is gravely reflected in the internal life of the Party organizations. Members of the Party are afraid openly to express aloud their most cherished thoughts, wishes and demands. This is what constitutes the cause of the “affair” of Comrade Lashevich et. al.

## 2. *The Cause of the Growth of Bureaucratism*

It is completely obvious that the more difficult it is for the ruling centers to carry through their decisions by the methods of party democracy, the less the vanguard of the working class sees their policy as its own.

The divergence between the direction of economic policy and the direction of the feelings and thoughts of the proletarian vanguard inevitably strengthens the need for repression and gives all policy an administrative-bureaucratic character. Any other explanation of the growth of bureaucratism is secondary and does not encompass the essence of the question.

The lag of industry behind the economic development of the country as a whole signifies, in spite of the growth in the number of workers, a lowering of the specific gravity of the proletariat in the society. The lag in the influence of industry on agriculture and the rapid growth of the *kulaks* lower in the village the specific gravity of the hired workers and poor peasants and their trust in the state and in themselves. The lag of wage raises behind the rising living standard of the nonproletarian elements of the city and the upper groups of the village inevitably signifies the lowering of the political and cultural self-esteem of the proletariat as the ruling class. From this, in particular, comes the clear decrease in the activity of the workers and poor peasants in the elections to the soviets, which is a most serious warning for our Party....

## 4. *The Question of Industrialization*

The present year again reveals with all clarity that state industry is lagging behind the development of the economy as a whole. The new harvest again catches us without supplies of goods. But movement toward socialism is assured only when the tempo of development of industry does not lag behind the general development of the economy, but leads it, systematically bringing the country closer to the technical level of the advanced capitalist countries. Everything must be subordinated to this task, equally vital both for the proletariat and for the peasantry....

The question of the *smychka* is under present conditions above all a question of industrialization.

Meanwhile the party sees with alarm that the resolution of the Fourteenth Congress on industrialization in reality draws back more and more, following the example of what was not carried out in the party's resolution on democracy. In this fundamental question, on which the life and death of the October Revolution depend, the party cannot and does not want to live with official “cribs”, which are dictated, frequently, not by the interests of the matter but by the interests of factional struggle. The party wants to know, to think, to check,

to decide. The present regime prevents this, and precisely from this stems the secret distribution of party documents on the "affair" of Lashevich, etc.

#### 5. *Policy in the Village*

In questions of agricultural policy in the village the danger of shifts to the side of the upper groups in the village is all the more clearly defined....

The fact is that under the guise of a union of the poor peasantry with the middle peasant, we observe steadily and regularly the political subordination of the poor peasantry to the middle peasants, and through them to the *kulaks*.

#### 6. *The Bureaucratic Perversion of the Workers' State*

The number of workers in our state industry does not now reach two million; together with transport, it is less than three million. The soviet, trade-union, cooperative and all other employees certainly do not number less than that figure, and this comparison alone testifies to the colossal political and economic role of the bureaucracy; it is entirely obvious that the state apparatus, in its composition and level of life, is to an overwhelming degree bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, and inclines away from the proletariat and the village poor, on the one hand, toward the displaced intelligentsia, and on the other toward the land-leaser, the merchant, the *kulak*, the new bourgeois. How many times did Lenin remind us of the bureaucratic perversion of the state apparatus and about the frequent necessity for the trade unions to defend the workers from the state, while the party bureaucrat in just his region is infected with the most dangerous self-deception....

#### 7. *The Bureaucratic Perversion of the Party Apparatus*

In 1920 a party conference under Lenin's direction considered it essential to point out the impermissibility of the fact that in the mobilization of the comrades, party organs and individual comrades were guided by some considerations other than business ones. Any repression whatever against comrades because they think differently about one or another question or party decision is impermissible. The whole present practice contradicts this decision at every step. Genuine discipline is shaken apart and replaced by subordinating to the influential figures in the apparatus. The comrades on whom the party can rely in the most difficult days are pushed out of the staff in ever greater numbers, they are thrown around, exiled, persecuted, and replaced steadily and regularly by casual people, untested, but who are distinguished by silent obedience. Now these bureaucratic sins of the party regime are transferred to the accused comrades Lashevich and Belinsky, whom the party has known in the course of more than two decades as devoted and disciplined members. The act of accusing them is therefore an act of accusing the bureaucratic perversion of the party apparatus.

The significance of a firmly welded, centralized apparatus in the Bolshevik Party needs no explanation. Without this skeleton the proletarian revolution would be impossible. The party apparatus in its majority is composed of devoted and irreproachable party members who have no stimulus other than the struggle of the working class. Under the correct regime and the proper distribution of forces the very same party workers could successfully help realize party democracy.

#### 8. *Bureaucratism and the Everyday Life of the Working Masses*

...The bureaucratic regime has spread like rust into the life of every plant and workshop. If the members of the party are in fact deprived of the right to criticize by district committee, the provincial committee, or the Central Committee, in the plant, they are deprived of the right to subject the immediate authorities to criticism. Party members are scared. The administrator who is able as a loyal person to guarantee himself the support of the secretary of the next higher organization thus insures himself against criticism from below and not infrequently also from responsibility for mismanagement or actual stupidity.



In a socialist economy which is under construction, the fundamental condition for economic expenditure of the nation's resources is vigilant control by the masses, above all by the workers in the factories and plants. As long as they cannot move openly against disorders and abuses and expose their perpetrators by name, without the danger of being counted in the Opposition, among the "dissidents", among the troublemakers, or of being driven out of the cell and even from the plant, the struggle for a regime of economy as well as for the productivity of labor will inevitably be viewed on bureaucratic lines, i.e., they will most often strike at the vital interests of the workers. Precisely this is observed right now.

Clumsily or slovenly rate-setting work, harshly striking the workers, is in nine cases out of ten the direct result of bureaucratic inattention to the most elementary interests of the workers and even of production itself. It is to this that we must account the delayed payment of wages, i.e., relegating to the last consideration that which ought to constitute the prime concern.

The question of the so-called excesses at the top is fully linked to the repression of criticism. Many circulars are written against the excesses. Not a few cases against them are conducted in the Control Commissions. But the masses are suspicious of this kind of office-routine struggle with the excesses. There is one serious solution here—the masses must not be afraid to say what they think.

Where are these burning questions being discussed? Not in official party meetings but in corners and alleys, under cover, always in danger. From these intolerable conditions has stemmed the affair of Comrades Lashevich et. al. The basic conclusion from this affair is: it is necessary to change conditions....

#### 10. *The Comintern*

Straightening out the class line of the Party means straightening out its international line. We must cast aside all doubting survivals of the innovation which represents the matter as though the victory of socialist construction in our country is not linked indissolubly with the course and outcome of the struggle of the European and world proletariat for power. We are building socialism and will go on building it. The European proletariat will struggle for power. The colonial peoples are struggling for independence. This is the common front. Each unit in each sector must give the maximum that it can give without waiting for the initiative of the others. Socialism will be victorious in our country in direct connection with the revolution of the European and world proletariat and with the struggle of the East against the imperialist yoke....

#### 11. *On Factionalism*

...The idea that by mechanically settling with the so-called opposition, it is possible to broaden the frame of party democracy in a crude self-deception; on the basis of all its experience the party cannot believe these lullabies any more. The methods of mechanical adjudication are preparing new splits and cleavages, new removals, new expulsions, new pressure with respect to the party as a whole. This system inevitably constricts the leading summit, reduces its authority and compels it to replace its ideological authority with doubled and tripled pressure. Whatever it does, the party must put a stop to this pernicious process. Lenin showed that firm leadership of the party does not mean strangling it.

#### 12. *For Unity*

There cannot be the slightest doubt that the Party is able to straighten out its difficulties. The idea that there is no way out for the Party on the path of unity would be the supreme nonsense. There is a way out—moreover, only on the path of unity....

Only on the foundation of party democracy is healthy, collective leadership possible. There is no other path. In struggle and in work on this, the only correct path, our unrecriminating support is guaranteed to the Central Committee wholly and in full.

## PARTY RESOLUTION AFTER THE FIRST GENERAL SOVIET ELECTIONS SINCE END OF THE CIVIL WAR

20 July 1926

*In reviewing the results of the 1925-1926 elections to the soviets, the first such elections since the end of the civil war, the Communist Party Central Committee found disappointing the expected participation of the working class, and the increased participation of the poor and middle peasants satisfying. It noted the growing influence of the wealthy strata among the peasantry on the electoral process and resolved to eliminate this influence. It also noted the increased participation of the Red Army and Navy in the soviets. As a result of the review, the Communist Party resolved to be more actively involved in the electoral process, revitalize the soviets, pursue annual elections, eliminate nomination and bureaucratic obstacles, and cement the alliance between workers and the poor and middle peasants at the expense of the kulaks.*

### THE RESULTS OF THE SOVIET ELECTIONS Resolution of the Joint Plenum of the CC and CCC of the CP of the Soviet Union

#### I

#### The Character and Significance of the Election Campaign

1. The Soviet elections of 1926 represent the first widespread and open election campaign since the end of the civil war and since the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship. For the first time since the civil war, the fundamental social groups of the urban and rural sectors have openly appeared at the Soviet election. Further, this Soviet election took place in the circumstances of rapidly growing activity on the part of the working masses.

2. As on former occasions, the *working* class took a foremost part as regards its activity. In comparison to the last election campaign, the activity of the workers and of the trade union members in general has increased, though it is true, to a comparatively insignificant degree. (The number of trade union members who actually took part in the election, increased in the RSFSR from 52 to 57 percent of those organized in trade unions.) This last fact can be explained either by there being immediate danger from the enemies of the proletarian dictatorship under present circumstances, or by the Party and other proletarian organizations not devoting sufficient attention to the election in the working class districts, further by work in the urban Soviets not being sufficiently developed and, in connection with this, by the chief attention of the workers being devoted to the activity of the organizations of the Party, the trade unions and of industry.

3. *In the towns*, the participation of the proletarian strata, which are not organized in trade unions (wives of workers, unemployed, workers who are not organized in trade unions etc.), as well as of the working strata of the petty bourgeoisie (small industrialists etc.) has considerably increased. The increase of the percentage in which they took part in the election campaign (in the RSFSR, this percentage has risen from 24 to 37 in the period 1924/25) is particularly striking, as their activity in previous election campaigns was quite insignificant.

4. *In the villages*, the election reflected on the whole the improvement of the political situation. This found expression in the manner in which the chief mass of the inhabitants of the villages, the middle and poor peasant, took part in the election (the number of peasants of the RSFSR who actually took part in the elections rose from 41 to 47 percent of all the rural electors). The greatest activity was shown by the masses of the middle peasants who often, in the course of the elections, got into much closer touch with the poor of the villages. The village poor and especially the agricultural workers however still showed unsatisfactory activity. The beneficial effect of the work among the village poor, which up

to now had only been intensified to an insignificant degree and only in some districts, was demonstrated in the growth of the activity and the improvement in the organization among the rural poor. On the other hand the large peasantry, who often showed great activity, were compelled, in the majority of cases, to abandon the open defense of their class interests and their anti-Soviet policy and they took refuge in hiding their class ambitions under the sheep's clothing of the so-called "interests of the village poor," "revolutionary legality" etc.

5. The election campaign brought into higher relief the predominance of the different social strata in town and country and gave evidence of still greater solidarity of the working class and the peasantry in standing by the Soviets. It also emphasized the difficulties, which, in view of the new conditions, have arisen in the work of the Soviets and the deficiencies in carrying out the leadership of the Party. The Soviet election of 1926 is consequently of extraordinary importance, as it put to the test the policy of vitalizing the Soviets and of carrying through revolutionary legality. The results of this general election campaign—the first since the policy of vitalizing the Soviets was carried through—must above all be examined from the point of view of further strengthening the proletarian dictatorship on the basis of the development of the (proletarian) Soviet Democracy.

## II

### The Vitalization of the Soviets, the Proletarian Dictatorship and the Lead of the Communist Party

6. The policy of the vitalization of the Soviets, as an actual step on the way to the development of the Soviet Democracy (the proletarian democracy), must be based on the principle that the proletarians and the poorest peasant semiproletarians should remain the "regular and only foundation of the whole apparatus of State" (see the program of the CP of the Soviet Union). This not only does not exclude the necessity of a real and ever extending enlistment of the whole chief mass of the peasantry in Soviet construction, it actually demands it as a preliminary condition to the strengthening of the Soviet Power.

In the period in question, the task is of particularly great significance for the proletarian dictatorship, in view of the consolidation of the material basis of the proletarian dictatorship (State industry is becoming more and more the decisive basis of the whole economic system of the country), in view of the considerable growth of the proletariat, which is ever increasing in numbers, in view of the great strengthening of the whole Soviet system and finally of the Communist Party itself, which is at the head of the proletarian dictatorship. This is why special emphasis is laid at present on the task of consolidating the alliance between proletariat and peasantry. "The chief principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance between proletariat and peasantry, so that the proletariat may maintain the share that it holds in the Power of the State." (Lenin) From this arises the necessity of creating a broad and active circle, consisting of middle and poor peasants, around the Party in the village.

7. The alliance between proletariat and peasantry will only become a firm support to the dictatorship of the proletariat, when the leading part in this alliance is ensured to the proletariat. For this reason the policy of the vitalization of the Soviets, as a genuine proletarian class policy, demands that the activity, the independent activity and the organization of the proletariat should be reinforced with all possible means, and especially that the proletariat should take part in the Soviet elections and in all activities of the Soviets in every way. We must therefore not judge the positive political significance of the election campaign merely by the absolute figures as to those who took part in the election, but also by the degree in which the participation of the proletarian section of the electors in the work of the Soviets, and their influence on that work grows and is strengthened (under the proletarian section we understand both the urban and the rural proletariat), and by the rate at which the quantitative and qualitative significance of the advanced workers of both sexes

elected to the Soviets grows, and the active and really leading influence on the whole work of the Soviets increases.

8. The policy of the vitalization of the Soviets also aims at doing away with the remnants of the political influence of the bourgeois elements (Nepmen, large peasants, bourgeois intellectuals) on the working masses. Any carrying out of the policy of vitalizing the Soviets can only be recognized by the Party as right, if it intensifies the organized fight of the workers themselves against all political attempts of this or that bourgeois element to influence the masses—a policy which will consequently lead to the final isolation of the bourgeois elements in the country. In connection with the election campaign, which gave expression to the growing activity of the petty bourgeois strata both in town and country, it becomes evident how very necessary it is that the masses should be enlightened with regard to the political action of the bourgeois elements, either open or secret (the latter is much more frequent now), that this action should be unmasked to them and that every attempt of such bourgeois elements to defend their intellectual and political positions, should be relentlessly combated. (For instance, the attempts to spread propaganda for their reactionary ideology by publishing literature which is “friendly to the New Soviets” (“Smena-vekh”), in the character of the forbidden paper “Novaia Rossiia”; further, their attempts to make use for political purposes of some economic, cultural and religious organizations contrary to the interests of the proletarian dictatorship, especially in the National Republics, where the proletarian strata are numerically particularly weak etc.).

9. In view of the circumstances of the new economic policy and in view of the partial restoration of capitalist conditions and of the still continuing development of home and peasant industries in large numbers, it is inevitable that there should be new attempts on the part of the petty bourgeois political parties (Mensheviks, SRs), to reestablish their organizations and their influence. It is now possible for them to conceal these attempts to gain a right to existence in some form of making use of the vitalization of the Soviets (and also of the Cooperatives etc.). The counterrevolutionary agitation for the necessity of establishing special peasant—in reality large peasant—parties and trade unions, which would inevitably be opposed to the proletariat and the Communist party must for instance, be counted amongst these attempts. On the other hand, it is also possible that attempts may be made to cast the bait of petty bourgeois policy (for instance Neo-Menshevism) in a so-called “purely proletarian” disguise under the cover of a so-called “genuinely proletarian” policy and treacherous “Left” slogans, which are opposed to the line of action of the CP of the Soviet Union. It is also inevitable that there should be attempts to reestablish the petty bourgeois nationalist parties (Petliurists, Dadist, Alashardinzes etc.). Apart from actually satisfying the real needs of the masses of workers, the Party must consequently make the improvement of the economic situation of the chief mass of the peasantry the center-point of its attention, as it always has done, thus nipping in the bud the economic cause of the political fluctuations of the small property owners. It must combine economic measures with a relentless and systematic fight against every petty bourgeois political vacillation, from whatever side it may come and in whatever external form it may show itself. The Communist Party and Soviet Power must continue to frustrate energetically and without mercy every attack of the petty bourgeois political groups, whose political idea is and remains a return to capitalism and an attempt to lead the country back to a bourgeois Power, which make these groups in reality direct accomplices and actual tools of international capital.

10. In view of the danger already referred to of fresh attempts to revive petty bourgeois policy, the question of the inadmissibility of two or more political parties under the conditions of a proletarian dictatorship (especially if we are steering a course towards the development of Soviet Democracy) must on principle be put very clearly. The existence of several political parties—and the fight for power which would result—could lead to

nothing but the actual destruction of the alliance between the proletariat and peasantry which has been achieved at so great a cost and which is now being consolidated. This would need the complete disintegration and the direct undermining of the most important foundations of the proletarian dictatorship. The existence of a fight between various political parties (as also the existence of pronounced fractions in one uniform party) is incompatible with the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat and would, by its nature, mean nothing else but some form or other of a resurrection of bourgeois Democracy. In the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship therefore, we refuse to recognize "the basis of Parliamentarism itself, the usual form of the bourgeois party system." (Lenin) The experiences of the proletarian revolution confirmed this principle of the development of the proletarian dictatorship.

11. The fact that the CP of the Soviet Union has become in the course of the proletarian revolution the undisputed and only leader of the proletarian dictatorship, is an enormous historical achievement of the proletariat and at the same time one of the most important and fundamental conditions for the really victorious development of the proletarian revolution. This fact shows what should be the nature (in its most essential features) of the Communist Party, the party of the victory of Socialism; it must be capable of carrying on a correct proletarian revolutionary policy, it must above all be deeply rooted in the masses of workers and in the broad masses of toilers in general, and finally, it must understand how to combine iron discipline with true democracy within the Party. The development of Soviet Democracy demands that the organized vanguard and leaders of the proletarian dictatorship—the party of the proletariat—should in the first place itself tread the path of the real development of genuine democracy within the Party, whilst maintaining and further consolidating its iron discipline, its unshakable unity and the true, firmly-welded proletarian solidarity of the ranks of the Party. It is only as a united party and as the sole leader and guide of the proletarian dictatorship that the Communist Party can ensure the victory of the proletarian revolution.

12. The only party in the country of the proletarian dictatorship, the party of the Communists, must however intensify more and more the work of attracting nonparty workers and peasants to help in the total work of Soviet construction. In the present circumstances, one of the central tasks of our Party must be to fight against bureaucracy in the apparatus of State, to fight against the numerous bourgeois-bureaucratic remains and their influence in all fields, to fight for a real improvement and a transformation of the apparatus of State. This demands that the Communist Party should enlist the nonparty workers and working peasants in the work of Soviet construction and should give leading positions in the State apparatus to those of them who are most devoted to the cause and most active. This is the most practical way by which mutual confidence and reciprocal control of the party members by the nonparty representatives, and of these by the party members, can be elected. Only in this case (presuming that the work for raising the cultural of the masses is pursued with more zeal), only if the Party shows the greatest possible understanding for the demands of the masses and gets into closer touch with them by way of giving the masses a more practical share in socialist construction, finding and applying the most pliable forms of organization for Soviet activity and combining with this activity the work of other mass organizations (in the first place the trade unions, the conferences on production, the Co-operatives etc.)—only then will it be able constantly to intensify its work for the construction of Socialism.

### III

#### The Results of the Elections

13. The chief result of the election campaign is that this campaign has fully confirmed the correctness of the political course entered on by the Party at the Fourteenth Party Congress. We realize this from the fact that the authority and influence of the Party among the

masses of workers and peasants has undoubtedly grown. In view of the firm course entered on by the Party, that of making greater endeavors to enlist the nonParty workers and peasants in the work of the Soviets, it was inevitable that there should be a certain decrease of the percentage of Communists in the Soviets, especially in those in which their percentage was previously the highest (for instance, in the urban Soviets). Nevertheless, the results of the recent election not only did not weaken the leading part played by the Party in the Soviets, on the contrary, it unmistakably strengthened it. This is confirmed by the fact that the election campaign revealed the absence of even the least perceptible influence of the petty bourgeois parties (Mensheviks, SRs etc.), nay even showed that they are completely bankrupt.

14. The increased activity of the masses in the elections was demonstrated by the enlistment of considerable numbers of new workers; of new strata of workers and particularly of new strata of peasantry, small tradesmen, employees, the intellectuals in the villages (teachers etc.) in the work of Soviet construction. The total number of those who exercised their right to vote has considerably grown since the last election, thus, in the RSFSR alone from 17 to 19.5 million. The first widespread and open election campaign has unmistakably confirmed the fact that, in spite of all the clamor of the petty bourgeois reaction about the "dying out of the Soviets" (nominally because of their class-homogeneity) it is an indisputable fact that a revival of the Soviets has really begun.

15. The election campaign has made it evident that the task of carrying through correctly and guiding the politics of the election campaign has become very much more complicated. Nevertheless, although some time has elapsed since the end of the election campaign, the discussion of its results both in the party organizations as a whole and especially in the periodical Press must, in the majority of cases be described as unsatisfactory, even as decidedly weak. At the same time, special attention must be called to the insufficient political valuation and explanation of the election results, and it must also be pointed out that very often there is a lack of any authoritative statistical data which would give an exact picture of the class fight and of the social and political tendencies which found expression in the election campaign.

16. In view of the growing activity of the chief mass of the peasantry, particularly of the middle peasants, and of the growing confidence in the Party, more favorable conditions are arising in the villages for the creation of a bloc of the middle peasants and the village poor against the large peasants and, in connection with this, we can report successes in the creation of an active nonparty circle around the Party and around the Soviets. This, however, implies that our Party is faced in the present period by particularly important tasks and difficulties in accomplishing the necessary work for the following reasons:

a) The party organizations in the village have not yet sufficient experience in the formation of an active nonparty peasant circle, and therefore the growing activity of the chief mass of the peasantry is far from being sufficiently organized and turned to account by our Party.

b) In consequence of the fact that activity among the agricultural workers and the village poor grows very slowly, more slowly than the activity of other rural groups, the interest and the share taken by the agricultural workers and village poor within the nonparty peasant groups is still not infrequently of but little significance. This results in much slower progress being made in the selection from among the circles of agricultural workers and the rural poor of persons to fill responsible functions in the Soviets (as well as in the Co-operatives, in the Peasant Relief Committees and in other organizations), than is the case in the circles of the middle peasants.

17. In the towns, the proletarian circles which are not organized in trade unions and the working strata of the petty bourgeoisie have taken a much larger share in the election than they have done in previous ones. In connection with this and with the insufficient attention paid by the party organizations and other proletarian organizations to the elections in

the working class districts, the share taken by the strata mentioned in electing representatives to the urban Soviets has considerably increased. This fact deserves special attention in view of the Soviets of those towns in which the proletariat forms the minority of the population.

18. As regards the leading part played by the Party, it should be specially mentioned, that the party organizations in the villages entered on the last election campaign with much more organization, no longer with that lack of purpose which was to be observed at the by-elections last year. Undoubted success can also be recorded in the field of preparatory measures of organization and of the improvement of the election technique (more frequent election meetings, previous choice of candidates, election regulations etc.).

All the same we must admit that there have been great deficiencies in this respect. Side by side with an appreciable improvement in the methods of administration on the part of the local organizations, especially in the villages (renunciation of methods of command and nomination as regards the Soviets) the bow has often been overstretched in the opposite direction, i.e. on the side of direct rejection of any leadership on party lines; on the side of the party organizations considering that their task in the election campaign is merely that of allowing themselves to be taken in tow.

In a number of organizations, the attempts to "hide the face" of the party organizations, not to appear in their own name in defense of the policy of the Party, to abandon openly putting up and defending their own candidates, did not find sufficient opposition. Further, the following defects must be mentioned: insufficient attention on the part of party organizations to the Soviet elections in the working class districts, inadequate political instruction of the provincial organizations, lack of proper discussion of the Soviet election in the Press etc.

19. Cases of misrepresentation of the political lines of the Party must be specially pointed out. Among these cases we must reckon the concessions, contradictory to the lines observed by the Party, in the working out and explanation of the election instructions (both by central and local Soviet organs), as well as the incorrect application and loose interpretation of these instructions and explanations in practice in the provincial elections. In connection with this, we must emphasize that it was a mistake to reduce the circle of persons not entitled to vote, at a time when there is a certain increase of the bourgeois elements both in town and country.

20. The part taken in the elections by the trade unions (especially the industrial trade unions), the Cooperatives, the Peasant Relief Committees, the Village Poor Committees and other organizations, was entirely inadequate. Special attention must be made of the lack of organized participation on the part of the youth and of the meetings of women delegates, especially those of the women workers.

21. The growing activity of the masses found expression in the somewhat increased interest shown by the Red Army and Navy in exercising their right to vote (at the last election campaign it was, on the average, 70 percent of the total strength of the Red Army).

The Red Army has already become one of the most important training schools for Soviet functionaries, especially for the villages. The demobilized soldiers of the Red Army are taking an increasing share in the work of the village Soviets. These facts make it necessary for the Party to keep a particularly close watch in this direction.

22. Up to the present we have insufficient data with regard to the activity of the newly-elected Soviets. In general, however, the work of the new Soviets reflects a further growth of their activity, especially in the villages. The village Soviets are increasing in strength on the basis of the improvement of the budgets of the village communities and of the development of independent activity on the part of the poor and middle peasants, and are increasing in authority in the eyes of the working masses of the rural population. As

compared with previous years, the part played by the Soviets in rural life has grown in the present period. In contrast to this, the activity of the urban Soviets which until the publication of the "regulations as to the work of the Soviets," which were recently passed, had insufficient material (Budget) and legal-organization basis, has only developed slowly and in an inadequate measure. It is only now, on the basis of the new "regulations", that, relying on the growing activity of the masses, the town Soviets have the opportunity of attracting to their work the working strata of the town, above all of course the industrial worker.

#### IV

#### CONCLUSIONS AND PRACTICAL TASKS

The Party which continues the policy of vitalizing the Soviets (trade unions, cooperatives etc.), must set itself the following tasks:

1. In order that the fight *for the improvement of the whole Soviet apparatus* may be intensified and that the bureaucratism of this apparatus and its seclusion from the masses may be overcome, the workers, peasants and other sections of those engaged in work must be enlisted in larger numbers and with more energy in the whole work of the Soviets (sections, councils, commissions).

2. With the same object in view, more energy must be devoted to the selecting larger number of *nonparty* workers, and peasants for responsible functions in the Soviets (trade unions, cooperatives etc.), whilst great stress should be laid on raising the standard of their education in politics, general culture and special subjects.

3. A greater responsibility of the elected members of the Soviets and a better realization of their duty to render account to their electors must be demanded. For this purpose, it is necessary, among other things, that the electors should be informed, that, if their representatives in the Soviets do not act to their satisfaction, they have the *right to recall them*,

4. The election instructions of the central and local bodies must be *corrected* and brought strictly into harmony with the Soviet Constitution and the general lines of the Party. It is necessary to work out supplementary directions with regard to the application of the election instructions in the districts with a population of nomads or seminomads.

5. Things must be brought to such a point that the Soviet Constitution and the election norms established by the instructions dealing with them, are *correctly carried out*. In doing so, special care must be taken that those citizens who, according to the Soviet Constitution, are not entitled to vote, be prevented from taking part in the Soviet elections. In order therefore, that the complication of the lists of electors may be controlled and Soviet legislation properly carried out, it is necessary that factory workers, agricultural laborers and the village poor, as well as middle peasants should be included in the election commissions.

6. In order that the *Party may be under better guidance* in carrying out the work in the Soviets, the following are necessary:

- a) The continuation of a systematic and uncompromising fight against both the remnants of the methods of "command" and "nomination" with regard to the Soviets and the symptoms of a "fail" policy in carrying out the elections and the work of the Soviets,

- b) Increased interest in the election and work of the Soviets in the working-class districts, so that the workers of both sexes immediately engaged in production may be induced to take a maximum of active interest in the elections and activities of the Soviets.

This is above all necessary in localities with a small proletarian population, since the other working strata, employees, small tradesmen, domestic servants etc., are taking an increased share in the elections and the work of the Soviets.



c) More lively, immediate and systematic guidance on the part of party organizations in the elections and in extending the connections between the Soviets and the workers and peasants by the elected Soviet representatives.

d) Greater attention on the part of the Press to the discussion of the results of the election and the work of the Soviets.

e) More attention to the right application of the Soviet Constitution in practice and to the election instructions to that effect.

7. With regard to the active nonparty peasant elements in the village, the following is necessary:

a) Systematic work in the establishment and guidance of an active nonparty element in the villages. In doing so, there must on no account be any fusion of the party organizations with these active nonparty circles, nor any transformation of the latter into definite organizations of their own.

b) Particular attention must be devoted to drawing the agricultural laborers and the village poor into this active circle and to increasing the share and the influence of this section within the active circle, and to a wider selection of agricultural workers and village poor for fulfilling functions in all the bodies of the Soviets, the Cooperatives etc.

8. It is further necessary to accelerate the application of the new "*regulations concerning the town Soviets*" and to work out the problems of the new duties of the town Soviets, both in general and in particular for the towns with an insignificant proletarian population.

9. There is further a need for an approach and close connection between the activities of the *trade unions, cooperatives* etc. and the activity of the Soviets; the part taken by these organizations in the election campaign must be considerably reinforced.

10. The same must be said with regard to the work of the *youth and of the meetings of delegates of the women workers and peasants* and also with regard to the enlistment of unorganized women.

11. Emphasis must be laid on the duty of interesting the workers of the *backward National Republics* and of the provinces in the elections and in the whole work of the Soviets. Here we are in many cases faced by the immediate duty of creating and developing Soviets as the real organs of Soviet Power.

12. Among the individual sections of electors, particular care must be taken that the *Red Army and Navy* take part in the elections and in the work of the Soviets.

13. With the object of attracting larger numbers of workers to the Soviet elections, it is necessary to take further steps for *improving the preparatory measures of organization and the election technique* itself.

14. Better organization of the *rendering of accounts* and especially of *statistics* of the results of the election campaign is necessary in order to obtain more correct estimates of the class elements and class tendencies, which become evident in the course of the elections and in the results of the elections.

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First the Fourteenth Party Conference and then the Fourteenth Party Congress have approved the policy of the vitalization of the Soviets. The chief tasks of this policy were: detachment of the middle peasants from the large farmers (kulaks), the political isolation of the large farmers, extension of the alliance between the proletariat and the village poor on the one hand and the middle peasantry on the other hand, the enlistment of the main mass of the peasantry in the work of socialist construction, consolidation of the leading part taken by the Communists among the broad masses of workers in town and country. The first widespread and open election campaign which was carried through on the basis of this

policy could not of course be entirely free from a certain transitional character, it could not but show some features characteristic of a period of transition from the old method of Soviets being guided by the Party to the new methods. In spite of the difficulties which came to light in the course of the election, this election campaign fully confirmed the correctness of the policy carried out by the Party. This is proved even by a simple comparison of the last election campaign with the double elections of the previous year. The Soviet elections in the villages showed how far the general political situation in the villages has improved under the new course of party politics; the growing activities of the chief mass of the peasantry (village poor and middle peasants) were directed into Soviet channels and developed in this direction. The elections on the basis of the vitalization of the Soviets have brought to light the commencement of a detachment of the middle peasants from the large farmers, an approach between the middle peasants and the village poor, the growth of the political activity of the village poor, a weakening of the political influence of the large farmers on the masses of peasants. The elections have proved that the Party has laid the foundations stone of the organization of the rural poor into an independent political force in opposition to the large farmers under the new conditions which prevail in the villages. The general result of the Soviet elections in the villages is that they have emphasized the growth of the authority of the Party, of the confidence in it shown by the masses of poor and middle peasants, who form the decisive majority in the villages, and the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship. The complete futility of the attempts made by the new opposition at the Fourteenth Party Congress to undermine the confidence in the policy of the Party, has been clearly revealed. The results of the Soviet election showed that the Opposition which, at the Fourteenth Party Congress, took its stand against the new course of party politics, wished to draw the Party back to the old and obsolete methods of leadership. Had this policy of the new Opposition been adopted, it could only have led to a weakening of the Party in the villages, to an increase of the political influence of the large farmers, and thus to the influence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the country being weakened.

Furthermore, the results of the policy of vitalizing the Soviets are of special significance for the development of Soviet Democracy (proletarian Democracy) in general and above all for the fight against bureaucratism in the apparatus of State. The first success shows that the abandonment of the policy of vitalizing the Soviets and thus of developing the policy of Soviet (proletarian) Democracy in present circumstances in present circumstances, which was practically the policy of the new Opposition, would have meant that the Party would actually have been subjected to the pressure of our apparatus of State which is still permeated by bourgeois-official influence and is to a large extent of a bureaucratic nature. The Party has entered on a firm course for the increase of the work of developing the Soviets and for the transformation of the whole apparatus of State; it has further enlisted greater and greater masses of workers and peasants in this work and has thus created favorable conditions for an efficient fight against bureaucracy.

In summarizing the results of the Soviet elections, the Party renders itself an account of the difficulties and deficiencies which have become evident, and it will continue to carry through with greater confidence the genuine Leninist policy of vitalizing the Soviets, which has begun.

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PARTY REMOVES ZINOVIEV, LASHEVICH, AND  
OTHERS FROM PARTY LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

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*The Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission expelled Zinoviev from the Politburo and warned him against further fractional activities. Lashevich was expelled from the Central Committee. The decision of the two bodies was based on detailed listings of conspiratorial activities by the two and their supporters.*

DECISION OF THE JOINT PLENUM OF THE CC AND CCC OF THE  
SOVIET UNION IN THE MATTER OF COMRADE LASHEVICH  
AND OTHER COMRADES AND ON THE UNITY OF THE PARTY

1. The preservation of the unity of our Party was always the object of care of the whole Party and of its Central Organs, of the CC, and of the CCC. The Party, with Comrade Lenin at its head, successfully repelled all symptoms of fractionalism, every attempt at a fight against the Party on the part of fractions and groups, "with special platforms and who strove to a certain extent, to rally together and to set up their own group discipline" (from the resolution of the Tenth Party Congress). The Tenth Congress, which took place in the period of the revival in the life of the country and the Party, in the period of the transition to the NEP, adopted a resolution on the unity of the Party drawn up and moved by Lenin. This resolution states:

"The Party Congress draws the attention of all members of the Party to the fact that the unity and firmness of its ranks, the securing of complete confidence among the Party members and the securing of a real, close, comradely work, really embodying the unity of the will of the advance-guard of the proletariat, is particularly necessary at the present moment, as a number of factors are increasing the vacillations among the petty bourgeois population of the country."

The Party Congress further pointed out that

"it is necessary that all conscious workers shall clearly recognize the harmfulness and the inadmissibility of any fraction activity, which in practice inevitably leads to the weakening of the firm cooperation, and will induce the enemies of the Party who are attaching themselves to the government Party, to attempt more and more often to deepen the cleft and to make use of it for the purpose of the counterrevolution."

The resolution on unity moved by Lenin and adopted by the Tenth Party Congress, was the guiding line for the Party and all its organs in preserving the unity of its ranks. Based upon the will of the Tenth Party Congress, the Party got rid of all expressions of fraction activity which made their appearance up to the Eleventh Party Congress. At the time of the Fourteenth Party Congress the Party was once again faced with the fact of traditional activity on the part of the so-called "new opposition".

The Fourteenth Party Congress decidedly rejected the political and organizational views of the opposition, which distorted the line of Leninism. In spite of this, the Party Congress and the newly elected CC of the CPSU considered it possible and necessary to put supporters of the opposition in all the leading institutions of the Party, including the CC and its Politburo. The Party hoped that the opposition would, in the course of practical work, recognize and make good its errors. The opposition was therefore given complete possibility of defending their views in the normal Party way in those cases in which differences over this or that question arose. Although the opposition continued to cling to the errors pointed out by the Fourteenth Party Congress and brought into the work of the Politburo of the CC, obviously fractional, irreconcilable elements, this defense of the views by the opposition in the normal Party way within the CC did not arouse serious fears either in the CC or in the CCC regarding the preservation of unity.

2. Unfortunately, however, the opposition in their fight did not remain on the basis of legitimate defense of their views within the frame of the Party statutes, and recently went over to immediate violation of the decision of the Tenth and Fourteenth Party Congresses regarding the preservation of unity in the ranks of the CPSU. While in their fight against the Party they made attempts to create an illegal fraction organization, directed against the Party and against its unity.

In recent times the Party was faced with a whole number of such fractional measures on the part of the new opposition which found their expression in the holding of illegal conspirative meetings, in the printing and sending both in Moscow and other towns, of tendentiously collected secret Party documents with the intention of discrediting the line of the Party (secret documents of the Politburo distributed among Party members and sent to the organizations of Briansk, Saratov, Vladivostok, Piatogorsk, Omsk, Khomel, Odessa), in the sending of agents to other Party organizations for the purpose of creating legal fractional groups (Belinsky's journey to Odessa for the purpose of organizing an illegal fraction and ascertainment of special ciphers and of places of meeting). It has been ascertained that the threads of these fractional proceedings of the opposition run to the apparatus of the ECCI, at the head of which stands Zinoviev. Special mention must be made of all illegal fractional meeting in the forest near Moscow, organized by Comrade Belinsky, coworker on the Central Committee and the ECCI, which constitutes a step towards splitting, unexampled in the history of our Party. This meeting arranged according to all the rules of conspiracy (patrol, strict fractional selection of those invited etc.) was not only led by a coworker of the ECCI, who acted as chairman, but—what is equally unheard of in our Party—at this meeting concealed from the Party there appeared a candidate of the CC of the CPSU, comrade Lashevich, who delivered a report and called upon those present to organize the fight against the Party and against the CC elected by it.

At these disorganizational steps of the opposition prove already that the opposition decided to go over from the legal defense of their views to the creation of an illegal organization in the whole of the Soviet Union which would be opposed to the Party and in this manner prepare a split in its ranks.

3. This activity of the new opposition called forth a revival of the groupings condemned by the Party and induced these miserable remnants of groups which are hostile to the Party and consciously aiming at a split, to take up again the work against the Party and its unity, supported by the aid of the new opposition. Thus for example it was ascertained that comrade Mikhailov, director of Moscow works, who formerly had belonged to the so-called Miasnikov "Labor group" (which was condemned three years ago by the Party as a counterrevolutionary group) had copied with the aid of nonparty typists secret Party documents for the purpose of spreading them among broad circles and also organized illegal meetings.

It has been ascertained that comrade *Shugaev*, who at one time belonged to the so-called "Labor opposition" which was condemned at the Tenth Party Congress on the motion of Lenin, went so far to conduct among the specialists an antiSoviet agitation, while at the same time in conversations with them he spoke of a direct fight against Soviet power by making use of the expected decomposition of our Party thanks to the activity of the new opposition. Finally Comrade Zhatsek, who at one time was expelled on account of connection with a menshevist organization, calling itself "Labor Truth" took part in spreading of secret documents of the new opposition among the Party members.

4. The growing fractional activity of the new opposition led to their playing with the idea of two Parties and increased the antiLeninist deviation of the opposition to the greatest extent: lack of faith in the forces of the proletariat, and pessimism in regard to the work of socialist construction in general and in regard to the building up of socialist industry in particular; tendency to destroy the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry (middle peasantry), which means abandonment of the principle which, according to Lenin, is for us "the highest principle of proletarian dictatorship;" tendency to support and screen the

Ultraright deviations in our Party with open tendency towards menshevism (group of comrade Sergei Medvedev, the former leader of the so-called "Labor" opposition which went so far as to propose to hand over our socialist State industry to foreign capital, and which spoke of liquidating the Comintern and the RILU etc., that is to say, of liquidating all the revolutionary aims of our Party); tendency to form a bloc on an international scale, both with the Ultraleft of the type of Korsch as well as with the Ultrarights of the type of Souvarine, who, expelled from the Communist International, are conducting a furious attack upon the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union under the pretext of an alleged peasant kulak degeneration of our Party. The new opposition brings forward no concrete proposals, makes use of so-called Left phrases which cover the Right opportunist content, and is going over to quite impermissible methods of fighting, leading to a split.

5. The fractional activity of the opposition is not confined to the CP of the Soviet Union, but attempts are being made to draw the apparatus of the ECCI into the fight and with its help to spread the condemned views of the opposition in other communist Parties, and thereby to prepare the soil for the incitement of foreign Communist Parties against the CP of the Soviet Union. It must be remarked that the first attempt of the new opposition to go over to conspiratory fractional struggle found its expression in the actions of collaborators in the ECCI who are immediately *connected with Zinoviev*, and who attempted to create fractional groups in various Parties of the Comintern (*Guralsky-Vuiovich affair*). In spite of the fact that this case was condemned by the delegation of the CPSU in the ECCI and by the Politburo of the CC, they continued to make use of the apparatus of the ECCI for fraction work (above-mentioned journey of the coworker of the ECCI Comrade G. Belinsky to Odessa to organize a fraction, as well as the holding by him of an illegal fraction meeting in a Moscow district).

6. The new opposition did not wish to make use of the indisputable right of every Party member to defend his own views, so far, of course, as they are not directed against decisions adopted by the Party, but it preferred, instead of an open and honest expression of its own views within the Party organization on the basis of the Party statutes, to arrange meetings which were kept secret from the Party and its members and to form an illegal fraction.

The Fourteenth Party Congress which, by their election into the CC and into the CCC, had given the supporters of the opposition full possibility of defending their views within the CC, at the same time issued the instruction: "A decisive fight is to be conducted against every attempt to undermine the unity of the Party, no matter from whence it may come and no matter who may stand at the head." This decision is only a confirmation of the decision of the Tenth Party Congress, which was adopted on the motion of comrade Lenin at the moment of a particularly sharp fraction fight. The Tenth Party Congress empowered the CC "to carry through the complete annihilation of all fraction activity" and ordered "the immediate dissolution without exception of all groups formed upon this or that platform," and instructed

"all organizations to take strict care that no fractional activity whatever permitted. The nonfulfillment of this decision of the Party Congress must involve unconditional and immediate expulsion from the Party."

7. The Party holds responsible for the fractional struggle all members of the Party who took part in it; nevertheless, the political responsibility for the Party-splitting struggle is borne by the leader of the opposition at the Fourteenth Party Congress, Comrade *Zinoviev*, whose comrades sharing his views take active part in the fractional activity and make use of the apparatus of the ECCI which is under Zinoviev, while at the same time Zinoviev made not the least attempt to condemn these comrades and to disassociate himself from them.

In view of all the above the Plenum of the CC and the CCC decides:

a) That as such a situation, in which the actual leadership of the fraction struggle of the opposition is in the hands of a member of the Politburo, cannot be tolerated, Comrade

*Zinoviev* is excluded from the Politburo of the CC, and at the same time all the oppositional comrades, no matter what their position in the Party may be, are warned that should they continue the work of creating a faction set up against the Party, that the CC and the CCC will be compelled, in order to defend the unity of the Party, to adopt towards them the necessary organizatory measures;

b) it is declared that the candidate of the CC Comrade Lashevich, by taking an active part in the creation of a fractional organization which was directed against the unity of the Party, has injured and abused the confidence of the Party, for which he deserves expulsion from the ranks of the CPSU. In view, however of the former Party activity of comrade Lashevich, he is strongly censured as well warned that any attempt on his part to continue fraction work will be followed by his expulsion from the ranks of the CPSU. On the basis of the special decisions moved by Lenin and adopted by the Tenth Party Congress of the CPSU, Comrade Lashevich is excluded from the Central Committee of the CPSU and recalled from the position of Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council, while at the same time he is prohibited for the period of two years, from holding a responsible Party function;

c) the decision of the Presidium of the CCC of 12 June 1926 in regard to comrades G. A. Belinsky, I. S. Chernyshev, B. G. Shapiro, N. M. Vlasov, and the women comrades M. W. Vasileva and K. A. Volgina, are confirmed.

8. The labor opposition directed against unity has, up to now, found no support in any organization of our Party; nevertheless, the further development of the fraction work of the opposition would face the Party with the serious danger of a split. The Leninist Party will also, in the future, not permit a split in its ranks, and will firmly resist any attempt at a fraction fight.

All organizations of the Party, without permitting a fraction struggle, must, in their practical work for the welding together of the ranks of the Party, strictly adhere to the instructions contained in the resolution moved by Lenin at the Tenth Party Congress in which it stated:

"The Party Congress, while instructing the CC to carry out the complete annihilation of all fractional machinations, declares at the same time, that, in questions which attract the special attention of Party members, i.e., the purging of the Party from nonproletarian and unreliable elements, the fight against bureaucracy, the development of democracy and of the self-activity of the workers, etc., all concrete proposals must be examined with the greatest attention and tested in the practical work. All Party members must know that the Party does not carry out all the necessary measures, because it encounters a whole number of various obstacles, and that the Party, in rejecting nonconcrete and fractional criticism, will continue at the same time, unwearably and with all means, and even with new methods, the fight against bureaucratism, for the extension of democracy, of self-activity, for the exposure and clearing out of hostile elements which have attached themselves to the Party..."

The Party, through the CC and CCC, calls upon the Party organizations to make a decisive correction of prevailing faults in the organizations, and, by a thorough discussion of the chief questions of the Party work in all organizations, to increase the activity of the Party members and to educate them in the spirit of the principles of Leninism, by fighting against the petty bourgeois sentiments which often make their appearance under the guise of Left phrases.

9. The Plenum of the CC and of the CCC summon all Party members to unity, firmness and Bolshevik discipline, as

"the most important prerequisites for all successes of the Bolshevik Party have always been, the steel unity and the iron discipline, the true unity of views on the basis of Leninism." (From the resolution of the Plenum of the CC and CCC of 17 January 1925).

In the present period of practical construction of Socialism and under the condition of the NEP and the dangers arising from it on the part of the bourgeois elements within the country, as well as the bourgeois environment which still exists, this unshakable unity of the Party is more necessary than ever. The Party has achieved considerable success in the sphere of economic reconstruction and in raising the material well-being of the working and peasant masses. But the Party soberly takes account of the fact that these successes are only the first and, perhaps, the easiest steps on the way to Socialism. There still exists a colossal and extremely difficult work for the further practical building up of Socialism and for raising the material position of the workers and village poor to a higher level than before.

For this purpose greater unity and discipline in our proletarian ranks are necessary. For this it is necessary to preserve and to strengthen further the unity of the proletarian advance-guard, the unity of our Party.

Without a firm Party discipline, without the submission of the minority to the majority, the Party would prove incapable of fulfilling the historical task which the October Revolution placed before it, to preserve and to consolidate the power of the dictatorship of the proletariat and thereby to secure the victory of Socialism. The CC and the CCC express their firm conviction that our Party will prove strong enough to repel all attempts to disrupt the unity of the Party and all attempts to split and disintegrate the Party.

Against fractions and against the fraction struggle, which hinder the Party from accomplishing the great work of constructing Socialism.!

For the Unity and firmness of the Leninist Party!

*International Press Correspondence*, VI, No. 54 (29 July 1926), 889-891.



## NONAGGRESSION TREATY WITH LITHUANIA

28 September 1926

*The Soviet government favored nonaggression treaties to forestall economic boycotts and military attacks as well as establishing trade relations with neighboring states. The treaty and exchange of notes between the Soviet Union and Lithuania are significant because they were aimed at Poland, which the Soviets considered a military threat. The Soviet government also could rely on Lithuania's neutrality as a member of the League of Nations in any actions proposed by the League against the Soviet Union. Kovno, where the treaty ratifications were exchanged, was the subject of territorial claims between Poland and Lithuania.*

## TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND NONAGGRESSION BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Ratifications exchanged at Kovno, 9 November 1926

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the one side and the President of the Lithuanian Republic on the other side, persuaded that the interests of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Lithuania demand permanent cooperation founded on confidence, and with a view to assisting, as far as in them lies, the maintenance of universal peace, have agreed to conclude a treaty for the development of the friendly relations existing between them, and with this object have appointed as their plenipotentiaries—The President of the Lithuanian Republic: Mykolas Slizevicius, Minister-President, Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

of the Lithuanian Republic; and Jurgis Baltrusaitis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Lithuanian Republic to the USSR; and

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR: Georgii Chicherin, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; and Sergei Aleksandrovsky, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the USSR to Lithuania;

Who, having met in Moscow and examined their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:—

Art. 1. The peace treaty between Russia and Lithuania concluded in Moscow on 12 July 1920, all the provisions of which preserve their whole force and integrity, remains the basis of relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Lithuanian Republic.

2. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Lithuanian Republic mutually undertake to respect in all circumstances the sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability of each other.

3. Each of the two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any aggressive action whatsoever against the other party.

In the event of one of the contracting parties, notwithstanding its peaceable conduct, being subjected to an attack on the part of one or several third Powers, the other contracting party undertakes not to afford support the said third Power or Powers against the contracting party attacked.

4. If, on the occasion of a conflict of the nature mentioned in Article 3, paragraph 2, or when neither of the contracting parties is engaged in warlike operations, a political agreement directed against one of the contracting parties is concluded between third Powers, or a coalition is formed between third Powers with a view to the subjection of one of the contracting parties to an economic or financial boycott, the other contracting party undertakes not to adhere to such agreement or coalition.

5. In the event of a conflict arising between them, the contracting parties agree to appoint conciliation commissions should it prove impossible to settle the conflict by diplomatic means.

The composition of the said commissions, their rights and the procedure which they will follow will be defined by a separate agreement to be concluded.

6. The present treaty is subject to ratification, which must take place within 6 weeks of the date of its signature.

The exchange of ratifications shall take place in the town of Kovno.

The treaty is drawn up in the Russian and Lithuanian languages.

For its interpretation both texts shall be regarded as authentic.

7. The present treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications and shall remain in force for five years, with the exception of Articles 1 and 2, whose period of validity is not limited.

The validity of the present treaty shall be prolonged automatically, on each occasion for one year, unless one of the contracting parties, at least six months before the date of expiration of the treaty, expresses a desire to open negotiations regarding the future form of political relations between the two States.

In confirmation whereof the plenipotentiaries have affixed their autograph signatures and their seals to the present treaty.

The original has been drawn up and signed in duplicate at Moscow on 28 September 1926.

*British and Foreign State Papers*, 1926, Part III, 890-891.





## EXCHANGE OF NOTES

*No. 1: From Mykolas Slizevicius, Moscow, 28 September 1926.*

Mr. People's Commissar:

In connection with the signing on this date of the Treaty between Lithuania and USSR, I have the honor to establish the following:

1. Both Governments have considered the principal questions connected with the adherence of Lithuania to the League of Nations. The Lithuanian Government, in the negotiations on the conclusion of the Treaty and its signature, has proceeded from the conviction that the principle, laid down by them in Article IV of the Treaty, of nonparticipation in the political agreements of third powers directed against one of the Contracting Parties cannot prejudice the observance of the obligations for Lithuania emanating from the Covenant of the League of Nations.

2. The Lithuanian Government is convinced that the adherence of Lithuania to the League of Nations cannot hinder the friendly development of the relations between Lithuania and USSR.

3. At the same time, the Lithuanian Government adheres to the opinion that, having in view the geographical position of Lithuania, the obligations for Lithuania emanating from the fact of her belonging to the League of Nations, which, in conformity with its fundamental idea, is called upon to regulate international differences in a peaceful and an equitable manner, cannot prejudice the striving of the Lithuanian people for neutrality, which most of all corresponds to its vital interests.

Please accept....

*No. 2: From Georgii Chicherin, Moscow, 28 September 1926.*

Mr. Minister:

In connection with the Treaty signed on this date between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic, I have the honor to bring the following to your knowledge:

Being immutably guided by the desire to see that Lithuanians, like every other people, independent, with regard to which the Government of the USSR has made repeated declarations in its *demarches*, and also in conformity with the Note of the Soviet Government of 15 April 1923, addressed to the Polish Government, and in conformity with the sympathies which the destinies of the Lithuanian people evoke in the public opinion of the workers of the USSR, the Soviet Government declares that the actual violation of the Lithuanian frontiers, which has taken place against the will of the Lithuanian people, has not changed its attitude toward the territorial sovereignty defined by Article II and Note thereto of the Peace Treaty of 12 July 1920 between Russia and Lithuania.

Please accept....

*Soviet Treaty Series, 323-324.*



## FIFTEENTH PARTY CONFERENCE OF THE CPSU—

## REPORTS AND DEBATES

26 October-3 November 1926

*At the Fifteenth Party Conference, the Communist Party leadership of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, and Stalin mounted an attack against the "United Opposition," which renewed its*

*"antiparty" actions in the preceding months after having tacitly surrendered following decisions adopted at the July Party Plenum. Bukharin rejected the Opposition's argument that international capitalism was presently unstable and criticized the left-wing supporters of the Opposition in the German Communist Party. Rykov delivered a long report on the economic situation and Tomsky, on trade unions. Both speakers punctuated their reports with attacks against the Opposition. Rykov's report contained data about taxation, prices, agricultural and industrial performance, education, imports and exports, and the State Planning Commission. Stalin gave an impressive speech in which he defended "socialism in one country" and detailed the antiparty activities and reneged promises of the Opposition leaders. Citing Marx and Lenin on numerous occasions, he pointed out the Opposition's deviations from the Communist Party line and asked the Opposition to renounce its errors so the Communist Party could get on with its business and work forward to socialist construction. Kamenev, Trotsky, and Zinoviev, questioned and interrupted by hecklers, attempted to present their points of view and defend their actions. Zinoviev was forced to end his speech by the vote of the Conference. A major portion of the speeches by Kamenev and Zinoviev constituted defense and explanation of the Opposition's declaration of 16 October 1926. The Conference stopped short of expelling the Opposition and adopted Stalin's theses, which categorized the Opposition as advocating social-democratic deviation. It instructed the Communist Party to conduct a decisive ideological struggle against this deviation to ensure the Opposition recognized the erroneousness of their views, and to preserve Party unity in every way possible. The documents below are speeches by Rykov, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and N. Miliutin, the RSFSR Commissar for Finance, who provided additional data to support Rykov's economic policies and criticized E. Preobrazhensky's theory purporting the capitalist farmer was emerging as a class in the countryside.*

#### [RYKOV'S REPORT]

Comrades! The subject on which I have to report is so extensive and so complicated, that the detailed analysis even of a single paragraph of the draft theses passed by the Politburo, might occupy a whole evening. This compels me not only to refrain from making use of the statistical material in its totality, which is characteristic of the economic situation of the country, but also to restrict myself to a general explanation of the principle part of the theses proposed.

Now, when new tremendous difficulties and gigantic problems of economic policy are facing the Party and the Soviet State, it is no longer possible to epitomize the whole of the questions which have to be solved in one report, even though it lasted for hours.

Quite recently the State Planning Commission issued a very valuable book on the "Control Figures of the National Economy for the year 1926/27," which delineates the chief tendencies of economic development and the most important general political instructions *taken as a whole* for the coming year. This is the second work of this kind. Although the first attempts to epitomize the "control figures" last year were not very successful, the work of the State Planning Commission, which has been done this time with much greater care, offers us a far more reliable support in our endeavors to set up the most important signs for the economic policy of the coming period.

There are, however, certain defects even in this book; not all its parts are harmoniously connected with one another. It contains certain assertions which have not been sufficiently thoroughly examined, not to call them incorrect assertions (for instance with regard to the price policy and to the analysis of the measure of the demand for goods in the country during the economic year). But in spite of some defects and commissions, this work represents a great event in our economic literature and offers auxiliary material for the systematic building up of our national economy.

Everyone who is interested in the economic life of the country can profit greatly from the "Control Figures". Apart from this, almost all the most important questions of economic policy for the Party have been worked out not only in the "Control Figures" and in the Press but also, in numerous meetings of workers—in connection with the discussion within the Party.

All this considerably facilitates the tasks set in my report and enables me to limit myself to the most important points of dispute and to avoid as far as possible quoting figures.

#### THE NEW STAGE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

It is generally recognized today that the national economy of the Soviet Union is passing through a turning point in its development from the so-called period of "reconstruction" to a stage which is characterized by the realization of a Party policy *steering towards industrialization*, which was laid down by the Fourteenth Party Congress.

In essentials the practical following up of this course, the development of large industry, the increase of the activities and of the significance of the working class throughout the country provide the necessary technical and material prerequisites for the concrete building up of socialist society. The necessity of tracing out the further path of our development, of delineating the main lines of our economic policy and of elucidating all the difficulties which interfere with our carrying out the immediate tasks of the economic leadership of our Party and of the Soviet State demands, that we draw up some kind of a balance with regard to the way we have traversed and determine the economic content of what is usually called the "period of reconstruction".

In my opinion it is not altogether correct to call the period of the economic development of the Soviet Union which has just passed, the "*period of reconstruction*"—in the literal sense of the word.

The literal interpretation of the expression "period of reconstruction" would only be right, had the economic boom in the course of this period signified the reproduction of prerevolutionary economics, of prewar economics, both as regards quantity (relations between the different parts of the national economy) as regards quality (social conditions, class conditions etc.). Such an assertion would however be incorrect with respect both to industry and to agriculture. The development of the productive forces in the village has proceeded under quite different class conditions.

The process has gone on under the conditions of the nationalization of the land, the abolition of the whole class of landed property owners, the distribution of the land among the proletariat, the creation of the beginnings of a new system of organization of agricultural production (collective farming, Soviet farming etc.), of a new system of taxation, different organization of agricultural credit, a different credit policy etc. This process can only be called a "period of reconstruction" in the sense that the area under cultivation and the crops have increased so far as to reach the "prewar norm". But the whole structure of agriculture, the relation of power between the individual groups of peasantry, the standard of living of the peasants—at this as fundamentally different from what existed in prewar times.

Looked at from this standpoint, the process of the boom in agriculture was not a "process of reconstruction" but a process of the assimilation of the achievements of the October Revolution.

Even leaving out the question the fundamental changes in social and class relations in the town, the "process of reconstruction" by no means signifies the restoration of the same proportions between the different branches of industry which existed before the war. The connection of industry with the market, for instance, is today of quite a different character, since the market of our Soviet Union is entirely different from the market of Tsarist Russia. Nowadays the workers and peasants are almost the only consumers; industry has

adapted itself to their requirements. The important group of titled landowners, the strata of well-paid officials etc. have entirely disappeared from the circle of the consumers. The boom in industrial production is accompanied by the realization of the plan of electrification, by a development of the electrotechnical industry which has far surpassed the prewar level, by the setting up of a number of new branches of production. I do not even mention that the distribution of the national income amongst the various groups of the population is today entirely different from what it was before the October Revolution. What has been said, is enough to make us realize how inexact is the expression "process of reconstruction".

It is equally incorrect to interpret the content of the "period of reconstruction" in such a way as to regard accumulation as the distinguishing characteristic between it and the new period. It is erroneous to imagine that the completion of the process of the "reconstruction" is identical with a transition from the exploitation of the technical and material elements of production inherited from the bourgeois society to "accumulation". In my opinion it is wrong to contrast in this way the "process of reconstruction" with the "process of accumulation". In doing so, the circumstance that the economic boom could not proceed without accumulation even during the period of reconstruction, is left out of consideration.

The distinction between these two periods is not that the growth of industrial production in the period in question took place at the cost of any special "sources of reconstruction" outside the totality of surplus production, but in the surplus production being used in such a way that it was turned to account as working capital for industry. This use of the surplus production had at the same time a great influence on the rapid rate of development of industrial production. In this way we succeeded in securing the stores of goods, raw materials and fuel which are necessary for the development of production, to reunite into a solid body the working class which had been disunited during the years of civil war, to organize the credit system, to stabilize our currency etc.

We can distinguish two separate stages in the economic development of our Union in the past. It is characteristic of the first period that industry and transport were working at a loss and that the means needed for the "revival" of industrial production were taken from other branches of the national economy. With the gradual strengthening of industry and widening of its connections with agriculture through the market, with the establishment of a stable system of currency as a foundation for the whole national economy, the development of industrial production is beginning to rely more and more on turning to account the surplus products created within industry itself. Not only has industry begun to work without a deficit, it is now even making profit which, in the past economic year, amounted to half a milliard rubles.

When industry began to work, it was not even in a position to cover the normal purchase of the means of production. Consequently the equipment became more and more worn out and the original stock was diminished. We were compelled to take the means for supporting industry from other branches of the national economy. In the past period we have succeeded in replacing the worn out means of production by writing them off as redemption so as to make industry work at a profit.

It is also wrong to believe that the "process of reconstruction" did not require accumulation in contrast to the period on which we are now entering, and to regard this as the cardinal difference between the two periods. It is characteristic that the accumulated means were formerly used as working capital, while those means are now used for increasing the original stock, i.e. for the building of new factories and works, for creating a new basis of national economy, which is technically and materially on a higher level. The increase of original stock is a much greater and more difficult task than those which we have hitherto accomplished. For the accomplishment of this task, we need much vaster means and much longer periods. The milliard which we intend to spend on the increase of original stock in

the current year, will only bear fruit in a few years. In the meantime, whilst these factories are being built, equipped and organized, we are taking vast means from the national economy, which cannot be turned to account until these factories are working. The building of the Dnieper power works will take five years if not more. The new outlay will, during this period, be less effective, i.e. for a certain time, we shall get less finished products for every ruble of capital invested than we should have received if that ruble had been invested as working capital during the period of reconstruction. This also accounts for the considerable slackening of the pace of the further development of production.

#### THE SOURCES OF ACCUMULATION AND THE RATE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The fate of the October Revolution and the practical solution of the question of the construction of a socialist society depend on whether we understand how to find *the means necessary for transforming the whole national economy on the basis of large industry, and to invest these means wisely*. The question of the sources of accumulation, i.e. the question whence and in what measure we can acquire these means is decisive for the whole policy of our Party in the coming period. The proposed theses point to the following sources: accumulation within industry, turning to account the income of other branches of national economy by distributing them through the machinery of the National Budget and the credit system, as well as turning to account the savings of the population.

We must further take into calculation that there is no longer a possibility of making use of an issue of paper money with the object of increasing the original capital. Even in the current economic year, we have seen that the possibility of increasing the quantity of money without conjuring up the danger of shaking the stability of the Chervonets, is very limited. In the economic year 1925/26, the average annual amount of money in circulation has increased by 55 percent as compared with the economic year 1924/25, this growth exceeding the growth of the gross production of industry, of that part of agricultural production which gets on to the market, of railway transport etc. The excessive growth of the issue last year was one of the most important reasons for all the economic complications, to extricate ourselves from which demanded the greatest efforts during the whole of the past year. Since one of the principal conditions for developing our whole economics without a crisis is the stabilization of our currency, it would be equivalent to conjuring up the danger of a severe crisis throughout our economic system were we to resort to issuing money for the purpose of investing capital. The issue of money as a source for the investment of capital in industry no longer comes into consideration.

Comrade Preobrazhensky in his "New Economics" writes:

"When the State is at the same time both an organ for the administration of the country and the owner of a mighty economic complex, the issue of money is a direct channel for socialist accumulation."

This is only the case when the issue does not shake the whole of the money in circulation. In the present circumstances, to issue money for the purpose of accumulation leads inevitably to an injury to the financial system and disintegrates the whole of trade; the burden resulting from this falls on the shoulders of the workers and peasants, so that not only economic difficulties but political complications arise.

As regards accumulation in industry, the profit on our industry amounted, according to the data of the Supreme Council of the National Economy: in the economic year 1923/24 to 105 million rubles; in the year 1924/25 to 305 million rubles; and in the year 1925/26 to 475 million rubles.

In addition to the systematic growth of the profits of industry, the amounts written off for the purpose of redemption are increasing from year to year.

The People's Commissariat for Finance disputes the data of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and estimates that the profit on industry in the economic year 1925/26

will amount to more than 600 millions. Here we have to deal with usual "inadequacy" of our bookkeeping. The truth probably lies somewhere between the two. Accumulation within industry itself will inevitably continue to increase with every improvement in the methods of working, with every new work-bench which is started, with the rationalization of the process of production, with the correct organization of work, with the starting of new factories built up on the basis of the latest achievements of technique.

The State Budget which is one of the most important instruments for the new distribution of the national income amounts, for the year 1925/26, to about 25 percent of the entire national income. In 1924/25 we allocated from the State Budget 184.2 million rubles and in 1925/26 491.1 million rubles for the development of industry. According to the statistics of the People's Commissariat for Finance, all the expenses of the State for industry, which include not only direct allocations from the Budget for the purpose of increasing industrial capital but also the expenses on the basis of the fund in accordance with the Budget for supporting uneconomic branches of export, the sums paid through the Communal Bank for the building of workers' dwellings, the expenses of the department for long-period credits of the industrial bank, the expenses of electrification, for the apparatus of administration etc. will amount in the three years from 1924/25 to 1927/28 to 1300.5 million rubles, of which 625.2 millions will be allocated in the current economic year. In contrast to this, the sums flowing into the National Budget from industry (deductions from profits, income tax, repayment of previous loans, investment of reserve capital in national loans) will amount to 120.9 million rubles in 1924/25, 196.4 million in 1925/26 and 250 million rubles according to the plans for the current year, i.e. 567 million rubles altogether for the three years.

To express ourselves in bookkeeping terms, the net amount of balance in favor of industry amounts to 63.3 millions in 1924/25, 294.7 million in 1925/26 and 375 million in the current economic year, and 733.2 million rubles in the three years taken together.

*Comrade Kuibyshev* (interrupting): Is the reconstruction loan included?

*Comrade Rykov*: Yes, it is included.

The next source which we might turn to account but which we have not yet learnt to turn to account, is the attraction of the savings of the population into the cooperatives, the savings banks, State loans etc. We must of course not disregard the leveling of the incomes of the different strata of the population of our country which was brought about by the October Revolution itself. This fact cannot, however, by any means justify the insignificant results of our efforts to get hold of small savings. I would remind you that Tsarism achieved much better results in this direction. The total amount of savings deposited in the National Savings Banks in 1925/26 amounted to about 90 million rubles, which is altogether only six percent of the balance of deposits on 1 January 1914. Only six percent of what was attained in Tsarist times! In the past economic year 1925/26, the increase of deposits amounted to the fairly big sum of 52.5 million rubles.

In my opinion, the economic boom in town and country has reached a sufficiently high level to ensure a more rapid influx of small savings. The percentage deposited by the peasants in the savings banks is extremely small in proportion to the total sum deposited, i.e., 24 percent. In prewar times, the deposits of the peasantry amounted to 28.5 percent of the total sum deposited (1 January 1914). We see a similar picture in all the cooperatives whose activities are combined with that of attracting the small savings of the population. We must realize clearly that, apart from the objective difficulties, the attraction of small deposits is hindered by insufficient attention being devoted to the problem. Neither the Press, nor the State and cooperative organs, the Party nor the trade union organs concern themselves to a sufficient degree with this question. In this respect it is the absolute duty of the Party to see that a decided change is made.

The rate of further economic development, the rate of the industrialization of the land, will depend on the extent to which capital is invested.

I have often observed how some comrades have brought very little understanding to bear on the question:—What then? At what pace will our development continue? In 1924/25, industrial production increased by 60 percent, for the economic year which has just come to an end, the Party calculated this increase at 35-40 percent; in reality, however, it is over 40 percent. And now, all at once, in the current year, a sudden drop. An increase of only 17 or 18 percent, and in the coming years still less. In view of this change, some members of the Party lost their heads, and this was the reason for the defeatist attitude of capitulation which, in its essentials, was expressed in the platform of the United Opposition. We must therefore make sure whether this slackening of the pace involves a danger which might give the Party reason for serious concern as to the fate of our socialist construction. With what speed did industry develop in the various countries, especially at a time when the juncture of affairs was favorable for those countries?

Between the years 1900 and 1913, the average annual increase of industrial production in prewar Russia amounted to 3.87 percent. At the time when trade conditions were most favorable this increase rose to 6.5 percent (1908-1913); in the years 1891-1905 it even amounted to 8.5 percent.

*In the United States* the average increase of production in the years 1899-1913 amounted to 3.5 percent; in *England* in 1905-1913 only to 1.16 percent. In 1922 the increase of production amounted to 2.2 percent and in the following year 2.7 percent.

Between the years 1898 and 1913, *France* had an annual increase of production of 3.35 percent.

What does it mean if at present we have an increase of more than 40 percent and in 1930 we shall perhaps only attain to an annual increase of ten percent in our industrial production? It indicates that our industry will in one year, make a leap forward such as has never been seen in any capitalist country.

The increase of industrial production by 17-18 percent this year is only possible thanks to the existence of reserve factory equipment which has not yet been turned to account. If this were not the case, an increase of industrial production by almost 20 percent in one year would hardly be possible. This would mean that, *in a single year, we should increase by a fifth the dimensions which industry has reached in the whole of its previous history. The rate of increase of production planned for the economic year 1927/28 of 12 percent will far exceed the historical examples quoted.* Thus there is truly no reason for a panic. We ought to be proud that, the proletarian dictatorship has been able to advance at a pace which no single capitalist country has reached, in spite of the general technical backwardness and the impoverishment of the Soviet Union at the time when it tackled the extremely difficult problem of increasing the original capital.

#### THE PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF NEW CONSTRUCTION

The question of investment of capital consists not only in whence and how much should be taken but also in how this money should be used. I deeply regret that I am not in a position to report to the Conference on the plan for the development of our industry which is calculated for five years. Comrade Krzhizhanovsky, President of the State Planning Commission, ought really to make a special report on this subject. This has not been done because the State Planning Commission has been so overburdened by the work on the control figures for the current year that the roughly sketched plan has not yet been finally examined and could not be laid before the Party for discussion.

In my opinion, it must be perfectly clear to everyone that the questions of construction on the lines of systematic economy are of much greater importance in this new stage of development than they have been in the past. We are determining the growth of industry

and the proportional growth of its separate branches for several years in advance by undertaking the building of new factories and works and the construction of new railways on a large scale. Any considerable miscalculation in the premises would lead in the future to a disproportion between the different branches of production, when fresh capital to the amount of several milliard rubles has already been invested (in this year alone we are investing more than a milliard). For this reason the working out of a plan which embraces a fairly long period of economic development is the most important task on the successful solution of which the efficient carrying through of industrialization will depend.

The past year was the first year of large investment of capital for the building of new works, and in this, as in every new matter, we have met both with considerable success and with a number of serious failures.

The traditions of our Party demand that we do not cover up our mistakes and defects but examine them with open eyes. This method of examining them is the only right way to limit our mistakes and defects to a minimum in a short time. I think that in the case in question we ought to face the mistakes we made in our first steps with regard to this work all the more openly because such mistakes may seriously affect the whole organism of our national economy.

I quote some examples of our failures:

Some time ago we discovered that we were suffering from a lack of white lead; it was imported from abroad. Some provinces, obviously prompted by a desire to promote the work of industrialization, began to build white lead factories at their own cost and their own risk. One factory of this kind was built in *Leningrad*, another in *Rostov*, a third somewhere else (voice from the audience: in *Iaroslav*)—I just hear in *Iaroslav*. Briefly, factories were built without any connection with the existing sources of raw materials and with the needs of the market. One of these factories came to a standstill for want of raw material. As the Supreme Council of the National Economy makes it its object to prevent factories which have been built, standing idle, it is distributing the existing raw material amongst all the factories so that they are working at only 50-60 percent of their capacity and are probably working at a loss instead of at a profit. As you see, we are considerably "overindustrialized" in the domain of the production of white lead (*laughter*).

This is a telling example of how necessary it is to insist upon stricter and more consistent discipline in planned economy.

Another example: in *Taganrog* there is one of the largest leather factories not only in the Soviet Union but, if I am not mistaken, in the whole of Europe. It is equipped on the basis of the most modern technical achievements. In Moscow a large leather factory has been hastily built. The result is that either the Moscow factory must come to a standstill for want of raw material or that both factories must work at half their capacity.

One more example in another field:

The building of many factories is connected in the first place with expenditure on those parts of the equipment which are ordered in our own factories and secondly for those parts which are ordered abroad. Cases are known to me in which articles ordered abroad have been delivered before our own were ready. The opposite has also occurred. Thus it happens that material of great value remains unused for months or even for more than a year, the equipment becomes damaged and antiquated, as technical science advances rapidly. We could quote plenty of such examples.

All this is the toll paid for our first steps, the penalty for our bad organization, lack of discipline, want of system and incapability. These must all be overcome in a short time.

There are however obstacles of much greater significance. They are inherent in our technical backwardness which makes itself felt in all sections of our economic organism. Let us merely take as an example our relations to foreign countries. There have been cases in which machines which have long become antiquated, are ordered from abroad. Very



often we do not understand how to order machinery properly or how to use machines which are imported. The backwardness of our technique, the inadequate training of our technical personnel, the gaps in our technical skill, all those defects act as a hindrance to our whole economics from top to bottom. It is impossible to raise the technical level of the country without improving the training and increasing the active participation of the workers in the introduction of the new achievements of technical progress (through conferences on production etc.), without improving the whole training in technical schools and colleges.

With regard to the investment of money in the building of factories and works, attention should be paid in the first place to the development of the construction of machinery, in which province we are at present dependent to a very large degree on foreign countries, not only from the material point of view, from the point of view of production, but also as regards technical knowledge. We cannot even construct a good electrical turbine by ourselves. Neither can we design nor construct a number of other machines on which the industrialization of our country depends. We must learn to construct machines ourselves, we must ensure the progress of engineering technique in the Soviet Union.

In the coming period the weakest link in the chain of the whole economic system of our country will be fuel, the production of electrical power and the traffic system. It is well known that since the October Revolution, attention has repeatedly been called, in the resolutions of the Party, to these branches of industry as the weakest points in our economic system.

I should like, however, to warn you against regarding what is said in the theses on these branches of industry as merely a repetition of what has already been said. We must take into consideration that the *Don* Basin increased its production by 500 million puds in the past economic year and will increase it by another 300-400 puds in the current year. Thus, in two years, the increase of production in the *Don* Basin yields almost a whole milliard puds of coal. This is so great an advance that we can look with pride on the vast achievements of our industrial work. The output of coal in the other coal-mining districts exceeds the prewar output. The present difficulties are both the coal and naphtha producing districts and with intensive working of the whole existing equipment for the production of fuel.

As regard the production of electrical power, it will increase in 1926 alone by 150,000 kilowatts in the district power works. In spite of this, the crisis in the supply of electrical power has become so acute that the Moscow Soviet has already had to regulate the consumption of electrical power. There will be further complications in the next few years in the domain of the supply of power unless new measures to supplement the existing ones are taken with regard to the construction of new power works and the extension of those already in existence.

Fuel and electrical current form that basis which is decisive for the development of the whole economic life of the country, not only for industry in the narrow sense of the word, but also for the life of the population, especially in the towns. The development of house building, the improvement of the standard of living of the workers, the rationalization of production, the extension of the tramway service, the improvement of the lighting of the town—quite apart from the direct dependence of the whole of industry on fuel and electricity—all these demand the concentration of all our forces and the whole of our attention on preventing a crisis with regard to fuel and electrical power.

In the production of fuel and of electrical power, the means at our disposal must above all be applied in such a way that these branches of production will form no obstacle to the development of all the other branches of national economy.

In addition to fuel, electricity and metals, special attention must be devoted to questions of transport. At the present time, railway transport has not only reached the prewar level, but already exceeds it in a certain measure. There has been a satisfactory development in

the increase of goods transported during the year. Nevertheless, transport shows a deficit this year. The amount of this deficit is still a matter of dispute, and figures varying from 50 to more than 100 million rubles are named. The deficit in the transport department is due to the fact that in connection with the new period of building of factories, works and houses etc., the amount of goods transported at a loss or at little profit, has greatly increased, whilst the percentage of the profitable carrying of goods has diminished. The share of profitable transport in the whole carrying of goods on the railways fell last year from 46.5 to 35 percent, whilst the share of transport at little or no profit increased in inverse proportion. The goods transported without profit are: fuel and building materials, wood, cement etc., for which low tariffs are fixed. The increase of the transport of these goods arises out of the whole character of the present epoch of new construction, though for railway transport it has meant considerable loss.

This deficit compelled us to pass a resolution increasing railway tariffs, from which we hope for additional earnings of about 110 million rubles in the current year. This is, of course, an unpleasant measure but it is not open to objection, since even now the price of railway transport will be considerably lower than in prewar times. The index of railway transport is considerably lower than that of either industrial or general goods.

#### THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION

In the opinion of some comrades, the section of the theses dealing with the fight against bureaucracy, the measures of economy and the new tasks of administration, are not clear enough and therefore likely to give rise to misunderstandings.

Such a criticism of this section is evidently based on its not being sufficiently, exactly and concretely explained what is to be done and in which fields of administration. In the theses it runs: "...the question of the revision of the whole system of the apparatus for economic administration must be raised." Nothing is said, however, as to how it is to be revised, when it is to be revised, what should be changed and how. This leads me to discuss in detail the tasks of the regime of economy and of the economic administration.

It is clear to everyone of us that the interests of industrialization demand the maximum of economy in expenditure, in the first place in the domain of the administrative apparatus. It is equally indisputable that the economizing regime must be combined with a more rational management of our economy, with the improvement of the methods of the functions of the State and with a fight against bureaucracy.

With every new step on the path to the industrialization of the country we shall be faced by new and increasingly complicated tasks concerning the organization of a socialist society. The process of industrialization means not only that the working class and its organizations must take a more important part and that the relation of forces between the classes must be more favorable for the proletariat, but also that there must be a fundamental change in the methods by which the working class exercises influence over the whole economic and political life of the country.

I entertain no doubts that the system of economic administration created by us since the October Revolution is not fully equal to its new tasks. It arose in a period when, under conditions of civil war and growing devastation, the works abandoned by the bourgeoisie were brought under the control of a centralized apparatus of State. As time went on, this system or organization was perfected to a considerable extent, but even today it is still centralized to a degree based on the mistrust of every minor link of the chain. Neither at the period of its creation nor in recent times has this system of organization been built on a foundation which reckoned with handing over the responsibility for the industrialization of the whole country to this organization. The system of organization was adapted to the tasks of the existing works, and that under conditions which have since undergone considerable changes. We must decide in what measure the system of economic administration

created in a previous period, is able to fulfill the new economic tasks by which the country is faced.

In order to illustrate whether and in what way our system of administration is equal to the new tasks, and on what weak points of our system we ought to concentrate our most earnest attention, I will read an extract from a letter I have received from a specialist. In former times I knew this specialist personally as a revolutionary; I do not know whether he is still a member of our Party or not, but I regard him as a person who is not far removed from our Party. He writes to me, so to speak, on the basis of our old acquaintance with considerable frankness. I will read some extracts from his letter:

"Five years ago, I undertook with your approval the task of creating, under present conditions, a new enterprise for the establishment of which we have only the creative forces of the new order to thank—an enterprise which was to lay the foundation of a new industry, an industry in the brilliant future of which not only I but our best technologists believe.

"As I wished to prove in practice that much can be accomplished under present conditions by an honest specialist devoted to the matter in hand and inspired by faith in the Soviet order, I have up to now avoided making use of any personal "connections", as I was of the opinion that knowledge and capability of work are able to overcome all difficulties. I devoted five years of my life to this cause. Amidst incredible difficulties, with an elasticity increased to the utmost, always cheering on my fellow-workers, I surmounted one difficulty after the other.

"And now, when everything is almost finished, of which you can convince yourself by a mere superficial glance at the accompanying copies of the report of the State Industrial Administration of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the deed of revision of the Financial Department of the province—now, when there is only work for two or three months, I feel that, in the present situation, I cannot carry the matter through to its end, as my nerves and heart will not stand it. My devotion to the cause and enthusiasm for the work are withering and the forces which are fruitlessly exhausted are becoming weaker; only one thing remains—the old Bolshevist obstinacy; the habit of fighting to the end from a sense of responsibility for the task undertaken. But even this is undermined by the consciousness that in the given situation, I cannot make any advance, that where I am, I am squandering power and energy to no purpose. Judge for yourself whether one can work profitably under the following conditions:

"During the whole five years there has not been a single year in which the means necessary for carrying on the work in hand were allocated to us. We only received small fractions, small doles. Consequently we found, for instance, on 1 October 1925 that the sum of the costs of the building work and of the finished equipment exceeded the allocation by 332,027 rubles 50 kopeks. Who was to make up this deficit? It was paid out of the money advanced by the purchasers of the products from the secondary undertaking directly dependent on the State Budget; however, I am not allowed to make out bills of exchange. They are nevertheless accepted and discounted throughout the RSFSR, out of confidence in the signature which has never been dishonored. Now, instead of the allocation of money, we receive innumerable inspections.

"Thus we had for instance in 1925:

1. A revision by the Financial Department of the province.
2. A revision by the Provincial Section for Work.
3. A revision by the Revision Commission of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.
4. A revision by the Supreme Building Board of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.
5. An inspection by a Special Commission at the order of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the Soviet Union. All this without counting the inspections of the local district bodies.

"And in 1926:

1. A revision by a combined commission of the People's Commissariats for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and for Finance.
2. An inspection by the Provincial Board for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.
3. An inspection by the Finance Department of the province.
4. An inspection by the provincial GPU.
5. An inspection by the Public Prosecutor's Office.
6. An inspection by the Avio Purchasing Department.
7. An inspection by the Board of Directors for Chemistry of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.
8. An inspection by the Board of Directors for Building of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.
9. An inspection by the Provincial Labor Bureau and other authorities; in the month of July alone six inspections by commissions.

"All these commissions regard it as their duty to make these inspections at the busiest time.

"My time is wasted in a most unproductive manner on reports, conferences, negotiations etc. The Central Government demands reports, the Provincial Government demands reports, the Local Government demands reports.

"The trade union organizations—the workers belong to three different trade unions: the union of the workers in the building trade, the woodworkers' union and the union of agricultural and forest workers—formed three factory disputes. I must have time for everything, as my presence at councils, three organizations for discussing production and three commissions for setting up standards and settling demanded everywhere and my absence gives offence. When am I to find time for work?"

He also describes his further worries and adds a truly extraordinary document, which is really what prompted him to apply to me; he received the following document"

"To the Director of the militia of the N factory,

"You are requested on the receipt of this letter to send citizen X to the office of the authorized representative in the district of the provincial department of the GPU about a matter which concerns him.

(Signed) The authorized etc."

Accompanying this document, the writer of the letter quoted received a communication from his deputy manager to the effect that this summons had, as he had learnt from a telephone conversation with the authorized representative of the GPU, no serious justification, but was only a childish whim on the part of the representative of the GPU who wished to show that he was a person in authority.

I have followed up the matter and have learnt that no administrative or judicial examination of the writer of the letter was intended, that no one accused him of any misdeed, that he was everywhere regarded as an honorable man. I spoke with comrades of the provincial government in question and not one of them expressed the faintest doubt that the man is absolutely loyal to us and that he is working with great self-sacrifice, with great devotion to the cause and with implicit honesty at the task entrusted to him.

If such revisions and this affair with the representative of the GPU are practiced in absolutely trustworthy cases and with respect to an undertaking at the head of which is a man whom Lenin knew, whom I know, whom Krzhizhanovsky and Bukharin know, with whom we formerly worked when our Party was illegal, how will other undertakings be treated? Can we, with such a system, confidently take for granted that the 1050 million rubles allocated for increasing the original stock is being used to good purpose?

(*Interjection by Comrade Chubar*: One milliard for revisions and fifty million for construction!)

Of course there are bad specialists as well as good ones. The working class must, however, know how to distinguish the good ones from the bad, to give the good ones every possible support and the bad ones the punishment they deserve! The circumstances under which this specialist worked, are quite abnormal. This whole system of revision and control which is at the same time combined with a lack of personal responsibility, is hardly calculated to ensure successful work in the course of the coming period.

The whole organization arrangement, which came into being last year, bears the distinguishing characteristic that it did not directly serve the industrialization of the country, and secondly (this has been and will be admitted by all of us) that it is infested with the disease of bureaucratism. This disease is especially dangerous in a period in which, under complicated conditions, we shall have to spend enormous sums for the industrialization of the country. I do not intend to quote innumerable examples of the bureaucratic distortions in the practical work of the soviets, I only refer to my own experiences.

In the People's Commissariats I am often at a loss to find the hand which would take a firm and determined grip of the practical questions connected with the industrialization of the country, I cannot find the bodies which would solve these questions quickly and exactly. There is not such an apparatus! Our administrative apparatus was adapted to the solution of other problems. The chief question is, of course, what practical measures we ought to take immediately. Who is responsible and for what is he responsible? Which authority has the final power to decide? What questions of planned economy must be worked out and in what order? I cannot give any exact universal prescription in this respect. Is it necessary to revise the trust law? In my opinion, this *must* be done. The diseases mentioned are reflected in the most dangerous way in the economic work, but I am not altogether sure that the system of our apparatus of State and the activity of the soviets ought not to be raised also, not only with a view to reducing bureaucratism but also with a view to adapting the system to some extent to the tasks of industrialization. If the whole way of putting the question meets with the approval of the Conference, then a whole system of practical tasks must be worked out in the immediate future and carried out *gradually*. It would, to say the least of it, be strange to imagine that we could at one stroke change a system which has taken several years to develop. In this work of revising the whole machinery of State and economy with the object of adapting it to the new tasks and of reducing bureaucratism, we shall probably make mistakes of some kind or another. This is unavoidable, but it cannot be regarded as an argument in favor of the system now in force.

#### AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

The above characteristics of the fundamental questions of the economic policy of the Party would be very inadequate and one-sided (not only in their form, but in their whole nature) if the treatment of the problems of industrialization were not brought into harmony with the problems of agriculture. It is perfectly clear to our whole Party that the questions of agriculture and our policy towards the peasantry must altogether be brought into agreement with our general policy. It is all the more necessary to dwell on these questions because the policy of the Party with regard to the peasantry is exposed to the violent attacks on the part of the opposition.

At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party in April, it was stated that there were two extreme points of view in regard to the questions of our agricultural policy and of our relations to the peasantry. One of them is based on the necessity of the greatest possible protection being given to agriculture and of the largest possible amounts being invested in it, and only after this, in the following stages of development, placing the problem of industrialization on the agenda. The other point of view laid such emphasis on the question of industrialization that, were we to follow the second way in practice, our industry would play the same part towards agriculture as England does to the colonial countries. Thus, the second point of view regards agriculture *merely* as a source from which to draw the means for the development of industry.

These two points of view are, in essentials, the point of view of capitulation. Both these points of view were rejected by the Fourteenth Party Congress and by the Plenary Session of the CC in April. In spite of this the question of our relations to the peasantry in connection with the problem of industrialization is being further discussed in the Press and at meetings of workers.

The practical solution of the task of industrialization must rest on an economic policy of the Party, in which the development of the whole of industry creates equally favorable conditions for the development of the productive forces of agriculture. The peasantry itself is interested in the development of industry. The peasant is interested in industrialization, not only as a buyer of industrial products (objects of general necessity and tools for production) of the best possible quality and at the lowest possible price (which we can only attain in proportion as industrial construction is extended), but he is no less interested in industrialization as the producer of agricultural raw materials. It is superfluous to point out on this occasion what an extraordinary influence machines, for instance the tractor, exercise on the development of agriculture. In our country, the Putilov works are the only ones which are equipped for the production of tractors. Even they, however, produce them at five to six times the cost of those from abroad. The quantity of tractors produced in our country is extraordinarily small. This year we shall be obliged to hand over tractors only to collective farms or tractor associations—and not even to all of them. We shall only be able to meet a fifth of the demand in the villages. The building of the tractor factory in Stalin-grad is just as much a workers' problem as a peasants' problem, because the tractors which this factory will produce are one of the main factors in agriculture. This example of the tractor factories could of course be supplemented by a number of other examples and illustrations, but on the whole we must start from the premise that even the development of agriculture itself depends on the development of industrialization. In exactly the same way the questions related to the surplus population in the country will be solved in proportion as industry is extended. A large part of the peasants, who can find no occupation in agriculture, will only be able to find a means of earning a living in the town if industry increases.

In this way the peasantry is interested in the development both as a consumer and producer. At the same time agriculture must be adapted in a greater measure than hitherto to the requirements of industry. It is sheer nonsense to maintain that the present shortage of a number of industrial articles is to be attributed entirely to the lack of machinery and tools. That is quite wrong. The shortage of textile, woollen and leather products in the course of the past and the present years is not due to the lack of tools but to the lack of raw materials, hides, wool, cotton etc.

From this point of view, the retardation of the growth of technical training, which became evident last year, is a particularly dangerous symptom. The production of agricultural products which supply industry with raw materials, amounts this year to nearly 94 percent of that production of last year. At the same time, the development of cattle-breeding is proceeding at a slower pace. To a certain extent we ourselves are to blame for this, the mistakes with regard to the regulation of prices especially have affected the question. Simultaneously with the increase of prices for cereal products, a great reduction of the prices for flax and other agricultural products used in industry, was permitted. The peasants, taking the unfavorable juncture of affairs into consideration, cultivate those products which bring them more profit. This has resulted in a drop in the production of agricultural products used in industry. Up to the present the problem of prices of cereals has been discussed in detail in all organizations and meetings, including the plenary meeting of the CC and the party conferences. Very little attention however is paid to the problem of the prices of raw materials which, to a certain extent, has vanished from the field of interest. The policy regarding the prices of agricultural products used in industry, which are most important for us, has not been sufficiently thoroughly dealt with, as it is regarded as a subordinate problem or one of second rank. Questions connected with it have only been settled from case

to case, for one particular month or one particular district. But on the whole, no sufficiently firm and consistent line of action has been taken in the policy regarding the prices of the raw products of agriculture. The mistakes which have been made in this domain must be corrected at all costs and as quickly as possible, for it is clear to everyone that the less raw material is produced in the country itself, the more must be imported from abroad. In our plan of imports for the current year the share of industrial raw materials (cotton, wool, hides etc.) amounts to more than 40 percent. We have to pay for the weakness of our agriculture by paying in foreign money for raw materials purchased abroad. It is therefore absolutely necessary to take every possible measure in the immediate future to remove this rift between agriculture and industry. It is imperative that the question of the regulation of prices for agricultural production by districts should be put on the agenda in all its aspects, in order to promote the development of an intensive cultivation of products used in industry. In doing so, it must not be the interests of a given month or of a group of purchasers which are taken into consideration, but the interests of the whole situation of our national economy.

One specially urgent question of the policy of the Party in the country is the question of the differentiation of classes amongst the peasantry.

Certain comrades of the Opposition maintain, in connection with the discussion on differentiation in the villages, that once again, in the conditions prevailing in the period since October, "the thread of the economic development of the upper strata of our villages which was tending towards the formation of a stratum of capitalist farmers—this thread which was broken by the revolution, will be taken up again and spun further by history" (from the speech of Comrade Preobrazhensky from the Communist Academy). The Opposition considers that it has been indisputably proved that exactly the same process of differentiation is going on in the villages as went on under the Tsars, under the conditions of private ownership of land and of feudal landlordism, that the October Revolution has had no noticeable and definite influence on the relation of forces in the villages and that "the thread broken by the revolution will be taken up again and spun further by history." This way of putting the question must attract the attention of the whole Party. This "theory" should be thoroughly appreciated, all the more so as our policy with regard to the villages is described by those comrades literally in the following words: "Mark time, steer a cautious course, make concessions to the petty bourgeoisie and then capitulate before their pressure...."

These are the accusations which are made against the Party in connection with the question of class differentiation in the village. It was this which prompted me to ask our statisticians for the most exact data possible with regard to the process of differentiation among the peasantry. Here are the results of the investigations which have been made by the Central Statistical Administration with regard to 35 provinces.

Grouping of the farms according to the area under cultivation in percentage:

	1922	1923	1924	1925
No land under cultivation	6.9	5.3	4.8	4.2
Up to 2 desiatins under cultivation	46	40.7	36.6	33
From 2-6 desiatins	40.3	44	46.7	49.3
From 6-10 desiatins	5.6	7.8	9	10.2
More than 10 desiatins	1.2	2.2	2.9	3.3
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

It is evident from the table that not only the percentage of peasants without land under cultivation but also the percentage of dwarf farms with up to two desiatins under cultivation is decreasing in number from year to year. On the other hand we may observe an increase of farms with more than 10 desiatins under cultivation.

To supplement this, I add a summary of the data with regard to the grouping of the peasantry according to their livestock for the whole RSFSR, as they have been worked out by the People's Commissariat for Finance on the basis of the latest agricultural taxation list.

	1923/24	1925/26
No cattle	17%	15%
Up to 2 head	63%	60%
From 2-4 head	18%	22%
Over 4 head	2%	3%
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%

We see from this that there is a decrease of the percentage of farms with no cattle or very few and an increase of farms with 2-4 head of cattle. At the same time there is a certain increase of farms with more than four head of cattle.

I have no data with regard to the distribution of new tractive power, i.e. the tractors, at my disposal. Thanks to the system we have introduced in the selling of tractors, we have brought about that, up to the present time, the greater number is in the hands of the poorer strata, who are combined in tractor associations, collective farms etc.

What is the significance of differentiation among the peasants, and how was this differentiation understood in former times? The differentiation of the peasants was understood in former times as the disintegration of the middle stratum of peasants and its separation into two extreme wings. The undermining of the middle stratum leads to an increase of, on the one hand, those owning but little land and on the other hand, the wealthy farmers (kulaks). Nowadays we have no process of differentiation in such a pure, "classical" form. We have at present a general increase of all economic groups and a decrease of all farms without livestock, with no land or but little land under cultivation. All groups of peasant farms are thriving. The fundamental stock of the middle peasants is not only not disintegrating but is growing and gaining in importance, as those strata of the peasants who have but little land join the ranks of the middle peasants as they improve their position (thanks to our policy in the villages).

At the same time, the proletarianization of some of the poorest groups of the peasants is proceeding as well as the separation of the kulak group from the well-to-do section of the peasantry, which is becoming more influential, more energetic and more active.

What is the political significance of the statistics quoted with regard to land under cultivation and livestock? That it proves objectively that the process of class differentiation which is going on in the villages is trending in a new direction thanks to the conditions of the revolution—the nationalization of the land, our taxation policy, the policy of granting agricultural credits, the organization of the rural poor, the creation of a special fund for the rural poor, the activity of the agricultural cooperatives, the promotion of collective forms of agriculture, and, finally, the whole policy of the Party and of the Soviets.

In any case there can be no doubt that both the character and the rate of differentiation are different from what they were in prerevolutionary times. This is the fundamental peculiarity of the process of differentiation which is going on in the villages.

The process of the appropriation by the village poor of the land which fell to their share through the agrarian revolution, is still going on. Up to the present they have not been able to cultivate the land to the full because of their lack of means, of livestock and implements.



The process of the appropriation of the land by those strata of the rural population who possess but little, is going on the basis of the general economic reconstruction. This is why the views which carry over the prerevolutionary conceptions of differentiation to the present day are absolutely wrong. These views are stamped with capitulationism, both when they are based on simple ignorance of the processes and when they are the result of some organic defeatism which manifests itself with every difficulty that is encountered. The representatives of these views have drawn up a special agricultural taxation program. This program was first expounded by Comrade *Trotsky* at the April Plenum of the CC in his amendment to the resolution on our economic policy. This amendment runs:

"The agricultural tax must be one of the most important levers for the distribution of the accumulation of our national economy."

The superindustrialists recognize no limits when they are looking for means to carry on industry. Had we granted, let us say, five milliard rubles for industrialization this year, we should have received the very next day a resolution to the effect that at least four milliards more must be added. But even from the point of view of the 1050 million rubles granted this year, the "most important lever," the agricultural tax ought obviously, even with this sum, to produce a few hundred million, otherwise there would be no sense in describing the agricultural tax as the "most important lever" for the redistribution of the accumulation of our national economy, for in that case the agricultural tax would have to be increased to twice its number if not multiplied. It is impossible to use the word "lever", "most important lever" etc. because of a few million rubles. Many other members of the Opposition (Comrade Preobrazhensky et. al.) are in favor of additional taxation of the peasantry and attribute great practical and fundamentally political significance to this additional taxation.

Our uniform agricultural tax is so arranged that its chief burden falls on the shoulders of the kulaks and on the wealthy groups of the rural population: 15 percent of the wealthy farms pay 47 percent of the whole tax, about 25 percent of the peasantry are entirely exempt from taxation.

In order to show how little possibility there is of increasing the burden of taxation, I will give an example from rural life. Our functionaries who are commissioned to investigate the conditions of taxation and to determine the amount of taxation which is admissible, examine a number of farms according to a system of making tests at hazard. Let us take a farm in the Bykov county (Bronitska district) in the province of Moscow. The income of this farm in cash amounts to 1248 rubles. The uniform agricultural tax amounts to 253 rubles 50 kopeks. Add to this personal taxation, insurance etc., altogether in round figures 400 rubles i.e. about 32 percent of the total income. In this way, from a farm with an income of 1248 rubles, i.e. roughly 100 rubles a month, 400 rubles, that is the income for four months, are deducted. Furthermore, in consequence of the high retail prices, the peasantry on the whole pays excessive prices for industrial goods.

Of course it is open to question whether the system of taxation is itself sufficiently perfected. The experiences of this year must show its defects and the direction in which changes might be made. I have received a number of communications direct from the source with regard to certain irregularities in the agricultural tax, according to which the agricultural tax has, this year, proved too heavy even for the farms of the middle peasants in certain districts. It is possible that these communications are incorrect. In any case, however, the burden of taxation is not so slight that the uniform agricultural tax could be so far increased as to make it "the most important lever" for the redistribution of the means of industrialization. Various kinds of improvement of the tax are possible, such as for instance a revision of the rates of assessment or, with the growth of agriculture, a certain increase; for some groups of the peasantry or for special districts, a reduction of the burden of taxation is even possible. It is clear that in the present situation of agriculture no means of any importance for industrialization can be obtained in this way. Anyone who

tries to make an increase of the uniform agricultural tax one of the most important levers for the redistribution of means which can be used for industrialization, is working towards shattering the alliance between the workers and peasants.

## THE PRESENT-DAY QUESTIONS OF ECONOMIC POLICY

### THE QUESTIONS OF PRIVATE CAPITAL

Apart from the attack on the Party's policy in the countryside, the Opposition, as is well known, attempted to make "political capital" out of the question of private capital. During the recent discussion, the Opposition drew up a program which was formulated by Comrade *Zinoviev* (he is a good stylist!) "in his speech in the nucleus of the Aviapribor factory with 100 percent of clearness and exactness."

He said:

"The expenditure on bureaucratism must be reduced by half a milliard. If we get hold of the kulak and the profiteer,—we shall receive another half milliard. In this way we shall gain a milliard which we shall divide between industry and wages. This is our economic program in two words."

Another economic program was expounded in No. 18 of the "Bolshevik" by a certain Comrade *Maislin*. I am told that this Maislin is a good friend of V. M. Smirnov and Piatakov. This Maislin found another milliard by increasing the factory price of articles of general necessity by 30 percent. Thus, Zinoviev has produced one milliard, Maislin another; two milliards are no small fund for our industrialization (*Laughter. Exclamations of: Enough to begin with!*)

You can see from this example in what atmosphere, under what unequal conditions, the discussion took place. Comrade Zinoviev comes into the nucleus and lays a milliard on the table (*Laughter!*), while Maislin holds another milliard in his hand with which to reinforce the till. Our supporters can offer nothing of the kind. And yet these two "milliardaires" were beaten by the simple members of the Party in all the nuclei. (*Laughter*) The simple members of the Party showed more knowledge of economic questions than the leaders of the Opposition. (*Applause*) I regard the whole evidence of the Opposition in favor of these milliards as an anecdote and will not insult the Conference by supposing that it is necessary to prove the absolute worthlessness of these proposals.

Exclamation from Comrade *Mikoian*: No proofs are necessary! (*Applause!*)

Since, however, the question of these milliards is linked up with the question of private capital, I should like to say a few words on this latter question, beginning with the reservation that there are no indisputable, exact figures with regard to the amount of private capital working in our country nor of its accumulation. The exaggerated calculations of Comrade *Piatakov* were disproved at the time by Comrade *Dzerzhinsky*. The reports on the amount of private capital and its accumulation which have been placed at my disposal by various authorities and by individual comrades who have concerned themselves with the question, do not seem to be indisputable. According to these data, the amount of annual accumulation of private capital varies between 100 and 200 million rubles. I state once more that I am not convinced that these figures exactly represent the truth. The only thing that is certain is that the share taken by private capital in our economic life has gradually *diminished* in the last few years. I call your attention to the following statistics:

In the economic year 1923/24, the share taken by private merchants in the turnover of *wholesale trade* was 22 percent. Today it is nine percent.

In *retail trade*, the share taken by private capital fell from 57 percent in 1923/24 to 39 percent in 1925/26.

You see from these figures how the private dealer has evacuated one position after another to the cooperative elements of our economy, and that on the section of our economic front which represents the most important field of activity.

*In production*, private capital plays an unimportant part. One of the sources of accumulation of private capital was speculation in currency, the "black exchange", which we have liquidated. Expressed in absolute figures, the accumulation of private capital will probably increase but, thanks to the much more rapid growth of the socialized sector of our economics, the relative part played by private capital is on the decline.

At the time of the discussion in 1923, Comrade *Preobrazhensky* estimated the accumulation of private capital at 600 million rubles, and today it is estimated by Comrade *Piatakov* at 400-500 million rubles. Thus the amount of this accumulation is falling even in the opinion of the Opposition, in spite of their dread of private capital.

We must, however, not ignore the fact that private capital is now becoming much more organized and active than it was formerly; it has adapted itself much better to present conditions and is forming connections with the upper stratum in the villages, whose activity is also on the increase. For this reason it would be a great mistake on our part did we fail to recognize the danger which threatens us in this respect.

The most characteristic factor is that in recent times, in the fight which we have carried on the whole time and shall continue to carry on against private capital, even though the form taken by the fight may change according to the circumstances of each given period of development, that we—the State, the socialized economy—are making the attack on private capital and not vice versa, private capital on us. We have already mastered a whole number of proved methods and forms of the regulation of private capital—regulation in the sense that we drive it out of those branches of industry where its activities seem to us least desirable, and attract it to those branches of industry where its activities can be strictly controlled and which, at the present stage, it seems most suitable from the point of view of the interests of the State—can and must be considerably extended.

We have already regulated the private transport of goods on economic lines. In some cases we have had favorable experiences in supplying private capitalists with the products of State industry under conditions exactly formulated and guaranteed, regulating the sale of the products of State industry by the private capitalist. By way of legislation, measures were taken to attract private capital to housebuilding. For the first time the experiment is being made of fixing a somewhat higher tariff for the transport of private goods, so that, should the experiment succeed, the prohibition of the carriage of certain private goods will be replaced by the increased tariff rates.

You are probably also aware that we have introduced a certain increase of the burden of taxation for the stratum of the population which does not belong to the working class. This happened after the change in the membership of the Council of Labor and Defense and of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Finance. The progressive gradation of income tax was increased one and a half times as compared with the laws previously in force.

I quote from the report of the commission of the Supreme Council of the National Economy which was entrusted with the special working out of the question of private capital. (I must remark that the standpoint of the commission quoted has not yet been confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy):

"The highest rates of income tax have been raised to 45 percent of the income of the tax-payer, exclusive of additional local charges. As the additional local charges have been raised from 35 percent of the tax on land to, in some places, as much as 50 percent, the income tax may amount to 56-67 percent of the income. The taxation of superprofits to the amount of 50 percent of the tax, i.e. 22.5 percent of the income, may in individual cases raise the amount of the burden of taxation to 90 percent. Thanks to the levelling of incomes, the average burden of taxation on the basis of income tax is nevertheless, in spite of the high individual rates, on the whole 8.4 percent"

Should these calculations be confirmed, measures would probably have to be taken, as regards some groups of tax-payers, not in the direction of raising but in that of reducing the progressive gradation of taxation.

The chief defect in the field of taxation policy with regard to private capital has hitherto been the possibility of defrauding the revenue with regard to a number of sources of income. The Party has so far not paid sufficient attention to the work of tax collecting and has not supported it in the measure which is necessary if better results are to be obtained from the taxation of private capital.

The chief problem is not the defects in our laws but the defects in their application.

The growth of our economic organizations, our organizations for provision, for taxation, for cooperatives etc., has made it possible to apply comprehensive and successful methods for the regulation of the activities of private capital without endangering the economic life of the country, methods which would have been impossible only three or four years ago.

Our chief weakness with regard to private capital was that we had it insufficiently under statistical registration and control. This means that in the immediate future the most important practical task in the question of private capital is the improvement of its statistical registration and control.

\* \* \*

The draft of my report contains a detailed description of the balance of the provision of cereals, of the demand for goods, of foreign trade and of the questions of work and wages. In view of the advanced hour I cannot deal with this analysis to the extent which would be necessary to characterize the economic situation of the country. I therefore restrict myself to a few quite short remarks.

#### THE BALANCE OF THE PROVISION OF CEREALS

This year's harvest is somewhat larger than that of last year, i.e. by about ten percent. This increase also found expression in our plan of export.

We began the campaign for the provision of cereals under much more favorable conditions than was the case in the previous year. We have succeeded in fixing the prices of cereals which, while lower in comparison with last year, is yet on the whole satisfactory from the point of view of the interests of the peasantry. The apparatus for the provision of cereals has decidedly improved.

Difficulties in the provision of cereals may arise from the fact that the yield of the harvest increased this year in such districts as Kazakhstan, Bashkiria, the Orenburg district etc., where the provision of cereals meets with great difficulties because of the inadequate development of the ways of communication and the weakness of the cooperatives and of the apparatus for providing cereals.

I have already spoken of the diminished role played by the agricultural products used in industry in this year's harvest.

#### THE DEMAND FOR GOODS

It has been pointed out in the theses that there will again be a crying demand for goods in the current year, but there is no reason to suppose that it will be intensified.

It is characteristic of the goods market in the current year that the demand of the internal market for industrial products will be satisfied by home production alone, whereas last year foreign currency to the amount of about 100 million rubles was spent on the importation of cotton fabrics and other articles of general consumption. Instead of importing finished goods we have increased the import of raw materials and have achieved a greater increase of production in our industry than we had anticipated in our program, especially in those branches of industry in which there is a crying demand for goods.

The number of goods for which there is a special demand has decreased and is now limited to cotton and wool fabrics, leather goods and the marketable sorts of metal products.

There are today certain factors which make an improvement of the situation in the goods market possible. The cotton harvest in Turkestan has, thanks to the good weather in the past month, proved to be rather better than was anticipated. The decrease of the prices of cotton on the American market has on the other hand made it possible to import more foreign cotton.

One of the most important and decisive question in the goods market is that of prices.

#### THE POLICY WITH RESPECT TO PRICES

I have already mentioned that the prices of *agricultural* goods are *on a considerably lower level* this year than they were in the previous year. Since the month of May, the curve of agricultural prices has fallen at a rapid rate, whilst the line of industrial retail prices shows a hardly perceptible decline (From 1 May to 1 October this decrease of prices amounted to 2.6 percent). Wholesale prices show during the whole time a certain, though scarcely noticeable rise (0.4 percent).

In past years the time between May and October has been a period of a rise in prices. Thus for instance during the same period last year, retail prices rose by more than six percent. It is therefore a sign of considerable success that, in the months of a seasonal increase in the demands for industrial products, we were able to attain a change in the movement of industrial retail prices. The level of retail prices is however still extremely high as compared with last year; on 1 October 1926 it was higher by 10 percent than on the same day of the previous year. The first stimulus to the increase of prices was given by the exaggerated issue of money at the beginning of last year and in the last quarter of the previous year. The good harvests this year enabled us to bring about a quick recovery of the market for agricultural goods.

The retail prices of *industrial* products, which are far too high, represent a great danger. We cannot rest content with the results achieved in the reduction of these prices and must continue with all our energies the *campaign for cutting down* prices, which we have already begun. Too great a disproportion between the prices of agricultural and industrial prices may give rise to a perfectly justified discontent among the peasants. The Party, the cooperatives and the industrial bodies must then exert all their energies to bring down the prices of industrial goods.

In respect of the price policy, there are fundamental differences of opinion on the principle between the Central Committee and the Opposition. As I have already said, the second milliard, which already "exists" in the till of the Opposition, must be procured out of the increase of prices advocated by the Opposition. This policy of increasing prices is in direct contradiction to the policy which the majority of the Central Committee is carrying through. The arguments against this policy of the Opposition are contained in the theses. I should like to remark that the differences with regard to price policy far exceed the limits of deeds of legislation. *These differences are of far-reaching political significance.*

The low prices are prices which suit *the interests of the poor proletarian workers and peasants*, the high prices are prices for the *kulaks, profiteers and the wealthy population*. The policy of high prices is nothing more or less than union with the kulaks and the profiteers. The high prices mean in the end *the disruption of the alliance between the workers and peasants*.

In spite of the exertion of the greatest pressure, we have so far only achieved unsatisfactory results in our whole resistance to the increase of prices, since our trade is still badly organized and the working costs of State and cooperative trade are still excessively high. Whatever would happen if we were to adopt the platform of the Opposition?

In this question there can be no excuse even for those members of the Opposition who either surround their platform with regard to price policy with innumerable reservations, or hint that there is no uniform point of view on this question within the Opposition.

If we disregard all these reservation within the discussion, which the Opposition uses to justify its standpoint with greater power of conviction, it becomes clear that the platform of high prices arises from the fundamental premises of the Opposition platform, i.e., the view of the Opposition which regards prices as a special kind of system of taxation, in so far as the masses of peasants are concerned. This policy of high prices would inevitably in the end lead to great political difficulties.

#### FOREIGN TRADE

A few words about foreign trade. The necessity of attaining a *favorable trade balance* must be emphasized with the greatest energy. Our program for foreign trade reckons with the accumulation of 75 million rubles reserve of foreign currency this year, in which case the balance on the credit side of our financial accounts would have to exceed 100 million rubles. This is especially necessary because in the last two years there has been a deficit in our trade balance so that our reserve of foreign currency has been considerably reduced.

Our scheme of imports for the current economic year differs essentially from the imports of last year, the import of material for equipment will be increased by more than 50 percent. At the same time the import of raw materials will be increased, which will render possible an extension of the production in those branches of industry which work for general consumption.

The completion of the import scheme must be made dependent, in its whole scope, on the completion of the export scheme. At the same time the gradual accumulation of reserves of foreign currency during the whole year must be ensured.

I do not think it is necessary to prove to this Conference the firmness of the monopoly of foreign trade which has been decidedly emphasized in the theses.

In order to illustrate what is said in the theses with regard to the necessity of the fight against the high working costs which continue to be excessively high. I quote the following information which has been placed at my disposal by the Trade Commissariat: the maintenance of the apparatus for the provision of flax cost 12-15 kopeks per pud before the war and costs today 40-50 kopeks. Equally high working costs can also be observed in some other branches of industry.

#### QUESTIONS OF LABOR

On the agenda of the Conference is a special report from Comrade *Tomsky* in which light is thrown on the details of the questions of wages, unemployment, the productivity of labor, the activity of the conferences on production etc.

Everyone who is taking part in socialist construction understands very well the extreme importance of these questions.

I should like to mention the chief factors in the immediate tasks of the Party in this domain.

First of all I should like to lay the greatest stress on the fact that, although there has been a considerable revival in the work of the conferences on production in recent times, we must see to it that these organizations take a still greater share in economic construction. Every functionary of the Party, the trade unions and the Soviets must be inspired with the consciousness that industrialization can only be carried through successfully if it is accompanied by an increase of the activity and better organization of the working class and by the raising of its cultural level.

Apart from increasing the share taken by the labor organizations in the field of economic reconstruction, (without which the idea of industrialization would itself inevitably assume a bureaucratic character), we must see to it that a stop is put to the attempts to carry through the regime of economy at the expense of the important interests of the working class. The Party must pursue such a policy, so that the *situation of the working class* and

in the first place the situation of its *worst paid strata* must be continually *improved* in proportion to the growth of the whole of industry.

In recent times cases of the relaxation of discipline in the works and of increased slackening have been noticed. These occurrences must be removed by the efforts of the labor organizations and especially of the Party.

At the same time the Party must devote more attention to *combatting unemployment*. In our circumstances the causes of unemployment are essentially different from those in capitalist countries. Unemployment exists in our country in spite of the increasing number of the workers employed in industry and is to a large extent bound up with the surplus of workers in the villages; it will therefore take a long time to overcome. The measures for combatting unemployment must not only be on the lines of developing industry and organizing public works but also on the lines of various agricultural schemes. These measures which we have taken, for instance, in respect to the central black-earth district and the districts visited by failure of harvests, already show remarkable results. This year we must make preliminary arrangements for improving the settlement of the land and must increase the estimates in the Budget intended for this purpose.

In the theses, the platform of the Opposition has been called a "*defeatist*" platform. This expression called forth great objections on the part of the Opposition when the theses were discussed in the Politburo. As we may take for granted that the adherents of the Opposition will attempt at this conference also to prove the inadmissibility of this expression, I should like to say a few words in its defense.

Lack of faith in the forces of revolution, lack of faith in the forces of the working class prompt the Opposition to talk all along of a "coming", "approaching", "possible" defeat of the proletarian dictatorship. I would remind you of Comrade *Trotsky's* letter of 8 October 1923 to the Politburo and of the document of "the 46" which dates from about the same period. These two documents contain similar statements. Comrade Trotsky wrote at that time:

"The Party may be overtaken by an extraordinarily severe crisis, and in that case the Party would be justified in accusing anyone who had seen the danger and not spoken openly of it, of having valued the form more than the content."

What was the crisis in question in Comrade Trotsky's document? In the document of "the 46", the crisis is described as follows:

"Unless far-reaching, well thought-out systematic and energetic measures are taken immediately, if the present lack of leadership continues, we are faced by the possibility of an extremely severe economic upheaval which would inevitably be linked with complications of our internal politics and with complete paralysis of our activities and capability of action with regard to external matters. It is easy to understand that nowadays we need this activity more than ever, on it depends the fate of the world revolution and of the working class in all countries."

And further:

"The economic crisis in Soviet Russia and the crisis of the fractional dictatorship within the Party will severely injure the proletarian dictatorship in Russia and the Russian proletarian party unless the situation is fundamentally changed in the immediate future. Being so heavily burdened, the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia and its leader the RCP, cannot but enter on the coming period of new world cataclysms with the prospect of failures along the whole front of the proletarian fight."

Thus spoke and erred the Opposition in 1923.

The words of the *new*, united Opposition are permeated by the same disbelief in the forces of the revolution. I will read you a few quotations from the amendments proposed by Comrade Trotsky and Comrade Kamenev to the resolution of the April Plenum.

Comrade Trotsky writes:

"All reports indicate that our industry will meet the harvests of 1926 without any stores of goods, which may mean *a repetition of the present difficulties on a larger scale*. (The emphasis is Comrade Trotsky's!) In these circumstances, the good harvest, i.e. the potential growth of a surplus of agricultural goods may become a factor which does not accelerate the rate of economic development in the direction of Socialism, but on the contrary will disorganize industry and exacerbate the relation between town and country and, in the town itself, between consumers and State."

The same "repetition of the present difficulties on a larger scale" and the same prophecy of a crisis in the autumn is found in Comrade *Kamenev's* amendment to the April resolution. He says:

"The economic period on which we are entering may, if the harvest is good—in addition to the general growth of industry—even intensify the difficulties described."

We said at that time, at the April Plenum, that it is impossible to satisfy those comrades: if there is a bad harvest, it is bad, if there is a good harvest it is worse still (*Laughter*). If the crops fail—a crisis; if the harvest is good—also a crisis. Is this not lack of faith and deliberately causing a panic? The Opposition approaches every little difficulty and even such positive facts as a good harvest, with anxiety, in the anticipation of an inevitable general crisis. No matter whatever happens in our industry is good or bad, they speak of nothing but a defeat. They terrified us with a defeat in 1923 and they are terrifying us with a defeat in 1926. Through all these expressions of opinion there runs the red thread of disbelief in the powers of the working class, in the forces of the Party and the revolution.

The ideology of the Opposition is also *defeatist* in the sense that if the Party were to base its activity on the political platform, the price policy, the peasant policy, the two-milliard program of the Opposition, the defeat of the revolution and of the dictatorship would really be absolutely assured.

There is of course a fundamental difference between the defeatism of today and the defeatism of the time of the imperialist war. At that time, the defeatists deliberately steered their course towards the defeat of the Tsarist troops in the imperialist war, towards the overthrow of the regime of the landed proprietors and capitalists. It would of course be nonsense to accuse the Opposition of deliberately aiming at the defeat of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union. "Independently of their wishes" however, their lack of faith in the creative forces of the revolution and the working class make their platform a platform of defeatism.

Is it possible that Comrade Trotsky does not understand that at the time of the imperialist war, when Tsarist Russia was taking part in the international slaughter, it was a very good thing to be defeatist, it meant being a good revolutionary, Bolshevik and Communist. (*Interruption: he did not know it at that time.*)

It is quite a different thing to be a defeatist in a period when the dictatorship of the proletariat is carrying on a victorious campaign for the organization of a socialist society. (*Long continued applause.*)

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#### [MILIUTIN'S SPEECH]

Comrades, the sum of the tasks by which we are faced in the present period can be expressed as three main tasks: *industrialization, ensuring that the cooperatives play a leading*



*part in the domain of exchange, and finally the development of the technique of agriculture, especially as regards raw materials.* These are the three chief tasks; all others are derived from them. The question is however how the tasks mentioned can be carried through in the present period. This will be the main difficulty, and we must realize it clearly. I shall only dwell on the most important questions of tactics and policy in carrying out and completing the chief tasks mentioned, all the more so because the Opposition and the "Ultraleft" Communists abroad who, by their nature, are identical with the Reformists, are opposing the carrying out and completion of these tasks, are opposing the policy of carrying them out.

It is well known that the chief task of the economic policy of the period of restoration is the union of workers and peasants which ought to be achieved in the process of the development of the productive forces of the country, in the process of the restoration of production. On this basis, as Comrade Lenin said, by way of practical work, we are attracting the peasantry to work at socialist construction, so that the peasant may realize the advantages of our system over the capitalist system. One of the chief triumphs and achievements of the period of restoration was that we were able to carry through these tasks without great interruptions. When we look back we see that one of the most serious factors which complicated this process, was the notorious discrepancy in the matter of prices, against which we have fought and are still fighting. Taken as a whole, however, the task of union with the peasants has been carried through, and in this respect we have succeeded in enlisting the masses of peasants in work of socialist construction under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the present moment, when we are completing the three chief tasks to which I have referred, this task is also a *main task*, and if we allow ourselves to deviate in any way from this path, it may be said that we are bringing our whole construction into very serious danger. What form of distortion might our policy take? Above all that of an incorrect estimate of the development of the village and therefore a *wrong policy as regards the village*.

The Opposition, with its theoretical founder, Comrade Preobrazhensky at its head, is now estimating the development of the village as a predominantly *capitalist element*. This is the attitude of mind of the Opposition. The Oppositionists abroad estimate the development of the village in just the same way. If we go further we remember that Kautsky, the renegade Kautsky, our chief opponent and the chief theorist of the Second International, estimated our economic development and our whole revolution essentially in the same way.

Comrade Preobrazhensky characterizes this development in the present time as follows:

"We know that capitalist accumulation in the village is developing, that this is the result of the weak effect of our State industry on agriculture, the result of the insufficient organization of the rural poor in productive cooperatives. This means that the thread of economic development within the upper strata in our villages leading towards the creation of a group of capitalist farmers which was broken by the revolution, has been taken up again and fastened together by history."

This is his main theory. This is in essential the main theory of the whole Opposition, which proves that it does not believe in socialist development amongst us. If it were proved that the majority of the rural population is following the capitalist path of development, it would be a danger, a serious danger. But is this true? No, it is untrue; it is a misrepresentation of facts. Comrade Rykov has already pointed out to us that the chief sign of the difference consists mainly of a *process of differentiation in the village*. I will not repeat the data which Comrade Rykov has quoted.

What then is the typical differentiation in the capitalist order? It consists in the decay of the middle peasants and in the formation of distinct poles; in the proletarianization of the poor and in the crystallization of large peasants. With us the process is different. A *rise of*

*the peasantry is taking place. In our country, the middle peasants are not being swept away. As the productive forces develop, the main mass of the peasantry flourishes. This is the main distinction from capitalism, of which evidence has been given.* This is the first point. The second is the *form of the organization of agriculture*. Is it growing towards the capitalist side?

Data concerning the cooperatives have been given here. It is true, the Opposition immediately expresses doubts as to whether the cooperatives are a socialist form or not. But I believe that this is the same kind of doubt which they abandoned not so very long ago, i.e. in respect of the character of our State industry. You will remember that before the Fourteenth Party Congress, they had in exactly the same doubts as to the socialist character of our industry, but at that time they concealed them as been proved to them. Now they are, in essentials, opposing the Leninist views with regard to the cooperatives.

The course towards the formation of cooperatives is the path to Socialism. Comrade Lenin wrote in his well-known articles of the cooperatives as a path to Socialism, as a form which in many respects coincides with Socialism.

In our country the cooperatives have greatly increased in numbers in the last three years. At the present moment the agricultural cooperatives already embrace 30 percent of the farms. From the financial point of view they have thriven and become consolidated, their share capital has increased threefold, their profits have also risen. Accumulation in the cooperatives increases from year to year. We are also well acquainted with their relation to forms of private capitalism in the domain of the turnover of goods; of the three sectors, State, cooperative and private capital, the cooperatives take the first place this year. This is an indisputable proof that our peasantry is on the whole advancing along the path of socialist development. The tendency of socialist development in the village is beginning to triumph over the capitalist tendency. This is the conclusion which we must draw.

From this arises the fundamental task of the further development of unity amongst the peasants which is being materialized by a whole number of measures in the field of taxation policy, in the field of providing the village with technical agricultural equipment and machines, products, goods etc. and in the field of the organization of the sale of agricultural production.

Comrade Preobrazhensky and the Opposition are proposing to us an essentially different policy. They argue as follows:

"The task of the socialist State is not to take less from the petty bourgeois producers than did capitalism, but to take more from the larger incomes which are assured to the small producer by the rationalization of the whole industry of the country, including the small farms."

This is their attitude which is contradictory to our whole policy. If it were to be accepted now, at the most difficult moment in the reconstruction of industry, it would lead to the disintegration of the peasantry, it would repel the peasantry instead of *attracting them* to the socialist economy.

The chief task in solving the question of industrialization is to put this question in such a way as to consolidate the union between the workers and peasants, but we can only do this by a suitable system of measures with regard to the peasantry which must consist in the mechanization of agricultural production, in an approach between agriculture and industry, in the development of local industry which work up the raw materials of the peasants, in a definite policy as regards prices and taxation and in a number of measures which will help the poor peasants by promoting chiefly the collective forms of farming. This is the system of measures which confronts us in the period on which we are now entering, the chief measures for ensuring and consolidating unity.

If the peasantry received help in the period of restoration and saw that it could improve its farming and better its situation, it must now participate in the reorganization of the

whole of industry, seeing in this an advantage for itself, recognizing the superiority of our system to the capitalist system. This is our task. Though we are in competition with capitalism, we do not compete with it by using the same methods as capitalism with regard to the peasantry; that would be a great mistake, which is fundamentally opposed to our whole line of action, which deviates from our whole policy. This is our chief tactical task, about which there is still much to be said, which will have to be put into concrete form throughout the period before us and which we must always steadily retain in our field of vision.

The second factor to which our attention must be devoted in carrying out and completing the tasks mentioned, is that of the questions (I do not know how to enumerate them completely here) of the quality of our work. They confront us now more urgently than ever. Comrades, we must admit that even in the solution of so enormous a task as the work of investment, we have probably spent in the current year more than 12 million rubles to no purpose. Comrade Ruchimovich, the Representative of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy stated in his report on this question to the Council for Labor and Defense that the work of investment had to a large extent been carried through without system and without principles. Last year it took six months to get the scheme passed, and in the course of these six months it was changed at least three times by the Central Committee. I think a large number of those present will know, will feel, what an effect this had on the local work. In this respect we must entrust the local bodies with the questions of rationalization more than we have done hitherto.

In this question, the comrades of the Opposition abroad, who are obviously instigated to it by those here, throw stumbling-blocks in our way by regarding the processes of rationalization, of qualitative improvement, which are necessary for our competition with capital, from the same wrong angle of vision. The Ultraleft in Germany, represented by Weber, Urbahns, state in a pamphlet that the idealization of the present, by no means ideal situation—as though we pretended that the situation here was ideal—of the reciprocal relations in the factories, of the whitewashing of the methods of rationalization etc., are more dangerous than the plain, unvarnished truth that these measures are due to the retarded rate of the world revolution.

Thus they regard the whole rationalization in our country as a retreat from the methods of socialist construction in consequence of the delayed world revolution. It is a very stupid mistake so to misunderstand the extremely important process of rationalization by which we are faced.

The *third chief question* (I cannot dwell at length on these questions) is that we must avoid crises. Our policy must be built up on a regard for an *equal rate of development in our whole economic situation*.

At the beginning of the present year, we almost drifted into a crisis, partly under the influence of Comrade Piatakov and the policy of Comrade Sokolnikov, partly under the influence of the policy of Comrade Kamenev. We were within a hair's breath of a crisis. The policy of an equal advance along the whole line is the best policy for competition with capitalism. Even with its present stabilization, with that relative stabilization of which Comrade Bukharin spoke in his report, capitalism is at present in a critical situation in some of its parts, now as regards the financial question, then as regards the question of markets; a state of crisis is an inevitable phenomenon of capitalism, it is dictated by the whole structure of capitalist economy. With us the whole structure of our economy makes it possible to avoid crises if we do not commit mistakes in our economic policy, in the management of our systematic economy. Those who would force upon us expenses which are not in keeping with our resources, which do not fit in with other parts of our national economy, are driving us directly on the capitalist path, the path of crises—on to a path of ruin.

Comrades, socialist construction consists first of all in consolidating the systematic arrangements of our economy, and secondly in carrying on the predominant part of the

socialist forms of economy, of our industry and cooperatives in such a way that an improvement in the situation of the masses of workers and peasants results. These are the essential features and the practical content of socialist construction. He who does not understand this policy, who deviates from its path, is opposing socialist construction, is injuring the masses of both peasants and workers. The lack of understanding of all this forms the basis of the attitude taken by the Opposition and, unless it resolves openly to defend its point of view here and now, we may expect that a complete union of forces within the Party in carrying out a definite line of action, definite tactics, will ensure the continuation of socialist construction.

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#### [RYKOV'S CONCLUDING SPEECH]

Comrades, I have taken up so much of the time of the Conference by my report, that I will endeavor to be very brief.

In a whole number of questions received in writing and speeches in the debate, proposals have been made which, in my opinion, might improve the draft theses which have been recommended for your consideration. It therefore seems to me that the Conference ought to elect a commission for the thorough discussion of these improvements and amendments, whose duty would further be to lay before us a final draft resolution.

#### ON THE RATE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In some of the questions I have received in writing it is pointed out that it is wrong to compare the rate of the economic restoration of the Soviet Union up to the present time with the rate of development in countries of Western Europe. There is evidently some misunderstanding. I have quoted examples of growth in the capitalist countries in the prewar period when capitalism was at the zenith of its development, in order to establish criteria for estimating the rate of or further growth. I have pointed out that we cannot expect any such growth in the future as we have had in the course of the last few years, when industry increased its production by 40 percent and by 60 percent per annum. Such a pace cannot be regarded as a norm or as a measure for the economic development in the period of reconstruction.

I have therefore quoted from the experiences of the Western European countries and America in the period of their development, when they were extending their original capital with the greatest success.

In other written questions I am asked to give comparative data as to the rate of the restoration of industry in the postwar period both in or country and abroad. The restoration in the countries of Western Europe has been adequately characterized in Comrade Bukharin's report. From this it could be gathered that, with the exception of America, hardly any country of any importance has exceeded the prewar level. Those countries where the conditions are most favorable, are only either approaching the prewar level or have exceeded it in a few branches of industry.

In comparing the rate of the process of restoration in our own country and abroad, we must however take into consideration that the countries of Western Europe suffered much less than we did from the imperialist war and have not passed through a civil war. The

process of restoration in our industry only began four or five years ago; for the years of the civil war against Denikin and Kolchak cannot in any way be regarded as a period of the restoration of our industry, on the contrary, it was a period of its worst devastation. If we take all this into consideration, it seems natural to come to the conclusion that even in the rate of restoration we have outdistanced the European countries.

Those parts of the theses and the report which speak of the necessity of improving the management of our economy as well as of the whole apparatus and of reinforcing the fight against bureaucratism met with general approval in the debate. In private conversations, comrades from the provinces have told me that they could quote a large number of examples of bureaucratism which completely justify the guiding lines laid down in the theses. The regulation of the system of administration, the fight against bureaucratism, adaptation to our new tasks are now one of the fundamental questions of our construction.

#### THE WORK OF PLANNED ECONOMY, ITS TASKS AND ITS REDISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO DISTRICTS

The same applies to the system of planned economic work. I consider those comrades quite right who declare that in the future the work of planned economy cannot possibly be carried on lines according to which the organ of Planned Economy of the Soviet Union and the organs of the People's Commissariat for Economy of the Soviet Union not only examine the plans and the guiding lines connected with them, but even decide various details down to confirming the exact estimates. By working our planned economy in this way we shall inevitably lose ourselves in detail and may overlook the important matters.

We must see to it that the work with regard to planned economy is distributed. The State Planning Commission is only now beginning to arrange plans according to districts and geographical areas instead of, as hitherto, according to branches of production (in the metal industry, textile industry etc). We must reckon with the fact that economic geography, the situation of industrial centers and industrial districts, as they have existed till now in our country, are the result of serfdom and of Tsarist times and frequently also of the selfish interests of the nobility and the landed proprietors.

Our wool industry is concentrated in the province of Simbirsk. In the province of Simbirsk there is neither fuel nor raw material for the development of the wool industry, and only when we study the history of the aristocracy of the province of Simbirsk, its connection with the commissariat and with army supplies, can we understand why just this province was a district for the development of the wool industry.

The destruction of the artificial fetters which capitalism, the nobility and the arbitrary rule in the old days fastened on the development of industry on the soil of our Soviet Union, must also lead to a change in the economic geography of our country and the creation of new industrial districts and new industrial centers.

With regard to economic geography, the process of industrialization must lead to the rationalization of production, to making the best use of the natural wealth of each district. The work of distribution must bring into relief the characteristic features of each separate district.

In this field of work of our systematic economy and economic construction, we are only beginning to make progress.

Up to the present our immediate perspectives of the industrial development in the individual districts have not been determined with sufficient exactitude. The carrying out of the plans for the whole Soviet Union according to individual branches of production frequently leads to these plans not being sufficiently in harmony with the prospects of economic development in the separate districts. This factor of the distribution must be taken into consideration in the program of the plan for a period of five years, which is to be finally drawn up in the immediate future.

Representatives of the provinces have, in their speeches, made far-reaching proposals with regard to the work of investment.

The Ukraine insists on the construction of an immense waterpower station on the Dnieper being started at once, and has already begun collecting for it among the population. Leningrad demands a power station on the Svir and the Volga district the construction of the Volga-Don canal. The interests of industry and the interests of agriculture demand that a railway connecting the cotton district of Central Asia with the corn-growing district of Siberia be constructed as soon as possible. In the interests of the supply of fuel, it is necessary to build a main line connecting the coal-field of the Don Basin with the industrial center. Personally I believe that the necessity for all these works has been convincingly demonstrated.

It seems to me however, that the Conference cannot now decide to which of these works preference should be given, that it cannot resolve or determine when any one of these pieces of work should be begun. If we have sufficient means, it would be best to begin two big undertakings, but I do not think that this year we shall have sufficient money. The question which of these pieces of work should be begun next year can only be solved when at least the State Planning Commission has given its expert opinion. I consider that urgent pieces of work are the construction of the railway from Turkestan to Siberia, the building of the powerworks on the Dnieper and the work of investment in the oil-field of Emba.

I consider it necessary to call the attention of the Conference to the fact that in a number of districts a peculiar tendency to a "parochial policy" may be observed. This tendency consists in each district regarding industrialization as an economic system according to which each district should be to a certain extent self-satisfying and independent, i.e. should possess a textile factory, a leather factory, a metal works etc. of its own, and should satisfy all the demands of the district with its own means, or that all the raw materials should be worked up in the district where they are produced. I do not consider these tendencies right. We cannot work up all the raw materials on the spot, because we have to steer our course according to large industry. The organization of large industry depends on the raw materials of some districts being worked up in a small number of large factories, in the organization of which not only the question of supplying them with raw materials but also the question of the supply of fuel, of means of transport, of workers etc. must be taken into consideration.

I have already spoken of the fact that there are among us some economists who understand industrialization to be the building of a factory on every *desiatin*. This is a peculiar form of industrialization (*Interruption: Overindustrialization!*). It is difficult to imagine that even with the universal development of industry in our country, the typical agricultural districts will disappear altogether. We cannot for instance make it our aim to turn Siberia into an industrial area in the next five years. The industrialization of the country means that industry should take a leading, predominant part in the whole economy of the Soviet Union, but this does not mean that industry must be of predominant significance in this or that province, district or even in each separate republic. These tendencies to separatism in the domain of industrial construction must be suppressed in the most decisive way.

There have been differences of opinion between individual speakers in the discussion as to whether centralized pressure or decentralization is necessary. In my opinion, a centralized scheme and discipline are necessary in carrying out this plan. At the same time the fulfillment of the plan must be decentralized.

The unity of our investment of capital must be preserved, the interests of the whole economy of the Soviet Union as a single entity must be brought into harmony, conditions must be created for the carrying out of the plan which will make it possible to develop the initiative of the republics, the territories and provinces to their full capacity. This, in my opinion, is our immediate duty with regard to changes in the management of our planned economy.

## OUR EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION

Comrade Lunacharsky has complained about the inadequacy of the allocations for education, but has produced no statistical material. I must therefore quote a summary of the allocations for education, at least in the RSFSR. According to the data of the People's Commissariat for Finance, 56.5 million rubles were allocated in accordance with the State Budget of the RSFSR in 1923/24; for the year 1926/27 however, allocations of 124.8 million rubles are provided, i.e. within four years we have increased the allocations in the RSFSR by two and a half times.

If we take the allocations from the State Budget and from the local budget altogether, we find the following: in 1924 184.5 million rubles were spent on education, for the current year provision is made for an expenditure of 418.8 million rubles. In 1924/25 9.7 million and in the current year 11.7 have been allocated for scientific and educational institutions, which are under the People's Commissariat for Education of the RSFSR, i.e. the increase in this year amounts to 20.6 percent. These are the figures which Comrade Lunacharsky evidently forgot to communicate to the Conference.

The position of the schools and the organization of the education of the people are not at present such that we can imagine they will satisfy the rapidly growing cultural requirements of the population; the outlay for purposes of education must undoubtedly increase. This year they are only being increased in keeping with the general increase of the Budget.

The difficulty of a rapid improvement in the work of education, especially in popular education, is that this improvement demands very considerable outlay. According to the data of the People's Commissariat for Education there are about 200,000 elementary school teachers in the RSFSR. They are at present quite inadequately paid for their work, but an increase of their salaries, even by only 10 rubles a month, which would be perfectly justified, would demand even in one single sector of our Soviet Union—the RSFSR—24 million rubles a year. Thus the payment of the work of those engaged in education increases from year to year but not with the rapidity which we should like to see. The following are the salaries of the professors: in 1924 a professor received 80 rubles for six hours a week, in 1925 100 rubles and 1926 110 per month.

In any case, with regard to those engaged in education, there can be no talk of a decrease, but rather of an increase of the funds for their salaries.

The distribution of the estimates and of the separate items of expenditure has not yet been examined by the Council of People's Commissars, and the draft Budget for the coming year is only the result of the preliminary work of the People's Commissariats, including the People's Commissariat for Education.

I think we should all realize that expenditure for education—and especially for technical education and for scientific work—is at the same time expenditure for industrialization.

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For the first time since the Fourteenth Party Congress, the debates on the most important questions of economic policy have taken place without parallel platforms, written declarations, or even verbal statements from the Opposition. I do not know if we should interpret this as an agreement on the part of the Opposition with our theses. It seems to me however that after its "declaration", the Opposition was under the obligation of coming on to this platform and stating exactly the nature of the differences of opinion which separates it from the Party (*Exclamations of*: "Quite right!") This was not only necessary for the Opposition but also for the whole Party. It is one thing, if the Opposition officially renounces its old platform with the "milliards" of taxation etc., which broke down at the most recent discussions in all the meetings of workers; it is another thing if it abides by its old

platform. This platform was not only fundamentally wrong and to a considerable degree illiterate, it was also dangerous to the Party by reason of its demagoguery.

The Opposition accompanied its proposals for an increase of taxation, about the two milliards etc. with an appeal to the nonparty workers for a greater increase of wages and an appeal to the peasantry for the exemption of 40 percent of the peasants from the agricultural tax. The Opposition calumniated the Party by saying that its policy was non-proletarian and promoted the rapid growth of the bourgeoisie both in town and country.

This platform, which is fundamentally false and, with regard to the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, is anti-Leninist, threatens to destroy the alliance between the workers and peasants. It was represented in such a form and loaded with such demagogic slogans that it gave the impression of being rather in favor of a general political fight in the country than of a discussion within the Party (*Hear! Hear!*). The Opposition ought to have come on to this platform and stated whether it still insisted on this platform or whether it renounced it.

I quote an example from which it can be seen what the Opposition was speculating on when it entered into the discussion. During the discussion, one of the members of the Opposition openly stated at a meeting that he disagreed with the Opposition. In the public explanation of the cause of the breach, he described his conversation with one of the leaders of the Opposition, who had said to him that the cause of the defeat of the Opposition was chiefly the backwardness of the working class (*Cries of: "Oho!"*) and secondly the "miscalculation" (I do not say unfulfilled "expectations") with regard to the intensification of the economic crisis in the autumn of this year. (*Cries of: "Not expectations but hopes!"*) In this explanation, the defeatist ideology of the Opposition became clearly evident.

Some of the comrades pointed out to me in a private conversation that "you don't kick a man when he is down." (*Laughter*) We would all gladly have spared these people and to the country for the conduct of the Opposition and had not the platform of the Opposition spread on a large scale amongst the nonparty workers and penetrated even into the village. The action of the Opposition was of great political significance (*Hear! Hear!*) and it is therefore the duty of our Party, which is fully responsible for the political situation of the country, to draw political conclusions from the discussion which took place, to estimate the value of the ideological platform of the Opposition and to take all the measures in its power to preserve the unity of the Party and the ideological solidity of the lines taken by the Party.

All this must be done in order to ensure the greatest success of socialist construction in our country. (*Prolonged, tempestuous applause*)

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[KAMENEV'S SPEECH]  
DECLARATION OF THE SIX

Comrades! Two weeks ago the Central Committee accepted "with satisfaction" as its communique states, a declaration from a number of the members of the CC. And next day the editor of our central organ observed that the communique of the Central Committee, and our declaration were "historical documents".



### WHY HAVE WE MADE THIS "DECLARATION OF THE SIX"?

I believe that the words of the Central Committee and the comment of the central organ, intend to point out that the Party does not regard our declaration as an inner Party maneuver, or as a mere move in a game. This declaration, which closes a very difficult period of inner-Party history, is not the result of any "maneuver," but has been called forth by or comprehension of the conditions in the Party, by our understanding of what is expected of us, we who have signed the declaration and those comrades who have supported it, by the broad masses of the members of the Party.

Above all, the declaration has been called forth by the fear that we might be obliged to face that prospect against which Lenin warned us so urgently during the last few months of his life; the prospect of a split (*Sensation*). This declaration is therefore, by no means, purely organizational in character. To us it is a purely political document, an obligation which we undertake towards the central authorities of the Party, towards the whole Party, and towards those proletarian masses, who will read our declaration in every quarter of the globe.

We, in the Bolshevik Party, do not set up an impenetrable barrier between the questions of ideas and principles, and the questions of organizational forms. It would be incorrect to regard our declaration as an organizational measure.

Our declaration imposes upon us a number of political obligations. One of these obligations, political in character, is that we shall be obliged to defend our views in forms not permitting anybody either in the Party or among our enemies outside to interpret our attitude, in questions upon which we differ from the Central Committee or other leading bodies, as a renewal of the conflict, or as a preparation for fresh contentions. Our declaration imposes upon us the obligation of renouncing all methods of defense of our views which might be regarded as an attack upon the Central Committee of that Party which embodies the dictatorship of the proletariat in the sole country building up the socialist state of society.

We were of the opinion that these obligations made it incumbent upon us to say as little as possible at the present juncture, since the atmosphere of the recent conflict is not yet by any means dispersed, and there is a danger that any utterance made by us may be interpreted as a fresh preparation for conflict, or as an attack upon the Central Committee. But I think you will understand, comrades, that after we have kept silence during the last few days, we cannot very well renounce making a statement of our standpoint, in view of the accusations contained in a brief form in a document which comrade Stalin has defended here. (*Voices: And rightly defended!*)

It is my task to ascertain, on the basis of this document, the true extent of our differences of opinion, and to point out as briefly as possible our estimate of the fate of these differences in the course of the further history of our Party.

### WHAT ARE OUR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION?

#### I. FICTITIOUS ACCUSATIONS

The resolution here defended by comrade Stalin places on record differences in fundamental questions, and constructs differences between the so-called opposition bloc and the Central Committee. I assume that if it were really true that fundamental and essential differences existed between us in the main questions of the character and prospects of our revolution, the character and prospects of our state, and the character of the present epoch of the world's history, or differences of opinion with regard to the determination of the general tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I assume that should we really meet with the great misfortune of differing in opinion with the Central Committee in these main questions, then we should actually be unable to work together. Then we should have to part, and it would be more honorable to part, that each side might perform its own historical task.

Comrades! Although this resolution places on record essential differences of opinion in these main questions, I am of the opinion that this is not the case. I shall endeavor, to prove this by reference to the text of the resolution. There is truly no necessity to add nonexistent differences of opinion in main questions to those which really exist between us.

Before I pass to the various points of the political indictment brought against us by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, I should like to point out that the first preliminary towards characterizing our views consists of the following words:

"Some, it is true, only a very small number of our Party members, are frightened by the difficulties, are displaying signs of weariness and hesitation, are falling into doubts and are being overcome by the feelings of disintegration, of unbelief in the creative forces of the proletariat and this is leading them to an ideology of capitulation." (*Voices*: "This is perfectly true!")

Comrades! I am of the opinion that this characterization is partly not really psychological. "Unbelief, weariness, feelings of disintegration." These are things which cannot be accurately weighed on a political scale. We, for our part, can say that we are not conscious of any weariness, pessimistic feelings, or lack of faith. (*Uproar*) Comrade Voroshilov was right in his observation that it is difficult to weigh up these abstractions; we shall do better to pass on to the ascertainment and formulation of a tangible political accusation. This accusation is contained in the term: ideology of capitulation. This political accusation is a matter which can and must be translated into class language, and not into the mood of this or that individual. But here I must ask: What is meant under an ideology of capitulation, what does this accusation actually signify?

To capitulate means: to lay down our arms, to surrender to the mercy of the victor. (*A voice*: "That is what you have done! Have you not surrendered? *Uproar.*") Before whom have we laid down our arms? At whose mercy have we surrendered? Have we laid down our arms to the Party? This is not the question; we are not accused of laying down our arms before the Party. The accusation insinuates that we surrender our arms to some class enemy. No other interpretation is possible.

What does this accusation mean? To whom has the so-called opposition bloc surrendered its weapons? To the Nep-men? This is a class force against which Communism must fight. Have we surrendered our weapons to the NEP? Is this what you accuse us of? (*A voice*: "Not against the capitalists, but against the Party!")

The second force which is hostile to Communism is the kulak. Is it to him that the opposition bloc is surrendering its weapons? (*Comrade Babushkin*: "You are afraid of him!")

The third class force against which Communism has to fight is the international bourgeoisie, the international Stock Exchange. Have we laid down our arms to this?

And finally, the last of the great class forces opposing Communism, to whom it would be shameful to surrender—after the Nep-man, after the kulak, after the international bourgeoisie—is the Second International. Have we surrendered to this? (*Comrade Moiseenko*: "You surrender to all of them!")

Comrades, this harsh term of "capitulation ideology" cannot be maintained. It goes too far. (*A voice*: "It is right!") But, comrades, you do not name the force, you do not name in our Marxist Bolshevik class language the force to which you accuse us of surrendering. We do not want to surrender to the Nep-man, but are fighting him. We do not want to surrender to the Second International, but are fighting it. (*A voice*: "A fine to the kulak, but are fighting him. We do not want to surrender the way you have of fighting!") *Laughter, excitement among the audience.* *Voices*: "And you are not going to fight against the Party any more?" *Comrade Moiseenko*: "Were you fighting against the kulak in the Aviapribor nucleus?"

Comrade Moiseenko, I was not in the Aviapribor nucleus. (*Comrade Moiseenko*: "If you were not, then your friends were!") I have risen to speak here for the purpose of pointing out our errors. I am equally prepared to deal with the suggestion that we have fought badly. But I beg the conference to make it possible for me, in view of the political indictment brought against us, to express what I really believe.

No superfluous accusations! That is the first thing. If we are guilty, then pronounce your verdict on our real sins, of which we have sufficient, but do not invent new and superfluous ones. (*Laughter*)

The same applies to the accusation of "defeatism". In the Bolshevik Party we are accustomed to designate as defeatism that political current which desires the defeat of a given country or class. Nothing else has ever been understood under defeatism. At the risk of arousing Comrade Moiseenko's indignation once more, I must ask you: What are you accusing us of when you accuse us of defeatism? For whose defeat are we anxious? Do you suppose that we desire the defeat of the working class? (*Voices*: "Yes!" *Disturbance*) Do we desire the defeat of the Soviet Union? Or the defeat of the Party? (*Voices*: "Yes!" *Disturbance*)

No comrades, that is not true, that is not true! (*Voice*: "Then why have you carried on a fractional struggle? You have been waiting for an economic crisis.") Comrades, surely you are strong enough to condemn all our real errors. But is not strength, but weakness, when you prevent me at such a moment from stating exactly what we believe. (*Hear, hear!*) We do not desire any defeat, and we repudiate the designation of "defeatism".

I now pass to the fundamental items of the indictment which has here been brought against us. The first, a really fundamental point is the question of the character of our revolution and its future. The resolution puts this question to us, and we reply to the question of the character and future of our revolution, without a moment's hesitation, that no one of us has ever doubted, since the April conference of 1917 at which Lenin's resolution defined the whole of the future character of our revolution, that our revolution is a socialist revolution, not only because it is headed by the proletariat, but because the proletariat is utilizing the power which it has gained for the establishment of the socialist state of society.

Attention has frequently been drawn of late to recollections of 1917. This is extremely useful. I maintain, however, that since that time, since the April conference of 1917, all those differences which existed between me personally and some other comrades on the one hand, and comrade Lenin on the other with regard to the possible character of the revolution, exist no longer. From that moment onwards none of us has ever uttered a single word which could be taken to mean that we doubted the socialist character of our revolution. I, comrades, know of only one declaration, subsequent to that April conference, which really revised the character of our revolution, but which does not by any means originate with us. This declaration, made in February 1918, has been printed in Comrade Lenin's works, and reads as follows:

"In the interests of the international revolution, we consider it necessary to deal with the possibility of the loss of Soviet power, which has now become purely formal."

This is truly a revision of the socialist import of our revolution and of our State. Happily for our Party this declaration has only been made once during the past nine years of our resolution. This declaration originated in the circle of the "Left communists", and Comrade Bukharin has been the only one to find the courage to declare that Soviet power assumes a purely formal character. (*Disturbance. Voices*: "You are using improper measures, Comrade Kamenev!") Comrade Bukharin speedily abandoned the declaration. But still it remains as the sole revision of the socialist character of our revolution since the time when Comrade Lenin formulated the tasks of our revolution. (*Comrade Shvernik*: "And who was to be expelled from the Party?" *Agitation in the audience.*)

We therefore wish, comrades, without doing any violence to our convictions, to express our full and complete agreement with that characterization of our revolution, which is given in the political document defended by Comrade Stalin. Here it is stated:

"The Party holds the standpoint that our revolution is a socialist revolution and that the October Revolution represents not only the signal, the impetus, and the starting point of socialist revolution in the West, but that it is at the same time, firstly, a base for the advance of international revolution, and secondly, opens the transition period from capitalism to socialism in the Soviet Union (dictatorship of the proletariat)."

I repeat that we do not doubt this in the very least, and you yourselves must admit that our past does not give the slightest reason which could render it in the least difficult for us to agree with this characterization.

Our whole Party holds the standpoint that our revolution is a socialist revolution, that it represents the basis for the future development of international revolution, and that it forms the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. Indeed, we even believe that this characterization is somewhat incomplete, that it is not a perfect characterization of the internationally socialist character of our revolution. (*Laughter*)

There is too little expressed when we state that our revolution is a basis for the further development of the world revolution, and that it forms in the Soviet Union the transition period from capitalism to socialist (this calls forth no differences); this characterization could have been supplemented—as in the resolution passed by the Fourteenth Party Congress—by pointing out that our revolution is not only a basis, a support, and a stronghold for international revolution, but the guide and leader of this revolution. We may remember Lenin's words, that in certain historical emergencies the leadership may be transferred from Moscow to Berlin or London, but that during the present period the leadership is not only the fulcrum, but at the same time the lever, of the world revolution.

Why is it then necessary, comrades, to invent differences of opinion on the character of our revolution and its future, since we are able to agree wholly and entirely with everything expressed in this resolution as the point of departure of the Party in the question of the nature of our revolution? (*A voice*: "Can Socialism be established?") Wait, comrades, I cannot say everything at once. Wait till I come to that.

The question of the tasks of our Party is closely bound up with this question. The resolution passed by the Central Committee states that the October Revolution

"forms a period of transition from capitalism to socialism in the Soviet Union (the dictatorship of the proletariat), in which the proletariat, provided it pursues a correct policy in its relations with the peasantry, will be able to succeed in establishing the completely socialist state of society."

And further adds:

"Provided, of course, that the power of the international revolutionary movement on the one hand, and the power of the proletariat of the Soviet Union on the other, will be sufficiently great to protect the Soviet Union from a military intervention."

We still hold in every respect to this same standpoint, which we held at the Fourteenth national congress, and have held during the whole course of the revolution since October; the Party has nothing new to say to us here.

## II. THE CHARACTER OF OUR REVOLUTION

Yes, in the course of the transition period between capitalism and Communism the proletariat will be able to establish the completely socialist state of society, provided it pursues a correct policy in its relations with the peasantry. But here the authors of the resolution have themselves put in the word "provided", and this "provided" must exactly be formulated.

"Provided", adds the resolution, "of course, that the power of the international movement on the one hand, and the power of the proletariat of the Soviet Union on the other, will be sufficiently great to protect the Soviet Union from a military intervention." (*Hear, hear!*)

Quite right, comrades, but insufficient. First of all I must ask whether this restrictive condition, that is, the possibility of a military intervention, interrupting the victorious progress of socialism, exhausts the whole of the dangers involved in the fact that we are surrounded on all sides by capitalism.

I have told you, comrades, that as far as possible I shall refer to no quotations or materials except those statements actually given in documents here laid before the conference. I take Rykov's resolution on the economic situation. I read here:

"It is necessary that we endeavor to reach, and then to pass, the level of industrial development in the advanced capitalist countries."

I ask: Is this true? And I reply: It is absolutely true. But why did Comrade Rykov write, and why did you unanimously decide—we are in perfect agreement with this standpoint—that we must catch up and pass the level of development in the advanced capitalist countries within a historically comparative minimum of time? Why does the resolution not confine itself to saying "it is desirable" or "it would be good?" No, Comrade Rykov has formulated it correctly: it is necessary for us to reach and pass this level. Why? Because it is only by catching up to and outstripping the capitalist countries that we can prove the advantages of socialist economy as compared with capitalist. It is solely for this reason that the resolution speaks of the necessity of reaching and passing the capitalist level. What does this mean? (*Comrade Bukharin*: "It means that it is possible!") It means that you, as well as we, regard such a speed of development as necessary. (*Comrade Rykov*: "And possible!")

The point is, comrades, that this speed is necessary, and we must ask why it is considered necessary. It is necessary because the Soviet Union, as the first country of Socialism, must prove to the millions of the working people, the workers and peasants, the real superiority of socialist economy. This means that this country must and can provide for the needs of the population much more completely and cheaply than capitalist economies are capable of doing. (*Comrade*: "Thank God for that!" *Laughter*.)

I ask: Does this sentence in the resolution, proclaiming the necessity of reaching and passing the level of the capitalist countries, refer in any way to our environment or does it not? What danger can threaten it? If you find it necessary to draw our attention to this necessity, it appears probable that the failure to fulfill this task is expected to involve dangers and difficulties. And if we have once raised the subject, then we must follow it to its logical conclusion: it is not only military intervention which may prove an obstacle in the path of the realization of the completely socialist state of society, but the failure to carry out the above instructions. For this reason we raise the question of the rate of development of our economy, and not only the question of military intervention. *The rate of our economic development, as compared with rate of capitalist development, the necessity of rapidly attaining and passing the level of capitalism, is as important a prerequisite for the final victory of Socialism in our country as the necessity of safeguarding against military intervention.*"

In the resolution passed by the Fourteenth national conference (April 1925) we find the conditions required for the final victory of socialism referred to somewhat differently. And although the resolution of the Fourteenth national conference was the result of a compromise, nevertheless it expresses this point more clearly and accurately:

"On the other hand the existence of two directly antagonistic systems of society creates the constant danger of the capitalist blockade and other forms of economic pressure, of armed intervention, and of the restoration of the capitalist order. The sole security for the

final victory of Socialism, that is, the sole security against the restoration of the capitalist state of society, is, therefore, the victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries."

Why does the present resolution, dealing with the conditions under which the victory of Socialism is possible, includes "military intervention", but omits the question of the other forms of economic pressure? To answer this question is to admit the necessity of developing our economy at a rate which will convert our country, as Lenin said (Stalin quotes this), from a "border state of the capitalist world," into an illustration of the tangible advantages of socialist economy, from the standpoint of actually supplying the needs of the vast masses, over the capitalist methods of economic organization.

It is very necessary to point out the danger of a military intervention. This danger stirs us to muster our forces; it forces us to prepare for the possibility of such an intervention. But we do not point out this danger alone. We are not threatened solely by armored cruisers and machine guns, but by the danger that the rate of our economic development, of our prices, our wages, and our agricultural progress remains behind the standard of the capitalist countries, instead of coming nearer and nearer to this level every day, and demonstrating that we shall surpass it.

Does the pointing out of this danger imply pessimism? Will it not rather stimulate the fighting will of the proletariat, as effectually as the threat of military intervention? Will it not arouse the will of the proletariat, and of all other strata, to ward off this danger? Can the pointing out of this possibility be constructed even to the slightest extent into a factor of unbelief or despair? (*Voice*: We shall judge by your deeds, not by your words.") "Less chatter, and more real action.") Comrades, if you regard my efforts to defend myself against the accusations which have been raised here, as mere chatter, I shall leave the platform. Do you know, comrades, when the following words were written:

"We have created the type of the Soviet state, and with this we have begun a new world historical epoch, the epoch of the political rule of the proletariat, succeeding the rule of the bourgeoisie. This cannot be revoked, although only the practical experience of the working class in several countries will enable the type of the Soviet state to be perfected."

Did the author of these words give in them the slightest sense to suspect a lack of faith, have these words spread pessimism abroad, have they robbed the working class of its future, have they in any way disorganized the consciousness and the will of the working class, or have they not rather organized them? And yet this passage contains the statement that not only the economic order, but at the same time the political order, the "type of the Soviet state", can only be perfected by the practical experience of the working class in several countries. The author then passes to the economic aspect of the question:

"But we have not completed even the foundation of socialist economy, and the hostile forces of expiring capitalism may still rob of it again. We must recognize this clearly, and admit openly that there is nothing so dangerous as illusions (and dizziness, especially at great heights). And there is nothing "frightful", nothing in the least likely to drive us to despair, in the recognition of this bitter truth, for we have always proclaimed and repeated this elementary truth of Marxism, that the victory of Socialism demands the joint efforts of the workers of several countries. (Lenin, Complete Works, Russian ed. vol. XX/2, page 487)."

Comrades, do these words contain anything which calls upon us to despair; are they not rather a powerful appeal for the acceleration of our work of building the foundation of socialist economy? (*A voice*: "When was that written?") I know, comrades, that you would be very pleased if it could be said that this written in 1917, 1918, or 1919. But I see neither for myself nor for the proletariat the slightest cause for sorrow or despair when I tell you that this article was written in March 1922, actually a few months before that article on the cooperatives, in which we are told that we possess everything which is required and sufficient for the establishment of Socialism. Are these words not right, is it not true

that there is nothing "frightful", nothing desperate, in the recognition of the elementary truth of the necessity of the joint efforts of the workers of several advanced countries for the victory of Socialism?

Must these words be repeated again and again today, before the whole of the proletariat and peasantry?

It is necessary that we abandon ourselves to delusions, is it necessary to assert that our difficulties consist solely of the dreadnoughts and machine guns which may come and bombard us? Would it not greatly spur our proletariat on to action, if I were to learn from the resolutions of our conference the plain truth that the foundation of our socialist state of society is not yet firmly established, that though we have made great progress a comparison with 1922, still we must not delude ourselves into thinking that our failure to keep up the pace of economic development can only threaten us with dangers in the form of dreadnoughts and cannons, but we must recognize that danger can threaten in even so simple a form as the question of prices, or the question of imports and exports. Is this then despair?

I believe that if we were to add these words of Lenin to the proposed resolution; if we were to take these words as the basis for the enlightenment of the broad masses of the workers with regard to our tasks, we should become stronger, not weaker. If we state that it is not merely military intervention of Lenin, then no further differences can arise, then nothing will prevent us from joining hands, and working together on the common basis furnished by Lenin's words.

Without in the least way violating our theoretical conscience as communists and Leninists, we can accept the characterization here given of our revolution. We are, however, of the opinion that it would be more accurate if the words on direct military intervention were supplemented by some words pointing out the necessity of accelerating the speed of economic development, as stated by Lenin. And then, I repeat there will be no more differences in this question. (*Comrade Riutin*: "Then we can add at the same time a few words on the unity of the Party.") I shall come to that presently. I cannot talk about the possibility of Socialism in one single country and about the unity of the Party, in one breath. One thing at a time.

### III. LENIN'S STANDPOINT IN 1915

Comrade Stalin has here given us a detailed analysis of Lenin's views on the possibility of the realization of Socialism in one country. In this he referred to an article of Lenin published in 1915. He proved that the theory and practice of the establishment of Socialism in the Soviet Union arise, so to speak, from his quotations, and from this law of the inequality of capitalist development. I cannot deal with this in detail, as the time is too short, and I must still speak of a number of other questions. But I cannot but observe that one must not refer to this quotation as indicating how Lenin conceived the tasks of the revolution in Russia at that time.

The simple duty of being perfectly accurate with respect to quotations from Lenin forces me to this explanation. This quotation, adduced correctly and completely by Comrade Stalin, was published in the "Social Democrat", the then central organ of our Party, on 25 August 1915. The article from which it is taken contains a general criticism of the standpoint of those social traitors who had said: We cannot begin the social revolution in Germany or in England or in Italy, we must begin everywhere at once. Lenin replied to them: You are traitors, for under the cloak of this theory, which compels one country to wait for another, you wish to avoid fulfilling your duty of kindling the proletarian revolution in every country. This was during the epoch of the imperialist war, in 1915. A month and a half later, in number 47 of the "Social Democrat", on 13 October, exactly six weeks afterwards, Lenin wrote an article dealing specially with the tasks then confronting the

Bolsheviks in Russia. Since Lenin stated in September that the victory of Socialism is possible in *one* country, even a backward country, and since he stated that it was the duty of every proletarian revolutionist to maintain this standpoint, we should naturally expect that he would apply the standpoint first of all to Russia.

But, comrades, this is not the case. We must not carelessly represent the true history of Lenin's views in order to score points in debate. Six weeks after the publication of the passage quoted by Comrade Stalin, Lenin wrote in his famous article "Some theses":

"While paying due regard to the demands made by our comrades from Russia, we formulate some theses on the actual questions of our present work."

A number of these are then enumerated, of which the fifth runs as follows:

"The social import of the next revolution in Russia can only be the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry."

The sixth thesis reads:

"It is the task of the proletariat of Russia to carry through the bourgeois democratic revolution to its end, in order to arouse socialist revolution in Europe. This second task is now following very closely upon the first, but it still continues to remain a special and second task."

(*Voices*: "What of it?" "We have read that for ourselves." "That will not do. Nothing can be made of that!") Comrades, I cannot help if it is disagreeable for you to hear these sentences. (*Voices*: "We not only hear them, but we understand them as well!")

If you will accord a straightforward consideration to the declaration of Lenin, made six weeks after the appearance of the article correctly quoted by Comrade Stalin, you will be bound to admit that Lenin's words in 1915 on the establishment of Socialism in one country referred clearly to the Western European States... (*A voice*: "Nothing of the sort!"), and that at the same time he pointed out another urgent task for Russia. That which I have already read to you is his definition of the social import of the impending revolution. (*A voice*: "You should do better to read what the New Economic Policy says.") Nobody will forget that as early as 1905 Lenin was prepared to break through the confines of the bourgeois democratic revolution at any moment, as soon as the power of the proletariat should be great enough to render it possible.

There are two points upon which we have no doubt whatever. Firstly, we were told by Lenin in 1917, as soon as the first rumblings of revolution were heard, that:

"We must break through the confines of our old Bolshevism, based on the idea that the import of the revolution in Russia will be bourgeois democratic, and we must go ahead with full steam towards socialist revolution."

Secondly. At that time many of us held to this old Bolshevik idea, but none of us denies that we were wrong, and Lenin completely right. But do not these references to the history of the Leninist standpoint confirm us in the belief that the passage quoted by Comrade Stalin from the year 1915 could not by any means have been intended to apply to Russia, and that Lenin was thinking of other countries? (*A voice*: "What leads you to suppose that?") I have already shown you what Lenin regarded as the task of the revolution in Russia in 1915. But if it appears to you that this has no connection whatever with the revolution of 1917, then you may permit me to read you another passage:

"Immediately after the February Revolution of 1917, when Lenin was organizing the propaganda of Bolshevik views, he wrote as follows to Comrade Ganetsky:

"Above all I must at any price have new editions—even if under the title, 'From the History of the last years of Tsarism'—of the local 'Social Democrat', of the pamphlets by Lenin and Zinoviev on War and Socialism, of the 'Communist', and of the 'Sammelheit des Sozial-demokrats'. But most of all and before all the new edition of the theses from No. 47 of the 'Social Democrat' (13 October 1915). These theses state directly, clearly, and accurately, a year and a half before the revolution, what we are to do in a revolution in Russia."



These theses have been magnificently confirmed by the revolution, down to the last letter.

I repeat once more, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding: You cannot quote a single passage out of any of our works which could indicate the slightest doubt on our part as to the socialist character of our revolution. I do not doubt in the least that the criticism exercised by Lenin on our views, which prevailed in our circle in the editorial staff of "Pravda", and were held by me personally, until the arrival of Lenin, and the designation of these views as old-Bolshevik, and entirely incapable of application to the socialist revolution of 1917, was absolutely correct. But this is no reason whatever why we should continue ourselves, at the present juncture, to insisting upon the danger of military intervention as the sole difficulty in the way of the complete establishment of an independent socialist state of society. This, comrades, is the first and main question to which I referred when stating that: If a difference of opinion existed between us on the leading question of the character and future of the revolution, then indeed it would be extremely difficult to carry on a joint policy.

#### IV. THE CHARACTER OF OUR STATE

The second question, not dealt with directly in Comrade Stalin's theses, but frequently raised of late, and in my opinion greatly in need of a clear definition—and you have a right to demand a perfectly clear answer from us in this question—is the question of the character of our State. We maintain, clearly and completely, the standpoint that our State is a proletarian State in the double sense of the word. (*Laughter. A voice: "And Trotsky?"*)

Comrades, if your accusations touched on matters referring to our real differences of opinion, I should have to answer them. (*Uproar*) Comrades, permit me to put the question directly: Is it disagreeable to you to hear that in the question of State we are entirely of your opinion? (*Laughter, disturbance, voices: "Extremely agreeable!"*). I am much afraid, comrades, or at least the impression cannot be avoided, that when I here declare my absolute agreement with this or that view of the Party, Comrade Moiseenko is dissatisfied for some reason or another. (*Comrade Moiseenko: I sit and say nothing, Comrade Kamenev, but I shall tell you what I think afterwards.*) *A voice: "And when are going to speak of Trotsky?"*) You will hear something about Trotsky too, comrades.

We regard our State as a proletarian State, not only because it is a State ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat, but because the proletariat is utilizing state power and state organization as an instrument for raising up to Socialism the whole of the *nonproletarian* strata of the workers.

But, comrades, we must add—and it is our duty to do this—all that Lenin said on this question. Were we to state that we have a proletarian State and nothing more, then we should not be stating the truth, nor what Lenin said. For Lenin told us that we have a proletarian State in a double sense: the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the raising of the whole stratum of the workers to an ever *higher* level; but we have a proletarian State in a country with a preponderant peasant population and with bureaucratic deformations. (*A voice: "True, but what follows?"*) If nobody disputes this, then let us register it in that golden book in which we write all the things we are agreed upon. (*Laughter*) Some entries will still remain in that other book in which we register all the points upon which we are *not* agreed. But we must not confuse these two books with one another. The matter must not be represented as if differences of opinion existed on questions in which the whole Party is actually in full agreement.

But when a proletarian dictatorship is realized in a country with a preponderantly peasant population, the inevitable practical result is that in ordinary daily work the lowest stories of the building of state power will not be found to be in the hands of the purely industrial proletariat, but in the hands of the peasantry. (*Disturbance. Voices: "Where then*

is the proletariat?" "Should we send the proletariat into the village Soviets, instead of to work in the factories?") Permit me to ask, comrades, if this is a fact or is it not? If you say that it is not a fact, then you deny all arithmetic, geography, and so forth. It is a fact. If we are to pursue a correct proletarian policy, and to realize the right leadership, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country, and if we are to take the lead over the peasantry as we should, then it is useless to close our eyes to this fact. It is a fact, and cannot be otherwise. If we have 100 million peasants, and if we pursue the correct line of Soviet democracy, the certain result is the fact which I have just stated. It is to redouble our efforts towards adapting the proletarian methods of leadership to those subordinate organs of the Soviet apparatus and the Soviet power which are unavoidably in the hands of the peasantry. (*Voices*: "What object do these facts serve?") As soon as we touch upon this necessary task, then you begin to say: You are exaggerating, that is not a fact at all. In this way we can come to no understanding, comrades.

And precisely as this fact is the inevitable consequence of the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the proletarian State in an agrarian country, in the same manner the bureaucratic deformations of the state apparatus are an expression of class.

What does this mean? In my opinion it means that the state apparatus, viewed from the class standpoint, is endeavoring to oust the workers from immediate participation in the administration of the State, and to subordinate the independent activity of these masses more and more to the bureaucratic apparatus. When we place this fact on record, and say: This is a tendency in the state apparatus, promoted by the whole petty bourgeois atmosphere; it must be combatted by increased participation on the part of the workers, by the methods of furthering the proletarianization of the State, then we are told on the one hand that a proletarian State cannot be proletarianized, since it is already proletarian, and on the other hand we are told that we exaggerate the facts. There are no differences of opinion in principle between us and the Party on the subject of the character of the State. It is solely our endeavor to ascertain from this Leninist characterization what are our actual tasks with reference to the leadership of the peasantry, the proletarianizing of the state apparatus, and the struggle against bureaucracy. We regard this as our duty.

I have raised the question of the character of our revolution, and have found no fundamental differences of opinion with regard to it. I have raised the question of the general tasks of the Communist Parties in the present situation, and have pointed out those prerequisites for the complete realization of a socialist state of society which have, in part, not been dealt with exhaustively in the resolution. (*Disturbance. Voices*: "Then why have you fought against us?") Surely you do not believe that we have fought against you for the reason that we regard our revolution as a bourgeois revolution. You write a great deal, Comrade Ruben, but you do not understand anything about our dispute. (*Laughter, disturbance*, the chairman calls for order. *A voice*: "It was not Ruben, but his cousin.") Unfortunately not only Ruben, but his relations as well, do not understand the import of our contention.

I pass to the fourth question. (*Voices*: "You have been talking for three hours and a half already.")

*Chairman*: I believe that I am acting in accordance with the wishes of the conference in not limiting Comrade Kamenev, who represents the Opposition. Comrade Kamenev has already spoken for one hour, and asks for another half hour. (*Voices*: Agreed)

*Comrade Kamenev*: Comrades, you will understand that my wish to make our standpoint perfectly clear is justified. (*Disturbance*) I shall not keep you much longer, and shall speak in thesis form.

I have discussed three central questions, in which such differences of opinion as are imputed to us would make our joint work impossible, were these differences to exist.

## V. THE QUESTION OF THE ESTIMATE TO BE FORMED OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF CAPITALISM

The fourth point is the question of how we judge the international situation, the present stage of the world's history. Should we disagree on this question, should we have formed a different estimate of the whole international situation, of the whole present stage of development in the world revolution, then it would be difficult indeed for us to come to an understanding on any subject. I am, however, of the opinion that in this question, too, no such difference of opinion exists.

In the resolution proposed by comrade Stalin we read:

"The Party holds the standpoint that the advanced capitalist countries are, for the most part, in a state of partial and temporary stabilization, that the present period represents a period between two revolutions, imposing upon the Communist Parties the duty of preparing the proletariat for the impending revolution; that the offensive of capital, vainly endeavoring to secure the stabilization, must call forth the defensive struggle and the combination of the forces of the working class against capital, that the Communist Parties must take part in the aggravated class struggle, and convert the attacks of capital into counterattacks of the proletariat, aiming at the dictatorship of the proletariat."

I do not see the slightest reason why we should not adopt this characterization of the present period between two revolutions as the common standpoint of the whole Party. If you have been told, whilst working out this resolution, that we are of the opinion that during the given period, today or within a few weeks, a revolutionary situation will arise which will compel us to go over to the attack, or if you have been told that we do not believe in the world revolution at all, then, comrades, you have been told falsehoods. (A voice: "You yourself have written 25 pages of print about it!") It does not matter who has written 25 pages of print about it, or 25,000—our standpoint is that we are in the midst of a partial and temporary stabilization, and that this is being shaken by the revolutionary achievement of the proletariat, and can be transformed, by a correct policy on the part of our Party and the Comintern, within a more or less brief period, into an offensive of the proletariat against capitalism. (A voice: "And Zinoviev's speech?") I shall come to Zinoviev.

But when I read in the speech of Comrade Lozovsky, leader of the Red International of Labor Unions, in the course of the five points which he formulates, of:

"...an element of stabilization, a very powerful element indeed, extending the period of stabilization over decades."

then, comrades, I must say: I am not in agreement with this.

The period between 1905 and 1917 may be designated as a period between two revolutions; these 12 years, in which the forces of the revolution expanded, organized themselves, were thrown back and recovered again and went forward, may be called a period between two revolutions. But what would you think of anybody who maintained that the period, let us say, between the Paris Commune of 1871 and the revolution of 1905, was a period between two revolutions? It is obvious that those comrades who expect the stabilization to last for decades are on quite another track. Those who calculate on decades of stabilization must certainly revise their tactics.

Tactics suitable for a period between two revolutions are of no use for a period of capitalist stabilization extending over decades. This is where our difference of opinion comes in. (A voice: "That is to say a difference with Lozovsky?") No, comrades, Lozovsky is not alone. I maintain that an article by a fertile writer (*Laughter*), Comrade Stein, entitled "The stabilization and its prospects," repeats substantially Comrade Lozovsky's anticipations with regard to the stabilization, and I can only offer Comrade Stein my sincere condolence that the social democrats have praised him greatly, and declared that they are perfectly in agreement with his view of the stabilization. Comrades, is it quite fair to criticize a few separate sentences, perhaps unhappily expressed, from a speech of Comrade Zinoviev's?

Is it really so dreadful when Comrade Zinoviev exclaims, in the course of an agitation speech, something to the effect that: "I do not care a rap for the stabilization, I think nothing whatever of the stabilization." (*A voice*: "But is it permissible to criticize Lozovsky.") *Another voice*: "That was not a speech, but theses.") Zinoviev did not write any theses alone; the theses are a collective work, and we are responsible for them. (*Disturbance*) Pardon me, comrades, but I have only half an hour, and cannot continue if you interrupt.

Take our standpoint as it is; criticize it, but do not criticize the words, but the substance. Combat those who declare that the revolution will break out tomorrow, and declare us to be mad, if we have stated anywhere that there will be a revolutionary situation tomorrow.

But at the same time you must combat those who cultivate the idea of decades of stabilization, and veil their propagation of this idea behind attacks on us. Do not forget to combat these comrades; they will do you much more harm than we, for they speak the language of another class.

I have finished this part of my speech. I maintain that in the central questions, in the question of the character and future of the revolution, in the question of the character and future of our State, in the question of the general tasks connected with establishing Socialism in our country, and in the general estimate of the international situation, no such fundamental differences of opinion exist between us as could separate us into two Parties, or give anyone the right to insult us, and to label us as social democrats before the astonished eyes of the whole world.

#### VI. THE RELATION OF CLASS FORCES IN OUR COUNTRY

There are, however, other categories of differences of opinion, comrades; there are differences of opinion relating to the estimate of the relation of class forces in our country. These are political differences of opinion. The question of the estimate of the relation of class forces in our country is a political question. It cannot, however, force us to such conclusions as we should be obliged to draw in the case of differences of opinion referring to the general character of our revolution, or to the general character of our State. But they can throw difficulties in the way of practical work, and have already done so.

These differences of opinion in the estimate of the concrete situation at a given moment, and of the comparative forces of the different classes, can lead to practical differences. Certain organizational conclusions can be drawn from this. It may be said, if you are not agreed with such an estimate of class forces at a given moment, if you do not agree with such an estimate of the relations between the kulak, the peasant poor, the proletariat, etc. then you cannot be a member of the staff which has to form practical decisions on the basis of the given estimate. If you say this, you are right from your point of view. But there is no need to call us social democrats, in flat contradiction of the truth and of history, in order to arrive at such practical and organizational conclusions.

These differences, comrades, undoubtedly exist, and we must estimate their extent. And you have a right to ask what has induced us to sound the alarm. (*A voice*: "Your fractional attitude.") But I did not come into the world with a fractional attitude, nor was it laid in my cradle. It did not make its appearance until 1925. (*A voice*: "No, already in 1917.") A fractional attitude in 1917? No, that is not the case. I became "infected" with the fractional attitude in 1925.

It must be of interest to you, comrades, to ask how it could come about that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky—all comrades who have not suffered from this affection during the last eight years—(*A voice*: "Trotsky has not suffered from it?" *Laughter, uproar*) I assure you, comrades, that I shall come to Trotsky presently. (*Laughter, disturbance*) I have risen to speak here with the intention of telling you straight-forwardly why the practical policy of the Party is causing us anxiety at the present time. (*A voice*: "Why?") Why? Let me tell

you. Because we have formed the opinion that in the question of the estimate of the concrete class relations in our country in 1925, the Party is not on the right road. We have therefore felt it to be our duty to point out that the wrong path is being taken, and to raise an alarm. In doing this we exceeded the limits of Party discipline and of the Party statutes. Punish us for this. We are already sufficiently punished; but you must not deny that this violation of discipline has arisen from no other cause than the anxiety for a correct Party policy, and the wish to convince the Party. We have not been able to convince the Party. We do not wish to force our views upon it.

At the Party Congress you rejected our standpoint. You rejected it both in April and in June. We have no desire to force our convictions upon you at any price. (*Disturbance.* Comrade *Shvernik*: "That was the only thing you failed to do.") If you hold the opinion that when one is politically accused one has the right to state how he has come to this or that conviction, hear me quietly.

At the given moment we were profoundly and sincerely anxious on account of the policy being pursued by the Party, and it seemed to us that a number of comrades, and especially the press, were underestimating those processes which are taking place, not in the socialist sector of our economy, but in the capitalist. It appeared to us that the Party is not sufficiently aware of those difficulties resulting from the increasing accumulation in the hands of the kulak and the Nep-man, and the increasing estrangement between us and the poor peasantry. Whether we were right or not is another matter. We were, however, convinced that it was our duty—within the confines of the Party statutes of course—to tell the Party of this.

We were further of the opinion that the Party underestimates the influence, exercised by this process of accumulation however slow in the nonsocialist sector of our economy upon the socialist sector.

Comrades, the Central Committee has already once declared me to be liable to a social democratic deviation, but this cannot hinder me from declaring the following here before the CC. Before the beginning of the last economic year, I personally pointed out not only our successes, but our difficulties, and now, a year later, everyone who observed carefully will admit that the difficulties have proved greater than could have been anticipated in September 1925, and that these difficulties have been along the lines of which I warned you, of which we warned you. (*Disturbance*) Difficulties arose with regard to the process of accumulation among the kulaks and the Nep-men, which attained such proportions that the development of our state sector was hampered in such a manner that we were made to obtain the grain and other products required for export, and were obliged to restrict imports. (*A voice*: "Panic!") Ah, panic: I do not know, comrades, what you understand under the word panic. If some comrade points out this or that difficulty, and you call that a panic, perhaps you prefer that we come to you and say: There are no difficulties whatever. Is that what you want? We cannot oblige you.

The main task confronting us in this regard is the correct solution of the question of the firmer establishment of the alliance with the peasantry. The resolution, in stating that we "must pursue an economic policy (price policy, taxation policy, etc.) which cements more firmly the bond between industry and peasantry, and preserves the alliance between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry," is, in our opinion, quite correct, but much too general in expression. It is a standpoint equally correct for 1921 and 1925, and for 1930. The alliance is necessary, but the question is, what are the dangers threatening this alliance in 1925/26, what is likely to destroy it? (*A voice*: "The high prices and the two milliards!")

The alliance is threatened by the disproportion, by the goods famine with all its consequences. That is, by the high retail prices, by the incomplete stabilization of the chernovets, etc. This, comrades, was the reason for our disquietude in this matter. Are we proposing

measures, as has been said here, which treat the peasantry as a hostile element? It is not true, it is an invention. (*A voice: "And Preobrazhensky?"*) We Leninists could not possibly regard the peasantry as a hostile element. I declare that anyone maintaining such a standpoint must not merely be called a social democrat, but must be told that he is dead to politics, and can pack up and go home. (*Disturbance, laughter*)

The essential point of the question is: Does our country possess inner resources enabling industry to be raised to a level ensuring that the peasantry is not aroused against us by the shortage of goods and the high prices, but can be convinced of the advantages of the proletarian economy in heavy industry? Does our country possess material resources sufficing for this? We reply: It does. (*A voice: Two milliards!" Disturbance, laughter*) Would you be displeased if we had two milliards?

Now, comrades, these inland resources exist. The next question is, how we can reach them. (*A voice: "That is the most important!"*) Comrades, if the standpoint that the accumulation in the hands of the kulak and the Nep-man is proceeding only to a very small extent gains the upper hand in our Party, if those elements which are undoubtedly striving to veil the increased differentiation among the peasantry, and the growth of the kulaks and the Nep-men are really to determine the policy of our Party, then we must really ask: Where are we to find in our own country the material resources required for the industrialization, if the workers receive low wages, if the "unhappy" "little" kulak is still to be pitied, and promises besides to "grow gradually into socialism," and if the Nep-man is earning four rubles per head—where are we to find the money? We must not deceive ourselves. We must admit that the development of Socialism will proceed at such a "snail-like pace", as Comrade Bukharin says, that nothing will remain of the necessity of reaching and passing the capitalist countries except the beautiful phrases of Comrade Rykov.

We shall certainly not apply to Poincaré for money. There is no difference of opinion among us about this. We shall not pay for foreign credits by means of the foreign trade monopoly. (*A voice: "And Sokolnikov?"*) Where are we then to find material resources?

If a correct taxation policy is to be pursued, the Party must first of all recognize two things. Firstly, that the growth of private capitalist accumulation in town and country is a fact which it is useless and dangerous to conceal; secondly, you must acknowledge that the question of the distribution of national income, that is, the transference of the means accumulated in the nonsocialist sector of our industry into the state sector, is a question of the class struggle. These two facts must first be recognized, before we sit down at our desks with pencils, and calculate the amount of the taxes, etc.

I maintain that our disquietude was caused by the fact that the recognition of these two factors of the growth of capitalist accumulation, and of the class struggle for the redistribution of this fresh accumulation, had not found a sufficient echo in Party consciousness, and was not accorded its proper place in the practice of the policy of the Party.

You may tell us that we are exaggerating, that the Party has been perfectly aware of conditions, that everything is in perfect order.

No, comrades. We declare: In this sense everything has not been in perfect order in the Party, there has been no clear conception of the importance of these facts. When it is stated, as it is in the proclamation issued by Comrades Stalin, Rykov, and Kuibyshev on the regime of economy (dealing substantially with various deformations of the regime of economy, the attempts at raising the means for industrialization at the expense of the working class), that a section of the communists are proposing to plunder the peasantry, then I must really say: Accuse us of what you will, comrades, but remember that we are no longer living in the Middle Ages. The day in which witches were burnt to death is past. It is unallowable to say to living human beings, who have stated that the taxation screw should be tightened on the kulak, the peasant poor should be helped, and that we should build up socialism in conjunction with the peasant poor—it is unallowable to accuse such comrades of wanting

to plunder the peasantry, and to burn them at the political stake. Lenin once said to the Left SRs:

"Anyone who classifies the kulak and the peasantry in one category, and speaks of the peasantry as a whole instead of the kulak, is a criminal."

If you can find so much in a single comma in all our writings which might hint that we demanded the taxation screw to be tightened upon the whole of the peasantry, then it would be a different matter. But did we not point out the necessity of a clearer definition in the resolution of the Party, of the differentiation in the peasantry? Have we not proposed a reduction of taxes for the poor peasantry? You cannot have it both ways.

First we are accused of wanting to overindulge the village poor, for we propose that 40 percent of the peasantry should be freed from taxation instead of 25 percent; and then we are accused of being unjust to the kulak, and of not believing that he is going to grow into Socialism. Again, we are accused of wanting to plunder the whole peasantry.

No, comrades, this is not true. Punish us for the sins which we have committed, if you think us guilty, but pronounce no verdicts in themselves unjust, and attributing to us views which we have never shared. We do not hold the theory that the middle peasantry represent an element hostile to us. We hold the theory that the peasantry is differentiated... (*A voice*: "And are you for or against Preobrazhensky?") Damn it all, I repeat once again, I am for the Party! (*Laughter*)

Comrades, I now conclude. (*A voice*: "And what about Trotsky?") In a moment. I trust that you will lengthen the time I am permitted to speak, for Trotsky's sake. The minutes left of our half hour I shall devote to the question of where our differences of opinion begin in this question.

Comrade Stalin's theses begin as follows:

"The complication of the struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements in our country is characteristic of the present period."

Complication of the struggle! This does not state the matter very plainly. It is obvious that the struggle is becoming more complicated between the capitalist and socialist elements. But it is not so obvious in what direction it is becoming more complicated, and with what direction it is becoming more complicated, and with what class content.

We have, however, Comrade Rykov's resolution, which states that the Soviet Union is passing through "a sharp struggle between the socialist and capitalist elements both in town and in the village."

And we have Comrade Tomsky's resolution, which defines the words "sharp struggle" more precisely.

I do not ask, comrades, and do not think that I should ask at the present moment, when this "sharp struggle" commenced, after the Fourteenth Party Congress, or after the April Plenum, or after the July Plenum. (*Comrade Zhifronovich*: "It has never stopped!") Comrade Tomsky says:

"The growth of the productive forces of the country is accompanied by a simultaneous growth of the social antagonisms, and, at a given period, by a certain aggravation of the class struggle in the country."

So that

"the economic and political activity of the classes and groups hostile to the proletariat, the bourgeoisie and the kulaks, and the activity of the city and rural bourgeoisie, greatly increase."

Comrades, if you want to disarm the Opposition, if you want to strike the ideological weapon from our hands, (*A voice*: "Do you want to make capital of that?"), then your best means is to speak in this language (*A voice*: "We have always spoken in that language.") of the social antagonisms of the growing activity of the classes and groups hostile to the proletariat. But how all this is to be made consistent I do not know. (*A voice*: "It now

appears that the Party came to the Opposition.”) How can we be accused of social democratic deviations simply because we propose that the Party should speak in this language.

I have here the leading article of “Pravda” of 27 October. I must say that this leading article is written in a manner “disarming” us. To be sure, this leading article cannot refrain from asserting that we, the Opposition, have doubted that we can successfully establish Socialism on the basis of our own home resources. This is the inevitable accompaniment, so to speak. But what is the substance of this leading article? I regard this leading article, after the passages quoted from the resolution drawn up by Comrades Rykov and Tomsy, as one of the most important documents. The leading article says:

“We are faced by the task of our growing economy, but there is another task demanding even more imperatively the energies of the proletariat, the task of the proper utilization of the accumulation taking place in the country.

“This task is a task of the class struggle, for in a country surrounded by capitalism, and under the conditions imposed by the capitalist accumulation going on in town and country (kulak and private capitalism), the question of consolidating the positions of Socialism, *is bound to be a question of acutest class warfare.*”

These words, this estimate of the present situation, concentrates the attention of the Party upon the fact that we are now faced by the question of the redistribution of our national income, and that this question is one of acutest class struggle, in which the kulak and the poor peasant are on different sides of the barricade, and the Nep-man and the socialist industry opponents of one another. If this were the principle upon which the members of the Party were educated, if this estimate of the situation were taken as the signpost for showing the way to the proletariat, if the working class were being prepared for the consequences of this situation, then the Opposition would be satisfied. (*A voice*: “In any case it is disarmed.”)

Let us read what “Pravda” has to say further:

“The problem of the utilization of the means accumulated is at the same time decisive for the question of the speed of industrialization, as well as for the question of our increasing strength as compared with that of the hostile capitalism surrounding us... If we regard the situation at the beginning of the economic year, it is perfectly clear that it is imperative for us to increase our industrial production:

“The same will probably be the case next year. The rate of industrial production and of investment of capital laid down by our plan will not abolish the shortage of goods. What is to be done?

“What we have to do is to find ways and means for increasing the mobilization of the means which have accumulated in our country, and to apply these to industrialization.”

This is an acknowledgement of the fact that even the sums allotted for industrialization by the Council of Labor and Defense under my chairmanship—sums alleged to be too generous—and now allotted under the chairmanship of Comrade Rykov, are insufficient to meet the needs of the shortage of goods. What is to be done? We must find out the right means of mobilizing the accumulated capital. This is a class struggle problem. In this struggle for the firmer establishment of proletarian power at the expense of the means accumulated by the capitalist sector of our economy both in town and country—among the Nep-men, new bourgeoisie, and the kulaks—the Party will have no differences of opinion with us, we shall place no difficulties in the way.

My time has expired, and I shall only say two words on the apparatus, on bureaucracy, and on Trotsky. Comrades, I promise to be finished with all this in two minutes. You state in your resolution that we have not only criticized, not only tried to have things done differently, but that we have insulted the Party apparatus. I now reply to this. You write in the resolution, which constitutes an indictment against us:



"The Party apparatus comprises the best members of the working class; it can and must be criticized, and it can and must be "revived", but it cannot be insulted without the danger being incurred of disintegrating and disarming the Party."

This is true, comrades, perfectly true. (*A voice*: "And the declaration?") I shall read to you what the declaration says. Now, comrades, what did we say in this fighting document—you are well aware that it is a fighting document? (*A voice*: "A disgraceful document!") In this document, in your opinion a disgraceful one, you may read:

"The importance of a closely united and centralized apparatus in a Bolshevik Party requires no further substantiation. Without this framework the proletarian revolution would be impossible. The majority of the members of the Party are disinterested and faithful solders of the Party, influenced only by the struggle for the interests of the workers. (*A voice*: "And further?") Given the right regime, and a suitable distribution of forces, these same functionaries could demand with success the realization of Party democracy."

And now, comrades, another point, and a new idea. (*Laughter*) This document, or declaration at the July Plenum of the CC and the CCC, is a fighting document. That is true. In this document we have concentrated everything which we had to say to the Party, and wanted to say, and in my opinion it would be better if the resolution, in criticizing our standpoint, would not refer to quotations from 1922/23, or to isolated ideas uttered at the Communist Academy, but to this document, for which we bear the responsibility, and to which our signatures are subscribed. Then you could not assert that this historical fighting document "insults" the Party, for you would have the words which I have just quoted before your eyes, and these say something very different.

I do not deny that in the heat of discussion a word or a sentence may fall that might be otherwise interpreted. (*Laughter*) If you had been able to find such sentences, comrades, you would have brought them up against us here. But you have not done this. In the official document, thought out by us outside of the heat of discussion, and containing what we really wish to say to the Party, we have spoken about the Party apparatus in the words which I have just read. We are ready to join you in condemning any criticism going beyond this, and assuming the nature of an "insult".

And now to comrade Trotsky.

#### THE BLOC WITH TROTSKY

Comrades. In this question your formulation is as follows:

"The fundamental fact in the development of inner-Party relations in the CP of the Soviet Union since the Fourteenth Congress, which Congress condemned the principles of the "New Opposition", consists of the fact that the "New Opposition" (Comrades Zinoviev, Kamenev), who at one time fought against Trotskyism, against the social democratic deviation in our Party, have gone over to the ideological standpoint of Trotskyism.... (*A voice*: "True!")

There is only one thing more to be asked, comrades. For what did you condemn us at the Party Congress?

If "the fundamental fact in the development of inner-Party relations since the Fourteenth Party Congress consists of the Opposition having gone over to the ideological standpoint of Trotskyism," then for what did you condemn us at the time of the Fourteenth Party Congress? (*Disturbance. A voice*: "At the Fourteenth Party Congress there were other sins to condemn!") You condemned us at the Fourteenth Party Congress, although we had not gone over to the standpoint of Trotskyism. Now you want to condemn us because we are alleged to have gone over to Trotskyism. I fear that you condemn us, whatever the standpoint we adopt. (*Laughter*)

Facts remain facts. I declare that you cannot prove to us by a single quotation, or a single fact, that we have "gone over" to the ideological standpoint of Trotskyism. Not even the exhaustive report given by Comrade Stalin could bring evidence of this. (*A voice*: "And

the declaration?") We have never and nowhere defended, do not defend, and never shall defend—of this we may assure you—that which specially differentiates historical Trotskyism from Leninism. (*Laughter*) For us, comrades, Leninism is sufficient. (*A voice*: "So Trotsky has abandoned his standpoint?") Wait, comrades.

We have joined forces with Trotsky for the defense of particular views against particular deviations in the Party, in doing this we have merely followed the practice of Lenin (*Laughter*) of joining forces with this or that group within the leading Party organs in the case of inner-Party conflicts. Comrade Lenin, as you should be aware, fought with us against Trotsky, and at other times fought with Comrades Trotsky against this or that deviation, against Rykov or Tomsy. These are facts in the history of the Party. They are recorded in the history of the Party. And the fact that we have been induced by what we consider—rightly or wrongly—to be our duty at the present time, to cooperate with Comrade Trotsky in the defense of a certain line—in this there is nothing impermissible, much less anything detrimental.

One of the political documents of this political bloc consists of these words of Comrade Trotsky's (quoted from his "Reply to the questions put by comrades to the "Opposition", printed in the "Stenographic minutes of the sessions of the Politburo, 8 and 11 October 1926"):

"We proceed from the conviction that, as experience has incontestably shown, Lenin was without doubt invariably right in all questions, touching to any extent on principles, in which any one of us was not in agreement with Lenin."

And when you read further that Comrade Trotsky has stated, in this same document, that:

"In the question of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, we are in complete and entire agreement with the theoretical and practical teaching formulated by Lenin."

Then I think you will admit that our bloc with Trotsky is nothing extraordinary or extravagant, and the question in hand is not whether the bloc has induced Trotsky or not, but whether its general lines have been correct or the contrary.

Comrades, after all this I ask you: Can the existing differences of opinion be settled within the boundaries set by our joint work, and by the solidarity and responsibility felt by every one of us for the work of the Party.

We declare: Yes, this can and must be done. You do not realize, comrades, that the acceptance of the resolution on the social democratic deviation throws great difficulties in the way of joint work. We for our part are prepared to exert our utmost efforts to engage in practical work in accordance with the Party decisions, the decisions of the CC and of the Conference, and to subordinate all our steps, all our actions and utterances, to the supreme principle of the unity of the Party and the firmer establishment of the dictatorship. We place on record that our declaration, to the effect that the system of fractions is inconsistent with the interests of Party Unity and the proletarian dictatorship, is our political declaration, that we stand on this platform only; and that we recognize that no individual member of the Party, whatever position he may occupy, can avoid the responsibility incurred by the general policy of the Party. We believe that it is our duty as communists to defend our views within the limits of those differences of opinion which actually exist, but that it is also our duty—which we shall fulfill—to submit to the Party discipline, and to recognize our responsibility for the joint work.

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## [ZINOVIEV'S SPEECH]

Comrades! What is it that the Conference has the right to expect of us before anything else? It has the right to ask for an explanation of that sharp conflict concluding with the well-known document of 16 October. On the other hand we have the right to express ourselves with regard to the "social democratic deviation" of which we are accused.

This second point is bound to lend a polemical character to our utterances. It will be understood that if we were to abstain from polemics in this question, this would be tantamount to admitting that we felt guilty of really having deviated in the direction of Social Democracy. But this is not the case, comrades; we do not and cannot admit anything of the kind.

## WHAT IS OUR ESTIMATE OF OUR DECLARATION OF 16 OCTOBER?

I can imagine that some comrades will probably interpret this polemical observation on the "social democratic deviation" of which we are accused, as a new stage in our policy, as a fresh attempt to continue the sharp conflict which has been carried on. Such a conclusion would be wrong. At the joint sessions of the CC and the CCC, we openly put the question of whether, at the Conference, we should give our explanation of the so-called "social democratic deviation". And if the comrades of the CC and the CCC had said that in the interests of peace we should rather abstain from our declaration, then we should have done so. (*Stir among the audience. A voice: "And what were you told?"*) We were told that nobody had any objection. We therefore take it to be our right, though confining our speeches at the Conference to the briefest possible minimum, to defend ourselves openly—and if necessary in a very sharp form—against these accusations of a "social democratic deviation", which we have not deserved, and which are entirely false. (*A voice: "Innocent lamb!"*)

We have reason to believe that some of our comrades, who share the views of the Opposition, or think that they share them, have not grasped the meaning of our declaration of 16 October. I could adduce an example of this from the ranks of the German communists. I have read the declaration made by Comrades Urbahns and Schimansky, members of the CC of the German CP, at the conference of Party workers of the Berlin organization on 20 October, from which it is to be seen that these comrades have not grasped the scope of the declaration of 16 October.

They have not grasped the fact that this document does not represent a "maneuver", but the result of the estimate which we ourselves have formed of the effect of our attitude upon the communist workers. We believe that the latter have feared most of all that to permit a discussion at the present time could invoke serious danger of the unity of the Party. (*A voice: "True."*) Our declaration of 16 October aimed at meeting the wishes and the feelings of the mass of our Party members, who demand above all that Party unity shall be secured. (*A voice: "And what did you used to think on that point?"*) Comrades, I shall not reply to interruptions.

To assume, as Comrades Urbahns and Schimansky do, that certain state organs could play any role in our declaration, is simply foolish and unheard of. Our declaration, if need not be said, was dictated by our conception of the interests of our Party and of the Comintern, the interests of Party unity. In our opinion, those comrades of the German CP who share the views of Comrades Urbahns and Schimansky should also abandon fractional struggles, and the CC of the German CP should aid them to do so.

I believe, comrades, that our declaration of 16 October, of which Comrade *Kamenev* has rightly stated that it has not only an organizational meaning, but at the same a political meaning, will be accepted as we have meant it, that is, as a step, no more than a step, as the decisive cessation of fractional struggle on our part. We have declared in this document that we shall carry out the Party decisions, the decisions of the CC, and of the other leading organs of our Party, to the utmost of our powers, and that we shall perform every work set us by the organs of the Party. And we shall hold consistently to this declaration.

It is only natural that our comrades will follow up with the question: So far good, but in your declaration of 16 October you have stated that you adhere to your views; if this be the case, will a fresh conflict not arise? Is this not a reservation on your part, enabling you to resume the fractional struggle in a new form?

To this we reply in Lenin's words:

"Ideological contentions in the Party do not mean that holders of different views sweep each other out of the way, but that they support one another."

To these words we shall hold fast. We shall defend our views, but within the confines laid down by the Party statutes, and in forms which have always been acknowledged by the Party, and—we are convinced—will continue to be acknowledged by it in the future.

It need not be said that here 90 percent depends on the majority. (*Voices*: "Oho!" *Disturbance*) Yes, comrades, when the newspapers of our Party, our central organs, have daily published inflammatory leading articles on our silence with respect to the preceding two or three points on the agenda of the Conference, have they been thereby serving the cause of the final establishment of peace, the cessation of the acute contention? (*Comrade Babushchkin*: "Do you want the Party to fall on its knees before you?") No, we do not want that by any means. It need not be said that we have not had the slightest expectation of being welcomed with open arms after our declaration. Of course we have not expected this. We knew very well that the ideological conflict continues. But we expected that the tone of our press would change. We expected.... (*A voice*: "Did you expect to be praised?") No, not to be praised, but there is a happy mean between praise and what has actually been done. Thus, for instance, the "Communist Path", the organ of the Saratov Committee of our Party, published an article on 20 October, four days after our declaration, under the title: "For unity in the ranks of the Party," concluding with the following words:

"The Party carefully safeguards its unity. The Party restores unity again, whatever the obstacles, and whoever may lay them in our way.

"It is high time for everyone to recognize clearly that the CPSU will relentlessly repulse any attempt at violating its unity. And no complaints may be made about the Party in this respect.

"Are we then to blame if your bones crack and break in our powerful claws?"

I am not opposed to poetical forms of expression, or to the works of Blok, but I think that the majority of you will find it somewhat out of place to issue such an article a few days after our declaration.

#### HOW DID THE PARTY UNDER LENIN TREAT THE OPPOSITION

We know, comrades, that an opposition has frequently appeared in our Party. And we must look back over the history of the Party to see how these earlier opposition were dissolved in Lenin's time, and how those comrades at that time in the minority on this or that question then took up their daily work again, thus ending the dispute.

The first fraction formed after the conquest of power was that of the "Left Communists" at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. The conditions under which we were working at that time will be known to you. They were extremely difficult. The existence of the Soviet hung by a thread. In the midst of this difficult situation a group was formed, participated in by a number of leading comrades. Some of these comrades are at the present moment in the ranks of the majority, others in the minority. It suffices to mention that of the present adherents of the majority the following comrades attached themselves to this group: *Bukharin*, who headed the "Left Communists", then *Iaroslavsky*, *Kuibyshev*, *Kosior*, *Lomov*, and others. At that time these comrades published a newspaper of their own in Leningrad and Moscow, and for a time the Petrograd Government and the Moscow Provincial Bureau were in their hands.

They themselves related afterwards that some of them had negotiated with the Left SRs on alterations to be made in the composition of the Council of People's Commissars. I shall

read some of the declarations made at that time. For instance, the exact wording of a resolution accepted at that time by the Moscow Provincial Bureau, conducted by Comrade Bukharin. (*Disturbance*) In this resolution we read:

"After discussing the activities of the CC, the Moscow Provincial Bureau of the RSDLP (the Party was renamed Communist Party later) expresses its mistrust towards the CC on account of its political line and its composition, and will insist upon a new election to the CC at the first opportunity. Besides this, the Moscow Provincial Bureau does not consider it its duty to subordinate itself unconditionally to the decisions of the CC where these deal with carrying out of the conditions of the peace treaty with Austria and Germany."

The so-called "explanatory comment" to this document states:

"The Moscow Provincial Bureau is of the opinion that it will be difficult to avoid a split in the Party in the near future, and considers it to be its task to endeavor to unite all consistently revolutionary forces, and to join with these in combatting the adherents of a separate peace, and all moderate opportunist elements in the Party. *In the interests of international revolution we find it advisable to take into account the possibility of the loss of Soviet power, which has now become purely formal. We continue to regard it as our leading task to spread the ideas of socialist revolution in all other countries, and to support energetically the dictatorship of the proletariat, at the same time relentlessly suppressing the bourgeois counterrevolution in Russia.*"

I recollect that when Comrade Lenin wrote his article on the "Revolutionary Phase", Comrade Bukharin replied in an article entitled "The Opportunist Phase". This was on 5 March 1918. Bukharin wrote that Lenin "repeated" in substance those same errors to which Kautsky has succumbed," that the "peace policy of the official CC (that is, of the Leninist CC) has left the rails of proletarian revolution," that the policy of Lenin "leads to the capitulation of the proletariat in its class war against the foreign and Russian bourgeoisie" and that "in consideration of these facts various members of the CC and of the Council of People's Commissars (Bukharin and others) declared at the time their withdrawal from these institutions." (*Voices*: "Tell about yourself. Read us the letter which Lenin wrote about you.") "Comrade Zinoviev, you have a very bad horse, he will not carry you far." *Disturbance*)

And how was this opposition dispersed, despite all this? I took an active part in the conflict against this opposition.

The CC sent Sverdlov and me to Moscow to oppose these errors. (*Disturbance. A voice*: "And who was sent to Leningrad in 1926?") Was this case at that time used as an occasion for drawing up any special theses? No, this was not the case. (*A voice*: "Tell us about the "Red Putilov" nucleus!" *Disturbance*) Tell me, was there one single comrade expelled from the Party in connection with the extremely sharp opposition of the "Left Communists"? No, this was not done. This is not a moot question. We know that a large number of members are being expelled from the Party, and this was not the case at that time. (*Disturbance*)

Did Lenin issue at that time the slogan of "destroying the Opposition"? No, comrades, and in this hall there are sufficient old comrades who can confirm my statement that no such slogan was issue, although the conflict was severe, as you will have seen from the passages quoted.

I may further remind you of the serious differences in 1919, on the organization of the Red Army. Many of you will probably recollect the sharp struggles on this question at the Eighth Party Congress. And yet this was not followed by any special organizational measures, or by special theses on any deviation.

In 1920 there were again important differences, before the Ninth Party Congress, on the question of the organization of our economy. On this occasion Lenin only received two votes at the session of the Communist fraction of the Central Trade Union Council, and the

majority were opposed to him. And were any theses on "social democratic deviations" published? Not at all.

Another example. In the autumn of 1920 there was a fierce conflict in the Moscow organization. One of the groups was headed by the democratic centralists under the leadership of Comrade *Bubnov*. *Lenin* played the part of intermediary. The municipal conference separated into two parts and met in two different places. (*A voice*: "That is an old story; better tell us how you organized the fraction.")

At that time Comrade *Lenin* said:

"In connection with the crisis in the Party much was to be observed that was perfectly sound, necessary, and inevitable in a moment of natural growth of the Party, in a moment of transition from a position in which our whole attention was concentrated on political and military tasks, to a position in which we have to devote ourselves to the building up of our organizations, in which we have to cope with dozens of bureaucratic institutions, and in which the cultural level of the majority of the proletariat and of the peasantry is not equal to the task."

Further:

..."We have lost a great deal of time in quarrels and contentions, and we must now say: enough! And we must endeavor to create sound working conditions under these or other conditions. We must make this or that concession—better too much than too little—to those comrades who are dissatisfied, who call themselves the opposition. But we must ensure that the work is carried on unanimously, or we cannot continue to exist at a time when we are surrounded by enemies at home and abroad."

This is the way to disperse an opposition, comrades. I place on record that the slogan of "destroying the opposition" has now been issued for the first time. And if it was possible to write in such a savage manner in Saratov on 20 October, then it is easy to imagine the tone which will be employed after the proclamation of the slogan of "destroying the opposition". (*A voice*: "Disperse yourselves, that will be better.")

#### A FEW WORDS ON THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION

I naturally understand that wild exaggerations have crept in the course of the struggle. We in the Bolshevik Party do not carry on conflicts with kid gloves, and we must not complain at every sharp expression. We have known this and know it still. But yet I cannot but remind you of what has been said about us in the course of daily agitation among the people, and in the country. (*Voices*: "And what have you said? And what have you done?")

I have here two numbers of the newspaper "Plough and Harrow", published chiefly for the broad masses of the peasantry, by the Leningrad Committee in the town of Kingisep. The number of 21 August has a big headline on the first page:

"The opposition proposes to deprive the peasants of their last penny."

The author of this loud proclamation begins his article by stating that:

"the peasant question is an extremely complicated one; to some of the proletarian leaders, who have a leaning towards deviations, it is as complicated as the riddle of peasant life is to the bourgeoisie who know of village life only from hearsay."

Further on he arrives at the following conclusion:

"When the power is once in the hands of the proletariat, then, of course, it is very easy for the Party and Soviet power to deprive the peasant of everything they have in one year, and to apply the money for industrial purposes, upon which industry will naturally make great progress." (*Voices*: And what did Leningrad "Pravda" write during the Fourteenth Party Congress?)

In another number of the same newspaper (28 August) our estimate of the last Soviet election campaign was characterized as an abandonment of the policy of drawing the nonparty peasantry into the Soviets, and was formulated as follows:

"Help, save yourselves, the muzhik is exercising pressure upon us. Drive him out of the Soviets!"

Some of the comrades here have called out "quite right"! But when I drew the attention of the Politburo to it, all the comrades there said that it was not right, and even promised to take measures preventing the repetition of such occurrences.

I am of the opinion that it was again not right to include, in the proclamation of the CC and the CCC on the economy regime (a proclamation correct in the substance of its purport), the following passage:

"There are two means of obtaining these hundred million. One means is to bleed the peasantry to the utmost, to squeeze everything possible out of him and give this to industry. Some of our comrades are endeavoring to induce us to employ this means."

It was wrong to say this, and especially wrong in an agrarian country. (*A voice*: "Why will you not say whether you are with Preobrazhensky or against him?") Preobrazhensky never proposed such a thing. (*A voice*: "Are you with him or not?") I trust Comrade Preobrazhensky will be given the opportunity of speaking for himself. (*A voice*: "Now he is dodging?")

Another example may be taken from the central organ of our Trans-Caucasian organization, "Zarya Vostoka", published in Tiflis. In its leading article of 8 October, under the title of: "We want no discussion!", we read:

"What does the opposition want?.... It wants to turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a democratic republic, into a democratically convoked congress." (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

Comrades, you know very well that this is not right at all, and could only be attributed to us in the heat of debate. And why not go further than a mere "democratic republic"? Surely it would be even more effective to say at once that we are in favor of the monarchy. (*Laughter. Disturbance*) You are perfectly aware, comrades, that this accusation of the "democratic republic" is an unheard of accusation.

It is not to be wondered at if, under these circumstances, our real differences of opinion are seized upon by the elements of a third force. We cannot conceal from ourselves that there are petty bourgeois elements in our country, and that these perhaps dream of a democratic republic. And if these are told that a section of our Party, a number of the members of the CC, people who have been working for years in the Party, are suddenly in favor of a democratic republic, then elements representing a third force are really given the opportunity of raising their heads.

We know very well that in such conflicts exaggerations are unavoidable, but even in admitting this we must state that the exaggerations brought up against us in the present contention have of late assumed proportions entirely impossible in our Party some years ago. When the peasants of an agrarian economy are told that we want to "deprive the peasants of their last penny," and that "the workers' power can, of course, deprive the peasant of everything he has if it wants to," then these are utterances which can have extremely negative consequences, not only for us, but for our State and our whole Party.

#### WHAT ARE OUR REAL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION?

Comrades, a great many nonexistent differences of opinion have been attributed to us. There are undoubtedly serious differences between us, but none which are not entirely possible within the confines of a united Party. (*Voices*: "So you say, so you say!") I shall now treat these differences. (*A voice*: "Go on!" *Another voice*: "Or lay diplomacy aside and speak of the differences with Trotsky!") What diplomacy do you mean? There is no diplomacy here.

You want to accuse us of a "social democratic deviation". You will find it difficult to make our workers, or even the social democrats all over the world, believe this. They will

believe everything imaginable about us, especially about me, but they will not believe that we are social democrats or incline towards social democracy. Of what do the differences consist? I believe, comrades, that the general line of our differences can best be illustrated by the following words of Lenin's:

"Yes, in overthrowing the landowners and the bourgeoisie we have cleared the way, but we have not erected the building of Socialism. History shows that on a soil cleared of one bourgeois generation, other generations spring up, if only the soil be fertile; and it generates as many bourgeoisie as possible. (*A voice*: "When was that written?")

This was written in 1919. I think, comrades, that this coincides closely with the ideas which have been reflected in our disagreements on the NEP question.

To us it is an absolutely incontestable fact that the path to Socialism in our country is only possible *through the NEP*. There can be no two opinions on this point. If it is laid to our charge that we want to do away with the NEP, and to return to war communism, then that is of course, a false accusation. (*A voice*: "And the revision of NEP?") It is *only by means of the NEP* that we can lead our country to Socialism; this is incontestable. But we have been of the opinion, and still are, that it would be false to say that we shall arrive *easily* at Socialism through the NEP. *Through the NEP* to Socialism—this is right, incontestably right. But it would be wrong to say, through the NEP, "easily" to Socialism, that the Party as a whole has never asserted this. But you cannot deny that immediately before the Fourteenth Party Congress there was among us (and this was the basis of our difference within the Leninist center) a fairly powerful current in the Party, influenced by other ideas and formulations, and tending to the view that "*the kulak will grow into Socialism*." You are aware that this was the case. In April 1925 Comrade Bukharin wrote as follows:

"Our policy in regard to the peasantry must be developed along lines enabling many of the restrictions hampering the growth of the well-to-do farmers and kulaks to be altered, and in part destroyed." (*Pravda*, No. 92)

You know very well, comrades, that this current existed in our Party, and that it became conspicuously apparent on the eve of the Fourteenth Party Congress. Why was such a difficult situation created? Because we believed, and were right in believing, that the Party had not discussed the differences sufficiently before the Party Congress, had not heard both sides—for reasons which I shall not discuss here. We were, of course, partly to blame, but the fact remains that the matter was so.

This is a really fundamental difference. I shall deal with some of the most essential differences: I only beg you not to interrupt me. (*A voice*: "Say something about discipline.") Comrades, I have already made three declarations regarding discipline, and the other comrades have done the same. If you like, I can make a fourth. It is not a question of the number of repetitions. I am well aware (*A voice*: "Will you carry out your declarations?") that you will demand that time prove whether we keep our promise. We accept this condition; time will show whether we carry out our declarations or not. (*A voice*: "We do not believe you!") What more can I say? Only time can show whether we keep our word or not. (*A voice*: "Your declarations show it in actual practice!")

Comrades, we are accused of being of the opinion that there is "no" *stabilization of capitalism*. This is a false accusation. (*A voice*: "And the July speech?")

My real standpoint on the stabilization of capitalism is as follows:

A "stabilization" of capitalism would mean first of all:

a) Low prices in the world's markets, which would have a powerful effect upon the economic progress of the Soviet Union;

b) Impending fresh wars against us. If the growing efforts of expansion of imperialist capital could lead to a war between two groups of imperialist powers, before the first workers' state (Soviet Union) made its appearance, then the growth of the same expansion can lead to an imperialist bloc against the Soviet Union.



The partial stabilization is a fact. This stabilization is, however, very shaky and temporary. The general strike in England furnishes a striking proof of this. The general strike in England could have been the spark which kindles flames, had not Purcell, Thomas, and all those working for the stabilization of capitalism, played a counterrevolutionary part. The subjective factor is of the greatest importance, that is, the degree of organization of the proletariat, and the fighting capacity of the Communist Party. To speak of stabilization extending over decades is equivalent to revising Lenin's views on our epoch of the world revolution.

You accuse us of holding the opinion that *no* stabilization exists *whatever*. This is not true, comrades. I have described our real standpoint with regard to the stabilization.

You say, comrades, that we do not believe in the *establishment of Socialism in the Soviet Union*. Permit me to refer to this further on. I recollect an interesting resolution passed at a meeting in Kutais. Up to now we have only been accused of lack of faith in the possibility of the establishment of socialism, but here a further step was taken, and a resolution was passed accusing us of "*believing in the impossibility of establishing Socialism*." ("Zarya Vostoka", 8 October 1926) A slight "correction". I think you must all agree with me that this is going too far. The first one says: "You do not believe in the establishment of socialism," and the second one takes this up and "deepens" it into "*You believe in the impossibility of establishing Socialism*." (Comrade Stura: "Don't cling so to grammar.") Very good. I shall not cling to grammar, but of an attempt to represent the whole purport of our lives, the symbol of that belief for which we live and work, as "a belief in the impossibility of socialism."

The theory of the international proletarian revolution, whose foundations were laid by Marx and Engels and elaborated by Lenin, remains our banner. The final victory of Socialism in *one* country is impossible. The theory of final victory in one country is false. *We are working towards the socialist state of society in our Soviet Union and shall realize it with the aid of the world proletariat, with the aid of the main mass of our peasantry.* We shall win the final victory, for the revolution is inevitable in other countries.

Now to the *peasant question*. We maintain that the following formulation of Lenin is completely acceptable, and that we can join hands unreservedly on the ground afforded by this formulation:

*"We must come to an understanding with the middle peasantry, we must not hesitate one minute in taking up the struggle against the kulak, and we must look for firm support only to the poor peasantry."*

This is a formula which has been weighed in a very accurate scale. It does not contain one superfluous word. Let us join hands over this formula. We stand for it in every particular. It need not be said that it is incompatible with those currents which have existed, and still exist, in our Party, such currents as those expecting that the *kulak* will "*grow into Socialism*".

You know that Lenin said that we must place *restrictions on the exploiting tendencies of the kulak*. But before the Fourteenth Party Congress we heard another formula, providing for the suspension or complete abolition of many of the restrictions on the growth of the well-to-do farmers and kulaks. Now, comrades, we take this formula of Lenin: "We must come to an understanding with the middle peasantry, we must not hesitate one minute in taking up the struggle against the kulaks, and we must look for firm support only to the poor peasantry," then you will find us completely in agreement with this.

*The organization of the village poor, and the aid given to the village poor*, are tasks of ever-growing importance. They must form one of the main criteria by which the success of the work of our local organizations is judged. I do not doubt that in the provinces more and more work is being done towards the accomplishment of this task. And I do not doubt that this will contribute to moderate our differences of opinion. Cooler relations between

us and the village poor might prove a serious danger to the revolution. The village poor are the main support of the proletariat in the village.

More attention must be paid to the organization of the agricultural laborers. More attention to the gradual collectivization of agriculture! Every tractor must be an instrument of collectivization! The combat against the kulak is not a combat against the peasantry. The middle peasant remains the chief ally of the proletariat. The alliance is formed on the one hand by the middle peasants, the leading role being played by the working class. The alliance between the working class and the peasantry must be unshakable.

We welcome a number of the decisions agreed upon in the CC of late; we give our complete support to such decisions as that on wages, that on the removal of the unfavorable aspects of the economy regime, on the annulment of the goods instructions and on the reduction of the costs of administration by 15 percent.

Many comrades have spoken here of the milliard (*A voice*: "Two milliards!") It has already swelled to two, and will doubtless be four before long. The circular drawn up by Comrades *Stalin*, *Kuibyshev*, and *Rykov*, declares that the Party has

"no reason to doubt that the costs of administration could be reduced by 300 to 400 millions, these 300 to 400 millions thus being won for industry."

So we can raise 400 millions. (*A voice*: "You will not raise it, but the CC!") Since we are all agreed that accumulation is growing steadily in town and country, there is no reason to doubt that we cannot only save 400 millions in officials and by means of the economy regime, but we believe that if we hang determinedly together and exert every effort we can obtain other considerable sums from the really great accumulations in the hands of the upper stratum in town and country. (*Laughter*) And if we only obtain 700 million at present out of the milliard, the miscalculation is not so extensive nor the evil so great. (*Laughter, disturbance, voices*: "That is your latest miscalculation!") Let us take 700 million for the present, and postpone the other 300 million until the first quarter of next year. (*Laughter*) We sacrifice these 300 million on the altar of unity. With these 700 million we shall promote industry and raise wages. We therefore fully welcome this decision of the CC on the 300 or 400 million. (*A voice*: "In other words, you make a cat's paw of others!")

We give our complete support to every decision aiming at putting pressure on the private capitalist; we welcome the fact that in the provinces more initiative is being shown on the subject of the organization of the village than was hitherto the case (*Disturbance*), although the resolution on the organization of the village poor was passed a year ago. (*Laughter. Voices*: "And did you welcome the decisions of the Party Congress?") We have already told you that we shall carry out the decisions of the Party Congress. (*A voice*: "Then why have you not carried them out up to now?")

We welcome the decisions of the CC on work in the cooperatives, decisions rejecting the false course towards the "economically powerful" middle peasant. We welcome the decisions of the CC on reviving the work in the conferences on production. We welcome the directions of the CC with respect to a certain revision of the budget in the direction of an increase in the amounts devoted to the purposes of industrialization. And we welcome the essential corrections made in our trade union statutes with respect to the affiliation of our trade unions with the Red International of Labor Unions.

Thanks to these decisions, our differences of opinion tend to diminish. We have already mentioned the fact that the abnormality of the situation lies in the fact that the Party had not discussed, before the Fourteenth Party Congress, those important differences of opinion which had already arisen before the Congress. You cannot deny that this is the case.

I may remind you of a passage in a resolution passed unanimously by the Thirteenth Party Congress. This states (I am giving you the sense) that: The abnormality of the inner-Party regime frequently leads even disciplined comrades to fractional activity. I shall not speak of myself. Let us assume that I am the worst disciplined member of the Party. (A

voice: "Which you are!") But you cannot deny that there are many old and well-disciplined comrades in the Opposition. (A voice: "For instance?") For instance Lashevich, whom you yourselves have regarded as a disciplined Party member. (*Disturbance*) And you know that when such members tread the path of the fractional activity this is the expression of some abnormality within our Party. (A voice: "What abnormalities?" Comrade Voroshilov: "That was the result of the leaders having gone off the track!" A voice: "You have turned Lashevich's head!")

I believe there is a reason why we did not discuss, before the Fourteenth Party Congress, all those fundamental questions by which we were confronted. I myself take a share of responsibility for it, and it certainly led to an abnormal situation. It has led to a number of differences being attributed to us of which we have never been dreamed, for instance the "democratic republic". We cannot tolerate the assertion, in an agrarian economy, that we want to "plunder" the peasantry, nor can we permit it to be said of us that we "believe in the impossibility of establishing Socialism."

We appear to be approaching a juncture at which the real differences of opinion existing between us, and which can be settled within the confines of a united Party, will have proper limits set them. At the same time every one of us is prepared to share the responsibility for the general line and the general decisions of the Party, and to carry these out.

But let us create a situation in which the Party is able to judge these differences as they really are.

#### THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

Three quarters of Comrade Stalin's speech of yesterday were devoted to the theory of the establishment of Socialism in one country. And truly this question is a central one, and one upon which there is as yet little clarity in the Party. Hence many comrades are found altering and defending their formalities, again realtering, etc. It is a very complicated and difficult question.

I was much surprised at what Comrade Stalin said with reference to *Engels*. I cannot agree with him here. I do not believe that Comrade Stalin is right in regarding as obsolete the theses of Engels, and of Marx, since Marx and Engels invariably worked together—theses taken from the original text of the Communist Manifesto and afterwards used as basis for the final text. I do not believe that we can regard these views as obsolete. Lenin never said so. You will find nothing to this effect in Lenin's works. In 1906 Lenin wrote as follows:

"What we demand is that a firm grasp be kept on the positions of revolutionary social democracy (today we should say: of Communism) against opportunism; we do not demand the creation of any "original" Bolshevik tendency."

To Lenin the task of Bolshevism was to interpret the views of Marx and Engels in a new era in history, in a new concrete situation. And if Lenin had held it to be necessary to correct Engels, he would have said this candidly and clearly. The passage here quoted was written by Engels in 1847. Engels himself lived for 50 years after this, but he did not correct these sentences. Lenin worked in the political arena for three decades. During the whole of this time he was interpreting Marx and Engels. After we had seized power, Lenin wrote many works in which he utilized Engels' views as applied to the new situation created by our Soviet Union. And not once did he say that this sentence of Engels was wrong. Although this such an important and fundamental question, we heard of it for the first time from Stalin yesterday.

In 1918 Lenin wrote as follows on this subject;

"The great founders of Socialism, Marx and Engels, who observed the development of the labor movement and the approach of the socialist world revolution for decades, saw clearly that the transition from capitalism to Socialism demands prolonged birth pangs, a

long period of decay of the old institutions, a ruthless destruction of all the forms of capitalism; they saw that it requires the cooperation of the workers of all countries, that these must join their forces to secure final victory. And they said: the French will begin, and the Germans will carry it on to the end....

"Today we see another combination of international Socialism. We see that the movement is most likely to begin in countries which do not belong to that category of exploiting countries possessing the possibility of plundering more easily, and of corrupting the upper stratum of their workers.... Today we can see clearly what course will be taken in the further development of the revolution: The Russians have begun, the Germans, the French, and the English will carry on the cause to the end, and Socialism will triumph."

This is the correction which Lenin made in the views of Marx and Engels. (A voice: "True!") Of course it is true. But here there is no revision of the question of the victory of Socialism in one country. Lenin writes: "Marx and Engels said that the French will begin and the Germans will carry on to the end." Matters turned out differently: "The Russians have begun, and the Germans, the French, and the English will carry on the cause to its end." This is the "correction" which has been made by our revolution. Lenin registered this and pointed it out. (A voice: "Stalin does not deny it!") But Lenin did not say that Engels' views on the impossibility of the victory of Socialism in one country were false. (A voice: "On the beginning of revolution in one country!") Not only Engels wrote on this question, but Marx, and I should like to quote here what Marx wrote on the subject. I shall, however, first read the corresponding passage from the final text of the "Communist Manifesto", which is not in the least obsolete. Lenin invariably protested energetically against any assertion that the "Communist Manifesto" was obsolete.

The following passage deals with the subject under discussion:

"The old local and national self-sufficiency and exclusiveness is replaced by general intercourse, by a general dependence of the nations upon one another... National one-sidedness and narrowness became more and more impossible... The cheap prices of their (the bourgeoisie) goods are the *heavy artillery*..."

This means that not only intervention is a weapon, but the low prices of goods! (A voice: "But you want to raise the prices!") The laws of the world market, in the hands of the bourgeoisie, are heavy artillery.

Further on we read:

"The united action of at least the civilized countries is one of the first conditions for its (the proletariat's) emancipation."

Marx dealt with this question again in his article "New Year 1849". This article was mainly inspired by the events in 1848 France. It is dated: Cologne, 31 December (1848). It was therefore written some time after the publication of the "Communist Manifesto". Here Marx writes as follows:

"Revolutionary rising of the French working class, world war—this is the table of contents for the year 1849.

"The overthrow of the bourgeoisie in France, the triumph of the French working class, the emancipation of the whole working class, this is the watchword of European emancipation.

"The emancipation of Europe... is thus conditioned by the victorious insurrection of the French working class."

Marx expected an insurrection of the French workers in 1849, immediately after the defeat of 1848. This means that Marx was perfectly clear in his conviction that the proletarian revolution can *begin in one country*. Marx, Engels, and Lenin were all agreed on this point. It is incorrect to present the matter as if the Marxists (including Engels) had at *one time* believed that the revolution could only begin in all countries at once. Marx, Engels, and of course Lenin, all knew that one single country can begin the revolution. These

passages from Marx even show clearly that Marx was perfectly aware that the revolution is not bound to begin in the country most highly developed, for that time France was not an industrial country, but a somewhat backward country economically rather similar to our country. (A voice: "But you maintain that it is impossible to begin!") In spite of the defeat suffered by the workers in June 1848, Marx reckoned with a renewed and victorious rising of the French working class. He at once raised the question of the international situation in which the French proletarian revolution would find itself immediately after its victory, and replied to the question as follows:

"But that country which has converted whole nations into its proletariat, whose gigantic arms embrace the whole world, whose money has once already paid the cost of European restoration, and within whose boundaries class antagonisms are manifested in their worst and most typical forms—England appears to be the rock upon which the waves of revolution break, England will starve the new society almost before it is born. England dominates the world's markets. A revolution of the conditions of national economy in any country of the European continent, of the whole European continent without England, is a storm in a tea-cup. The industrial and commercial relations of every nation are ruled by its intercourse with other nations, and conditioned by its relations to the world's markets. But England rules the world's markets, and the bourgeoisie rules England."

Marx added somewhat later that the task of the working class (that is, what he expected from the French working class; the socialist revolution):

"will not be accomplished in France, but it will be proclaimed in France. *It cannot be accomplished anywhere within national limits.*"

This is what Marx wrote: The social revolution will be proclaimed in France, but it will be decided in England, whose position places the fate of capitalism in its hands. *The workers' revolution cannot be accomplished anywhere within national limits.*

In 1885 Engels, when writing the history of the First Communist Federation, wrote as follows:

"Both the open society and the secret federation began to assume an increasingly international character, though a first only in the limited sense of the word; in practice they have become international through the various nationalities of their members, and in theory as result of the view that only *a revolution in the whole of Europe can be victorious.*"

We see that the First Communist Federation, even before the issue of the Communist Manifesto, was aware that only a revolution all over Europe can be victorious. When Engels asks if a revolution can be victorious in one country, and replies with "No", then he is not asking whether a revolution can begin. If we refer to some of the chapters of "Principles of Communism" we see that under "such a revolution" Engels understood not only the conquest of power by the working class, but at the same time a number of economic measures leading in their totality to a really socialist order. He names twelve such measures; ten of them are included in a somewhat altered form in the final text of the "Communist Manifesto". The totality of these measures means the transformation of society into the socialist order. Among these measures are such as: "Destruction of all unhealthy and badly built houses and parts of cities." This is not the conquest of power, but the actual realization of Socialism. Another measure relates to the "organization of labor", to the "employment of proletarians in the state farms, factories, and workshops," to "equal compulsory work for all members of society, until the complete abolition of private property;" "increase of state factories, workshops, railways, ships, etc." These twelve points, collectively, involve a real socialist revolution. And now Engels asks whether such a revolution is possible in one country, and answers with "No".

I am of the opinion that we must not revise Engels in the manner which I have pointed out; this may "lead" to grave errors.

Up to now nobody has ever said that Engels is obsolete. (*Comrade Ivanov*: "It appears that you were right in the October period.") I have acknowledged my errors. (*A voice*: "You are responsible for your errors.") Engels is not responsible *for my errors*. The point at present is that it would be extremely rash to regard the above-mentioned standpoint of Engels as obsolete, and it would fail to correspond with the views of Marx and Lenin. We must keep to the old standpoint of Engels as obsolete, and it would fail to correspond with the views of Marx and Lenin. We must keep to the old standpoint. It is not true that the inequality of capitalist development was less in the preimperialist period. On the contrary. The fact that we have now a *monopolist* capitalism, a centralized oligarchy of financial capital, facilitates a more or less international capitalist action.

I am of the opinion, comrades, that we must not be too hasty in "canonizing" this standpoint, and in officially declaring that the view held by Lenin is obsolete. We must first think it well over, we must disagree about it in thick volumes or in discussion articles, as Lenin advised us to do, but we must not hastily declare this to be the standpoint of the Party. It is not true that Engels' view of this matter has hitherto been the property of the social democrats. That would be too great a compliment for social democracy; in this point they are not by any means in possession of the standpoint of Marx and Engels, but have misrepresented it, and continue to misrepresent it. Therefore I cannot agree with this.

#### LENIN ON SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

What did Lenin say about Socialism in one country? Comrades Kamenev and Trotsky have quoted a number of exact passages. I could quote more, but I have no time. I shall only remind you that during the first discussion on the program of the Party, at the Seventh Party Congress, the following little episode occurred. You will find it recorded in the minutes of the Seventh Party Congress, page 185. Comrade *Miliutin* delivered the following brief speech:

"I propose that the words "international social revolution" should be inserted in the sentence on "the commencing era of social revolution;" here the word "international" should be inserted. I believe that it is superfluous to substantiate this, but it is extremely necessary, when dealing with this point, to draw particular attention to the fact *that our social revolution can only be victorious as an international revolution. It cannot be victorious in Russia whilst in the countries surrounding us the bourgeois order still exists. It must be especially emphasized that the social revolution can only become firmly established as an international revolution. I therefore propose, in order to avoid misunderstandings, that this be inserted.*

"*Chairman*: Comrade Lenin accepts this correction."

This took place at the first discussion of our Party program, at the Seventh Party Congress. At that time it was taken as a matter of course. And until 1924, until the question was raised in Comrade *Stalin's* book, it was regarded as a matter of course. For this reason I am much disquieted by the attempt at revising this question at the present time.

The view is attributed to us that the technical backwardness of our country is an *insurmountable* obstacle in the way of the establishment of Socialism in the Soviet Union.

Since there is no written proof of our holding such an idea, a speech delivered in the Politburo is adduced. The word "insurmountable" is falsely laid to my charge. That the technical backwardness of our country is an obstacle to the establishment of Socialism is true, and everyone will admit this. But it is not true that it is an insuperable obstacle, and we have never said that it is.

On the subject of technical progress Lenin observed:

"Socialism is unthinkable without big capitalist technics built up on the latest achievements of science or without a systematic state organization subordinating dozens of millions of

human beings to the strictest observance of a uniform standard in the production and distribution of products..." (Lenin, Complete Works, Vol. XV, page 267.)

"...but, it is somewhat strange to hear such words from the lips of a Marxist, one who has learnt that Socialism is impossible without the utilization of the achievements, technical and cultural, of big capitalism. Here there is nothing left of Marxism. (Ibid., page 277)

"...The real and sole basis for developing resources, and for the realization of a socialist state of society, is big industry alone. Without the capitalist big undertakings, without highly developed big industry, there can be no thought of Socialism, least of all in an agrarian country. We in Russia know this much more accurately than before, and instead of speaking of an indefinite or abstract form of great industrial equipment, we now speak of a definite, exactly calculated, and concrete plan of electrification." (Lenin, Vol. XVIII 1, page 260)

Today we still recognize this view as perfectly correct. Lenin grasped perfectly that it is imperative that we overcome our economic backwardness, and he never considered it insurmountable. We have always maintained this standpoint and continue to maintain it. (*A voice*: "And who is opposed to it?")

This time I am justifying myself, and accusing nobody. We have been accused of regarding our technical backwardness as an *insuperable* obstacle. I maintain that I have never said this, and the word "insurmountable" has been falsely attributed to me as the "social democratic deviation". I maintain that our technical backwardness actually renders our development more difficult. And of course we have always maintained this, it is an alphabet which we learnt from Lenin. (*A voice*: "And what about the article on the cooperatives?") The article on the cooperatives is absolutely correct, but I much regret, comrades, that everyone who has quoted this article up to now—even comrade Stalin yesterday—has cut off his quotation precisely before Lenin's sentence on our international tasks.

"I would be prepared to say that we should attach supreme importance to our cultural development, *were it not for our international relations, were it not our duty to fight for our position on an international scale.*"

And here he is not speaking of our duty as international proletarian revolutionists, but from the standpoint of the necessity of confirming our victory in the Soviet Union internationally.

I am also of the opinion that Comrade *Bukharin* formulation is extremely unhappy when he says that "if we abstract ourselves from international affairs... then, etc."

Such an abstraction is *not possible*.

To be sure, *if* we can perform a process of abstraction from the laws of physiology, then we may maintain that Comrade Bukharin will live for another 200 years and become younger and cleverer every day. (*A voice*: "You at least will never become cleverer.")

This can be done if the "abstraction" from physical laws is accomplished. Only this cannot be done. And when Bukharin accuses me of lumping together the "international" and the "internal", he is wrong. But that these two factors are connected with one another is incontestable.

Lenin, a recently published article entitled: "A reply to the questions of the English correspondent Ransome," wrote as follows on the price question:

"The prices are determined... by the prices of production abroad plus our state advance in support of production." ("Pravda", 21 January 1926)

This is what Lenin said. And can it now be maintained that the only danger threatening us is that of armed intervention? No, and again no. The laws of the world's markets, too, have their influence over us. This was stated in the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Congress, which represents a compromise resolution. If we take into consideration the manner in which it is drawn up.

Hence it is entirely wrong, comrades, to say that the only danger threatening us is that of armed intervention. When we are asked, comrades, what prospects we have for our work towards Socialism; when we are accused of expecting no future for our cultural work, nor for the trade unions, nor for the youth, then we reply: That is not true. We have a future, and that is the future seen by Lenin. This future is completely bound up with that of the world revolution. (*A voice*: "Better tell us at once who is right, you or the Party.")

*If you ask us whether we shall establish Socialism, we reply: Yes, we shall establish it. If you ask us how we shall establish it, we reply that it will be in alliance with the workers of other countries, in alliance with the world revolution, and, finally, in alliance with the peasantry of our own country and with the colonial peoples.*

If we are asked whether this international revolution will come in time, we reply: Yes, it will come in time. We have to maintain our revolution till the revolution breaks out in other countries. Lenin answered this question:

"Our task, so long as we stand alone, is to maintain the revolution, to hold fast at least one stronghold of Socialism, however small and weak it may be, until the revolution matures in other countries, and other troops hasten to our aid."

Comrades, I should like to add a few words on the bloc. (*Voices*: "You have said enough already. You were going to say everything from the beginning, and you have said nothing. Enough." *Uproar*) I should like to say a few words on the bloc and the Comintern. (*Voices*: "Enough. You ought to have spoken of that, instead of saying all that you have said.") Then you do not consider the question of the realization of Socialism in one country to be important? Then why did Stalin speak on this subject for three hours, and say that time must be allowed for this question. (*Disturbance, protests*) I ask for 10 to 15 minutes, in order to refer to the bloc and the question of the Comintern. (*Disturbance. Voices*: "Enough!") You are aware, comrades, that the Party is now deciding that I am not to work in the Comintern any longer. (*A voice*: "That is already decided!") Under the given circumstances this is unavoidable. But it would be just on your part to give me five minutes in which to speak of the Comintern. (*Disturbance. Voices*: "Enough!" *The chairman rings*.) I ask for 10 to 15 minutes more for these two questions.

*Chairman*: I take the vote. Who is in favor of Comrade Zinoviev's continuing to speak? Against? The majority is against.

*International Press Correspondence*, VI, No. 79 (25 November 1926), 1382-1388.



## RSFSR CODE OF LAWS ON MARRIAGE, FAMILY AND GUARDIANSHIP

19 November 1926

*The 1926 code revised the marriage code of 1918 and clarified the distinction between registered and de facto marriage. This distinction was not adopted in the marriage codes of the other republics, perhaps because of the strong traditional views of marriage among their populations. The RSFSR code emphasized the protection of children, regardless of the relations between the sexes, and the absolute equality between man and woman. It remained in force for more than a decade. The document below as amended to 1935 contains numerous clarifications and interpretations of the code. In addition to marriage, family, and guardianship, the code includes laws on births, deaths, and adoption.*



## DECREE

Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee passed at the Third Session of its XII Convocation on 19 November 1926 (Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, 1926, No. 82, Article 612).

In order to regulate the legal relations arising out of marriage, family relationships, and guardianship on the basis of our new revolutionary conditions of life so as to safeguard the interests of the mother and especially of the children, and so as to place the husband and wife on an equal footing with respect to questions of property and raising of the children, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decrees:

1. To confirm and carry into effect the Code of Laws on Marriage, the Family and Guardianship as from 1 January 1927.

2. Amendments to the Code of Laws on Marriage, the Family and Guardianship, with a view to adapting it to the special living and national conditions obtaining in the autonomous republics and autonomous regions, shall be adopted by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in accordance with suggestions to be submitted by the Central Executive Committees of the autonomous republics and the Executive Committees of the autonomous regions (oblasts).

3. To charge the People's Commissariat for Justice jointly with the People's Commissariat for the Interior to submit within a month for the confirmation of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR a list of the legal enactments which have become inoperative or which are being repealed as from the date when the Code of Laws on Marriage, the Family and Guardianship goes into effect.

## PART I

*MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE*

## CHAPTER I

## GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. The registration of marriages is introduced in the interests of the state and society as well as for the purpose of facilitating the protection of the personal and property rights and the interests of husband and wife and of children. A marriage is contracted by registration at a civil registry office in the manner prescribed by Part IV of the present code.

2. The registration of a marriage at a civil registry office is conclusive evidence of the existence of the state of matrimony. Documents attesting the celebration of marriage according to religious rites have no legal effect.

Note. Marriages celebrated according to religious rites prior to 20 December 1917, or which were celebrated in localities occupied by the enemy prior to the establishment of the civil registry offices, are of the same effect as registered marriages.

Notes. (a) The registration of a marriage is an indisputable proof of the existence of marriage. The absence of marital relations in a registered marriage may be proved only by means of a lawsuit. (In accordance with the decision of the Civil Cassation Collegium of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1927, No. 19).

(b) The registration of marriage remains an indisputable proof of marital cohabitation until the marriage terminates for the reasons and in the manner set out in Articles 17-20 of the Code, even though the actual marital relations had ceased before that time. (Extract from the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 20 June 1927).

(c) The periods up to which marriages celebrated according to religious rites are treated on the same basis as registered marriages have been fixed for separate localities of the republic by the Circular of the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs, 1926, No. 326 (Bulletin of the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs, 1926, No. 22).

(d) Article 197 of the Criminal Code. The coercion of a woman to contract a marriage or to continue marital cohabitation, as well as her kidnapping for the purpose of marriage, entails deprivation of liberty for a period of two years.

Note. In case rape takes place in this connection it is punishable under Article 151 or 153 of the present code. (Applicable in localities where actions referred to in the present article constitute the survivals of a tribal manner of life.)

(e) Article 196 of the Criminal Code. The payment of purchase money for the bride (*kaly*m) effected by the bridegroom, his parents, or his relatives, by blood or by marriage, to the parents, or relatives, by blood or by marriage, of the bride in money, cattle or any other form of property, or in personal labor, entails correctional labor for a period up to one year. The acceptance of the purchase money entails the same punishment together with a fine equal to the amount of purchase money. (Applicable in localities where actions referred to in the present article constitute the survivals of a tribal manner of life.)

3. Where *de facto* conjugal relations exist between persons, which relations have not been registered in the manner prescribed, such persons are entitled at any time to regularize their relations by means of registration, stating in so doing the period of their actual cohabitation.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGES

4. The following conditions are required for the registration of a marriage: (a) mutual consent to register the marriage; (b) both parties must be of marriageable age, and (c) the documents set forth in Article 132 of the present code must be produced.

Note. When deciding the question of the existence of marriage according to Soviet laws it is necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle that the *de facto* marriage is the decisive factor.

In all cases when the person who is married by registration has in fact dissolved that marriage and subsequently in fact entered into a second marriage, and registered such marriage (having concealed the first marriage from the registry organs), the entry of this new marriage is of full effect. The original marriage when the above-mentioned circumstance has been discovered must be declared dissolved, and the registry organs must register the divorce. The person who at the time of the registration of marriage concealed the fact that he was at that time married by registration to another person is liable under Article 88 of the Criminal Code not for bigamy but only for communicating wrong information to the registry organs. (Interpretation of the People's Commissariat for Finance of 26 October 1934, No. ch. 118.)

5. The marriageable age is fixed at eighteen years.

Note. The presidiums of the central executive committees of the autonomous oblasts, krai executive committees and also of town and district soviets in towns may, in exceptional cases, and acting upon individual petitions, lower the marriageable age fixed for women in the present Article, but not by more than one year (6 April 1928. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 47, Article 355 and 28 February 1930. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 12, Article 146).

Notes. (a) Marriage *de facto* with persons under age (under 18) who have attained sexual maturity is not a socially dangerous action and is not subject to prosecution. (Interpretation of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 15 April 1929.)

The above-quoted interpretation does not apply to those localities (autonomous republics and regions) in the territory of which Article 198 of the Criminal Code is effective. (Interpretation of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 6 June 1930—"Court Practice", 1930, No. 94.)

(b) Article 198 of the Criminal Code. Marriage of a person who has not reached the marriageable age entails deprivation of liberty for a period up to two years.

Marriage with a person who has not reached sexual maturity, or coercion into such a marriage, is punishable under Article 151 of the present Code. (Applicable in localities where acts referred to in the present article constitute the survivals of a tribal manner of life.)

(c) The celebration of a religious marriage of persons who have not reached the marriageable age entails criminal responsibility for ministers of religion under Article 135 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 23 July 1923.)

6. It is unlawful to register the following marriages: (a) between persons, one or both of whom is or are already married either with or without registration; (b) between persons one or both of whom has or have been adjudged weak-minded or insane, in the manner prescribed by law; (c) between relatives in the direct line of descent; also between brothers and sisters, whether of the full blood or the half blood.

Notes. (a) The celebration by mullahs of religious rites with regard to persons who are already married and are contracting another marriage (bigamy) is punishable under Articles 17 and 199 of the Criminal Code. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 1 April 1929.)

(b) Article 199 of the Civil Code. Bigamy or polygamy entails correctional labor for a period up to one year or a fine up to one thousand rubles.

Note. The operation of criminal laws dealing with bigamy or polygamy does not extend to cohabitation in marriages contracted prior to the issuance of these laws. (Applicable in localities where acts referred to in the present article constitute the survivals of a tribal manner of life.)

(c) The establishment by the court of *de facto* marital relations into which the plaintiff entered while he was married to another person by registration does not amount to bigamy. However, the court in such cases establishes the date at which the actual relations began and must declare the registered marriage dissolved from that date. (According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1929, No. 20.)

### CHAPTER 3

#### RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF HUSBAND AND WIFE

7. On registering a marriage the contracting parties may declare it to be their wish to have a common surname, either that of the husband or of the wife, or to retain their antenuptial surnames.

Notes. (a) The change of the surname of one of the spouses does not entail the change of the surname of the other spouse. (Paragraph 17 of the instruction issued by the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs, 1928, No. 180.)

(b) The joining of two surnames of persons registering the marriage into a hyphenated one for both of them is not permitted. (Paragraph 47 of the instruction issued by the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs and the Central Statistical Administration (TSSU) 1927, No. 468.)

8. Upon the registration of a marriage between a person who is a citizen of the RSFSR and a person who is a foreign citizen, each party retains his or her respective citizenship. The change in citizenship of these persons may be effected in the simplified manner provided for by the Union laws (Article 16 of the regulations governing USSR citizenship, edition of 23 November 1930. Collection of Laws of the USSR, No. 58, Article 614).

9. Both husband and wife enjoy full liberty in the choice of their respective trades and occupations. The manner in which their joint household is conducted is determined by the mutual agreement of the two contracting parties. A change in residence by either husband or wife does not oblige the other marriage partner to follow.

Note. After contracting a marriage neither husband nor wife is obliged to reside at the same apartment. (By decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1929, No. 18.)

10. Property which belonged to either husband or wife prior to their marriage remains the separate property of each of them. Property acquired by husband and wife during continuance of their marriage is regarded as their joint property. The share belonging to either husband or wife shall, in case of dispute, be determined by the court.

Note. The rights of either husband or wife in regard to the use of land and in regard to property used in common and forming part of a peasant household are defined by Articles 66 and 67 of the Land Code and by the enactments published to supplement the same.

Notes. (a) In a toiler's family both spouses have equal rights to property acquired during marriage. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 23 February 1926.)

(b) Apart from common property of spouses acquired during marriage as set out in Article 10, neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Laws on marriage lay down the concept of common property of the family unless the latter is not a peasant household. (Letter of Instruction of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, 1927, No. 1.)

(c) Things destined for the special use of one of the spouses are not subject to the division of property. (Decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1930, No. 9.)

(d) Objects of luxury acquired during cohabitation even though they are used only by one of the spouses form part of the common property of the spouses. (Decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, "Court Practice", 1928, No. 23.)

(e) When setting disputes between spouses concerning the division of common property in two equal parts, but in accordance with the circumstances of the case may increase the share of one of the spouses at the expense of the other. (Decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1927, No. 20.)

(f) A spouse who participated by his labor or means in building a house in accordance with building rights has a right to a certain share of the building rights even though the building rights contract was made in the name of the other spouse. (Decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1929, No. 19.)

(g) Common property of the spouses is liable for debts contracted by them in common or by each of them separately. (Decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1927, No. 12.)

(h) The surviving spouse belongs to the category of persons entitled to succeed to the property of the deceased spouse both by operation of law and under a will. (According to Article 418 of the Civil Code.)

11. Article 10 of the present code extends also to the property of persons married in fact though not registered, provided these persons recognize their mutual status of husband and wife, or their marital relationships is established as a fact by a court on the basis of the actual conditions under which they live.

Note. A wife *de facto* has a right to succeed to the property of a person to whom she is married *de facto* even though the deceased was simultaneously married by registration to another person. (Decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1927, No. 19.)

12. The following circumstances serve for the courts as proofs of marital cohabitation in cases where marriage is not registered; the fact of joint cohabitation, in case of such cohabitation of a common household, statements made to third persons in personal correspondence and in other documents proving the existence of marital relations, and also according to circumstances, mutual financial support, joint education of children, etc.

See Note (c) to Article 6.

13. The husband and wife may enter into any contractual relations with each other regarding property provided they are lawful. Agreements between husband and wife intended to restrict the property rights of the wife or of the husband are invalid and are not binding on third parties nor on the husband or wife, who may at any time refuse to carry them out.

14. When either husband or wife is incapacitated and in need he or she is entitled to receive alimony from the other conjugal partner, if the court finds that the latter is able to support the former. A husband or wife in need of support but able to work is likewise entitled to alimony during the period of his or her unemployment.

Notes. (a) The incapacitated spouse has a right to maintenance irrespective of the cause of such incapacity and the period when it originated. (Letter of Instruction of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, 1929.)

(b) In applying Articles 14 and 15 the courts must ascertain whether the unemployed spouse has applied to the labor organs with the request to provide him or her with work, and may make the defendant liable for alimony only if a certificate of a labor organ establishes that the labor organ did not provide work for the plaintiff. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 26 February 1934.)

15. The right of a needy incapacitated husband or wife to receive alimony from the other conjugal partner continues even after the dissolution of the marriage until there has been a change in the conditions which according to Article 14 of the present code serve as a basis for the receipt of alimony, but not for a period exceeding one year from the time of the dissolution of the marriage. The amount of alimony to be paid to a needy unemployed husband or wife in case of dissolution of the marriage is fixed by the court for a period not exceeding six months and shall not exceed the corresponding amount of the social insurance relief.

Note. If the incapacity of a woman has been caused by certain actions of her former husband at the time of their marital cohabitation (coercion to abortions, tortures, etc.) the imposition on the defendant of the duty to lend financial assistance to the plaintiff must be based not on Article 14 of the Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship, but on Article 403 and the following articles of the Civil Code. (Decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1929, No. 1.)

See Note (b) to Article 14.

16. The right to receive alimony both during marriage and after its dissolution extends also to persons who are married in fact, though not registered, provided they fall within the purview of Articles 11 and 12 of the present code.

## CHAPTER 4

### DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

17. A marriage is dissolved by the death of one of the parties to it or by a declaration of the presumptive death of either the husband or the wife through a notary public or court. See Note to Article 4.

18. During the lifetime of both parties to a marriage, the marriage may be dissolved either by the mutual consent of both parties to it or upon the *ex parte* application of either of them.

See Note to Article 4.

19. During the lifetime of both parties, the dissolution of a marriage (divorce) may be registered at the civil registry office, whether the marriage was registered or unregistered, provided that in the latter case it had been established as a fact by the court in accordance with Article 12 of the present code.

20. The fact that a marriage has been dissolved may also be established by a court, if the divorce was not registered.

See Note (c) to Article 6.

21. When registering the dissolution of their marriage the husband and wife indicate what surname each of them wishes to use. In the absence of an agreement between the parties on this point, each resumes his or her ante-nuptial surname.

22. When registering the dissolution of a marriage it is the duty of the civil registry office to consider the question of which child or children, if any, shall be entrusted to the custody of each parent, to what extent each parent is to bear the expenses of raising the children, and the amount of alimony to be paid to an incapacitated husband or wife. In case the husband and wife arrive at an understanding on these points, such agreement is recorded in the registration book of divorces and a corresponding extract from the book is handed to both husband and wife; this agreement does not deprive either the husband or wife, or the children, of the right subsequently to present, by way of an ordinary lawsuit, a claim for alimony in a sum exceeding that stipulated in the agreement.

Note. 1. The registry organs must devote special attention to the act of divorce, explaining to the parting spouses before registering the divorce that the maintenance of children constitutes the duty of both parents, and that divorce does not relieve them of that duty.

2. The registry organs when registering divorce must ascertain: (a) which of the children remains in the custody of the mother and which in the custody of the father; (b) which of the parents will bear the expenses of maintaining the children; (c) the amount of alimony paid by one parent to the other; (d) the periods of payment (by the month, by the fortnight, etc.). (Extract from the Circular of the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs, 1928, No. 287—"Bulletin of the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs," 1928, No. 31.)

23. If the obligations set forth in the agreement have not been carried out, the persons interested may apply at the office of a notary public for a writ of execution in accordance with Clause B of Article 1 of the List of Documents by virtue of which executions are levied by means of writs of execution issued by notarial organs (January 2, 1928. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 15, Article 116). (21 May 1930. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 38, Article 477).

24. In the absence of an agreement the question of the amount of alimony to be awarded to children is settled by an ordinary lawsuit; the court at the time statement of claim is filed renders a decision, after careful consideration of the circumstances of the case and the interests of the children, specifying which of the parents, and to what extent, he or she must, pending the decision of the lawsuit, provisionally bear the expense of the maintenance of the children.

The amount of alimony awarded to a needy incapacitated husband or wife must in the absence of an agreement likewise be decided by the court upon the institution of an ordinary lawsuit.

Notes. (a) In deciding questions connected with divorce the only matter that must be of interest to the judge in such cases is the interests of the child, and where the child will be better provided with normal education. However, in deciding this question there is not the slightest necessity at all to turn the trial into philistine wallowing in the details of intimate relations between spouses, into an evaluation of their "moral conduct", etc., as is still often done by the courts.

The Supreme Court lays stress once more on the instruction which has already been issued by it with regard to such mistakes on the part of the courts: "In the decision of our court, which is an organ called upon to spread among the masses revolutionary ideas, the principles of new life, and of a comradely attitude towards women, it is intolerable to use expressions which show that the court, so far from going in advance of the masses served by it, is dragging in tail of philistine moods inherited from the old regime." (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 26 February 1931.)

(b) The courts must accept statement of claims for maintenance filed directly by plaintiffs who are under age. (Letter of Instructions of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, 1929.)

(c) The courts must accept statement of claims for maintenance filed directly by plaintiffs who are under age. (Letter of Instructions of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, 1929.)

(d) Actions for alimony may be brought in a court with jurisdiction over the place of residence of the plaintiff. (According to the note to Article 25 of the Civil Procedure Code.)

(e) The procedural privilege established by the note to Article 25 of the Civil Procedure Code with regard to the possibility of filing alimony suits at the place of residence of the plaintiff applies only to actions for alimony. Actions for the reduction of or for the exemption from alimony must be brought in accordance with the general rule, i.e., according to the place of the permanent residence of the person in receipt of the alimony. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 22 December 1927.)

(f) It is pointed out to people's courts that alimony cases may not be tried by social courts. (Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 13 November 1933.)

## PART II

### *THE MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD AND BETWEEN OTHER RELATIVES*

#### CHAPTER 1

##### GENERAL PRINCIPLES

25. The mutual rights of children and parents are based on consanguinity. Children whose parents are not married possess the same rights as children born in wedlock.

26. The father and mother of a child are recorded in the register of births.

27. If no record is made of the parents, or if the record made is incorrect or incomplete, the parties interested are entitled to prove or disprove paternity or maternity by having recourse to the court.

Note. Actions brought in order to correct or supplement the records of birth and records concerning parents, in the absence of a dispute, are outside the jurisdiction of the people's courts. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 6 February 1928.)

28. In order to protect the interests of the child, the mother is granted the right during the period of her pregnancy or after the birth of a child, to file a declaration or paternity with the local civil registry office according to her place of residence, stating the name, patronymic, surname and residence of the father of the child.

Note. The filing during the period of pregnancy of an application to the Registry Office naming the father of the child constitutes the right of the mother, but not her duty. Failure to make use of the right does not deprive the mother of the right to bring an action of affiliation in the court after childbirth. (According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1930, No. 9.)

29. The civil registry office informs the person alleged in the declaration to be the father, of the filing of such declaration (Article 28) unless the office is informed that the person named has acknowledged his paternity.

If the putative father, within a month after receiving this notification, does not raise any objection, the registry informs him that he has been registered as the father of the child and that within a year he has the right to disprove paternity by having recourse to courts (20 July 1933. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 42, Article 159.)

Note. Birth registration entry which was not, within the prescribed period, disputed by the person named as father is an indisputable proof of paternity. (According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1928, No. 9.)

30. The mother of the child also has the right to institute a paternity suit in court after the birth of the child.

Notes: (a) In case of a dispute as to paternity the court, basing itself on the concrete circumstances of the case, may recognize as father of the child even a person whose paternity is denied by the mother, and if the mother refuses to receive maintenance from such person may raise the question of appointing a guardian. (According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1930, No. 2.)

(b) In case the plaintiff withdraws the filed statement of paternity claim owing to an agreement between the parties, the court must establish the real terms of such an agreement and must refuse to stop the case if the conditions are prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff or of the child. (According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1928, No. 22.)

(c) The instruction of the method of ascertaining or rejecting paternity claims by means of an investigation of the blood is deemed premature (Circular of the People's Commissariat for Justice and of the People's Commissariat for Public Health, 1925, No. 120.)

(d) Expert medical examination is inadmissible as evidence in deciding paternity cases. (Circular of the People's Commissariat for Justice, 1926, No. 34.)

31. If the court is satisfied that the person stated in the declaration (Articles 28 to 30 of the present code) is the father of the child, it enters a finding to that effect and imposes on the father the duty to contribute to the expenses of the mother during the period of her pregnancy and for six months after childbirth.

32. In case the court during the trial of the paternity case finds as a fact that the mother of the child at or about the time of conception has sexual intercourse not only with the person referred to in Article 28 of the present code, but also with other persons, the court enters a decree which recognizes one of these persons as the father of the child and imposes on him the duties set forth in Article 31 of the code.

Note. When the court establishes that the plaintiff was intimate with other persons besides the defendant, it cannot reject the claim, but must cite those persons as codefendants and then determine the actual father of the child. (According to the decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of January 16, 1928.)

## CHAPTER 2

### RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF RELATIVES

33. Parental rights are to be exercised exclusively in the interests of the children and in case they are improperly exercised the court is authorized and empowered to deprive the parents of their rights.

Notes. (a) The deprivation of parental rights may be imposed only when it is established that these rights have been abused by the person condemned (Article 31 of the Criminal Code) and irrespective of the principal measure of social protection imposed by the court. (Resolution of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 19 April 1927.)

(b) Failure to pay alimony is a ground for bringing suit for deprivation of parental rights. (According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1930, Nos. 17-18.)

34. If the parents have a common surname, that surname is also given to the children. If the parents do not have a common surname, the surname of the children is determined by agreement between the parents. In the absence of an agreement between the parents on the question of the surname of their children, the surname of the children is decided upon by the Office of Guardians and Patrons. If the father is unknown, the child takes the name of the mother. In the case of a dissolution of the marriage, the children retain the surname given them at birth.

35. If the citizenship of the parents is not the same, but at least one of them at the time of the birth of the child was a citizen of the RSFSR, at least one of the parents at the time



of the birth of the child was living on USSR territory, the child will be deemed a citizen of the RSFSR. If one of the parents was a citizen of the RSFSR at the time of the child's birth but at that time both parents lived outside of the territory of the USSR, the citizenship of the child is determined by agreement of the parents.

See Article 7 of the regulations governing USSR citizenship (Collection of Laws of the USSR, 1931, No. 24, Article 196).

36. The change in the citizenship of either husband or wife, where both are citizens of the RSFSR and living on USSR territory, does not affect the citizenship of their children. The citizenship of children in cases where one of the parents, a citizen of the RSFSR but lives outside the territory of the USSR, loses his RSFSR citizenship is determined by agreement of the parents.

See Articles 9 and 10 of the regulations governing USSR citizenship (Collection of Laws of the USSR, 1931, No. 24, Article 196).

37. Agreement between the parents that their children adhere to any particular religion is of no legal effect.

38. All steps in regard to children are taken by both parents jointly.

39. In cases where a difference of opinion arises between the parents, the point of dispute is decided by the Office of Guardians and Patrons, with the participation of the parents.

40. If the parents live separately, they may agree on the question of the residence of their minor children; in the absence of such an agreement between the parents, this question is settled in the ordinary way by a lawsuit in a people's court.

Note. When deciding the question with which of the parents the child should remain, the court shall be guided exclusively by the interests of the child. (According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1929, No. 18.)

41. On the parents rest the duty of taking care of their minor children, in particular of bringing them up and preparing them for socially useful activity.

Note. The failure on the part of the parents to supply any support to their young children (under sixteen) entails criminal liability under Article 158 of the Criminal Code.

42. Parents are obliged to provide maintenance for their minor children, as well as for needy and incapacitated children.

Notes. (a) Parents must support their children until they come of age. The employment of the minor may serve as ground for raising the question of the reduction of the alimony or its complete discontinuance. (According to the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 2 July 1928.)

(b) Wilful non-payment of means adjudged for maintenance of children entails criminal responsibility under Article 158 of the Criminal Code.

42a. The duty of providing for minor children and for those who are needy and incapacitated also extends to the stepfather and stepmother (a) in case the parents of these children are dead; (b) in case the parents do not possess sufficient means to provide for the children

These duties are imposed on the stepfather or stepmother provided the child was dependent upon or was raised by either one of them prior to the death of the father or mother, or prior to the happening of the contingency set forth in Clause (b) of the present article.

Stepsons and stepdaughters are obliged to provide for a needy incapacitated stepfather or stepmother in cases where they had been dependent upon the latter for not less than ten years (29 November 1928. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 22, Article 233).

42b. Whoever has come into any inheritance from a person who had been supporting children, or from a person who was legally obliged to support them, must support the minor children, or those who are needy and incapacitated, to the extent of the value of the property inherited.

In case the inheritance was shared by several persons, the duty imposed by the present article becomes their joint obligation and is imposed on each of them in proportion to the value of the respective shares inherited by each of them (29 November 1928. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, 1929, No. 22, Article 233).

Note. The obligation to support children mentioned in the present article arises: (a) when the parents of these children are dead; (b) when the parents do not have sufficient means to support the children (29 November 1928. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, 1929, No. 22, Article 233).

42c. Persons who have taken no children to be permanently brought up and kept are, in the case of their refusal to do so, obliged to pay alimony to minor children or to those needy and incapacitated: provided (a) the parents of these children are dead; or (b) the parents do not possess sufficient means to support the children. The duty set forth in the present section does not extend to guardians or patrons nor to persons who have undertaken to raise a child by virtue of an agreement with the Department for Public Education, the Department of Public Health or some other constituted authority of the State (29 November 1928. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, 1929, No. 22, Article 233).

43. The protection of the interests of minors, whether they pertain to their persons or their property, is incumbent upon the parents, who act as guardians *ad litem* of the children in courts and other institutions.

44. The parents are entitled to sue in court for the return of their children from any person detaining the children without warrant of law and not in pursuance of any court decree; in such case the court is not bound by the formal rights of the parents but decides according to the merits of each case with due regard only for the welfare of the children.

Note. In safeguarding the interests of the child when deciding the question of transferring him to parents, the court must take into consideration not only the financial position of the parties in dispute, but mainly the question as to where the child could obtain proper education. (According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1930, No. 9.)

45. Parents are granted the right to entrust their children to other persons to have them raised and educated. They also enjoy the right, with the consent of the children, to make contracts of apprenticeship and work for wages in the cases and in the manner permitted by the labor legislation in force at the time.

Children may not be entrusted for purposes of being raised and educated to persons who under Article 77 of the present code may not act as guardians and patrons (10 April 1930. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 19, Article 241).

46. In case of the nonfulfillment of their duties on the part of the parents or in case they do not properly exercise their rights with respect to their children, or if they treat their children cruelly, the court issues a decree to the effect that the children be taken away from the parents and turned over to the care of the Office of Guardians and Patrons, and the court is authorized to decree at the same time that both parents contribute to the support of their children.

Note. The Office of Guardians has the right pending the decisions of the court to issue orders to take the children away from their parents or from other persons in whose custody they are, if the continuance of their stay with these persons constitutes a menace to the children.

47. Where the court issues a decree depriving parents of their parental rights, the Office of Guardians and Patrons must allow parents to see their children except in cases where such meetings may prove injurious to the children.

48. The duty to support children rests upon both parents; the extent of their contributions towards their support depends upon their respective means.

Notes. (a) The mistakes committed by the courts in cases of alimony which is payable by members of collective farms, consist in that sometimes the court adjudges the alimony not from the parents or persons obliged to pay alimony to the plaintiff, but directly from the collective farm of which the defendant is a member. The courts must bear in mind that the socialization of the means of production and the management of collective households on that basis does not relieve the parents and other persons obliged to pay alimony of the duty to maintain children and incapacitated relatives. Therefore the payment of alimony constitutes the duty of person referred to in the code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship and not of the collective farm, and only the nationalized property of the defendant may be attached for alimony; and in case the defendant has no unsocialized property, or if it is of trifling value, sums due to the defendant as a member of the collective farm may be attached in the manner prescribed by Chapter 23 of the Civil Procedure Code.

There frequently occur cases when courts refuse alimony on the ground that since both parties are members of a collective farm, the maintenance of collective farmers' children who are under age must be effected out of a special collective farm fund. In passing such judgements the courts lose sight of the fact that the fund for the assistance of the incapacitated members of the collective farm is formed in accordance with the economic possibilities of the *artel* and, therefore, such fund, if it exists at all, may not happen to be adequate to satisfy the interests of the children. No doubt, when deciding the question of the amount of alimony, the court in ascertaining the financial position of parents must take into account also the assistance which the plaintiff obtains from the collective farm in accordance with Article 16 of the charter; however, the receipt of such assistance, although of importance when determining the amount of alimony, may not serve as a ground for relieving the parents of the duty to maintain and to educate their children, which is imposed on them by the law. (Extract from the Letter of Instructions of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, 1929.)

(b) The amount of alimony must as a rule be stated in the form of a definite sum. (Extract from the Letter of Instructions of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, 1929.)

49. Children must support their needy incapacitated parents.

Note. The defendant's reference in defense of an action for maintenance of parents to the fact that he lived with and was brought up by persons other than the parents is not a sufficient ground for disallowing the claim. (Extract from the Letter of Instructions of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, 1929.)

50. When parents are unwilling to support their children, or children their parents, in the cases provided in Articles 42 and 49 of the present code, the persons entitled to support may sue for the same in court.

Note. In case of any change in the financial position of the parents or children, the court decree may be modified as a result of the institution of a lawsuit in the usual way.

Notes. (a) Alimony is as a rule adjudged to be paid monthly. The capitalization of payments is permitted only in case of insolvency or of bankruptcy of the defendant. (According to the Letter of Instructions of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, 1929.)

(b) Courts in adjudging periodical payments in cases when they are not tied by law (wages, social insurance or public welfare pension, etc.) or by agreement of parties, have a right to adjudge them in accordance with the financial position and economic conditions of parties to be paid either monthly or quarterly. (According to the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 26 October 1925.)

(c) Actions by one parent against the other for expenses incurred during a past period are not, as a general rule, permitted, except in cases when the plaintiff proves that he owes money in respect of these expenses, and that moreover such expenses were necessary; for the fact that he could bear such expenses without applying to the court proves that in the past he was able to fulfill his duty of maintaining the children alone and that the action for

the participation of the other parent in the maintenance of the children should not serve as a means of accumulation of funds. For the same reason, as regards a past period, there can in any case arise only the question of claiming sums equal to a corresponding part of the necessary expenses, but in no case should such sum exceed the expenses which were actually incurred. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 18 January 1929.)

(d) Taking into consideration that in cases of alimony and compensation for mayhem, in respect of which periodical payments were adjudged not for the past but for the future, new and unforeseen circumstances may arise affecting the amount of sums claimed and the grounds for claiming them, under Article 250 and the following of the Civil Procedure Code, the Plenum interprets that such new circumstances serve only as a ground for bringing in the usual manner an action for an increase, reduction or complete discontinuance of payments adjudged for the future, but not as a ground for a petition for the revision of a judgement which has come into force. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 16 February 1924.)

(e) When levying execution for alimony from persons serving terms of correctional labor at the place of their employment, whose wages are paid with the deduction in accordance with Article 20 of the Correctional Labor Code, the alimony payments are calculated on the basis of the full sum of the earnings which would have been given to the defendant had he not been serving a term of correctional labor.

The actual deductions of the payments that have become due are made from that part of wages which is actually handed over to the defendant with the observance of rules set out in Article 289 of the Civil Procedure Code. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 27 May 1929.)

(f) The courts should in a stricter way control the execution of judgements of the courts in alimony cases, instituting criminal proceedings both against the persons who try to avoid the payment of alimony and against the officials of state cooperative and public organizations whose negligence or abuse of power is responsible for the nonpayment of sums due under writs of execution. (Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 28 May 1933, Protocol No. 29.)

(g) On measures securing the successful execution of alimony judgements. (Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars of 11 June 1928—Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 68, Article 487.)

51. The deprivation of parental rights does not relieve parents of the duty to support their children.

52. Persons who are jointly liable to contribute support are liable in equal shares, except where the court in view of the unequal means of the persons liable to contribute or in view of the absence of one of them, or for some other cogent reason finds it necessary to fix other ratios in the discharge of this duty.

53. The rights of parents and children with regard to the property of a peasant household are determined by the relevant articles of the Land Code.

54. Needy brothers and sisters, if minors, are entitled to obtain support from their brothers and sisters who possess sufficient means if the aforesaid brothers and sisters are unable to obtain alimony from their parents either because there are no parents or because the parents are impecunious.

Note. Under conditions referred to in this article brothers and sisters who leave without any assistance (to) juveniles, whom it is their duty to support, may be prosecuted under Part 2 of Article 158 of the Criminal Code. (According to the interpretation of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 7 May 1928.)

55. A needy incapacitated grandfather or grandmother is entitled to alimony from his or her grandchildren if the latter possess sufficient means, provided such alimony cannot

be obtained from the conjugal partner or the children. Similarly needy grandchildren who are either under age or incapacitated are entitled to alimony from their grandfather or grandmother who possess sufficient means, provided they are unable to obtain such alimony from their parents.

Notes. (a) Incapacitated grandchildren have a right to alimony from their grandfather or grandmother, who possess sufficient means, in so far as these children cannot actually obtain alimony from their parents. In this connection the mere fact of failure to pay alimony on the part of the father allows the court according to circumstances of the case to arrive at the conclusion that it is impossible to obtain alimony from the father and gives the court the right to make the grandfather or grandmother support the child; a special decision may be then passed determining the mutual accounts between the father of the child and the grandparents, without adjournment of the alimony case.

In case it is impossible actually to obtain the sums due from the father of the child under a judgement on account of lack of means and such impossibility is revealed only after the judgement has been passed, the grandfather or grandmother will become liable only under a judgement on a new independent action.

The question as to which grandfather or grandmother (father's or mother's parents) should support the children is decided by the court according to the concrete circumstances of each individual case (place of residence of grandparents, their financial position, etc.). (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 5 March 1928.)

(b) In case of the existence of conditions indicated in Article 55, a grandfather and grandmother who have left without any assistance (to) juveniles whom it is their duty to support may be prosecuted under Part 2 of Article 158 of the Criminal Code. (According to the interpretation of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 7 May 1928.)

56. Children born of members of a peasant household are recognized as members of the household to which their father or mother belongs, irrespective of whether their parents are married with or without registration.

Where parents belong to different peasant households, their children may be registered as members of one of the households at the option of the parent with whom the children are living.

Dispute as to which peasant household the child should be assigned shall be decided by a court of law, which is guided by the interests of the child (25 January 1930. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 5, Article 53).

56a. Where the fatherhood of a member of a peasant household has been established, the court fixes at the same time the quantity of food products which the peasant household of the father must contribute to the support of the child.

Children born of a member of a peasant household (Article 56) retain the right to alimony out of the personal means of the father and out of the personal means of the mother over and above the rights which they possess as members of the peasant household, on the general principles laid down in Articles 48 and 50 of the present code (25 January 1930. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 5, Article 53).

## CHAPTER 3

### ADOPTION

57. Adoption is allowed only of young children and persons under age, and exists exclusively in the interests of the children.

Notes. (a) Adoption cannot entail the deprivation of the right of the adopted to succeed to the property left on the death of his parents. (According to the interpretation of the People's Commissariat for Justice, 1927.)

(b) Adoption does not exempt the father of the child from paying for his maintenance. (According to the interpretation of the People's Commissariat for Justice, 1927.)

(c) Adoption effected before the revolution is valid only in case it remained in fact by the time the Code of Acts of Civil Status was published in 1918. (According to the decision of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR—"Court Practice", 1927, No. 4.)

58. Persons deprived of the right to act as guardians in accordance with Article 77 of the present code have no right to adopt.

59. Adoption is effected by order of the Office of Guardians and Patrons and must be registered in the usual manner in the civil registry office.

Note. The adoption of children of Soviet citizens by foreign citizens (subjects) residing in the USSR territory is allowed provided the rules laid down in the present chapter are observed and provided further that special permission be obtained in each individual case from the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the respective krai or oblast (3 September 1928. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 117, Article 735). (See Article 11 of the regulations governing USSR citizenship. Collection of Laws of the USSR, 1931, No. 24, Article 196.)

60. At the time of adoption, the adopted child may be given the surname of the adopter and, with the consent of the adopted child, also the adopter's patronymic.

Notes. (a) At the time of adoption the adopted may be given the surname of the adopter; he may also preserve his former surname. In deciding this question it is necessary to take into consideration not only the wish of the adopter, but also the wish of the adopted, provided he is capable of taking an intelligent view on this question. It is necessary to bear in mind that after the registration of the adoption at the registry organ, the surname recorded can only be changed after the adopted attains majority. It is extremely undesirable to change the surname of those adopted children whose parents have become famous by their activities in the revolutionary sphere or as scientists, artists, etc. (Extracts from the Instruction of the People's Commissariat for Education, 1925, No. 104.)

(b) The adopted child may keep his former patronymic. (According to the Instruction of the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs and Central Statistical Administration, 1927, No. 468.)

61. If the parents of the adopted child are living, or if it is under the care of a guardian or patron, adoption can take place only with the consent of the parents, if they have not been deprived of their parental rights; or of the respective guardians or patrons.

Notes. (a) In case of the consent to adoption on the part of one of the parents, the consent of the other, if he lives separately from the adopted child and does not take part in his education and maintenance, is not required. (Extract from the Instruction of the People's Commissariat for Education, 1925, No. 104.)

(b) The coordinated effect of Articles 61 and 65 is that adoption may be effected even without the consent of the parents, if they are not available, i.e., if their place of residence is unknown.

Therefore, children in children's institutions (homes) may be adopted also without the consent of parents, if the latter have not appeared for a considerable time past (e.g., one year, and their place of residence is unknown. Adoption may take place only with the consent of the management of the children's institution where the child is educated. (Interpretation of the People's Commissariat for Justice of 19 March 1934.)

(c) 1. In the following cases the consent of parents to the adoption of their child is not required: when the parents were by decree of court deprived of their parental rights, or when their whereabouts remained unknown for more than one year, or when they themselves are under guardianship owing to mental derangement. All the above circumstances must be confirmed by appropriate documents.

2. In case of adoption of children who are living in the institutions of the Society for the Protection of Mother and Child, and of the Departments of People's Education, when the whereabouts of their parents is unknown, and when the parents have not been heard

of for a least one year, adoption may be effected without their consent. In such cases only an appropriate certificate from the institution where the child resides and the consent of the management of the institution to adoption are required.

Note. Should the institution have some idea as to the whereabouts of the parents steps must be taken to find them, and only in case such attempts prove fruitless may such parents be deemed missing.

3. In case one of the parents consents to the adoption of his child, the consent of the other parent is not required if he lies separately and takes no part in the bringing-up or in the education of the child. The last-mentioned circumstance must be confirmed by a written statement of the parent who gives his consent to the adoption, by evidence of witnesses and by the data of investigation.

4. In case the adopted child has a guardian, or a patron, as well as parents, not only the consent of the guardian or patron, but also that of the parents is required for adoption. (Circular of the People's Commissariat for Education, issued in agreement with the People's Commissariat for Justice, No. 20/102, 11 July 1934.)

62. Where the adopter is married, adoption can only take place with the consent of the other conjugal partner.

63. No children above the age of ten may be adopted without their own consent.

64. Adopted children and their offspring have the same personal and property rights and duties with regard to their parents by adoption, and the latter with regard to their children by adoption and their offspring, as have the corresponding relatives by consanguinity.

Notes. (a) In cases when the circumstances of the case establish that the actual relations between the person who took the child to be educated and that child are such as to fall within the provisions of the new law on adoption, the court has the right in pursuance of Article 4 of the Civil Procedure Code to apply to such cases the new law on adoption with all the rights and duties resulting therefrom. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 1 February 1926.)

(b) The adopted is under no duty to provide means for the support of the children of the adopter, nor are the children and parents of the adopter under a duty to support the adopted after the death of his adoptive parent. (According to the interpretation of the People's Commissariat for Justice, 1928.)

(c) The adopter may not have any claims to the succession property obtained by the adopted child from his parents. (According to the interpretation of the People's Commissariat for Justice, 1927.)

65. Adoption effected in the absence of, or without the consent of, the parents of the adopted child, may be annulled by the Office of Guardians and Patrons at the request of the parents, if the child's return to them is in the interests of the child. In order to annul the adoption of a minor over ten years of age his personal consent is required.

66. Any person or institution may institute a suit in court for the annulment of an adoption if such annulment is necessary in the interests of the child.

67. Where an adoption is annulled the court enters a decree taking the child away from the adopter and entrusting it to the care of the Office of Guardians and Patrons; the court is empowered at the same time to require the adopter to pay alimony to the child.

### PART III

#### *GUARDIANSHIP AND PATRONAGE*

##### CHAPTER I

#### GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING GUARDIANSHIP AND PATRONAGE

68. Guardianship and patronage are established to protect persons legally incapable of independent action, to protect their lawful rights and interests, and also to conserve property in cases provided by law.

69. Guardians may be appointed over minors up to the age of fourteen and over persons declared feeble-minded or mentally deranged. In addition to the foregoing, guardians may be appointed over the property of persons who are dead or missing in cases provided by law. Guardians when acting in the name of and in the interests of their wards enjoy the rights and discharge the duties of the latter.

Note. The Presidium recommends the following as some of the measures to provide for the children of persons condemned to deprivation of liberty: (1) appointment by competent authorities of guardians to the children, who were left (unprovided for) owing to the condemnation of the person whose duty it was to support them; (2) in the above-mentioned cases the representatives of the Commission for the Protection of Mother and Child must obligatorily be summoned to appear in court (in case the children are under four), or else the representatives of the Guardianship Boards of the Departments of People's Education (in case of children over four); (3) the court imposes on these representatives the duty of carrying into effect the decision of placing the child in a children's home. (Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 18 April 1933, Protocol No. 19.)

70. A patronage may be set up over minors who are from fourteen to eighteen years of age; also over persons who are of age, if the latter, owing to their physical condition, are incapable of protecting their rights themselves. The patrons, whenever proper occasion arises, lend these persons assistance in exercising their rights and discharging their duties and protect them against any abuses on the part of third persons.

71. Parents or adopters are recognized as guardians or patrons without special appointment.

72. The functions of guardianship and patronage are vested in the presidium of the krai and oblast executive committees; in the presidium of the oblast executive committees (in autonomous regions), and in the presidiums of the district and town executive committees in the village soviets.

The above-mentioned Offices of Guardians and Patrons exercise their authority by virtue of special regulations concerning Offices of Guardians and Patrons (26 September 1927. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 105, Article 705). (24 September 1928. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 124, Article 789.)

Note. The presidiums of the executive committees delegate the performance of the functions referred to in the present article to the proper departments of the respective executive committees, namely: those of age are assigned to the Departments of Public Education; those feeble-minded and mentally deranged to the Departments of Public Health, while all other categories of wards are assigned to the Departments of Social Welfare.

Within city limits the exercise of the said functions of the presidiums of the city soviets is delegated to the city sections of the respective departments of the executive committees (24 September 1928. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 124, Article 789).

Notes. (a) Regulations concerning the organs of guardianship and patronage. Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of 18 June 1928. (Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 75, Article 524 and No. 129, Article 828.)

(b) The duties of organs of social welfare in regard to guardianship and patronage. (Instruction of the People's Commissariat for Public Welfare, 1929, No. 1—"Questions of Public Welfare," 1929, No. 7.)

73. Supervision over the activities of the Office of Guardians and Patrons, and the direction of the same is exercised by the presidium of the respective krai or oblast executive committee, whose decisions on matters pertaining to guardianship and patronage are final.

74. For the purpose of directly exercising the functions of guardianship and patronage, the Office of Guardians and Patrons appoints a guardian or patron from among those close to the ward, or from among persons selected for the purpose by a public body (trade union,



committee of a Peasants' Mutual Aid Society, etc.): if there are no such persons, then from among other persons.

Note. In rural areas guardianships and patronage are set up by the village soviet, which is obliged to draw up an inventory of the property of persons under guardianship or patronage, to appoint guardians and patrons, to make public the appointment of guardians and patrons and to issue certificates to the guardians. They also supervise the actions taken by guardians and demand a periodic accounting of the property of persons under guardianship or patronage (26 September 1927. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 105, Article 705).

Note. According to Article 70 of the Land Code, if the surviving membership of a peasant's household consists exclusively of minors, the village soviet appoints to them a guardian or patron, in accordance with the law relating to guardianship and patronage.

If one of the remaining minors—members of the household—has been allowed by the village soviet to manage the household independently, a patron is assigned to him. In case, if apart from the housemaster who is a minor, there are other members of the household who are under age, guardians are assigned to them on the basis of the existing laws. (Circular of the People's Commissariat for Justice, 1928, No. 116.)

75. The locus of guardianship or patronage is determined by the place of residence of the persons under guardianship or patronage or by the place where the property entrusted to the care of a guardian is situated.

76. In selecting a guardian or patron the following factors must be taken into consideration; personal qualities, ability to discharge the corresponding duties, relations existing between the party in question and the ward and, whenever possible, the wishes of the ward.

77. The following persons may not be appointed guardians or patrons:

(a) Persons deprived of electoral rights by virtue of Article 69 of the Constitution of the RSFSR;

(b) Persons deprived by the court of parental rights;

(c) Persons whose interests are opposed to those of the prospective ward, as well as persons who are on inimical terms with him; and

(d) Persons under age.

Note. The restrictions stated in subsections (a) and (d) of the present section shall not apply to parents, unless they are mentally infirm.

78. Refusal of the appointment of guardian or patron shall not be permitted, except in cases provided for by the present section. The following may decline to accept appointment as guardian or patron:

(a) Persons who have reached the age of sixty;

(b) Those who by reason of illness, physical defect, insufficiency of means, the nature of their occupation or the office which they hold, are unable to discharge these duties;

(c) Persons bringing up two or more children living with them;

(d) Mothers nursing a child at the breast or having a child under eight years of age living with them;

(e) Those who are already acting as guardians or patrons.

79. The guardian of a person under age must attend to his bringing-up, education and training for socially useful activity. The guardian of a feeble-minded person or one mentally deranged must take measures to secure for his ward medical treatment and conditions suitable to his state of health.

80. Where a guardian or patron has been selected, under Article 74 of the present code, by a public body, that public body supervises his activity and the proper discharge of his duties as guardian or patron, lending him assistance in that direction and submitting its conclusions when required to do so by the Office of Guardians and Patrons.

81. The duties incident to guardianship or patronage are performed gratuitously. If there is any property yielding an income and managed by the Office of Guardians and Patrons,

that office is empowered to allow the guardian or patron a remuneration which shall not exceed ten percent, of the income derived from the said property.

82. The expenses incurred for the maintenance of the ward which are recognized by the Office of Guardians and Patrons as necessary and useful are paid out of the income derived from his property; if such income is insufficient or is altogether lacking, out of the ward's property itself, which may be alienated with the permission of the Office of Guardians and Patrons.

Note. Where the ward has no property, the Office of Guardians and Patrons petitions the Board of Social Maintenance to grant funds to the guardian for the maintenance of the ward.

83. The guardian has the right to demand the return of the ward from any person detaining the ward without warrant of law.

84. Whenever a guardianship is instituted over a person mentally deranged the Office of Guardians and Patrons communicates with the competent Board of Public Health so that the person may be under constant medical observation to be carried out in accordance with the instructions of the People's Commissariat for Public Health.

85. The respective foreign plenipotentiaries of the USSR are in charge of all questions pertaining to guardianship and patronage of citizens of the RSFSR who reside abroad or who have property outside the boundaries of the USSR. The procedure in establishing a guardianship over property left abroad after the death of citizens of the RSFSR is laid down by special laws (20 June 1930. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 30, Article 391).

## CHAPTER 2

### RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS AND PATRONS

86. A guardian may perform any transaction which the ward himself might perform if he possessed the capacity to exercise his rights, or which could be performed by the owner of the property over which a guardianship had been instituted, except: (a) alienation of the property; (b) mortgaging the same; (c) signing promissory notes or other instruments of indebtedness; (d) waiving a succession estate under a will or on intestacy; (e) letting of property on a long-term lease (for a period exceeding one year); (f) closing down an enterprise belonging to the ward; (g) partnership agreements. In order to consummate any of these transactions, the assent of the Office of Guardians and Patrons is required. No gift whatsoever may be made of property belonging to the ward and no contracts of guarantee whatsoever binding the ward may be entered into.

Note. Property liable to rapid deterioration or intended for sale by the nature thereof; or such as has become unfit for consumption, provided its value does not exceed fifty rubles, may be sold without permission of the Office of Guardians and Patrons.

Note. The restrictions of the right to dispose of property, provided in Article 86 of the Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship, must apply to parents when acting as guardians, when property owned by children is pledged. (Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR of 20 June 1927.)

87. In authorizing the alienation of property or placing a mortgage upon it, the Office of Guardians and Patrons indicates the purpose to which the guardian must apply the sums realized.

88. The guardian may not enter into any business transactions with his ward, nor represent him in any transaction or lawsuits between the ward and the guardian's conjugal partner or his near relatives, nor may he acquire instruments of indebtedness on which the ward is liable; the debts of the ward to the guardian or to the guardian's conjugal partner or relative, incurred prior to the appointment of the person in question as guardian, are paid with the permission of the Office of Guardians and Patrons.

89. A guardian should obtain the permission of the Office of Guardians and Patrons when sending a minor ward away to be brought up or educated, or entrusting a person mentally deranged to be maintained by others.

90. Persons who are placed under a patronage in accordance with Article 70 of the present code may transact business only with the consent of the patrons. The limitations enumerated in Article 86 of the present code extend also to patrons. No consent by the Office of Guardians and Patrons is required in transactions relating to objects or sums acquired as the result of the personal labor of the person placed under a patronage.

91. Guardians and patrons act in defense of the rights and interests of their wards and those under patronage in all institutions, including law courts, also when making agreements involving law courts, also when making agreements involving property.

92. A guardian or a patron neglecting or abusing his powers may be removed by the Office of Guardians and Patrons from office on the petition of the ward himself or of the person under patronage or of state institutions, public bodies or individual citizens or by the Office of Guardians and Patrons of its own motion.

93. The actions of guardians and patrons are subject to appeal to the respective Office of Guardians and Patrons by wards, and persons under patronage.

94. Complaints against the decision and orders of the Office of Guardians and Patrons are filed with the presidium of the respective executive committee, and the decision of the presidiums of the krai and oblast executive committees is final on this question.

### CHAPTER 3

#### PROCEDURE IN MATTERS RELATING TO GUARDIANSHIP AND PATRONAGE

95. In considering questions relating to guardianship and patronage, the Office of Guardians and Patrons summons petitioners, complainants, guardians and trustees, persons interested in the case, witnesses, experts, and in case of necessity the ward or person under patronage. The nonappearance of petitioners, complainants or other persons does not prevent the examination of the case, unless the body that issued the summons deems their appearance necessary.

96. The Office of Guardians and Patrons enters decisions concerning the institution of a guardianship or patronage, their termination, the appointment of guardians and patrons, their removal, the permission to alienate property, or to mortgage it, the waiver of rights and the consideration of complaints, reports and various questions connected with the bringing-up of the child. Such decisions are announced to the parties interested.

97. If a person over whom a guardianship or patronage has been instituted owns property within the jurisdiction of another Office of Guardians and Patrons, the latter may be entrusted with the management of the property, its sale and with taking any other action relating to the property rights and interests of wards or persons under patronage.

98. The following persons and bodies must within three days give notice of the necessity of instituting guardianship over minors (Article 69 of the present code) and of the appointment of a guardian: (a) house managements, owners and leaseholders of houses, if there are minors in the house subject to being placed under guardianship; (b) village soviets; (c) civil registry offices when on registering a death it comes to their knowledge that minor orphans are left without tutelage, or when they learn of registered foundlings or orphans; (d) court sheriffs if on drawing up an inventory of property, they discover minors liable to be placed under guardianship; (e) judicial bodies and militia when arresting or sentencing to a term of imprisonment persons acting as guardians or patrons of minors, who thereby remain without proper attention; (f) citizens connected, either by consanguinity or by being members of the same household, with persons subject to being placed under guardianship or patronage.

Note. The Office of Guardians and Patrons institutes a guardianship over minors also of its own motion if it is apprised of the necessity of doing so.

99. Sales of the property of wards are made on the strength of a decision to that effect by the Office of Guardians and Patrons, the sale taking place at public auction or at an agreed price based if necessary on the valuation of experts. A sale by auction must subsequently be confirmed by the Office of Guardians and Patrons.

Note. In rural areas in matters of guardianship and patronage, whenever necessary, the village soviets are granted the right on the petition of guardians and patrons to hold auction sales of the property of wards for an amount not exceeding 15 rubles. In this connection the district executive committee is placed in general charge of directing matters of guardianship or patronage and of arranging auctions whenever necessary for the sale of property under guardianship or patronage valued in a sum exceeding 15 rubles (26 September 1927. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, 1927, No. 105, Article 705).

100. Monies, securities and valuables owned by wards, in excess of the money necessary for the support of the wards and for the management of their property, are placed in state institutions (workers' savings banks, branches of the State Bank, etc.), and may not remain in the personal possession of the guardian.

101. Guardians and patrons submit to the respective Office of Guardians and Patrons, not later than 1 February an annual account in writing covering the past year. The report of a guardian or patron must contain not only information concerning the management of the property, the incomes of wards and persons under patronage and expenses incurred, but must also explain how the personal welfare of the ward or person under patronage has been attended to, stating his health, the bringing up of a minor ward, his education, his training to take a useful part in life, etc.

After the termination of a guardianship or patronage, the guardian or patron submits a general accounting of his management of the property.

102. The accounts are verified to see if they are substantially correct, in which event they are confirmed; otherwise the guardian or patron is required to furnish explanations, submit vouchers, etc.

#### CHAPTER 4

##### THE EXAMINATION OF MENTALLY DERANGED AND WEAK-MINDED PERSONS

103. The krai, oblast, or city and district Office of Guardians and Patrons, on presentation of sufficient proof of the necessity of instituting a guardianship over persons mentally deranged or feeble-minded, appoints a special examining commission, under the chairmanship of the chief of the corresponding Department of Public Health in cities subject to the district executive committees, and in the districts under presidency of a member of the presidium of city soviet or executive committee, or of a person empowered by them. Such commission must include not fewer than two doctors, one of whom must be a psychiatrist.

104. Persons and institutions which petition for the examination in lunacy are informed of the time and place when the meeting of the commission will take place.

105. The commission provided for in Article 103 of the present code has the right to order the removal of the examinee to a special medical establishment for a period not exceeding two months, or keep him under observation at home. The commission if necessary questions the doctor who treated the patient, and persons to whom the patient may refer.

106. A detailed official report is drawn up embodying the results of the examination, which report is signed by all persons who took part in the examination. The report must state whether the examinee is mentally deranged or feeble-minded and whether he requires a guardian.

107. Petitions to declare a person mentally deranged as sane, or to revoke guardianship, may be filed by the persons and institutions enumerated in Article 98 of the present code as well as by the medical institution in which the patient has been placed for treatment; or by the patient himself.

108. The examination of a person mentally deranged for the purpose of declaring him sane or revoking the guardianship over him follows the procedure outlined in Articles 103-106 of the present code.

109. The expenses incurred in connection with the examination are defrayed out of the property of the examinee, and in the absence of any such property, are borne by the State.

Note. Expenses incurred in connection with the examination of a person found to be of sound mind are borne by the persons who petitioned for the examination.

110. The finding of a medical commission declaring a person mentally deranged or feeble-minded may be appealed against within one month by any person or institution interested to the presidium of the respective executive committee.

#### PART IV

#### REGISTRATION OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CIVIL STATUS

#### CHAPTER I

#### GENERAL PRINCIPLES

111. The registration of documents relating to civil status (births, deaths, marriages, divorces and adoptions) is performed:

(a) in cities and workers' settlements—by the registry organs of the corresponding city or workers' settlement soviets and in cities where district soviets were formed by the competent organs of the district soviet;

(b) in rural areas—by corresponding village soviets (secretaries of village soviets).

The registration of changes of surnames and names is effected:

(a) in cities and workers' settlements—by the registry organs of the corresponding city or workers' settlement soviets and in cities where district soviets were formed by the competent organs of the district soviets;

(b) in rural areas—by registry sections of the general departments of the corresponding district executive committees. (20 July 1933. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 49, Article 159.)

Note. The registrations mentioned in the present article are entered outside the territory of the USSR by the plenipotentiary representatives and consulates of the USSR. (26 September 1927. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 105, Article 705. 20 July 1933. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 49, Article 159.)

112. The registration of births, deaths, and adoptions and declarations to establish paternity as well as the issuance of original certificates of these registrations, are free of charge and exempt from all imposts.

Fees are charged for the registration of marriages, divorces, and changes of names and surnames, the amounts being fixed by a special decree. (30 December 1929. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, 1930, No. 5, Article 54.)

Note. By virtue of the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of 3 September 1933 (Collection of Laws of the USSR, No. 56, Article 329), the uniform state duty on applications for the registration of marriages, divorces, and changes of names or surnames, shall be collected in the following amounts:

	2nd Category	3rd Category
Marriage and Divorce	3 Rubles	15 Rubles
Change of Name or Surname	15 Rubles	75 Rubles

The second category comprises: workers, employees and collective farmers, individual toiling peasants, handicraftsmen and artisans working without hired labor, who are treated on the same basis as workers and employees, as well as members of their families who are dependent on them. The third category comprises all other citizens.

113. The civil registration books are kept in duplicate.

114. Every record made in the proper book of registration must be read to the declarant, signed by him, if he can read and write; if he cannot read and write, by witnesses who can; and in either event by the registration official.

115. If it becomes necessary to correct a record in the civil registration books, and there is no contest, such corrections are made by permission of the authorities to which the civil registration office in question is subordinated.

116. Records entered in the book may be contested by any party interested by instituting a lawsuit.

117. Registration books are governed by instructions.

## CHAPTER 2

### (A) REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS

118. Declarations of births should be made within two weeks of the date of birth (20 July 1933. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 42, Article 159).

Note 1. Under the resolution of the Central Executive Committees of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics and of the krai or oblast executive committees the period stated in the present article may be extended in the case of individual localities, for a period not exceeding three months (20 July 1933. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 42, Article 159).

Note 2. A declaration of birth made after the expiration of the period fixed in the present article must immediately be registered. If the period has been exceeded for insufficient reasons, the person whose duty it was to make the respective declaration is liable to summary punishment by administrative order. Such punishment being a fine of 10-25 rubles; or in case of malicious failure to register—up to 100 rubles (20 July 1933. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 42, Article 159).

119. The declaration of birth is made either orally or in writing to the civil registry office for the place of birth, or for the place of residence of one of the parents, by both parents or by one of them, and in case of illness or death of the parents or of their inability to draw up the record for any other reason, the record may be drawn up by relatives or nearest neighbors or by the administration of the maternity hospital where the mother gave birth to the child.

120. The record of the child's birth must indicate the date and place of birth, the sex of the child, the name and surname it has received, as well as the names, patronymics and surnames, permanent residence, occupations and ages of the parents.

121. If the declaration is made by the mother, she must indicate the name and surname of the father or declare that she cannot or does not want to furnish the information required.

122. The declaration of birth must be made also in case of a still-born child. A corresponding notation is made in a special column of the birth records.

123. A foundling must also be registered, in which case the declaration is accompanied by a formal report drawn up by the militia, and if there is no militia, by the village soviet, indicating the time, place and circumstances under which the child was found.

## NOTES

### INSTRUCTION ON THE METHOD OF REGISTERING BIRTHS

Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of 20 March 1933 (Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 22, Article 74).

1. Oral and written applications for the registration of births must be accepted by the local registry organs according to the place of birth of the child or according to the place of permanent residence of parents or one of them.

1a. Applications for the registration of births in rural areas shall be accepted by the village Soviets in the manner prescribed by the present instructions, and the responsibility for the correctness and timeliness of the registration of births is imposed personally on the secretaries of the corresponding village Soviets (timely notification to the inhabitants of the periods of registration, the discovery of cases of evasion of registration, the proper keeping of books of births, etc.). (1 June 1933, Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 39, Article 145).

2. Application for the registration of birth must as a general rule be filed not later than within one month after the date of birth (1 June 1933. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 39, Article 145).

Note. On decision of the Central Executive Committees of the corresponding Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, and of the krai and oblast executive committees, the period of filing applications may be prolonged, but not more than to three months (1 June 1933. Collection of laws of the RSFSR, No. 39, Article 145).

3. Applications for the registration of births made after a lapse of the prescribed period, owing to justifiable reasons, are subject to immediate registration in accordance with the general rules.

In such case under the heading of the birth entry entitled "Special Remarks" a note is inserted to the effect that the reason given by the applicant for being late is regarded as satisfactory.

4. If the reasons assigned for a late application are deemed unsatisfactory, the registration of birth must also take place immediately, but the persons who are under a duty of filing such declarations are liable to be fined by administrative order of the corresponding executive committees or Soviets, such fine to be from 10 to 25 rubles, and in case there is a wilful evasion to register birth, the fine may be raised up to 100 rubles.

In such case the official in charge of the Registry Office is obliged to draw up a protocol not later than on the following day and send it to the corresponding executive committee or Soviet for the purpose of deciding the question of imposing an administrative punishment (1 June 1933. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 39, Article 145).

5. Childbirth is certified either by a doctor or a maternity home in which the mother was accommodated at the time of childbirth, or by the house management, or else by two witnesses including the applicant.

Note. The present paragraph is not binding on permanent inhabitants of rural areas where births are registered by the village Soviets.

6. When registering births it is necessary to require documents identifying the parents; passports in those areas where they were introduced, and in areas where passports were not introduced, certificate of identity issued by the militia, by the village Soviet, certificate or reference from the place of work, reference from the house management, labor union ticket, etc.

Note. The production of the said documents is not required from permanent inhabitants of rural areas when registering births.

7. When an application for the registration of birth is made in respect of children whose parents have contracted a *de facto* marriage (not registered in the registry office and not ascertained by decree of court) the registration is effected on the application of parents in the same way as in case of a registered marriage.

8. When the person stated to be the father is either absent or denies his paternity, and the application is made by the mother it is sufficient to present data required by law to prove a marriage *de facto* (e.g., a reference from the house management concerning the

joint cohabitation of the persons named, their correspondence with each other, evidence of third persons, etc.).

In such case the person stated to be the father of the child is sent a notification in accordance with Article 29 of the Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship, and the column under the heading "Information Concerning the Father" is filed in on the expiration of one month's period from the date he receives the notification, irrespective of whether he sends in a statement objecting to this.

9. In case the person who is stated to be the father sends in a statement denying the paternity before the expiration of the period of one month, the registry organ is obliged to inform that citizen for a second time that in accordance with Article 26 of the Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship his paternity of the child has been recorded in the entry and that he has the right to refute paternity by way of a lawsuit (Article 27 of the Code) within the period of one year.

10. When the birth is registered in the absence of the person named as the father, or in case of his disagreement, the child is given a surname in accordance with Article 34 of the Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship.

11. When registering the birth of a child on an application filed by a mother who is married by registration, but who states that the father of the child is a person other than her husband, the registration is effected in the manner provided for in Article 8 of the present instructions.

12. When the father is unknown and the mother refuses to name the father of the child, the child is registered in the surname of the mother, the patronymic is given him in accordance with her wish, and in the column of the birth entry entitled "Special Remarks" it must be stated that the mother refused to give the required information. The patronymic of the child is also entered in the same column.

#### (B) REGISTRATION OF DEATHS

124. The register of deaths contains the records of all cases of death and of certifications by a notary public or a court declaring a person to be dead (27 May 1929. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, 1929, No. 40, Article 422).

125. A declaration of death must be made within three days of the occurrence and in cases of violent death or the discovery of a corpse not later than on the day following this occurrence.

Note 1. The Central Executive Committee of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, the krai or oblast executive committees are empowered to grant extensions in the time limits indicated in the present article according to local conditions (30 May 1927. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 42, Article 159).

Note 2. Declaration concerning death, if the time limit has been exceeded, shall immediately be registered, and in cases when the delay was caused by unjustifiable reason the person obliged to make such a declaration may be fined by administrative order in the usual manner, such fine to be 10-25 rubles (30 July 1933. Collection of Laws of the RSFSR, No. 42, Article 159).

126. The declaration of death must be made either orally or in writing by persons who lived together with the deceased, or in the absence of these by the house management, neighbors or the administration of the institution (hospitals, corrective-labor institution, etc.) where the death occurred, or by the militia which found the corpse.

127. The declaration of death records all information concerning the deceased known to the declarant, specifying the name, patronymic, surname, year of birth and last residence of the deceased, whether married or single, the year, month and day of death, the cause of death, as well as the name, patronymic, surname and residence of the person who made the declaration of death.



128. Death must be attested by a medical certificate, or, where this is impossible, by two witnesses.

129. The declaration of the discovery of a corpse is accompanied by an official report drawn up by the militia.

130. The decree of a court declaring a person dead, in cases where death is to be established by a declaration of the court, is recorded at the place of the last known residence of the person declared dead, with a reference to the court which pronounced the decision and the date when the decision was pronounced.

#### (C) REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES

131. Persons desiring to register their marriage make a declaration to that effect at the Civil Registry Office of the place of residence of one of the declarants.

132. Those who register their marriage must produce at the time of the declaration documents attesting their identity, a signed statement denying the existence of any bar to the marriage as indicated in Part I, Chapter 2, of the present code; and a statement to the effect that they are mutually informed of each other's state of health, especially with regard to venereal and mental diseases and tuberculosis. They must also state how many marriages, registered or unregistered, each of them has previously contracted, and how many children each of them has.

133. The responsible official registering the marriage must read to the persons appearing before him to married Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the present code and warn them of the criminal liability that attaches to false statements. Thereupon the record drawn up is read and signed by the parties and countersigned by the official.

134. If the parties so desire, the registration of marriage may also take place in the presence of witnesses.

135. If prior to the signing of the record of marriage a declaration is filed by any one of the existence of lawful bars to the registration, the official must suspend the registration and demand from the declarant that he produce the relevant documentary proofs within a period of time fixed by the chief of the Civil Registry Office.

136. Marriages between foreigners and Soviet citizens as well as marriages between foreigners contracted on the territory of the USSR are registered according to the general laws.

Note. The registration of marriages between foreigners at the accredited consulates and embassies within the territory of the USSR is allowed on terms of reciprocity provided the conditions set forth in Part I, Chapter 2 of the present code are observed.

137. Marriages between foreigners contracted outside the territory of the USSR under the laws of their respective states are recognized in the territory of the USSR as fully valid within the meaning of Part I, Chapter 1 of the present code.

138. A declaration of dissolution of a marriage is filed with the Civil Registry Office either in writing or orally at the place of residence of either the husband or the wife.

139. If the declarant possesses no documents attesting the registration of the marriage that is being dissolved, he signs a statement indicating the time and place where the marriage was registered and assumes the responsibility for the correctness of the information given.

140. If the declaration of the dissolution of marriage is made by one of the conjugal partners, the other partner receives a copy of the record of the dissolution of marriage, addressed as indicated by the declarant.

141. Documents issued to foreigners attesting a divorce granted according to the laws of their respective countries are regarded as equivalent to extracts from the registers of divorce.

## (D) OTHER RECORDS

142. Decrees of adoption, change of surnames, recognition of paternity or maternity, or correction or supplementation of birth records issued by competent authorities must be presented to the Civil Registry Offices within a fortnight to be incorporated in the respective registration books.

Hsinwoo Chao, 1-51.

Vladimir Gsovski, 267-268.



## NATIONAL CENSUS OF 1926

17 December 1926

*The All-Union Census of 1926 was the first comprehensive census of the national population since 1897. It provided the Soviet government and Communist Party with data about nationalities, languages, literacy, education, occupations, birth place, living conditions, unemployment, and other demographic information. The census, conducted by the Central Statistical Administration, began on 17 December 1926 and ended on 30 December 1926. It showed the actual population was 147,028,000 and more than eighty percent of the population lived outside of towns and cities. It indicated the population reached the pre-war level only in 1926. Millions perished or fled as a result of the First World War, revolution, civil war, and famine. The census results were published in fifty-six volumes between 1928 and 1932. The document below is representative of hundreds of tables from the published results. This particular table illustrates the number of communists among the national minorities in the autonomous regions and republics. It reveals that the percentage of the minority populations drawn into the Communist Party was lower than the general percentage of communists to the total population.*

<i>Name of republic and region</i>	<i>Total No. of populations</i>	<i>Communist</i>	<i>Actual No. to 1,000 inhabitants</i>	<i>No. of native population</i>
1	2	3	4	5
Komi autonomous region	207,200	1,324	64	191,000
Karelian republic	269,700	2,813	104	103,300
Votsk region	756,300	3,053	40	395,500
Mariisk region	482,100	1,157	30	247,800
Bashkir republic	2,695,000	11,126	41	1,102,200
Tatar republic	2,594,000	9,865	38	1,252,900
Chuvash republic	894,500	2,697	30	667,300
Kalmyk region	141,600	1,075	76	107,000
German Volga republic	571,900	2,156	38	379,700
Crimean republic	714,100	7,696	108	179,200
Dagestan republic	788,100	4,745	60	599,000
Kazakh republic	6,491,700	30,583	47	3,758,700
Kirghiz republic	993,100	4,274	43	661,400

<i>Name of republic and region</i>	<i>Total No. of populations</i>	<i>Communist</i>	<i>Actual No. to thousand inhabitants</i>	<i>No. of native population</i>
1	2	3	4	5
Oiratsk region	99,800	787	79	35,200
Buriat Mongolian republic	491,300	3,708	75	215,200
Azerbaizhan SSR	2,313,200	27,090	117	1,485,100
Armenian SSR	876,600	8,202	94	742,500
Georgian SSR	2,660,900	28,322	106	1,655,100
Ukrainian SSR	27,303,800	168,341	62	21,784,100
Belorussian SSR	4,983,900	25,298	51	4,009,000
Uzbek SSR	4,447,600	26,879	60	3,361,000

<i>Name of republics and regions</i>	<i>Communists of native population</i>	<i>Actual No. to thousand inhabitants of native population</i>
<i>[Continued]</i>	6	7
Komi autonomous region	1,151	60
Karelian republic	752	73
Votsk region	528	13
Mariisk region	681	25
Bashkir republic	4,031	37
Tatar republic	3,336	27
Chuvash republic	1,668	25
Kalmyk region	751	70
German Volga republic	687	10
Crimean republic	720	42
Dagestan republic	2,149	36
Kazakh republic	10,775	29
Kirghiz republic	2,159	33
Oiratsk region	129	37
Buriat Mongolian republic	929	43
Azerbaizhan SSR	9,633	65
Armenian SSR	7,408	100
Georgian SSR	15,489	94
Ukrainian SSR	87,185	40
Belorussian SSR	13,224	33
Uzbek SSR	11,488	34

Batsell, 660-661.



## KRUPSKAIA, CRITERIA FOR CHILDREN'S BOOKS

23 December 1926

*Nadezhda Krupskaja, Lenin's wife, played a major role in formulation of Soviet educational policy. She was an advocate of "progressive" education and an ardent supporter of programs to improve the education and cultural level of Soviet youth. She was adverse to supporting extremist educational measures. This document contains a blend of "progressivism" and traditional and Marxist values.*

## ON THE QUESTION OF EVALUATING CHILDREN'S BOOKS

The Commission on children's books within the Pedagogical Sciences Section of GUS [State Academic Council of the Commissariat for Education—AGC], after discussing the condition of the book market, found out that there is a very large amount of trash on the book market, that there are published masses of dull, absurd, and ugly books, that there are not any measurements for the evaluation of children's books, and that there are not any established criteria. Meanwhile, the request for children's books is enormous. Children's books augment school work, continue it, and serve the child who does not go to school. They have tremendous influence upon children. The Commission on children's books within the Pedagogical Sciences Section of GUS worked out the fundamental criteria for children's books, which the collegium approved on 23 December 1926 (See below).

Furthermore, it was decided to organize a special commission within the Pedagogical Sciences Section of GUS for the preliminary examination of children's books and together with Giz [State Publishing House—AGC] to publish a special bulletin for the evaluation of children's books.

Parallel with this would be conducted in Sotsvos [Chief Administration for Social Training—AGC] a large combined effort to compile a condense catalog of recommended children's books based on the existing catalog of books recommended by Glavpolitprosvet [Chief Administration for Political Education under the Commissariat for Education—AGC], Institute of Children Reading, Pedagogical Workshop, etc.

## FUNDAMENTAL CRITERIA FOR CHILDREN'S BOOKS

1. We inherited a great quantity of children's books from the old system. However, the large part of this legacy is unacceptable to us, because of its contradiction with our new educational tasks.

We are accepting the most valuable literature of the past and discarding completely such books that touch upon mysticism, belief in god and miracles, preaching of monarchism, national hatred, chauvinism, and the right of strong nations oppressing weaker nations.

For us unacceptable literature preaches passivity, acceptance of evil, long-suffering, and worship of wealth, superficiality, and power. Unacceptable literature is saturated with slave or manorial morals.

2. The standards for children's books must be equal to those set for general [adult—AGC] literature.

Children's books must not be dry, crudely biased, must be interesting to children, fascinate them, set them thinking, stimulate development of their social instincts, striving toward life in the collective. Children's books must give clear images, be for the child a source of happiness, help him to comprehend his surroundings, natural phenomena, and relations among people.

It is necessary to work on creating children's literature linking this work with observing the interests of the contemporary child of different social classes, and observing his requirements for books.

Together with this it is important to learn the peculiarity of national fairy tales, literary methods which make these fairy tales intimate to the child (for example, simplicity of subject and characteristics of heroes, communalism, rhythm, etc.).

3. We consider fantasy fairy tales harmful. They hamper the child's efforts to investigate his environment, develop his superstition and fear, build up unhealthy fantasies, and dull his sense of reality. Animal stories are permitted as an artistic method, at the age when the child has already established a clear, realistic concept of the animal kingdom.

4. In connection with the age-groups of children, criteria for children's books can be divided into the following groups:

a) Books for three-to-four year olds.

Use only the immediate environment (different books for children in rural and urban communities). Concerning form, picture books for this age-group are the best desirable form. Illustrations must be realistic, clear, in bright colors, represent people, objects, and animals not personified. The text accompanying the picture, if any, must be brief, simple, and in direct relationship to the picture above.

b) Books for five-to-seven year olds.

In content the book must deal with the child's environment, helping him to broaden his understanding of it. It should cover already existing realistic relationships between objects, since at that age the child begins to show interest in them. It is important to foster children's fascination with life, and to stimulate their engagement in collective games. At this age illustrations play the major role. The accompanying text is designed for reading aloud to children. The quality of the language read is very significant to the child, since it becomes one of the ways to enrich his vocabulary. Any imitation of the child's way of speaking is inexcusable. It must be the regular adult language, simplified on the level of the child's comprehension. When presenting poems, they must have good form.

c) Books for eight-to-twelve year olds.

At this age the book plays a very important role. Although the children of eight-to-twelve have various interests, in general they are all directed toward the interrelationships among people, toward social relations. People become the center of attention for children in this age group. They have not yet formed their social criteria, and are still defenseless in this respect. Most important are books which are full of life content. The plot must be interesting, and the action fast moving. Ten-to-twelve year olds are fascinated by novels dealing with social problems and struggles. They must understand what we are fighting for. For example, the child should understand the struggle against slavery, against serfdom, etc. Fables and ideas at this age level must be presented in a simple and uncomplicated way.

d) Books for Adolescents.

In addition to the above-mentioned material, it is pertinent to provide this age group with content which would deal in depth with problems and topics presented to them at the ten-to-twelve age level. Of great importance to an adolescent are criticism and evaluation of social occurrences. He often ponders questions such as morals, individual relationships of people with the collective, etc. Biographies of famous people stimulate his striving for self-improvement. The lives of people should be presented against the background of social movement to avoid personality cults.

They are fascinated by man's fight with and conquest of nature. They must know the achievements of science in various fields and gain in perspective. "Do It Yourself" books of a technical nature are also important.

No less important are books on natural history. Natural science books must also be, on the one hand, forward-looking, expanding the horizons, and on the other hand, working to push children to observe nature, to work on using its power and resources.

Krupskaia, 75-79.



## STALIN'S SPEECH ON PERSPECTIVES OF THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA

30 December 1926

*The "united front" policy was pursued with considerable energy, resources, and determination in China. As a supporter of this policy, Stalin advocated the cooperation of communists with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang group in the struggle against imperialism. He argued that China was on the threshold of a bourgeois-democratic revolution similar to Russia's 1905 Revolution, but differed in that the Chinese Revolution was aimed at foreign imperialism. Stalin delivered this speech to the Chinese Commission of the Comintern's Executive Committee.*

Comrades, before taking up the question itself I consider it my duty to state that I have not sufficient material at my disposal on the Chinese question to present a complete picture of the revolution in China. For that reason I am obliged to limit myself to a few general remarks on principle which have direct bearing on the question of the fundamental tendencies of the Chinese Revolution.

I have the thesis of Comrade Petrov, the thesis of Comrade Miff, two reports by Comrade Tang Ping-tshan and Comrade Rafes' notes on the Chinese question. I think that all these documents, in spite of their good qualities, suffer from the great defect that they ignore a number of fundamental questions of the revolution in China. First of all I think first it is necessary to draw attention to these defects. Therefore, my remarks will bear a critical character.

## 1. The Character of the Revolution in China

Lenin said that very soon the Chinese will have their 1905. Several comrades understand this to mean that the very same thing will take place in China as took place in Russia in 1905. This is not correct, comrades. Lenin did not say that the Chinese Revolution would be an exact copy of the 1905 revolution in Russia. What he meant was that besides the general features of the revolution in 1905, the Chinese Revolution also has specific peculiarities which must leave their impression upon the whole revolution.

What are these peculiarities?

The first peculiarity is that the Chinese Revolution, while being a bourgeois democratic revolution, is at the same time a revolution of national emancipation directed against the domination of foreign imperialism in China. This distinguishes it from the Revolution of 1905. The domination of imperialism in China reveals itself not only in the military power, but principally in that all the threads of industry in China, railways, factories, mines, banks, etc., are in the hands of foreign imperialists. This means that the question of fighting foreign imperialism and its Chinese agents must inevitably play a predominant role in the Chinese Revolution. This links up the Chinese Revolution directly with the revolution of the proletariat against imperialism.

This peculiarity of the Chinese Revolution indicates a second peculiarity which consists in that the big national bourgeoisie is extremely weak in China, incomparably weaker than was the Russian bourgeoisie in the period of 1905. This is quite understandable. If the principal threads of industry are concentrated in the hands of foreign imperialists, then the big national bourgeoisie in China must be weak and backward. In this connection Comrade Miff's remark to the effect that the weakness of the national bourgeoisie is one of the characteristic facts of the Chinese Revolution is absolutely correct. From this follows that the role of initiator and leader of the Chinese Revolution, the role of the leader of the Chinese peasantry must inevitably be taken up by the Chinese proletariat as it is more organized and more enterprising than the Chinese bourgeoisie.

Nor must we forget about the third peculiarity of the Chinese Revolution, which is that side by side with China there exists and is developing the Soviet Union, the revolutionary experience and assistance of which must facilitate the struggle of the Chinese proletariat against imperialism and the feudal-medieval survivals in China.

These are the principal peculiarities of the Chinese Revolution which determine its character and its tendency.

## 2. Imperialism and Imperialist Intervention in China

The first defect of the theses which have been presented here lies in that they ignore or under-estimate the question of imperialist intervention in China. In reading the theses we get the impression that there is no real imperialist intervention in China at the present time, but that all that is taking place is a conflict between the North and South or between one group of generals against another group of generals. There is a tendency to regard intervention as meaning the actual landing of foreign troops on Chinese territory. If that is not taking place then it is presumed that there is no intervention.

This is a profound mistake, comrades. Intervention does not mean merely landing troops, in fact this is not the especial feature of intervention. Under the present conditions, with the growing revolutionary movement in capitalist countries, when the direct landing of foreign troops may give rise to protests and conflicts, intervention may assume much more devious and masked forms. Under present conditions the imperialists prefer to intervene by organizing the counterrevolutionary forces against the revolution and by rendering moral and financial support to their Chinese agents against the revolution. The imperialists tried to make it appear that the fight of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and Wrangel against the Russian Revolution was a purely internal struggle. But every one knew that behind the backs of these counterrevolutionary Russian generals stood imperialist England, America, France and Japan, without whose aid serious civil war in Russia would have been absolutely impossible.

The same thing can be said with regard to China. The fight of Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuan-fang, Chang Tso-ling and Chang Chung-chang against the revolution in China would be simply impossible if these counterrevolutionaries were not inspired by the imperialists of all countries, if they were not financed, supplied with munitions, instructors, "advisors", etc.

Wherein lies the strength of the Canton troops? In that they have ideas and enthusiasm, inspiring them in their fight for emancipation from imperialism, in that they are the bearers of the liberation of China. Wherein lies the strength of the counterrevolutionary generals of China? In that behind their backs stand the imperialists of all countries, the owners of all the railways, concessions, factories, banks and business houses in China. Hence it is not a matter only or even so much of the landing of foreign troops, but of the support which the imperialists of all countries render to the counterrevolution in China. Intervention through others—this is the fundamental feature of imperialist intervention at the present time.

Hence imperialist intervention in China is an undoubted fact against which the Chinese Revolution is directed.

Hence all those who ignore or underestimate the fact of imperialist intervention in China ignore or underestimate the principal fact in the Chinese question.

It is said that the Japanese imperialists are displaying certain symptoms of "inclination" towards the Cantonese and the Chinese Revolution in general. It is said that in this connection the American imperialists do not lag behind Japan. Comrades, this is self-deception. We must be able to distinguish between the essence of the policy of the imperialists, including Japanese and American imperialists, and the masked form in which this policy is applied. Lenin frequently said that it is sometimes difficult to overcome revolutionaries

with the aid of blows and the stick, but that sometimes it is possible to kill them by kindness. We must never forget this truth, comrades. At all events the Japanese and American imperialists fully appreciate the significance of this. For that reason we must draw a strict distinction between the kindness and the praise directed towards the Cantonese and the fact that the imperialists who are most generous in their display of kindness cling most strongly to *their* concessions and *their* railways in China, which they are not prepared to "emancipate" in China.

### 3. The Revolutionary Army in China

The second remark I wish to make concerning the theses that have been presented here refers to the question of the revolutionary army in China. This question has been ignored or underestimated in the theses; this is their second defect. The advance of the Cantonese to the North is usually regarded, not as the development of the Chinese Revolution but as the fight between the Canton generals and Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang, as a fight for the mastery of one general over the others.

This is a profound mistake, comrades. The revolutionary armies in China are a most important factor in the struggle of the Chinese workers and peasants for their emancipation. Up to May or June of this year the situation in China was regarded as being the domination of reaction, which set in after the defeat of the army of Feng Yu-hsiang; and then later on in the summer it was sufficient for the Canton troops to advance victoriously to the north and occupy Hupeh, for the whole situation to change radically in favor of the revolution. Was this an accident? No, it was not an accident; for the advance of the Canton troops was a blow to imperialism, a blow against the agents of imperialism in China, a blow in favor of freedom of assembly, freedom to strike, a free press, and the right to organize for all the revolutionary elements in China generally and for the workers in particular. This is the peculiar and most important significance of the revolutionary army in China.

Formerly, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, revolutions usually began with the uprising of the people, usually badly armed, who came into conflict with the armies of the old order and the rebellious people tried to disintegrate these armies or at least to bring part of them over to their side. This is the typical form of revolutionary outbreaks of the past. This is what took place in Russia in 1905. In China the situation is different. There it is not an unarmed people that is standing up against the troops of the old government, but an armed people represented by the revolutionary armies. In China the armed revolution is fighting against the armed counterrevolution. This represents one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese Revolution. And in this is concealed the special significance of the revolutionary army in China.

That is why the under-estimation of the revolutionary army is a reprehensible defect in the theses which have been presented here.

From this it follows that the Communists of China must develop special attention to work in the army.

First of all the Communists in China must intensify their political work in the army to the utmost and try to convert that army into a real and exemplary bearer of the ideas of the Chinese Revolution. This especially necessary for the reason that all kinds of generals, having nothing in common with the Kuomintang, are joining the Canton troops. These generals join the Canton troops as the force which is crushing the enemies of the people, but doing so they introduce the elements of disintegration into that army. These "allies" may be neutralized or converted into real Kuomintangists only by intensifying political work in the army and organizing revolutionary control over them. Unless this is done the Canton army may find itself in a very serious situation.



Secondly, Chinese revolutionaries, including the Chinese Communists must seriously take up the study of military affairs. They must not regard military affairs as of second rate importance, because in China this is one of the most important factors of the revolution. Revolutionaries, and therefore the Chinese Communists, must study military affairs in order to gradually come to the front and occupy various leading positions in the revolutionary army. In this lies the guarantee that the revolutionary army of China will proceed along the proper path directly towards its goal. Unless this is done, wavering and vacillation in the army may become inevitable.

These are the tasks of the Communist Party in connection with the revolutionary army.

#### 4. The Character of the Future Government in China

The third remark I wish to make is that the theses do not at all or sufficiently deal with the question of the character of the future revolutionary government in China. Comrade Miff approached this question closely in his theses, and that is to his credit. But having approached closely to the question he got scared at something and did not carry them to their logical conclusion. Comrade Miff thinks that the future revolutionary government in China will be a government of a revolutionary petty bourgeoisie led by the proletariat. What does that mean? During the February Revolution in Russia in 1917 the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries were petty bourgeois parties and to a certain extent revolutionary. Does it mean therefore that the future revolutionary government in China will be an SR-Menshevik government. No, it will not. Why? Because the SR-Menshevik government was an imperialist government, whereas the future revolutionary government in China cannot be anything else but an antiimperialist government.

There is a radical difference in this. The MacDonald Government was a "Labor" Government. But at the same time it is an imperialist government, because it aimed at preserving the imperialist power of Britain, say in India and in Egypt. The future revolutionary government in China will have this advantage over the government of MacDonald, that it will be an antiimperialist government. It is not important that the Canton government, the embryo of the future All-China revolutionary government, is bourgeois democratic. What is important is principally that this government cannot be anything else but an antiimperialist government, that every step of progress made by this government will be a blow to world imperialism and consequently a blow in favor of world revolution.

Lenin was right when he said that while formerly, prior to the epoch of world revolution, movements for national liberation were part of general democratic movements, now however, after the victory of the Soviet Revolution in Russia and the opening of the epoch of world revolution, the movement for national liberation is part of the world proletarian revolution.

Comrade Miff failed to take this circumstance into account.

I think that the future revolutionary government of China will recall the type of government we had in mind in 1905, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, with this difference, however, that the Chinese government will be mainly an antiimperialist government. It will be a government of China in a state of transition to noncapitalist, or more precisely socialist development.

This is the direction in which the revolution in China must proceed.

This path of development is facilitated by three circumstances.

Firstly, by the circumstance that the revolution in China is a revolution for national emancipation; it is directed against imperialism and its agents in China.

Secondly, by the circumstance that the national bourgeoisie in China is weak, weaker than the national bourgeoisie in Russia in the period of 1905. This will help the proletariat to assume the hegemony and will help the proletarian party to assume the leadership of the Chinese peasantry.

Thirdly, by the circumstance that the revolution will develop under conditions in which the experience and the aid of the victorious revolution in Soviet Russia may be utilized.

Whether the revolution will actually proceed along this path or not will be determined by a number of circumstances. One thing is clear, however, and that is that it is the fundamental task of the Chinese Communists to strive to direct the revolution along this path.

This brings up the task of the Communists in China, in relation to the Kuomintang and to the future revolutionary government. Some say that the Chinese Communists must leave the Kuomintang. That is stupid, comrades. It would be a profound mistake for the Chinese Communists to leave the Kuomintang. The whole process of development of the Chinese Revolution, its character and its perspectives, undoubtedly show that the Chinese Communists must stay in the Kuomintang and intensify their work in it. But can the Communist Party in China take part in the future revolutionary government? Not only can it take part, but it must do so. The process of the revolution in China, its character and perspectives eloquently speak in favor of the Communist Party in China taking part in the future revolutionary government of China. This represents one of the necessary guarantees that the hegemony of the Chinese proletariat will be carried out to the full.

### 5. The Peasant Question in China

The fourth remark I wish to make concerns the question of the peasantry in China. Comrade Miff thinks that the slogan of forming Soviets, Peasant Soviets in the Chinese villages, must be put forward immediately. I think this is a mistake. Comrade Miff is running too far ahead. Soviets cannot be set up in rural districts of China if they are not set up in the industrial districts. Moreover, we must bear in mind that we cannot isolate Soviets from surrounding circumstances. Soviets, and in this case we speak of Peasant Soviets, may be set up only if the peasant movement is at its zenith, breaking down the old order and constructing the new and on the understanding that the industrial centers of China had already broken the dam and entered the phase of setting up a Soviet Government.

Can it be said that the Chinese peasantry and the Chinese Revolution generally have entered this phase? No, it cannot. Hence it is too early as yet to speak of setting up Soviets. The question that must be raised now is not one of setting up Soviets, but of establishing Peasant Committees. I have in mind the election by the peasantry of committees which could formulate the principal demand of the peasantry and adopt measures to carry out these demands in a revolutionary manner. These Peasants' Committees should serve as the axis around which the revolution in the rural districts should develop.

I know that among the members of the Kuomintang and even among Chinese Communists there are some who think that the revolution must not be allowed to develop in the rural districts. They fear that if the peasantry is drawn into the revolution the united antiimperialist front will be broken. This is a profound error, comrades. The antiimperialist front in China will be more powerful if the masses of the Chinese are drawn into the revolution. The authors of the theses, especially Comrades Tan Ping-tshan and Rafes, are quite right when they say that the immediate satisfaction of a number of the most pressing of the peasants' demands is a necessary condition for the victory of the Chinese Revolution.

I think that it is time that the inertness of "neutrality" towards the peasantry, which is observed in the actions of certain elements of the Kuomintang, should be broken. I think that both the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, which means the Canton Government, must immediately pass from words to deeds and take up the question of satisfying now the most vital demands of the peasantry. What are the perspectives of this and to what limits should they go? This depends upon the progress of the revolution. I think that in the final analysis they must go as far as nationalizing the land. At all events we must not repudiate the slogan of nationalizing the land.

By what paths and roads must Chinese revolutionaries proceed in order to rouse the vast masses of the peasantry in China for revolution?

I think that under present conditions we may mention only three paths.

First, the path of forming peasant committees into which Chinese revolutionaries should penetrate in order to influence the peasantry. (*A voice*: "What about the Peasant Leagues?")

I think that the Peasant Leagues will group themselves around the Peasant Committees, or else that the Peasant Leagues will become the Peasant Committees armed with the necessary power to carry out the demands of the peasantry. I have already referred to this above. But this part is inadequate, it will be ridiculous to believe that there are a sufficient number of revolutionaries in China to carry this out. China has a population of 400 million of whom 350 million are Chinese, and of these nine-tenths are peasants. To think that several tens of thousands of Chinese revolutionaries could absorb this ocean of peasantry would be a profound mistake. Hence we must seek other paths.

The second path is the path of influencing the peasantry through the apparatus of the new national revolutionary government. A government of the type of the Canton government will no doubt be set up in the liberated provinces. Undoubtedly the government and the apparatus of this government, if it really desires the progress of the revolution, must undertake to satisfy the most pressing demands of the peasantry. The tasks of the Communists and of the Chinese revolutionaries generally is to penetrate into the apparatus of the new government, to make this apparatus accessible to the masses of the peasantry, and through this apparatus to help the peasantry to secure the satisfaction of their demands by confiscating the land of the large landowners or by reducing taxes and rent as circumstances require.

The third path is to influence the peasantry through the revolutionary army. I have already spoken of the great significance of the revolutionary army in the Chinese Revolution. The revolutionary army of China is a force which first penetrates into the new provinces, which first enters right in among the masses of the peasantry and is the criterion by which the peasantry judges the good and bad qualities of the new government. Upon the conduct of the revolutionary army, upon its attitude towards the peasantry and to the landlords, upon its readiness to assist the peasantry, depends first of all the attitude of the peasantry towards the government, towards the Kuomintang and towards revolutionary China generally. If we bear in mind that a considerable number of doubtful elements have attached themselves to the revolutionary army and that these elements may change the character of the revolutionary army for the worse, then it will become clear of what enormous importance is the political face of the army, its peasant policy, so to speak, which it presents to the peasantry. Therefore, the Communists of China and Chinese revolutionaries generally must take all measures to neutralize all the anti-peasant elements in the army, to preserve the revolutionary spirit in the army and to see to that the army helps the peasantry and rouse it for the revolution.

It is said that the revolutionary army in China is welcomed with open arms wherever it comes, but that after time, as soon as the army has settled in a particular district disappointment seems to set in. The same thing happened in the Soviet Union during the period of the civil war. This is explained by the fact that the army, having liberated a province and settled in it, must feed itself at the expense of the surrounding population. We Soviet revolutionaries managed to compensate this by our efforts to help the peasantry through the medium of the army and against the landlord elements. Chinese revolutionaries must also learn to compensate those losses by conducting a correct peasant policy through the medium of the army.

These are the means by which we can conduct a proper peasant policy in China.

## 6. The Proletariat and the Hegemony of the Proletariat in China

The fifth remark refers to the question of the Chinese proletariat. I think that insufficient stress is laid in the theses upon the role and significance of the working class in China. Comrade Rafes asks: Upon whom must the Chinese Communists orientate themselves, upon the Left or upon the Center in the Kuomintang? This is a strange question. I think that the Chinese Communists must orientate themselves upon the proletariat and get the leaders of the movement for liberation in China to orientate themselves upon the revolution.

I know that some Chinese Communists think that it is undesirable for the workers to go on strike to improve their material and legal conditions, and dissuade the workers from going on strike. (*A voice*: "This happened in Canton and Shanghai.") This is a great mistake, comrades. This means absolutely to underestimate the role and the weight of the proletariat in China. This should be mentioned in the thesis as a harmful tendency. It will be a great mistake if the Chinese Communists fail to take advantage of the present favorable conditions to help the workers to improve their material and legal conditions, even by means of strikes. What then is the use of the revolution in China? There can be no hegemony of the proletariat if the sons of the proletariat are whipped and tortured by the agents of imperialism during strikes. At all costs this medieval state of affairs must be abolished in order to rouse among the proletarians of China the sense of their power, the sense of their dignity and to make them fit to take over the hegemony in the revolution. Without this it is impossible to conceive of the victory of the revolution in China.

Therefore the economic and legal demands of the working class which are directed towards palpable improvements in their conditions must be mentioned in the theses. (*Comrade Miff*: "It is mentioned in the theses.") Yes, it is mentioned in the theses, but the demands are not outlined in sufficient relief.

### 7. The Youth of China

My sixth remark refers to the question of the youth in China. It is strange that this is not taken into consideration at all in the thesis. And yet, the youth of China at the present time, is of extreme importance. Reference is made to this question in the thesis of Comrade Tang Ping-tshan, but unfortunately it is not given its due prominence.

The question of the youth in China is of first-class importance. The revolutionary students, the young workers and the peasant youth—all these represent a force which could make the revolution advance by seven league paces if they are subordinated to the intellectual and political influence of the Kuomintang. It must be borne in mind that no one realizes the oppression of the imperialists so profoundly and sensitively, no one realizes the necessity to fight this oppression so acutely as does the youth of China.

This circumstance must be taken fully into account by the Communist Party of China and by Chinese revolutionaries and should induce them to intensify their work among the youth. The question of the youth must be mentioned in the thesis.

#### Deductions

I would draw two deductions: (1) in connection with the struggle against imperialism in China, and (2) on the peasant question.

It is quite certain that the Communist Party of China cannot now confine itself to the demand for abolition of unequal treaties. Even counterrevolutionaries like Chang Hsu-liang put forward this demand now; it is quite evident that the Communist Party of China must go further than this. They should take as a perspective the question of the nationalization of the railways. This is essential, and they must bring affairs to this pitch.

Further, they must have in view the perspective of the nationalization of the more important factories. In this connection the first thing that arises is the nationalization of those enterprises, the owners of which have made themselves prominent by their hostility and particular aggressiveness towards the Chinese people.

Then the peasant question must be brought to the front and linked up with the perspective of the revolution in China. I think that in this connection affairs must be brought to the state of the nationalization of the land.

The rest goes without saying.

These, comrades, are the remarks I desired to make.

*Communist International*, III, No. 6 (30 December 1926), 5-9.



## 2 THE YEAR 1927

### MAIAKOVSKY ON ARTISTIC FREEDOM VERSUS CONTROL

February 1927

*A whole host of literary groups proliferated during the tolerant New Economic Policy period of the Hin-Economic Period. On 26 December 1926 numerous literary groups met jointly to establish the Federation of Organizations of Soviet Writers (FOSP) to improve the material condition of writers in such areas as housing and authors' rights. The impetus for this idea originated with the All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers (VAPP), which attempted unsuccessfully to extend its authority over the whole field of literature. Although Communist Party leaders were divided over involvement in literary controversy and toleration of proletarian writers not hostile to the regime, they apparently applied some pressure on VAPP and other groups to form FOSP. Several minor groups within the amorphous FOSP challenged the hegemony of VAPP over the proletarian writer. One of these groups consisted of the Futurists and technical innovators who drew their support and prestige from Vladimir Maiakovsky, the so-called Poet of the Revolution. Their literary journal Left (Lef) ceased publication in 1925, but revived as New Left in January 1926. It did not receive Communist Party encouragement, suffered numerous attacks from VAPP and other groups, and died an ignominious death at the end of 1928. In this article Maiakovsky criticized the current literary atmosphere, specifically the film industry, for reluctance to experiment and for reliance on the decisions of accountants and administrators.*

#### VLADIMIR MAIAKOVSKY

##### HELP!

I wrote a film script—"How are you?" This script is a matter of principle. Before writing it, I asked myself a number of questions and answered them.

*First question:* Why do foreign films on the whole beat ours even in artistic quality?

*Answer:* Because foreign films found and utilize the special means of expression resulting from the very essence of cinema art and for which there are no substitutes. (The train in "Our Hospitality", Chaplin's transformation into a cockerel in "The Gold Rush", the shadow of the passing train in "The Parisienne", etc.)

*Second question:* Why is it necessary to be for the newsreel and against acted film?

*Answer:* Because the newsreel deals with real things and facts.

*Third question:* Why is it impossible to endure the newsreel for an hour?

*Answer:* Because our newsreels are a random collection of close-ups and events. The newsreel should be organized and should organize itself. We could endure this kind of newsreel. This kind of newsreel is like a newspaper. It is impossible to live without this kind of newsreel. To discontinue it is as stupid as closing down "Izvestiia" or "Pravda".

*Fourth question:* Why is "The Parisienne" so dazzling?

*Answer:* Because, in organizing simple little facts, it achieves the greatest emotional saturation.

The script of "How Are You?" had to be an answer to these questions in the language of cinema. I wanted this script to be produced by Sovkino, by Moscow (the "national pride of Great Russia", the desire to correct work in all its trends). Before they read the script,

I tried it out on various specialists: "Could it be produced?" One of our best directors and experts on cinema art, L. V. Kuleshov, calculated and replied: "It can be, it must be—and it would not cost much."

Not wishing to part with a newly-finished script, I read it out myself to the head of and the Sovkino's Literary Department consisting of Comrades Bliakhin, Sol'sky, Shklovsky and the Secretary. The reading was accompanied by continuous joy and laughter.

After the reading:

*Bliakhin*: "Magnificent piece! It must definitely be produced! Of course, there are unacceptable places, but you can of course rework them."

*Shklovsky*: "I have read thousands of scripts and I have never seen one like this. It is a breath of fresh air. You have opened new windows."

*Sol'sky and the Secretary*: "Agreed."

The stunning treatment was in keeping with stunning speed. Two days later I read the script to the Sovkino board of directors. Comrades Shvedchikov, Trainin, Efremov and the Secretary and—of those who had heard it before—Comrades Bliakhin and Kuleshov, listened. They listened cheerlessly. Comrade Efremov escaped (for health reasons?) at the beginning of the second part.

Afterwards there was discussion. I am relaying the quintessence of the views expressed according to my own notes made in the margins of the script. Unfortunately, no stenographic record was kept of this proud spectacle which was an inspiration to new work.

*Comrade Trainin*: "I know of two kinds of scripts: one speaks about the universe in general, the other about man in this universe. The script that has just been read out does not fall under either of these types. It is difficult to comment on it right away, but that it is ideologically insupportable, this is clear."

*Comrade Shvedchikov*: "Art is a reflection of everyday life. This script does not reflect everyday life. We do not need it. Direct your attention to "The Tailor of Torzhok". Your script is experimental, and we must pay our way."

*Comrade Efremov* (who returned just as Trainin was at the beginning of his speech): "I have never heard such rubbish!"

The Comrade Secretary looked at the board of directors, also took the floor and also said: "This script is unintelligible to the masses!"

*Comrade Kuleshov* (having listened to the discussion): "What is the use of talking to them? Do you see? After what they have said I will have a headache for the next two weeks!"

Sovkino did not accept the script. Comrades! Explain to me what all this means. It is not a matter of the script. Certainly not of mine. I can write poorly and I can write well. They can accept me and they can reject me. There's no point in kicking up a fuss about things like that.

But:

1. How can there be such a difference of opinion between the people Sovkino appointed specifically to select scripts and the people who appointed them, who appointed them precisely because these people have to know better than the board of directors what is a good script.

2. If, however, their opinions do differ, why does the administration have the final say on artistic issues?

3. Why, after these kinds of decisions are made, are the authorities of art submissive and become like the character in the children's fairy-tale:

The fish covers his mouth,  
And he cannot hear, what he is singing.

4. Why do accountants have the final voice on culture and art, while those who produce art and culture do not have even an advisory voice on accounting matters?

5. Does the phrase "We must pay our way" mean that scripts must be written by cashiers? And what kind of writer would emerge from similar encounters?
6. If a monopoly like Sovkino will not produce experimental films, what is going to be done about new inventions in cinema? How much will you pay in the end to foreign countries for this inventiveness?
7. If this (general) system is safeguarding us against pulp literature, then why are the scripts of the films shown so wretched, why is scriptwriting limited to making use of corpses and why does every investigation of every cinema enterprise reveal the staleness of the worthless scripts that are accepted?

There is one consolation for workers in cinema: "Governing bodies come and go—but art remains."

Maiakovsky, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii*, XII, 130-133.



## LITVINOV ON WORSENING ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

27 February 1927

*The British government, irritated by what it considered Soviet interference in British domestic affairs through the support of the failed General Strike of 1926 by the Soviet-backed Comintern, warned the Soviet government that continued interference with purely British concerns and hostile actions or propaganda against British subjects eventually would lead to the abrogation of the trade agreement of 1921. The Foreign Office, for example, criticized the Comintern for supporting the General Strike, for Soviet articles on alleged British policy in Persia, and publication of a "grossly insulting and mendacious cartoon" on the front page of Izvestiia which showed Sir Austen Chamberlain, the foreign secretary, applauding the execution of Lithuanian communists. In response Litvinov refuted the charges and attempted to allay suspicions and recriminations. The so-called "Zinoviev Letter" of October 1924 remained a bone of contention between the two governments. For information about the letter and Anglo-Soviet relations at that time, see Volume 2 of this collection.*

M. LITVINOV

### REPLY TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT

The Soviet Charge d'Affaires *ad interim* in Great Britain has transmitted to me telegraphically the Note signed by Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, which was handed to him on the 23rd instant and published on the same day in the British press.

The note begins by stating the quite unquestionable fact of the existing unsatisfactory relations between Soviet Russia and Great Britain. The unsatisfactory character of these relations Sir Austen Chamberlain attempts to explain in his Note, as he so often did in public speeches, in Parliament and outside, by alleged infringements on the part of the Soviet Government of obligations undertaken regarding Great Britain in the domain of propaganda. The Note cites textually the agreement signed by the Soviet Government on 4 June 1923, to the effect that the Soviet Government undertakes not to support with funds or in any other form persons or bodies or agencies or institutions whose aim is to spread discontent or foment rebellion in any part of the British Empire, and to impress upon its officers and officials the full and continuous observance of these conditions.

During the three and a half years which have elapsed since the signing of the said agreement the British Government has repeatedly addressed to the Soviet Government directly and through public statements reproaches of alleged infringements of the said agreement. Rejecting these charges, the Soviet Government has always demanded that they should be based on some definite instances. In violation of the obligation undertaken in the same year, 1923, on behalf of the British Government, by Lord Curzon, the then Foreign Secretary, immediately to bring to the cognizance of the Soviet Government supposed instances of infringement of obligations, not allowing such cases to accumulate without making charges (Lord Curzon's telegram of 29 May No. 127), the British Government has heretofore preferred to make general wholesale reproaches to the Soviet Government, never giving details except in one case, when, during the General Election in Great Britain in 1924, there was made an unsuccessful attempt to corroborate an accusation by reference to the well-known and so-called "Zinoviev letter" of the then President of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

The Soviet Government, though immediately declaring that it could not assume responsibility for the actions of an international organization which was directed and controlled by delegates of the Communist parties of various countries, in view of the special political role which the latter may play, agreed to submit it to any expert examination and accept the decision of any arbiter. The fact that the British Government declined the proposal of the Soviet Government could not be understood otherwise than as the withdrawal of the accusation, and since then the forgery of the letter has evoked no more doubts from anyone, including Labor circles, holding power in England when the accusation was proffered.

Thus, the only definite charge was based on a faked document, the so-called "Zinoviev letter". At the same time none of the persons who misinformed the British Government was punished, although that forged letter at one time created a threat to peace and strained to the utmost the relations of the two States and left its mark on the whole subsequent development of Anglo-Soviet relations.

With reference to the agreement of 4 June 1923, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in the entire text of the Note, does not adduce a single instance of the infringement by the Soviet Government of this agreement—namely, there is not a single instance of "spreading discontent or fomenting rebellion in any part of the British Empire."

The British Government's Note only enumerates a series of public utterances by Soviet leaders in Russia and newspaper articles in the Soviet press. I must, therefore, mention the fact that between the Soviet Government and Great Britain there exist no agreements limiting the freedom of speech or of the press within the frontiers of the two countries. Just as the British Government did not undertake the obligation on behalf of its citizens to praise or not to criticize the social political order of the Soviet State, so the Soviet Government undertook no obligation on behalf of its citizens that they should praise or not criticize the social and political order of Great Britain and the capitalist countries generally.

The Trade Agreement of 1921, of the infringement of which the Soviet Government has also been repeatedly and without foundation accused, a clause dealing with propaganda binds the two parties only to "refrain from hostile actions or undertakings against the other party, and from conducting outside of its own borders, any official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic."

To bring published or verbal utterances made within Soviet Russia within the scope of the agreement of 1923 or the agreement of 1921 is an arbitrary extension of the limits of these agreements.

I could produce numerous examples of the wide use and, unfortunately, most immoderate abuse of the right to engage in propaganda within Great Britain against the Soviet Government by members of the British Government. I will strictly limit myself to but a



few examples. In his speech at Watford, on 20 June Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, referred to the Soviet Government as "a gang of assassins and robbers" (the "Morning Post", 22 June 1925). At a Conservative meeting at Tunbridge Wells, Mr. Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, attacking the British Socialists, declared: "Behind all this sinister and unwholesome movement stood the dark power of Moscow. There we had what we had never before, a band of cosmopolitan conspirators gathered from the underworld of the great cities of Europe and America in despotic possession of the still great resources of what was once a mighty and famous Empire, Russia" (the "Morning Post", 30 November 1925). At Bolton Mr. Churchill spoke of the Soviet Government as "Dark conspirators in the Kremlin in Moscow" (the "Daily Telegraph", 22 June 1926).

Similar attacks can be found in the utterances of Mr. Amery, the Colonial Secretary; Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary for Air; Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Secretary for War, and others, not to mention their supporters in the Conservative party such as Mr. A.T. Cook, who at the Conservative Conference at Scarborough on 7 October 1926, called the Soviet Government "a group of international murderers" (the "Morning Post", 8 October 1926), Commander Locker-Lampson, Sir William Davison and others.

Still sharper attacks against the Soviet Union abound in the press of the ruling Conservative party every day, abusing Soviet institutions, the Soviet Government and its representatives in London, and spreading incredible and fantastic lies about the Soviet Union.

It must at the same time be observed that the British representatives in Moscow are enjoying the same diplomatic privileges as the representatives of other countries, and have never been subjected to insults or abuse on the part of the Soviet press as were the representatives of the Soviet Government in London on the part of the British Conservative Press. It is impossible to find either in the Soviet press generally or in the articles and speeches to which the British Government refers in its Note any sharp attacks against Great Britain similar to those mentioned above.

It is impossible to regard as anti-British propaganda such things as analysis or estimate of the foreign policy of the British Government and its attitude towards the Soviet Union, or arguments by the principal party leaders about the inevitability of world revolution, and the importance of the national revolutionary movement in the East, still less the ideas expressed by the People's Commissariat for Public Health concerning the significance of physical culture from the viewpoint of the revolutionary labor movement or the appointment of Kamenev as Ambassador to Italy, which has nothing to do with Anglo-Soviet relations and was agreed to by the Italian Government. Within the limits of his party activity Kamenev has voiced his opinions concerning the tasks of his party.

Regarding "Izvestiia", which is considered as the official organ of the Central Executive Committee, since in it all decrees and decisions of the Government must be published, it may be said that this paper has one of the largest circulations and caters for hundreds of thousands of readers, who must be given all information interesting to them, including manifestoes and resolutions of the Soviet, as well as of party institutions. The office publishing this paper can no more accept responsibility for the contents of such kind of manifestoes and resolutions than it can for reports which it prints of utterances and statements made against the Soviet Government, including the above-mentioned speeches by British Ministers. Here again it must be repeated that the publishing within the Soviet Union of any reports of any verbal statement does not infringe any obligation undertaken by the Soviet Government whatsoever.

Particular dissatisfaction has apparently been caused the British Government by the opinions expressed by Soviet leaders concerning the anti-Soviet course of British policy in third countries. But with no less justification and foundation, could be characterized as delusions the constant references made by the politicians and members of the British Government to the alleged omnipresence and omnipotence of so-called "Soviet agents", who

are represented as being responsible for all or any difficulties in the British Empire in all parts of the world.

The Soviet Government deplores the unsatisfactory condition of the relations between Russia and Great Britain indicated in the British Government's Note. It believes, however, that to explain these regrettable circumstances by mutual accusations and an unfriendly tone in the press of the two countries would be to take cause for effect and vice versa.

The Soviet Government would likewise consider it incorrect and undignified to seek an explanation of these conditions in physiological or psychological characteristics of these or other British statesmen. It is inclined to believe that the abnormality of these relations consists not only in the fact that the representations made by the two countries do not correspond with the interests of the development of relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Government.

What also matters is that in its relations with the Soviet Union the British Government consciously infringes the usual international customs, and even elementary decency. It periodically thrusts in the face of the Soviet Government indefinite and unfounded accusations, refusing even to discuss them; it avoids settling mutual claims and complaints either diplomatically or through special conferences, committees, or delegations; declining the usual diplomatic ways of settling conflicts, it permits itself to talk to the Soviet Government in the tone of threats and ultimatums; and, lastly, it ignores the constitution of the Union of Soviet Republics, making insistent attempts in its Notes to substitute party or even international institutions for the formal Government of the Union.

The same abnormality of relations is also expressed by the fact that the British Government in its Note permitted itself an unheard of and unprecedented tone towards M. Chicherin, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The position which the British Government has established with regard to the Soviet State encourages the hostile campaign which finds expression in the coarsely abusive statements in the British Parliament on the part of members of Parliament and even members of the Government and in the British press.

It must be added that the constant attempts by the British Government to minimize and even annul the importance of the fact of the restoration of diplomatic relations together with the authoritative information possessed by the Soviet Government regarding the continued attempts by individual members of the British Government to come to an understanding with ex-Tsarist diplomats and counterrevolutionary representatives working in favor of another insurrection will not allow public opinion in the Soviet Union to forget the role played by Great Britain in the first insurrection.

At the conclusion of his Note, Sir Austen Chamberlain deemed it timely and fit to advance the threat of a complete rupture in commercial and diplomatic relations in the event of the Soviet Government not complying with the new demands which do not arise from the existing Anglo-Soviet agreements and the mutual formal obligations. In declaring that threats against the Soviet Government will have no intimidating effect upon anyone in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government takes the liberty to express its firm conviction that the conclusion of the Trade Agreement in 1921 and the subsequent restoration of diplomatic relations corresponded to interests and necessities of the peoples of the Soviet Union as well as those of the British Empire. If the present British Government believes that the rupture of Anglo-Soviet trade and all other relations is called for by the needs of the British people and will serve the British Empire and cause general peace, then, of course, it will act in a suitable manner, assuming full responsibility for the consequences.

On its part, the Soviet Government confirms that the statements of the late M. Krasin, quoted in the Note of the British Government, concerning the desirability of removing all difficulties existing between the two countries and everything giving ground for mutual complaint and of establishing quite normal relations actually correspond to the immutable

and sincere wishes of the Soviet Government. In accordance with the decision for peace of the toiling masses of the Soviet Union, which are in entire conformity with the same aspirations of the popular masses of Great Britain, the Soviet Government will in the future also pursue its peace-loving policy, which excludes all aggressiveness towards other countries. It will welcome the British Government sincerely if it will go to meet it on this path.

*Soviet Union Review*, April 1927, 67-70.



EISENSTEIN'S FILMS BATTLESHIP  
POTEMKIN AND OCTOBER  
April 1927

*Sergei Eisenstein's film "Battleship Potemkin" was the most celebrated cinematic event of 1926. His film and a second film "October," commemorating the October Revolution of 1917, were not as popular in the Soviet Union as they were in the West. Both films received criticism in the Soviet Union for their lack of plot and overemphasis on objects at the expense of actors. They were characterized as documentary or newsreel films, though hundreds of extras were used in the filming. Another preeminent director and film-maker, Dziga Vertov, also received praise in the West for his films. Considered an enfant terrible of the 1920s, he rejected films which contained plots and he used professional actors. Viktor Shklovsky, a prominent critic who also was a scriptwriter and intimately familiar with film-making, examines the question of films which lack plots and use professional actors under the guise of documentary works. He praises the creativity of the two directors, and criticizes those who produced films for strictly commercial purposes. These and other films were used by Soviets to emphasize the flourishing of the arts during the NEP era and as signs of overtaking American and European cinema.*

VIKTOR SHKLOVSKY  
SERGEI EISENSTEIN AND THE  
"NONACTED" FILM

The question about the so-called "nonacted" film is very complex.

At the infancy of Soviet cinematography they claimed: "nonacted" film is life caught unawares.

In fact "nonacted" film was above all "montage" film.

But montage fragments call for stopping and staging to shoot the film.

In Dziga Vertov's [film—AGC] *Kino-Pravda*, which was devoted to radio, I saw one of Vertov's assistants playing a peasant. According to *Pravda* he was a middle peasant.

Even if we were really able to catch "life unawares", the very fact of catching would all the same be artistically directed.

In the works of Stendhal and Dostoevsky we include nonacted fragments, and these are all the same aesthetic works. Thus, a rejection of dramatization and the staging for the construction of raw fragments are neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason to judge any work as nonacted and nonaesthetic.

What's more, one can say without hesitation that it is precisely in the newsreel that we meet a large amount of acted material.

I know that some moments of the February Revolution, for example the passage of the armored cars, were dramatized because I myself saw the staging. I saw fragments, taken of Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoi, and it seems to me that even this self-assured man was playing to the camera a little. It is very difficult to teach someone to walk in front of a camera as if he had not noticed it.

There are only two conclusions that one can draw from this—either every single person must be taught film-acting, but that would be as ridiculous as driving a wall into a nail. Or, one must select people with professional skills who would be able to work on these skills until they were so perfected and standardized that they would not change during filming.

But if we choose a selected seed to sow, if in the countryside we are now, by introducing pedigree breeding stock, castrating all the nonpedigree bulls and stallions and not allowing them, in Sergei Tretiakov's phrase, to cultivate a sexual aesthetic, then why should we not have on the screen a selected person who must ideally also be an actor.

The film actor nowadays is usually both biologically and socially the ideal of his audience and substituting a passer-by for the actor would mean retreating from industrialization.

I do not reject the magnificent work done by Dziga Vertov. I only reject those places where he selects a large script. It is not work with a casual model that is suitable for the selection of cinematographic form in Dziga Vertov's view, but the transfer of compositional problems from plots to the pure confrontation of facts.

Sergei Eisenstein is not working presently with nonacted film, but he is working with nonplot film. There is an old saying that the dead possesses the living. This saying is now a petty bourgeois idyll because now the dead does not possess the living but travels on it like a tram.

Once upon a time a method was invented to unite semantic fragments by the fate of a single hero. But this is not the only method and in any case it is a method, and not a norm. Certain things can be treated well by this method, by this technique.

It is easy above all to use it to treat the story about how boy meets girl. And that is why so many plots often end with a wedding.

But now is not the time for families.

On the contrary the dead is riding on the living.

I had recently been asked to write a libretto, reworking the subject of worker correspondents. In the subject, there was a boy and a girl. Then the girl was expelled from the Kom-somol cell. After I wrote the libretto, I gave it to a group of worker correspondents on a newspaper to read. One of them made a suggestion: "Shouldn't the secretary of the cell be the girl's husband as well?" The director asked, "Could it really happen that a husband would expel his wife or admit her without anybody raising an objection?" No, they said, it does not happen. But man has gotten used to thinking in terms of kinships.

Eisenstein says that if you ask a scriptwriter nowadays to portray a war from seven different points of view, he must invent a family with seven brothers.

At the same time the technique of art shows us that compositional concepts can replace semantic ones, producing the same effect. For example, even in literature we can resolve the composition of a novella by introducing parallelism. Or one can create a plot enigma with the aid of "missing documents" or simply by rearranging chapters.

Cinematography nowadays is not short of traditional plots. Eisenstein's *The General Line*, *The Battleship Potemkin* (let it get used to second place), *October*—these are not films held together by kinship, these are acted films but are composed of raw material without a plot. It is the secondary qualities of this division that are more important than the very problematic primary quality.

Nonacted film has turned out to be useful in a subsidiary role, as has the difficulty created by the new technique of resolving a problem. But plot cinematography proper, the

commercial scripts that people write, still exist like mummies. Unfortunately, mummies are very durable.

*Novyi Lef*, 1927, No. 4 (April), 34-35.

*Slavistic Printings and Reprintings*, 34-35.



## LITVINOV ON THE PEKING RAID

6 April 1927

*Peking police and soldiers suddenly entered the Soviet embassy, maltreated and arrested diplomatic personnel, and confiscated documents. The documents later were published to show the "united front" strategy and actions of the Communist Party Central Committee of the Soviet Union and details about Soviet military activities in China in collusion with the Kuomintang. Support for the raid from the European diplomatic corps in Peking, particularly the British, provided fodder for Soviet claims of European imperialists' thwarting the Chinese Revolution and attempting to turn the situation into a new world war.*

M. LITVINOV

### NOTE TO THE CHINESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

9 April 1927

In connection with the raid by armed soldiers of Chang Tso-lin's army and the Peking police upon the premises of the Military Attache of the Soviet Embassy in Peking and upon the quarters of the Embassy employees, I have the honor to ask you to transmit the following to the Peking Cabinet:

1. Supplementing the note of Mr. Chernykh, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR, delivered on 6 April 1927, in which he notified the Peking Government of the outrageous raid upon the premises of the Military Attache and the quarters of the Embassy employees, of the assaults and arrests to which they were subjected, and of the searching and looting of their quarters, it may be stated on the basis of information available at present, that in spite of protests, the quarters and the office of the Military Attache were searched, looted and partly burned; and that the quarters of the embassy employees were likewise sacked and looted. A number of employees were arrested, and some of them were beaten up and subjected to acts of violence and insults. It is not possible to ascertain the names of all arrested persons because the armed policemen and soldiers did not admit anybody to the section in which the quarters of the Military Attache and of the employees were situated, and the names of the arrested persons have not been communicated so far. At the present time armed soldiers and police still occupy all the premises of the Military Attache as well as the quarters of the Embassy employees.

2. The raid carried out by the Peking authorities is an unheard of violation of the elementary principles of international law. The original supposition expressed by Mr. Chen himself, Charge d'Affaires of the Peking Government in Moscow, to the effect that what took place was an attack by bandits and not a search on the part of the State police, has at present, after the delivery of the note of Mr. Vai Tsiao-boo, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Peking, on 8 April 1927, proved to be out of keeping with reality. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was inclined to consider Mr. Chen's supposition as the most

likely, because it could not assume that the lawful executors of the will of the Peking Cabinet would commit the acts enumerated in the note of Mr. Chernykh, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR, and mentioned above, viz.: arrest and brutal assault of employees of the Embassy, sacking of the quarters of the Military Attache, searching and looting of the Trade Delegation and of the major part of the quarters of the Embassy employees, situated in the same section as the latter. At the present time it may be considered as firmly established that the acts which Mr. Chen characterized as a bandit raid, were committed by Peking soldiers and police upon the orders of the Peking Government. Such acts of violence are entirely without precedent between two countries entertaining official relations.

3. If the Peking Government considered that it was raiding a building which, as it writes in its note "under the direct management of the Soviet Embassy," it had no right to undertake any actions with regard to these premises without notifying the Soviet Embassy. However, access to the territory on which the searches and the sacking took place, was refused by the raiding soldiers not only to representatives of the Embassy, but even to Mr. Chernykh, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR.

Such a course of action may be explained only by the fact that the Peking Cabinet preferred to have the acts of violence and looting effected by its agents in the absence of official persons. The completely incredible and implausible statement made by the Peking Government alleging that during the search weapons and documents were found which constituted evidence that an uprising was being prepared, may explain why the raid upon the quarters of the Military Attache and of the Embassy employees was carried out under such extraordinary circumstances. For under such circumstances which exclude any possibility of control, or of listing the seized objects, etc., there is no guaranty that things that could be unused by hostile foreign influences which inspired and countenanced the raid of April 6, may not be made to appear among the objects "found" in those premises.

4. If the Peking Cabinet was in possession of information as to the presence on the territory directly managed by the Soviet Embassy, of Chinese citizens to whom it attributed activities directed against its interests, it was fully in a position, and was bound, in the first place, to bring this to the cognizance of the Soviet Embassy. However, it appears from your note, Mr. Charge d'Affaires, that the Peking Government has considered it more appropriate to apply, on this account, to the diplomatic corps in Peking, and, with the consent of the Dutch Minister Oudenbijk acting in the name of the diplomatic corps, to violate the extraterritorial rights of the Military Attache, to commit acts of violence against Embassy employees, and to sack and pillage their quarters. The collaboration of military and police forces of the Peking Government with the representative of the diplomatic corps in Peking throws light upon the real driving forces behind the outrageous acts of violence and infringements of international law, and constitutes a further evidence indicating in whose interests these acts of violence were committed.

The Government of USSR firmly protests against the above-mentioned acts of violence and infringements of law, and considers it necessary to insist upon the fulfillment of the following elementary requests:

(a) The Chinese military and police forces must immediately be removed from the quarters of the Military Attache and from those of the employees of the Embassy and of the Trade Delegation.

(b) All the arrested employees of the Soviet Embassy and of the Soviet economic institutions are to be freed immediately.

(c) All the documents seized in the premises of the Military Attache are to be returned immediately.

(d) The property, such as money, personal belongings, furniture, books, etc., robbed and taken away by the police and the military authorities of the Ankuochun (Northern Army), is to be returned immediately to its owners.

The Soviet Government considers that until these demands are complied with, it is compelled, as a sign of protest, to recall from Peking its Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Chernykh, with the entire Embassy staff, leaving only the personnel in charge of the execution of the consular functions.

The Soviet Government is restricting itself to the above essential demands which are far from placing the Peking Government in a humiliating position. Had similar acts of violence been committed against the representatives of any imperialist government, the latter would have answered with the most ferocious reprisals. The Soviet Government which is in possession of sufficient technical resources to enable it to resort to measures of retaliation, nevertheless declares that it decidedly renounces such measures. The Soviet Government is fully aware of the fact that irresponsible foreign imperialist spheres are attempting to provoke the USSR to war. The Soviet Government is fully aware of the fact that the Peking Government has become a tool in the game played by foreign imperialist spheres. But the Soviet Government has been basing and will base its policy on the interests of the working masses of the entire world, including the interests of the masses of the Chinese people and of the working masses of all countries. As a reply to the Peking act of provocation the aim of which is to aggravate the international situation and to convert into a new world war the military operations actually conducted at present against China by a few imperialist countries, the Soviet Government declares that it will not let itself be provoked by anybody and that it will by all means stand for the cause of peace among the peoples. The Soviet Government has no doubts that in its endeavor to preserve peace it will meet with the friendly support of the working masses of all countries, including, first of all, the peoples of China and of the USSR.

*Soviet Union Review*, June 1927, 97-98.



#### EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING SETTLEMENT OF EXISTING CONFLICT WITH SWITZERLAND

14 April 1927

*Given pressure from the French government, the Swiss government agreed to resolve differences with the Soviet Union concerning the assassination of a Soviet official by a Russian emigré. This reconciliation of grievances opened the door for Soviet participation in organizations affiliated with the League of Nations. The letter below is the note from Krestinsky, the envoy to Germany, to the Swiss minister in Berlin.*

Mr. Minister,

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the USSR has empowered me to effect an exchange of the following declarations with Your Excellency:

"In connection with the desire of the Government of USSR and the Swiss Confederation to settle the conflict existing between the two states, which arose as a result of the assassination of Mr. Vorovsky during the Lausanne Conference and as a result of the attempt on Mr. Arens and Mr. Divilkovsky, the Swiss Federal Council declares anew that it condemns these criminal actions and regrets them very much. Moreover, it will be ready, in a spirit of conciliation, when the negotiations between the Governments of USSR and the Swiss Confederation will begin, regarding all the questions which are to be settled

between the two countries, to give material aid to Mr. Vorovsky's daughter; the character of such aid and the transmission thereof can be agreed upon simultaneously with the above questions.

After this, the two Governments shall proclaim as settled the conflict existing between their countries, and as abolished, the mutually restrictive measures."

*Soviet Treaty Series*, 333.



## STALIN, QUESTIONS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

21 April 1927

*When Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang forces seized Shanghai in April 1927 and crushed the communists in the city, the conflict between Chiang and the Soviet-backed Left Kuomintang and Chinese communists emerged. For all intents and purposes, the Soviet "united front" policy failed in China. In this article, which appeared in Pravda, Stalin attempted to mitigate this failure. He claimed that the international situation, i.e., stabilization of capitalism, and Chiang's deal with the European imperialists, nationalists, and bourgeoisie pushed the revolution in China to the next stage. Now the communists and Left Kuomintang were linked to the workers and peasants. He also used the opportunity to attack the Opposition, which opposed the Party's China policy, and to characterize them as supporting the enemies of the Party and revolution should they continue opposing this policy.*

### THESES FOR PROPAGANDISTS, APPROVED

BY THE CC, CPSU(B)

#### I

### PROSPECTS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Basic factors determining the character of the Chinese Revolution:

- a) the semicolonial status of China and the financial and economic domination of imperialism;
- b) the oppression of feudal survivals, aggravated by the oppression of feudal survivals, aggravated by the oppression of militarism and bureaucracy;
- c) the growing revolutionary struggle of the vast masses of the workers and peasants against feudal and bureaucratic oppression, against militarism, and against imperialism;
- d) the political weakness of the national bourgeoisie, its dependence on imperialism, its fear of the sweep of the revolutionary movement;
- e) the growing revolutionary activity of the proletariat, its mounting prestige among the vast masses of the working people;
- f) the existence of a proletarian dictatorship in the neighborhood of China.

Hence, two paths for the development of events in China:

*either* the national bourgeoisie smashes the proletariat, makes a deal with imperialism and together with it launches a campaign against the revolution in order to end the latter by establishing the rule of capitalism;

*or* the proletariat pushes aside the national bourgeoisie, consolidates its hegemony and assumes the lead of the vast masses of the working people in town and country, in order to overcome the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, secure the complete victory of the



bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then gradually convert it into a socialist revolution, with all the consequences following from that.

One or the other.

The crisis of world capitalism and the existence in the USSR of a proletarian dictatorship whose experience may be successfully utilized by the Chinese proletariat considerably enhance the possibility of the Chinese Revolution taking the second path.

On the other hand, the fact that imperialism is attacking the Chinese Revolution, in the main with a united front, that there is not at the present time that division and war among the imperialists which, for instance, existed in the imperialist camp prior to the October Revolution, and which tended to weaken imperialism—this fact indicates that on its path to victory the Chinese Revolution will encounter far greater difficulties than did the revolution in Russia, and that the desertions and betrayals in the course of this revolution will be incomparably more numerous than during the Civil War in the USSR.

Hence, the struggle between these two paths of the revolution constitutes the characteristic feature of the Chinese Revolution.

Precisely for this reason, the basic task of the Communists is to fight for the victory of the second path of development of the Chinese Revolution.

## II

### THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

In the first period of the Chinese Revolution, at the time of the first march to the North—when the national army was approaching the Yangtze and scoring victory after victory, but a powerful movement of the workers and peasants had not yet unfolded—the national bourgeoisie (not the compradors) sided with the revolution. It was the revolution of a united *all-national* front.

This does not mean that there are no contradictions between the revolution and the national bourgeoisie. All it means is that the national bourgeoisie, in supporting the revolution, tried to utilize it for its own purposes and, by directing it chiefly along the lines of territorial conquest, to restrict its scope. The struggle between the Rights and Lefts in the Kuomintang at that period was a reflection of these contradictions. Chiang Kai-shek's attempt in March 1926 to expel the Communists from the Kuomintang was the first serious attempt of the national bourgeoisie to curb the revolution. As is known, already at that time the CC, CPSU(B) considered that "the line must be to keep the Communist Party within the Kuomintang," and that it was necessary "to work for the resignation or expulsion of the Rights from the Kuomintang" (April 1926).

The line was one directed towards further development of the revolution, close cooperation between the Lefts and the Communists within the Kuomintang and within the national government, strengthening the unity of the Kuomintang and, at the same time, exposing and isolating the Kuomintang Rights, compelling them to submit to Kuomintang discipline, utilizing the Rights, their connections and their experience, if they submitted to Kuomintang discipline, or expelling them from the Kuomintang if they violated that discipline and betrayed the interests of the revolution.

Subsequent events fully confirmed the correctness of this line. The powerful development of the peasant movement and the organization of peasant associations and peasant committees in the countryside, the powerful wave of strikes in the towns and the formation of trade-union councils, the victorious advance of the national army on Shanghai, which was besieged by imperialist warships and troops—all these and similar facts indicate that the line adopted was the only correct one.

This circumstance alone can explain the fact that the attempt made by the Rights in February 1927 to split the Kuomintang and set up a new center in Nanchang failed in face of the unanimous resistance of the revolutionary Kuomintang in Wuhan.

But this attempt was a sign that a regrouping of class forces was taking place in the country, that the Rights and the national bourgeoisie would not desist, that they would intensify their work against the revolution.

The CC, CPSU (B) was therefore right when it said in March 1927 that:

a) "at the present time, in connection with the regrouping of class forces and concentration of the imperialist armies, the Chinese Revolution is passing through a critical period, and that it can achieve further victories only by resolutely adopting the course of developing the mass movement; "

b) "it is necessary to adopt the course of arming the workers and peasants and converting the peasant committees in the localities into actual organs of government authority equipped with armed self-defense";

c) "the Communist Party should not cover up the treacherous and reactionary policy of the Kuomintang Rights, and should mobilize the masses around the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party with a view to exposing the Rights" (3 March 1927).

It will therefore be easily understood that the subsequent powerful seep of the revolution, on the one hand, and the imperialist onslaught in Shanghai, on the other hand, were bound to throw the Chinese national bourgeoisie into the camp of the counterrevolution, just as the occupation of Shanghai workers were bound to unite the imperialists in order to strangle the revolution.

And that is what happened. The Nanking massacre served in this respect as a signal for a new demarcation of the contending forces in China. In bombarding Nanking and presenting an ultimatum, the imperialists desired to make it known that they were seeking the support of the national bourgeoisie for a joint struggle against the Chinese Revolution.

Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, in firing upon workers' meetings and engineering a coup, was, as it were, replying to the call of the imperialists and saying that he was ready to make a deal with them together with the national bourgeoisie against the Chinese workers and peasants.

### III

#### THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Chiang Kai-shek's coup marks the desertion of the national bourgeoisie from the revolution, the emergence of a center of national counterrevolution, and the conclusion of a deal between the Kuomintang Rights and the imperialists against the Chinese Revolution.

Chiang Kai-shek's coup signifies that in South China there will now be two camps, two governments, two armies, two centers—the revolutionary center in Wuhan and the counterrevolutionary center in Nanking.

Chiang Kai-shek's coup signifies that the revolution has entered the second stage of its development, that a *swing* has begun away from the revolution of an *all-national* united front and towards a revolution of the vast masses of the *workers* and *peasants*, towards an *agrarian* revolution, which will strengthen and broaden the struggle against imperialism, against the gentry and the feudal landlords, and against the militarists and Chiang Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary group.

This means that the struggle between the two paths of the revolution, between those who favor its further development and those who favor its liquidation, will grow more acute from day to day and fill the entire present period of the revolution.

It means that, by waging a resolute struggle against militarism and imperialism, the revolutionary Kuomintang in Wuhan will become in fact the organ of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, while Chiang Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary group in Nanking, by severing itself from the workers and peasants and drawing closer to imperialism, will in the end share the fate of the militarists.

But it follows from this that the policy of preserving the unity of the Kuomintang, the policy of isolating the Rights within the Kuomintang and utilizing them for the purposes of the revolution, no longer accords with the new tasks of the revolution. It must be replaced by a policy of resolutely expelling the Rights until they are completely eliminated politically, a policy of concentrating all power in the country in the hands of a *revolutionary* Kuomintang, a Kuomintang without its Right elements, a Kuomintang that is a bloc between the Kuomintang Lefts and the Communists.

It follows, further, that the policy of close cooperation between the Lefts and the Communists within the Kuomintang acquires particular value and significance at this stage, that this cooperation reflects the alliance between the workers and peasants that is taking shape outside the Kuomintang, and that without such cooperation the victory of the revolution will be impossible.

It follows, further, that the principal source of strength of the revolutionary Kuomintang lies in the further development of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and the strengthening of their mass organizations—revolutionary peasant committees, workers' trade unions and other mass revolutionary organizations—as the preparatory elements of the future Soviets, and that the principal pledge of the victory of the revolution is the growth of the revolutionary activity of the vast masses of the working people, and the principal antidote to counterrevolution is the arming of the workers and peasants.

It follows, lastly, that while fighting in the same ranks as the revolutionary Kuomintangists, the Communist Party must more than ever before preserve its independence, as an essential condition for ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

#### IV

##### ERRORS OF THE OPPOSITION

The basic error of the opposition (Radek and Co.) is that it does not understand the character of the revolution in China, the stage it is now passing through, and its present international setting.

The opposition demands that the Chinese Revolution should develop at approximately the same pace as the October Revolution did. The opposition is dissatisfied because the Shanghai workers did not give decisive battle to the imperialists and their underlings.

But it does not realize that the revolution in China cannot develop at a fast pace, one reason being that the international situation today is less favorable than it was in 1917 (the imperialists are not at war with one another).

It does not realize that decisive battle must not be given in unfavorable conditions, when the reserves have not yet been brought up—just as the Bolsheviks, for example, did not give decisive battle either in April or in July 1917.

The opposition does not realize that not to avoid decisive battle in unfavorable conditions (when it can be avoided) means taking things easier for the enemies of the revolution.

The opposition demands the immediate formation of Soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies in China. But what would forming Soviets now mean?

In the first place, they cannot be formed for the sake of talk—they are formed primarily as organs of struggle against the existing power, as organs of struggle for power. That was the case in 1905. It was also the case in 1917.

But what would forming Soviets mean at the *present moment* in the area of action, say, of the Wuhan government? It would mean issuing the slogan of a struggle against the existing power in that area. It would mean issuing a slogan for the formation of new organs of power, a slogan of struggle against the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang, which includes Communists working in a bloc with the Kuomintang Lefts, for no other power exists now in that area except the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang.

It would mean, further, confusing the task of creating and strengthening mass organizations of the workers and peasants—in the shape of strike committees, peasant associations and committees, trade-union councils, factory committees, etc.—on which the revolutionary Kuomintang already relies, with the task of establishing a Soviet system, as a new type of state power, in place of the power of the revolutionary Kuomintang.

It would mean, lastly, a failure to understand what stage the revolution in China is now passing through. It would mean placing in the hands of the enemies of the Chinese people a new weapon against the revolution, enabling them to spread new legends to the effect that what is taking place in China is not a national revolution, but artificially transplanted “Moscow Sovietization”.

Hence, in advancing the slogan of the formation of Soviets *at the present moment*, the opposition is playing into the hands of the enemies of the Chinese Revolution.

The opposition considers inexpedient the participation of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang. The opposition, consequently, considers expedient a withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang. But what would withdrawal from the Kuomintang mean *now*, when the entire imperialist gang with all its underlings are demanding the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang? It would mean deserting the battlefield and abandoning its allies in the Kuomintang, to the glee of the enemies of the revolution. It would mean weakening the Communist Party, undermining the revolutionary Kuomintang, facilitating the work of the Shanghai Cavaignacs and surrendering the banner of the Kuomintang, the most popular of all the banners in China, to the Kuomintang Rights.

That is precisely what the imperialists, the militarists and the Kuomintang Rights are now demanding.

It follows, therefore, that by declaring for a withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang *at the present moment*, the opposition is playing into the hands of the enemies of the Chinese Revolution.

The recent plenum of the Central Committee of our Party therefore acted quite rightly in categorically rejecting the platform of the opposition.

Stalin, *Works*, IX, 224-234.



#### SECRET SOVIET-GERMAN MILITARY AGREEMENT REGARDING POISON-GAS EXPERIMENTS

23 April 1927

*Following the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 Soviet and German military leaders developed a secret arrangement to meet their respective needs. Restricted by the Versailles treaty of 1919 in military personnel, armaments, and exercises, Germany trained military officers, conducted exercises, and developed heavy armaments on Soviet soil. The Soviets, in turn, learned from their German military counterparts and acquired technology and equipment for modern weapon systems. By February 1927 the German government began reconsidering its collaboration with the Soviets because public revelations could compromise Germany in Europe and prevent regaining of rights lost at Versailles. Such revelations appeared in the European press late in 1926. It also was evident to German leaders that extensive collaboration with the Soviet military could be used against Germany in any future war. The top secret telegram below notes certain technical reasons for reevaluating old and new programs on Soviet soil.*

*Of special interest was construction of a poison-gas test facility near the city of Orenburg inasmuch as German circles were divided about pursuing poison-gas undertakings. This document was translated by Dr. Edmund Remys.*

Top Secret!

Berlin, 23 April 1927

Major Fischer came to see me today and on behalf of General Heye informed me of the following:

As is well known, we have agreed that certain gas experiments should be done in Russia. Until now a place near Moscow has been considered as the site for these tests. But for security reasons one wants to now select a place in the vicinity of Orenburg. For the time being, an officer has been considered to look into this matter. He handed in his resignation shortly after the war and is now employed in industry. This officer, however, left his current position several days ago because he had received a job for life in Norway. As a result General Heye decided to send another officer, namely an active-duty lieutenant colonel. This gentleman, who is by the way very sensible and prudent, is supposed to carry out his orders in the form of a vacation trip. Incidentally, his task consists **exclusively** in examining the considered site near Orenburg for its suitability and then to report his findings to us. General Heye is of the opinion that the trip carried out in this way could not lead to any complications.

I thanked Major Fischer for his information and asked him first of all if the ambassador in Moscow had been informed about this trip.

Major Fischer answered this in the affirmative. Colonel Thomsen had been informed about the trip with instructions to notify the ambassador.

Then I told Mr. Fischer that I was not very comfortable with this trip. By the way, I can remember that during our last discussions we could have talked about gas experiments, but without being able to recall any details.

I find it all the more important that an old idea be carried out, namely to do a protocol about the status of the Russian concerns in that a clear explanation would be given about liquidation of certain concerns and then determine which things have to be approved by a secret council of state. Only in this way can absolute clarity be achieved regarding the matter.

Major Fischer replied that he had already spoken with Mr. von Dirksen about this matter.

I then told Major Fischer he should keep the matter in mind so that this issue could finally be settled in the foreseeable future. I myself am going on vacation for five weeks, Mr. von Dirksen will also be away on vacation for several weeks. Perhaps the matter could be settled only after I return from vacation, but perhaps already earlier during my absence.

German Documents, U.S. National Archives II, Serial 4564, Roll 2331, T120, E163877.



# VOROSHILOV'S SPEECH TO THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ON THE STATE OF THE RED ARMY

25 April 1927

*K. E. Voroshilov's report to the Fourth Congress of Soviets was the most comprehensive examination of Soviet military aims and needs since the civil war. Although Voroshilov, Commissar for War, admitted the Red Army lagged behind the major European powers, he claimed*

*Soviet military technology was advancing in aviation, armaments, antichemical warfare, and shipbuilding. He reported Soviet military forces successfully could defend the Soviet Union against its neighbors. He emphasized the need to improve the living conditions of military personnel, to adapt the economy to the requirements of war, to train a large number of reserves of officers and men, and to link the front with the rear through the "psychological" mobilization of workers and peasants. He singled out Great Britain for its attempts to provoke the Soviet Union into war. This document, sent to the British Foreign Office by the British envoy in Moscow, was a summary, analysis, and partial translation of Voroshilov's long report. Of particular concern to Great Britain was the military capability of the Soviet Union, especially in development of chemical warfare.*

*Mr. Peters to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received May 18)*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that on 25 April, M. Voroshilov, Commissar for War, delivered before the Fourth All-Union Congress of Soviets a speech on the Red Army and the defence of the Soviet Union.

2. The speech, as will be seen from the summary of salient points which I enclose, was reserved and pacific in tone and, taken in conjunction with the present position of the USSR, gave the impression of studiously avoiding all "dangerous" topics.

3. M. Voroshilov devoted considerable space to statements by Sir Laming Worthington-Evans and Mr. King, in the House of Commons, accusing the Soviet Government of preparing for chemical warfare on a large scale. I am inclined to think that, while the Communist Party is indeed obsessed with this question of chemical warfare, it is a case of obsession by fear. There has long been a campaign for providing the means of defence against chemical attack (see Mr. Burbury's memoranda on aviation submitted to the Department of Overseas Trade), but I have no reason to believe that there have been any great preparations for offensive chemical warfare on the part of this country. It is, indeed, improbable that sufficient funds have been available for more than limited work in this direction, just as is the case with expensive construction work for the Red fleet and Red air force.

4. The most important points of M. Voroshilov's report are, in short, his admission that the Red Army is very weak in modern heavy technical equipment, that the Red air force is small and not yet independent of foreign technical resources, that the existing "territorial-militia" apparatus is not yet able to train the available annual quota, and, in particular (see paragraph 23 of enclosure), that transport in the Soviet Union is already overtaxed and would in time of war be a factor greatly impeding all major military operations.

5. The summary forwarded with this despatch is from the press report of M. Voroshilov's speech. I am taking steps to obtain the official report of the speech and also if possible the materials to which M. Voroshilov referred (see paragraph 9 of summary). The latter, if obtained, I propose to forward as of possible interest to the War Office.

*Report of M. Voroshilov, USSR Commissar for War,  
delivered on 25 April to the Fourth All-Union  
Congress of Soviets, on the Red Army*

#### SUMMARY OF SALIENT POINTS

Part I.—*International Situation and Growth of Armaments in Capitalist Countries.*

1. "From Comrade Rykov's full and exhaustive report you can draw the conclusion that we have entered upon a new series of difficulties, that we are passing through a period when all workers must be especially alert and careful not to be taken unawares by the advance of dangerous events."

2. The League of Nations is bankrupt; even "Rul," the Berlin White-Guard organ, admits it.

3. (Details of the increase of armaments in England, France, Italy and the United States of America.)

4. ("Inventions of the English War Minister," Mr. King of the War Office, and General Knox: quotations from House of Commons debates.

No, it is England and America that are preparing for chemical wars.)

5. Ridicule of "Rul" correspondent's assertion that he saw masses of war material on the Trans-Siberian Railway moving to Urga for China; and of the story ("Daily Telegraph," of 6 April), that the Red army in Siberia had been mobilized for an irruption into Manchuria.

6. Why all this *bourgeois* slander? It is designed to provoke us into some kind of conflict which will serve to justify an armed assault on us.

Part II.—*State of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union*

7. We depend for our security on four factors: our peace-footing armed forces, the necessary reserves of men and command-staff, the power of switching our whole economic life with its State organs on to the rails of war, and "the psychological mobilization of our workers."

*Junior Command Staff.*

8. In recent years we have accomplished one of our most difficult tasks. We have now a trained junior command staff in our army. It amounts to nearly 100,000 men out of an army of 562,000. It differs from the rest of the command staff in that it serves in the army or fleet only for the same period as the rank and file, whereas the other "commanders" are professionals.

"A considerable number of the junior commanders, after a suitable preparation, enter the normal military schools and pass out thence as Red army commanders."

*Command and Political Staff.*

9. I have little to say of them. Seventy-five per cent of our company battalion and regimental commanders have served in the Red army since its creation. Among the higher command staff the proportion is 85 percent.

The role of political organs and political workers has increased during the period of peace, and not diminished.

We began the "unity of command" system in 1924. "On the whole the principle of unity of command, which has at present been carried into effect on a considerable scale, has given quite serious results. This is dealt with in more detail in the written report."

*Officers' Training*

10. Two or three years ago we had few manuals for the various arms; now we have them, embodying the results of the imperial and civil wars, and our ranks are trained with them. "I would not say that the results of this teaching are insufficient. But I must definitely declare with responsibility before the Fourth Congress of Soviets of the USSR that we have much yet to do before we can say that the words of battle-training of the individual and, in particular, of individual units—and also of training in the coordination of different arms—has been completed by us; we cannot say so as yet." We hope to have done so in a year. The qualifications of the command staff are on the upward scale. The normal military schools have decreased in members but increased in quality; each year they give us thousands of new fully trained specialists.

We have also six military academies, which have in the last years passed out about 2,000 highly qualified workers; and five military sections in civil higher educational institutes, which also train Red Army workers for us.

*Reserves*

11. "Our whole system of armed forces is not enough to train even the annual contingents liable to be called to the colours. Instead of 800,000 young men called up for service we are training in the cadre and territorial units only a little over half the number.

"As for 'planmassig' even in elementary training of the wide worker masses we have, I regret, not yet got to grips with this question."

(Sport. Aviakhim.)

*"National" Units.*

12. In the Ukrainian, the White Russian, and the Transcaucasian Socialist Soviet Republics we have completed our work on national units; but in the Soviet Republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and others, we have only begun to work, and it is far from having been finished.

Speedy completion has been hindered in a number of ways: "First, the absence of a sufficiently qualified national command staff; secondly the population itself of these republics, never having been accustomed to military service before, has until today, I regret, not been sufficiently prepared for a swift completion of this important and complicated task."

*Reserve Command Staff*

13. Capitalist Powers have big officer reserves. We build ours up from certain groups of the command staff which retire: "and, since the autumn of last year, we have taken measures to prepare a reserve command staff in our civil educational institutes. All students are now legally compelled to study military matters and during a certain period to pass a time in camp. This permits of those who are liable to be called up entering the army at the conclusion of their studies with already certain preparation, and after a certain time—after eight or maybe six months (as we intend to arrange later)—to become a reserve commander [sic]."

*Women*

14. A movement is on foot in Poland for permitting women to be trained and proceed to summer camps and to receive tasks on mobilization. "I propose, comrades, that we too in our future development of our work should give corresponding attention to the preparation of women as active participants in the defence of the State."

*Part III.—Military Technique, the Air Fleet and the Navy**Technical Equipment*

15. "We must clearly and definitely declare that as regards supplying our army with technical means of fighting we continue to lag behind the present West European Powers. Our improvement in this respect, however, will not lag behind the general level of our economic development." (*Applause.*)

*Artillery.*

16. "Our artillery equipment, in particular as to its quality and quantity, does not give us, who are responsible for military condition of the Red army, any cause for apprehension or alarm."

In all countries armaments continue to be to a considerable extent what they were at the end of the imperial war. Aviation and chemistry are in a special position, and I will deal with them in more detail.

*Chemical*

17. "Though Knox and Evans prophesy a very great development of chemical industry with a special military tinge in our country, we must, I regret, say that in this respect also we are considerably behind other countries. Our chemical industry, which was weak even before the war, is now only in its restoration period. The preparation of the means of chemical warfare in the necessary quantities can only be based on a chemical industry that in time of peace is well and widely developed. Hence we must frankly confess that we are



not so very well off as to the chemistry of war. But in order to be prepared for defence against gases we shall have to build up and organise our chemical industry for war purposes."

Everybody knows the need of antigas preparations for a modern army. Our scientific workers had to work their very hardest in order "to invent and construct antigas preparations which afford protection from all poisons now known. Such a Soviet antigas preparation has already been included in our armament." We need it in vast quantities; not only every soldier but every worker connected with the front or the lines of communication must be supplied. I think it will not be long before we have coped with the task.

#### *Aviation*

18. We may be proud of our air force. Instead of a few out of date and useless machines we have built a powerful modern force. We are able to construct this air force in the main on the basis of our own Soviet aviation industry. We have also produced a body of fliers sufficient in quantity and quality.

We have created a Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute ("Tsagi") for scientific construction, and it has not its like in Europe, nor in the whole world (*Applause.*) At its head is Professor Chaplygin. Others of our noted workers are Engineer Tupolev (designer of the ANT types), and also Stechkin and Iuriev.

#### *Navy*

19. "We must say straight out that our fleet, comparatively small, cannot be compared with the English or a number of other fleets. None the less, in comparison with our neighbors we have a sufficiently large and powerful force, and the tasks which lie before the Baltic and Black Sea fleets will undoubtedly be fulfilled."

#### *Mobilization Reserves*

20. We agree with the prevalent view that "no mobilization reserves can decide the issue of contemporary armed conflicts." The Tsarist, French and German armies expended too quickly vast supplies accumulated for a short war. Hence the famine of shells and cartridges and the adoption of invisible trench warfare. We must so organise our industries in peace that they may be able at a given moment to produce all that is needed for the front and for the minimum requirements of the war.

"Sharing, however, the above view, one must yet admit that an inconsiderable minimum we shall have to accumulate beforehand."

#### *Part IV.—The Preparation of National Economy and Defence.*

21. Other States have special laws determining the functions of various bodies in war time. We are fortunate in that we do not need this; we are a united economic whole, with Gosplan (the State Planning Commission), the Supreme Council of National Economy, the Commissariats of Ways and Communications and of Trade, and the State Bank to aid us.

"None the less the favourable objective conditions must be correspondingly employed. In this respect we are as yet doing little."

#### *War Industry.*

22. "Our military industry, which has until lately been limping on all four legs, more than any other part of our economic apparatus, having gone through the maladies of the imperialist and civil wars, has now recovered, if not wholly at least to a considerable extent. It is on its feet, and has lately begun to fulfill not badly the functions laid upon it under present conditions."

#### *Aviation Industry*

"Our aviation industry is yet young. It has still a number of defects, both, organizational and other; still, we must remark that in the main tasks of creating an aviation industry of our own have been solved by us." We have a good staff of engineers, technicians and workers. "Furthermore, our equipment and the material means of our aviation factories have increased."

### *Transport*

23. "All know that our transport is at the present time working under a stress but even, one might better say, a superstress. Therefore, if a misfortune happened in our country, if we were suddenly attacked, we should meet with colossal difficulties in precisely this most important branch of our economic life."

All war, especially nowadays, is based with its whole weight on transport, and "Under our conditions, I repeat, we are already, in peace time, working under a tremendous strain, and therefore special measures are necessary in order that our transport possibilities may be improved, etc."

### *Agriculture*

24. Before the war our country had 35 million horses. At the end of the war the number had fallen to 10 million, and our peasantry met vast difficulties in cartage.

"Intensified breeding of horses, including chargers, a speeding-up of the reconstruction of peasant transport in view of the insignificant development of mechanical haulage, acquire the most significance for our defence."

25. (Need of chemical defence for Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev and many other towns; need of an increased air force as the best defence against poison gases; need of explanations on the subject to the wide masses.)

### *Conclusion*

26. We must be on the alert.

Voroshilov's concluding speech, after the (uninteresting) debate.

### *Barracks*

27. As one of the speakers pointed out, our military housing accommodation is bad. In old times most of our barracks were in the areas which are now Poland and the Baltic States. Not that we took over insufficient barracks from Tsarist times; those we have are enough for our small army, but they are not in the areas where we have to keep our troops. And those we have were much damaged in the war and the revolution, while many of them were built in the reign of Catherine II or even earlier.

The housing question is particularly acute as regards the command staff. The Government and the Revolutionary War Council have taken measures to mitigate the crisis, but real serious measures are still necessary.

### *Bombast*

28. Technically our army is not to be compared with those of Western European and American armies, but as to command staff and rank-and-file I can echo (one of the speakers) and say our army is a solidly knit body which feels itself the van-guard of the many-millioned warriors of Socialism.

"On such a force the armies of the *bourgeoisie* will break even though they be better equipped technically."

The "decree" passed on M. Voroshilov's report by the Fourth Congress emphasised strongly the need of concentration on horse-breeding, and of making assignations from the budget in the next five years to improve the uniforms, diet and barracks of the Red soldier; otherwise, it contained nothing beyond the hints given in the above summary.

*British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part II, Series A, Vol. 9, 48-52.*



OBOLENSKY-OSINSKY'S SPEECH TO  
THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE  
Geneva, 4-23 May 1927

*Upon resolution of grievances with the Swiss government the Soviet Union began participating in League-sponsored organizations. The first such participation by the Soviet Union was in the World Economic Conference, which began on 4 May 1927. In the initial speech by the Soviet delegate, V. Obolensky-Osinsky, the Conference received a brief description of the contradictions inherent in capitalism, such as exploitation of the working class and colonial countries, escalation of armaments, unemployment, and unused industrial capacity. He called upon the Conference to reduce its antagonism toward the Soviet Union, understand the Soviet position, and work toward the coexistence of the two economic systems in order to solve the world's economic problems. The document below is a characteristic excerpt from a collection which contains a translation and abridgement of Obolensky-Osinsky's long speech.*

SPEECH BY SOVIET DELEGATE  
V. OBOLENSKY-OSINSKY  
7 May 1927

The present world economic system is a veritable maze of contradictions. We find them everywhere. Though interlinked, they are infinite in number and variety. It would be impossible to enumerate them all, but no adequate review of the present situation can be given without a brief reference to the most important idea of the true situation.

Suppose for a moment that we proceed to classify, in order of economic prosperity, the countries represented at this Conference, and also those not represented here.

We should give first place to the United States, the economic victor of the world war. We should place next the neutral States and the British Dominions; next would come England and France, the military victors, conquered Germany and the new States of Eastern Europe; and, finally, we should have the agricultural countries of the East and the semicolonial and colonial territories.

If the experts who prepared the documentation for the Conference had drawn up a comparative table showing the conditions obtaining in all these countries—their national wealth, the national income per head of the population, the consumption of certain commodities, the average wages paid, the average length of the working day and so on—we should find a pitiful state of affairs attended by startling inequalities.

These inequalities existed before the war, it is true, but they have since been accentuated. It must be remembered that the whole population of the world—about 2,000 million—were caught in the backwash of the war. Even the most backward countries were aroused from their age-long slumber. All are now aspiring to economic and social equality, and no one who fails to grasp that truth can ever find the key to the social psychology of the age....

To return, however, to the contradictions in the economic system of the world. The most general and the most obvious is the enormous disparity that exists between the productive capacity of industry and the purchasing power of markets. It is revealed by the incomplete use that is being made of the instruments of production. Even in the United States, one of the most prosperous countries in the world, 25 percent of the iron founding plant and 25 percent of the mechanical engineering plant is standing idle.

In England, 41 percent of the metallurgical and 45 percent of the textile plant is unused. In Poland, the figures are higher still. This phenomenon is so well known that I need not trouble you with fuller details. The root-causes of the situation are the reduction of the

purchasing-power of the working and peasant classes in the majority of countries, the ruin of whole States, and the policy of boycotting and violence applied to large countries such as the USSR and China. As the result of the late war, certain States are burdened with payments which oblige them to sell commodities, to throw them on the market—a senseless procedure from the economic point of view—or, conversely, to refuse to buy commodities that they actually require.

The reduction in the purchasing-power of the working-classes is one particular feature of another contradiction which has been greatly accentuated. I refer to the contradiction between the economic position of the working classes and that of the business capitalists. This contradiction is particularly striking in the United States.

Despite the upward trend of wages, the gulf between capital and labor has widened. During that period the class-consciousness of the workers, their economic claims and their demands for social equality greatly increased. There are in the world today not only what are known in Russia and Germany as “the scissors” between the curves of industrial and agricultural prices, but also social-economic “scissors” which are no less important and no less sharp.

In Europe, real wages are, at best, on the same level as before the war. East of the Elbe they are—except in the USSR—below the prewar level.

At first sight, it may seem strange that, with so much unemployment in the world, the working day should be lengthened for those actually employed; yet this process—one of the lesser contradictions in the economic field—is very much on the increase. The Washington Resolutions of 1919 concerning the eight-hour day have never been ratified. The USSR is the only country where the working day does not exceed eight hours, and is indeed only six hours in the mines. The working day in England, Germany and other countries is tending to become longer.

All these facts are illustrative of the general offensive conducted by industrial capitalists against the working classes. This offensive is already taking the form of an attack against the trade-union right of association and the right to strike. From the economic point of view it is a sure sign of the sharpening of the contradictions that exist between labor and capital. For, I repeat, class-consciousness and the just claims of the working classes have grown apace.

An equally sharp contradiction is that which exists between capitalist industry and agricultural production.

In the capitalist world itself we find a whole series of contradictions—of conflicts. Let us pass over the less important of these—between capitalists in various branches of industry and between industrial, business and banking capital. The principal contradictions are between the powerful national capitalist groups in control of the big Powers today. A fierce struggle is raging in this domain, the struggle for sea and rail routes, for export markets, for sources of raw materials, for openings for capital investment. The struggle for raw materials is the most plainly visible, but it is not the most important. It is astonishing to think that none of these problems are suggested as subjects for discussion at a Conference which is asked to study the economic difficulties that threaten the peace of the world.

While the great contradictions between the imperialist systems themselves were assuming vast proportions, some of these countries transformed into a contradiction of the sharpest kind the innate contrast that exists as between the capitalist system of the European-American world and the Socialist system of the Soviet Union.

The existence of this contrast does not imply that these two parties must necessarily come into actual conflict. The Soviet Union at any rate sees no inherent necessity for that. Socialism is not merely a system of economic and national equality; it stands primarily for peace. A peaceful foreign policy is a permanent feature and forms an organic part of the

policy of the Soviet State. The fact that dissimilarity exists between two economic systems, which are forced for a given period to exist side by side, by no means precludes the possibility of a practical understanding between them. On the contrary, such an understanding is perfectly feasible. For that reason, the economic and financial boycotting of the USSR which has been attempted with partial success in recent years has formed an unnecessary addition to the confusion already existing in the world. The share taken in world trade by the territory now comprised in the USSR amounted before the war to four percent. By 1925 it had fallen to a little over 1 1/2 percent, chiefly through the lack of requisite credits. Nevertheless, the part played by the Soviet Union in world trade and in the world money market is capable of increasing to dimensions even larger than before the war. The absence of the USSR from these markets and its partial exclusion from world trade have aggravated the effect of the disturbances resulting from the reduced purchasing-power of the world as a whole.

The contradiction between the great empires of the world is closely connected with the other great contradictions in economic life today. The powerful groups which control the contemporary world States are causing violent conflicts between the interests and rights of the mother-countries and their colonies. The struggle for export markets, sources of raw materials and openings for capital investment is also a struggle for economic exploitation with the maximum yield.

This contradiction, which already existed before the war, became sharply accentuated after the close of hostilities. The whole world having been divided up, the next step was to intensify the exploitation of the colonies. But the national consciousness of the colonial peoples and the class-consciousness of colonial workers have also grown. The ineradicable sympathy which the first Socialist republic of the world feels for colonial peoples, and more particularly for the people of China, in their struggle for their rights, is consonant with the inexorable laws of history.

The contradictions of the world capitalist regime may be described as constituting one long and constant world crisis, independent of the periodic economic crises and the periodic alternations of activity and depression.

In their more acute phases these contradictions take the form of a series of revolutions and armed conflicts which for the time being are only in the nature of guerilla warfare. But the large-scale armaments which are still being maintained together with the acute economic struggle now being waged render the menace of a new war, a fresh world cataclysm, a very real one.

What are the reasons for all these contradictions, and what has made them so intensely acute? The primary cause undoubtedly lies in the actual character of the economic system under which they have arisen. [Goes on to interpret the capitalist system as a growth of trusts and monopolies eventually resulting in armed competition among capitalist monopolies.]....

There is no real way out of the newly formed complex of these contradictions in world economy, or, rather, there is only one way out—to transform the whole economic system, or, in other words, to change over from the capitalist system, based on private ownership, to the socialist system. The contradictions that exist in the world economy today will not disappear, nor will the menace of war be permanently removed, until the producers themselves take over the management of producers' trusts, which today have assumed nationwide proportions, and until production, instead of being carried on in private interests, is designed to satisfy the requirements of the producers themselves. All other solutions are vain, and will only aggravate these contradictions, or at best temporarily mitigate their harmful effects, only, perhaps, to give rise to still more serious troubles in the future. [Analyzes and condemns proposals put forth by Loucheur and Jouhaux.]....

I shall be told, the schemes for the reorganization of Europe on socialistic lines have no bearing upon conditions at the present day or even in the present year. If the coexistence of the bourgeois and the Socialist systems for a limited period is regarded as feasible, it is ipso facto implied that the bourgeois system still has a further lease of life before it.

The world economic system is passing through a period of acute crisis. The consequences of that crisis will have a far-reaching effect on the situation of the masses. What are the measures that should be taken or that can be taken to remedy the worst of these contradictions, to improve the situation of the workers and to facilitate the transition to a new era in world economy? The following concrete proposals may furnish the answer to this question.

It is essential that:

1. All war debts and all payments relating to the war should be cancelled, this being the sole means of liquidating the contradictions which are the direct heritage of the war of 1914-18. The cancellation of such debts would be a great step towards the restoration of world trade.

2. The wages of industrial workers should be raised.

3. The eight-hour day should be restored and a six-hour day should be introduced in mines and in occupations that are especially arduous or unhealthy.

4. The working classes should be given full and genuine freedom of association and an absolute right to strike.

5. A system of real and effective assistance should be introduced for the unemployed, particularly for those thrown out of work through what is known as the rationalization of production. For this purpose, heavier taxes should be levied on the incomes of the wealthy classes, and all unproductive forms of consumption (expenditure on army and navy, civil service, luxury articles, etc.) should be cut down.

6. Strong measures should be taken to combat the raising of the prices of industrial commodities, particularly by cartels.

7. All barriers to the migration of the surplus population of one State to another should be removed.

8. Protectorates and mandatory systems should be abolished, troops should be withdrawn from the colonies and all nations should be allowed self-determination in both the political and the economic field.

9. All military intervention in China should cease. China should be granted full political and economic self-determination with a view to the reestablishment of normal economic relations between herself and the rest of the world.

10. The economic and political boycott, in whatever form, of the Soviet Union should cease, and the relations established should be based on the acceptance of the fact that two different systems must exist side by side. The Soviet Union should be granted credits to strengthen its purchasing-power; concessions should be given in the Soviet Union to foreign capital; technical cooperation and a system of exchange of information in the sphere of industrial technology should be established; no further attacks should be made upon institutions which form an indissoluble and organic part of the Socialist system—in particular, the State monopoly of foreign trade.

11. There should be complete and effective disarmament, and all permanent land and sea forces should be abolished. All plant and equipment intended for military purposes should be dismantled under the supervision of the workers' and peasants' organizations.

Public opinion in the Soviet Union unanimously holds that not only is peace as dear to the heart of all peoples as life is to man but that it is the fundamental condition essential for all work in the economic sphere. Public opinion in the Soviet Union repudiates the capitalist and imperialist system for the very reason that it leads to war. The Soviet Union will do its utmost to support all practical measures to reduce the dangers of war and to save

the lives of the workers in every country. It is itself prepared to take all measures that may be necessary to this end.

Eudin and Fisher, 382-386.



### THE ARCOS RAID

12 May 1927

*Invoking the Official Secrets Act of 1911 London police, with warrant in hand, entered the rooms of the Soviet Trade Delegation and Arcos Limited, a company registered in England, and with the use of pneumatic tools drilled through the strong-rooms of the Trade Delegation. The police searched the premises, cataloged and seized documents, and prevented entry by Soviet officials throughout the ordeal. Questions arose about diplomatic immunity. This so-called raid created a stir in the British press, provided the opposition Labor Party with ammunition to criticize the Conservative government, and led to huge demonstrations in Moscow. Litvinov protested the raid as a violation of the trade agreement of 1921 and of diplomatic immunity, and claimed it was an attempt by the Conservative government to provoke tensions with the Soviet government. The Commissar for Trade, A. Mikoian, used a session of the National Conference of Commercial and Office Employees of the Soviet Union to threaten Britain that the Soviet Union would conduct its business with other countries at Britain's expense. His speech reflected the attitude of the Communist Party toward capitalist countries and the importance of foreign trade, and contained details about the magnitude of commercial relations with Britain, Germany, Austria, and the United States.*

### LITVINOV, PROTEST NOTE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

17 May 1927

Sir,

1. In his note of the 12th of this month, the Charge d'Affaires of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Rozengolts, filed a formal protest with the British Government against the violation of the trade agreement of 1921 that concerned the raid of the English police on the premises of the Soviet Trade Delegation in London and the examination and removal from the premises of delegation documents, which included codes and ciphers, and against the offensive and violent behavior of the police agents during this raid. While confirming and supporting Mr. Rozengolts' protest in the most emphatic manner, I consider it necessary to direct the attention of the British Government to the following:

2. When the Soviet Government, immediately after the ending of intervention and raising of the blockade against the Soviet Union, was proceeding to establish economic relations with Great Britain and other Western States, it considered that if great importance is attached to the preservation of commercial secrets among private trading firms, the government organs connected with the State foreign trade monopoly must seek to secure in the most express form the complete preservation of the immunity of the State documents, instructions, circulars etc. sent by them abroad, as they concentrate in their hands the entire import and export activity of the whole State, and carry out these operations in accordance with the

previously laid down State plans and preconditions. For this reason the Soviet Government, in its negotiations for the conclusion of commercial treaties, put forward with special emphasis the demand that its commercial agencies abroad shall be assured complete immunity and inviolability, and at the same time took into consideration that the hostile atmosphere in which the commercial agents of the first Soviet State will have to work in capitalist countries and that extraordinary attention which can be accorded them on the part of the reactionary police chiefs of these countries.

The principle of immunity of the trade delegations and representatives of the Soviet Union has now been recognized by nearly all the countries with which the Soviet Government has treaty relations. No objections were raised against this principle by the British Government, in the person of Sir Robert Horne, then President of the Board of Trade, who, in 1921, carried on negotiations with the late Krasin. This principle was embodied in the fifth article of the Soviet-British Trade Agreement of 1921, which has now been violated by the British authorities in the grossest and most insulting manner.

3. According to our information, the court order authorizing the raid on Soviet House on Moorgate Street, which was presented only an hour after the police began the raid, was made out both for the Arcos limited liability company and for the Trade Delegation. Although Arcos is formally a limited liability company, registered under English law, the British authorities could not be unaware that it is chiefly, if not exclusively engaged in carrying out the commercial instructions of Soviet economic bodies.

A police raid on an English trading company, with good references in British circles, with an annual turnover of tens of millions sterling, which has accurately fulfilled its obligations, is altogether unprecedented in the history of the City of London. The raid could only be actuated by the motive of causing detriment to the Soviet interests connected with the activities of Arcos by compromising the latter and creating around it an atmosphere of want of confidence and hostility. From this point of view the Soviet Government feels that it has a right to protest against the raid on Arcos.

4. However, if in regard to Arcos the British authorities, ignoring the most elementary demands of correctness, commercial usages, and even reasonableness, can refer to their formal right, there cannot exist the least doubt that the violent irruption of the police into the premises of the Trade delegation and the acts they committed there also are a flagrant violation of the Agreement of 1921. If, according to the fifth article of this Agreement, the official agent of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is granted the right to use cipher correspondence, then it follows without the least doubt that this correspondence and the ciphers themselves can in no event be examined by agents of another State nor by any foreigners without the sanction of the head of the Soviet Delegation. If, according to the same article, the official agent of the Soviet Union is granted the right, on the ground of his diplomatic immunity, to receive sealed packets by special couriers, then the immunity of the contents of these packets is obvious to everybody.

Nevertheless, police agents, having forced their way into the premises of the Trade Delegation and the personal bureau of Khinchuk, an official agent enjoying diplomatic immunity, allowed themselves to examine and take away without discrimination all papers found there, including ciphered correspondence, codes, and papers received by the diplomatic mail, etc. At the same time, officials of the cipher department of the Trade Delegation, Miller and Khudiakov, who were fulfilling their duty, protested against the illegal demands of the police, and were subjected to acts of violence and even beaten, while the wife of the Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who was on the premises and has a diplomatic passport, was detained with violence and searched.

5. No less significant is the political aspect of the above described measures of the British Government. The absolutely uncalled-for police raid on a Government institution of another State, apart from the question of treaty rights belonging to it, is itself a most serious hostile act, without doubt jeopardizing the further preservation of relations between



the interested States, with all the ensuing consequences. The fact that the Trade Delegation by its activity gave no justification for such a raid can be proved by the circumstance that on the part of the British Government there was not a single instance of representations or complaint about this activity. The police authorities themselves who undertook the raid apparently did not expect to find on the premises of the Trade Delegation any documents throwing the least shadow on the delegation's activity, or capable of serving as a basis for accusing it of illegal actions. Otherwise they would have taken good care to make the search in such conditions as would be a guarantee of faith in the results of the search. By refusing the representatives of the Trade Delegation the right to be present during the search and to certify the authenticity of the documents taken away by drawing up a proper list and protocol, the police authority deprived the search of any formal significance.

The British Government certainly has cognizance of the Soviet Government's Note referring to the police raid recently made in the same manner and in analogous circumstances in China. To provide the search with even the most elementary legal guarantees was in the circumstances most necessary, in view of the ominous role already once played in the relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain by a forged document.

6. It is impossible not to recall today the Note of 23 February in which Sir Austen Chamberlain, referring to the tension in the relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, sought reasons for this tension in the conduct of the Soviet Press and of certain Soviet statesmen and public leaders. Actually the police raid on the premises of the Soviet Trade Delegation and the motives underlying this action clearly, show in which direction should be sought the true reasons for the unsatisfactory Soviet-British relations. Against the unfounded, absolutely unconfirmed by any proofs, although often repeated, accusations against the Soviet Government of the nonobservance of obligations undertaken and the violation of the rules of international relations, the Soviet Government can produce absolutely unquestionable proof of violation by the British Government of the Soviet-British Agreement of 1921, and of the most offensive handling of persons enjoying the right of diplomatic immunity, while the requirements of international law and recognized international usages were totally ignored.

7. These actions of the British Government prove that not only is it not disturbed by the tension in Anglo-Soviet relations which it complains of in its Note of 23 February, but that it is apparently striving to bring this tension as soon as possible to the culminating point. These actions are in obvious contradiction with the frequent declarations of the British Government as to its efforts to maintain peace and to improve the economic relations of Europe. These actions, which synchronize with the World Economic Conference, which was called by the League of Nations, of which Great Britain is the leading member, in order to promote and strengthen international economic relations and to remove all unnecessary hindrances and obstacles from the path of economic cooperation of the peoples, show to the whole world where the really destructive forces which are working to increase the economic chaos and anarchy of Europe are to be found.

8. Putting above all the interests of peace, and desiring to ensure peaceful conditions for internal construction within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Soviet Government has patiently suffered for a long time a series of gross attacks and provocative acts from individual members of the British Government and the Government itself. The Soviet Government has repeatedly desired its willingness to do everything in its power, within the limits of normal relations and negotiations on equal terms, for the adjustment of all misunderstandings on pending questions between both Governments. With this object it did not discontinue trade relations with Great Britain, trying to enlarge them as British business circles went half-way to meet the Soviet Government, and inasmuch as the British Government did not prevent such action. It noted with satisfaction the growing interest

noticeable lately in the Soviet market on the part of the City of London and the growing confidence in Soviet economic organizations shown by London banks, as testified by the agreement regarding a credit of 10,000,000 Pounds Sterling recently concluded with one of these banks just before the raid.

However, the absolutely unprecedented and unrestrained hostile campaign of hate which culminated in the raid on the premises of the Trade Delegation and which also lately was meeting with growing encouragement by members of the British Government, compels the Soviet Government with all earnestness and frankness demanded by the alarming situation created, to put the question to the British Government whether it desires the further preservation and development of Anglo-Soviet trade relations or whether it intends in the future to hamper them.

9. For its part the Soviet Government categorically declares that the conduct of trade relations is possible only on conditions of the strict observance by the British Government of the Trade Agreement and of the guaranteeing to the economic organs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the possibility of uninterrupted, quiet, and normal work.

The Soviet Government equally resolutely declares that while realizing its self-appointed tasks of internal development according to a definite economic plan, and while coordinating with this plan its operations in foreign trade, it cannot countenance that the conduct of these operations shall be made dependent upon casual party combinations in England, electioneering maneuvers, or the fantastical ideas of this or that Minister.

The Soviet Government feels it has the right to demand from the British Government a clear and unequivocal reply from which it may be possible to draw due conclusions. At the same time it reserves the right to present demands for satisfaction for the violation by the British Government of its treaty obligations, for insults suffered, and for material losses caused by the action of the police.

Requesting you, Sir, to bring the above to the cognizance of the British Government. I beg you to accept the assurance, etc.

*International Press Correspondence*, VII, No. 31, 630-631.

*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, 213-218.



#### MIKOIAN, THE RAID ON THE TRADE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN LONDON

May 1927

The raid on our Trade Delegation in London, and the searching of the Arcos premises, an economic institution of the Soviet Union, working in Great Britain in keeping with British laws, effecting our entire foreign trade monopoly in Great Britain, and transacting business to a value of several hundred millions of rubles yearly, is an overt act of provocation.

In the five years of our commercial relations there has not been a single case in which the Arcos did not fulfill its obligations or in which a single British firm lodged a single complaint against the Arcos or hinted in the least at any disloyal action on its part.

Our imports from Great Britain and the export of goods to that country developed as follows:

Year	Imports from Great Britain to the Soviet Union	Exports from the Soviet Union to Great Britain
	In Thousands of Rubles	
1923/24	49,177	80,726
1924/25	110,698	185,639
1925/26	129,167	197,719
1926/27	176,125	251,010

And now, in defiance of all the rules existing in British law, 200 policemen break in, rummage for secret codes, burst open safes and cupboards, and damage the most important apparatus of the Arcos. And only an hour later a warrant for the search is forthcoming, instead of being presented on the spot.

If the police had demanded documents, the Arcos would have presented them, just as, in its character, as a company constituted under British law, it would have delivered up the keys needed for the investigation. But our Trade Delegation refused to surrender the keys to the safes and to the code cupboard, seeing that our Trade Delegation, which is conducted by Comrade Khinchuk, is in the enjoyment of the extraterritorial rights confirmed according to British law in the commercial treaty of 1921. It was stipulated that Comrade Khinchuk should be entitled to communicate with Moscow in cipher, that he should have the right to keep a cipher key, and that he should be authorized to send couriers with mail which neither the police nor anyone else should have the right to open. All this is set forth in the commercial treaty.

Meanwhile, however, the police forced their way into the Trade Delegation premises. Upon the refusal of our employees of the cipher department to surrender the cipher keys to the British police, the British police, who appear to have learnt of the Chinese police and seem to excel them, maltreated our honest collaborators of the cipher department, who were prevented by their duty from betraying the secrets of the cipher code. With threats and violence our comrades were thrust aside and the police seized the cipher key by force.

In the course of the last few months we have been negotiating with Great Britain. Our commercial representative negotiated with the leading British bank, an institution of world-wide importance.

These negotiations also embraced discussions with the representative of the engineering industry in Great Britain, who knows that there is no market in Great Britain itself for the products of British engineering, which is consequently suffering from a lack of orders.

As you will know, the German Government last year granted us a credit of 150 million gold rubles, a fact which aroused a tremendous discussion in the Conservative press of Great Britain. Nevertheless, the British business circles are inclined to come to an understanding with us, and on 11 May a treaty was signed placing a credit of 100 million rubles at our disposal, this being somewhat less than the German credit. It was granted us in form of a guarantee of our bills for purchases in Great Britain.

Besides this, we have been negotiating with the leading firms of textile machinery manufacturers in Manchester, who offered us textile machinery on credit to a total value of 25 million rubles, this credit to be redeemed within a lapse of 48 months. The average length of time the credit was to run was 23 months.

We also had credit offers from other firms for equipment for petroleum boring to a value of 20 million rubles, repayable after a longer period.

Within the last two or three months, therefore, British business circles have approached us in regard to a credit to our benefit of almost 150 million rubles, that is to say very nearly as much as was granted to us last year by the German Government to the great indignation of the British Conservative press.

This did not happen out of any special love of the Soviet Union on the part of British business circles; indeed, I believe I am not mistaken if I wager that no such feelings are

cherished for us there. It happened merely for the reason that they require markets for the products of their industry; it is to their advantage to sell the goods and to our advantage to buy them. This is a business transaction which is advantageous for both parties, quite independent of the political sympathies and convictions of either.

It is probably well known to all of you that the German credit reduced unemployment in Germany and that thousands of workers are now working there to Russian orders.

The same thing was now to happen in Great Britain. And to this end, on 11 May, the contract regarding the 100-million ruble credit was signed, while at the same time the negotiations took place in regard to the textile machinery. Exactly one day later occurred the raid on our Trade Delegation and the Arcos. How can this be made to rhyme? Obviously the Conservatives have already become so confused as politicians that their right hand does not know what their left hand is doing. Nay, there is reason to believe that the object of the raid was that of bringing matters to a head for fear than an increase of our trade with Great Britain would strengthen the opposition not only of the working masses, but also of the British industrialists and merchants against the reactionary and pernicious policy of the Diehards.

Under such circumstances I believe that in the full consciousness of our strength (and I may remark that on the world market, too, we are constantly growing in strength), in the full consciousness, I say, of our dignity and strength, we shall take all steps to safeguard our interests fully and wholly, but we shall not allow ourselves to be caught in the snare of the British bourgeoisie, who intend to inveigle the Soviet Union in a massacre.

The very fact of a grant of credits is proof that the business circles of the European bourgeoisie cannot help recognizing our unmistakable progress. They are obliged to accept the cancellation of debts and to accord us credits. Austria is willing to lend us 50 million, besides which we have recently got into touch with a group of Austrian banks, headed by Rothschild, in regard to further credits to a like amount. The Norwegian Government has resolved to grant us credits. Denmark is likewise according us export credits. With British banks and bankers we have negotiated credits to a total of 150 million rubles. Our home and foreign trade is on the increase. And at sight of our progress, at sight of our consolidation, the Diehards are seized with yet greater anger, and they are resolved to frustrate our growth. I do not think that they will succeed.

There can be no doubt but that the raid on our trade representation and on the Arcos will harm those commercial operations which were envisaged between ourselves and Great Britain. At the moment our Trade Delegation in London and our economic authorities hold licenses to the value of 25 million rubles, intended for Great Britain. The metal industry and the chemical industry in particular afford licenses aggregating about 6,130,000 rubles, while the Gostorg (State Trade) holds licenses valued at two million. For the equipment of our textile industry, we have given our consent to an order of machinery representing a value of 11 million rubles. There is, moreover, an order, not as yet placed, for apparatus for petroleum boring and another for equipment of transportation. Besides this, there are orders for electrotechnical equipment and for electrical construction.

I have received a great number of inquiries on the part of our economic authorities, showing that under the abnormal conditions at present governing our trade representation in London they have no confidence in the fact that the great investment of capital for the purpose of erecting buildings and providing raw materials for those factories for which equipment was to have been ordered in Great Britain, will ever be fully exploited. The managers of the factories and workshops point out that if the equipment does not arrive in due time, which is not excluded if raids are made on our trade representation and the work is held up, they can undertake no responsibility for the unproductive expenditure of dozens of millions. They demand the transfer of the orders to other countries.

To this must be added that already on the third day after the raid we received tenders from certain textile and electrotechnical firms of the United States, initiating orders and

suggesting conditions which are hardly worse than those stipulated by Great Britain. At the same time our textile industry demands the transfer of wool purchases from Great Britain to other countries. Such suggestions, which refer to the purchase of a number of goods such as rubber, coffee, cocoa, and wool, have likewise been received from Dutch, Australian, and other firms. In this connection suitable terms of credit have reached us from a number of quarters interested in the transfer of our orders from Great Britain to the countries of production.

Our export organizations submit demands that they be permitted to transfer the sale of a series of goods, such as timer or furs, to other countries, in which connection American firms have also offered to grant us favorable credit terms as regards the furs at present reexported thither by Great Britain. Leading German firms (of Leipzig) also express their readiness to accord us credits for the preparation or collection of furs for export to Germany.

The raid on our Trade Delegation will thus cause enormous loss to a number of industrial and commercial firms, which are innocent of the short-sighted policy of the Conservatives. We ourselves who appreciate the consciousness of many British industrial and commercial firms and recognize the value of those normal trade relations which were established between us, are of opinion that such circles in Great Britain ought to call a Government to order which causes them such substantial losses and restricts their turnover from business with Russia. But our friendly attitude towards these correspondents of ours in Great Britain can only continue if the British Government actually is called to order for this unprecedented act of violence and for their violation of the very basis of international relations.

*International Press Correspondence*, VII, No. 33 (26 May 1927), 680-681.



#### THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT REEVALUATES SECRET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Berlin, 18 May 1927

*Soviet and German diplomats were uncomfortable regarding their secret military arrangements. The German Foreign Office constantly feared public revelations of the arrangements would endanger its foreign policy and publicize the issue of circumventing the Versailles peace treaty. Soviet diplomats were concerned about their public announcements that the Soviet government would never form secret treaty relations. This document, an official rendition of a special meeting of the German foreign minister, defense minister, and major participants in the Soviet-German military relationship, illustrates their fears and concerns. In addition the document, translated by Dr. Edmund Remys, demonstrates the desire of the German government to limit its gas-warfare experiments and establishment of a tank school in Kazan.*

Today talks were held in the Foreign Ministry on various matters relevant to Russia. The following persons participated in the discussion:

Foreign Minister Dr. Stresemann

Defense Minister Dr. Gessler

Chief of Army Command General Heye

Chief of the General Army Offices Colonel von Blomberg  
and on behalf of State Secretary von Schubert  
Undersecretary Dr. Koepke.

1) General Heye presented the enclosed protocol, which was drawn up by request of State Secretary von Schubert with the Army Command, and reported on its contents with explanatory remarks. There was total approval of the contents. Pertaining to the signature of the protocol, all participants agreed that the protocol should best be described and treated simply as a record of a conversation between the above-named gentlemen and that one really wanted to refrain from a formal signature. A copy of the protocol was made available to the Foreign Ministry during which it was agreed that both government offices would see to absolute secrecy of the document.

2) As far as the Russians are concerned, the request has been made that the Foreign Ministry give its express approval for the desired establishment of a tank school in Kazan'. The matter has already been the subject of discussions with Litvinov in Russia in which he proposed

a) at all costs to outwardly give the operation a legal form, for instance the form of a Limited Liability Company.

b) that the Foreign Minister send a communication about this matter to the local Russian Ambassador and that from our side no political objections would be raised against the intended establishment of the school.

Regardless of various misgivings about such a declaration, the Foreign Minister made a comment to the effect that he could after all consent to such a declaration. First of all, however, it would still have to be determined if it would not be better to make this declaration via Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and not through the Foreign Ministry in Berlin as far as the local Russian Ambassador Krestinsky is concerned. Therefore, the Foreign Minister wants to get in touch with the German Ambassador in Moscow who is staying here in Berlin at the moment.

3) Pertaining to the question of **disarmament**, Unschlicht expressed the wish to Lieth that the Russians would be informed in detail of all relevant questions from our side, since they intend to work with us together also in this area.

The Foreign Minister on the other hand merely expressed the willingness to convey this wish to the Foreign Ministry and pointed out that in the opinion of the Defense Minister this question was solely a political matter.

General Heye expressed his personal opinion that one could not reject it if the Russians should submit an appropriate request, that in any case, however, it would be better if we do not proceed on our own initiative with corresponding offers.

The Foreign Minister promised further notification after consideration of the matter through appropriate authorities in the Foreign Ministry.

4) **Gas protection.** It was intended on the part of the Defense Minister to carry out a rather large experiment dealing with practical gas protection near Orenburg. Therefore, the Russians have already been contacted; but they had asserted substantially far-reaching demands, namely, they not only demanded full participation in the exercise, but unrestricted disclosure and exchange of the entire pertinent material as well.

In the discussion the Defense Minister himself raised doubt about the project. He expressed apprehension that one would lend the Russians, who some day could be our possible opponents, a helping hand with valuable material without any considerable service in return [quid pro quo—ER]. He suggests to have preferably the experimental exercise at the military training area in Grafenwoerth and to ensure secrecy by restricting the number of participants and other measures. A possible disgruntlement on the part of the Russians about subsequent digression from our original offer should be precluded by asking the Ambassador, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, to inform the Russians that the exercise cannot be carried out in the form as originally considered above all for pecuniary reasons.

The Defense Minister promised to notify appropriately Count Brockdorff-Rantzau whom he will see today.

5) The Chief of Army Command asked the question if uniforms should be worn when Russian and German officers are exchanged during joint field exercises, or would it be better, as before, to refrain from doing so.

The Defense Minister came out in favor of wearing uniforms since other countries were handling this matter in a similar way.

The Foreign Minister agreed with this opinion and made the comment that a deviation from this exercise could appear to be particularly obvious. There was agreement about complying with possible contrary wishes of the Russians.

6) General Heye then asked if it would still be necessary to maintain the ban on leave to Russia. Due to the fact that various officers have already requested leave for the purpose of language studies, it would be desirable for the Foreign Minister if German officers could be granted leave at least to some Russian cities which could be listed by the embassy according to the number and names of the cities.

The Foreign Minister declared that he had no misgivings at all about a repeal of the ban on leave with the proviso suggested by the Chief of the General Army Offices and promised to issue an appropriate directive to Moscow.

cc: Minister Dr. Stresemann  
Colonel von Blomberg  
State Secretary von Schubert  
Department—Russia

German Documents, U.S. National Archives II, Serial 4564, Roll 231, T120, E163880.



OBOLENSKY-OSINSKY SPEECH ON THE RESULTS  
OF THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

Geneva, 23 May 1927

*Throughout the World Economic Conference rumors, some true, spread that the Soviet delegation was negotiating commercial agreements and credits with representatives of various countries. The Soviet delegation engaged in courteous but firm discussions with other delegations during Conference sessions. Obolensky-Osinsky sounded a positive note about the results of the Conference, particularly about the coexistence of capitalism and socialism. He abstained from approving the final resolution of the Conference, although he expressed support for some of its principles. He offered clear enunciation of Soviet policy toward the League of Nations—participate but remain critical of the League. Obolensky-Osinsky emphasized the current Soviet view about the stabilization of the capitalist order.*

[CONCLUDING SPEECH BY OBOLENSKY-OSINSKY]

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—The work of the World Economic Conference is nearing its conclusion, and the present moment appears to me to offer a suitable opportunity to draw certain conclusions from the point of view of the Soviet delegation.

Members of the Conference, Press representatives, the public, and all who have been following the proceedings of the Conference have been asking one another the same question during these last few days: Has the Conference been a success, or have its activities resulted in failure?

I shall endeavor first to reply to this question.

In the view of the Soviet delegation, the Conference might have proved a great success, and a very real success, if the decisions passed and the practical measures derived therefrom—to quote my first speech—had been such as to “remedy the worst of these contradictions, to improve the situation of the workers and to facilitate the transition to a new era in world economy.”

Such a success would have involved the acceptance of the Soviet delegation’s proposals, which were set forth in the eleven points mentioned at the end of the speech I have just quoted. As you know, these proposals were not accepted, and most of the questions with which they deal were not even examined by the Conference.

The representatives of the capitalist States present here had assigned another task to this Conference, and tried to find other means of promoting what they called “the alleviation of world economic difficulties.”

These means they sought to find by making minor changes in the economic and social policy of the capitalist States. They were thus helping to consolidate and stabilize the capitalist system, wherever it exists. Are such achievements of any value? Does this Conference, in the opinion and judgment of those assembled here, represent—for the moment, of course, only psychologically—any real progress in the stabilization of the capitalist economic system? For such stabilization is a fact, as we have repeatedly noted. Its existence is not assured forever, or even perhaps for very long, but at present it is a fact.

If this Conference really marks a further step in this direction, it must be confessed that it is only a very timid one, considering the acute differences of opinion and the divergence of interests and the enormous difficulties presented by the arrangement and the abstract form of the decisions taken, which are themselves due to those differences and divergence.

One very far-reaching question was submitted to this Conference. I refer to the question of establishing measures for the peaceful coexistence of two economic systems—the socialist system in the Soviet Union and the capitalist system in other countries.

The Soviet delegation suggested this practical formula, a formula which is inevitable in view of the *de facto* coexistence of the two systems and the structural links which exist in the world economic system. In proposing this formula we did not renounce a single one of the principles upon which our socialist system is based. We spoke advisedly of the coexistence of two different, two opposed economic systems.

Does this Conference mark a step forward towards the practical realization of our proposal? It does. That is an actual fact, and it is one of the successes achieved by the Conference. This fact, like many others, is not yet fully established, but in the relevant resolution the principle has been enunciated sufficiently clearly.

As regards this point I should like to refer to a statement by M. Jouhaux to the French Press. M. Jouhaux thinks we are inconsistent in condemning his very enthusiastic attempt to arrive at a compromise with the capitalist class while at the same time ourselves concluding compromises with the capitalist States.

Surely M. Jouhaux must see the fundamental difference. To begin with, what he calls our “compromises” do not mean a renunciation of the principles of the socialist system existing in the Soviet Union. Our compromise consists in a desire to promote exchanges of commodities between two entirely different economic systems. Such exchanges would in no way prejudice the interests of the working classes or compromise the principles upon which the socialist system in the Soviet Union is based.

M. Jouhaux’ compromises are quite different in character. They simply amount to economic and political concessions to the capitalist class in the name of the workers.



Again, does M. Jouhaux not realize that, when the political and economic power of the whole State is in the hands of the workers, the relations between that State and capitalist States are not the same as relations between the different classes in any single State? Collisions between States mean war. Hence those who are opposed to war must seek for some scheme of peaceful coexistence. We deem it our duty to endeavor to find some such solution in our relations with States whose economic system is different from our own.

The position of the workers within a capitalist State is obviously quite different.

To return to questions which directly concern the Conference. I beg to inform you that the Soviet delegation will abstain when a vote is taken on the resolutions of the Conference as a whole. This we shall do because, although opposed to many of the principles, statements and concrete decisions formulated in this report, we find in it and in the resolutions as a whole various concrete decisions which we think right. There is, for instance, the formula—to us a vital formula—concerning economic cooperation between all countries irrespective of differences in their economic systems.

We do not wish to raise any formal obstacle which would prevent the realization of those of the decisions which we approve. Therefore we shall abstain from voting on the report as a whole.

As regards the separate parts of the report, we expressed our opinion when voting on the individual motions.

I should mention that we have not been able to approve the proposals entrusting the execution of certain measures to different organs of the League of Nations. We are not members of the League, and we have no intention of applying for admission. We cannot regard the League as an instrument of peace, for in our opinion, it constitutes, in its present form, an instrument which serves the interests of the ruling Powers of the world and is often employed as a cloak to cover acts of violence committed at the expense of weaker States.

We propose, therefore, in conjunction with these States, to seek other means whereby the measures we take to carry out the resolutions that we approve may be coordinated with the measures taken by other States. We shall do our utmost to carry out these resolutions by rapid and energetic means, and we earnestly hope that the other States and nations will adopt, without delay and to the fullest possible extent, such parts of the Conference's work as may lead to positive results.

League of Nations, *World Economic Conference*, Geneva, 1927, I, 165-166.



## GREAT BRITAIN SEVERS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH USSR

26 May 1927

*The tensions between Great Britain and the Soviet Union culminated on 26 May 1927 when the former terminated diplomatic relations with the latter. The foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain, declared that documents seized in the Arcos Raid showed that Arcos and the trade delegation were carrying out military espionage and subversive activities throughout the British Empire. He pointed out that he forewarned the Soviet government on 23 February 1927 to cease such activities. Litvinov responded to Chamberlain's note by professing innocence on behalf of the Soviet government, and claiming the Conservative government was trying to cover up the defeat of its policies in China and distract public attention from the*

*"failure of its senseless raid" on Arcos and the Soviet Trade Delegation. The rupture of relations apparently led to tensions between the Soviet Union and France and Germany, which were concerned about Comintern activities within their countries.*

NOTE FROM SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN TO M. ROZENGLITS  
*Foreign Office, 26 May, 1927*

SIR,

THE recent examination by the police of the premises of "Arcos" Limited and of the Russian Trade Delegation has conclusively proved that both military espionage and subversive activities throughout the British Empire were directed and carried out from 49, Moorgate. No ostensible differentiation of rooms or duties was observed as between the members of the Trade Delegation and the employees of "Arcos", and it has been shown both these organization have been involved in anti-British espionage and propaganda.

2. But the matter does not end there. Your Government and you will recognize the messages which were read by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons last Tuesday. I would remind you that your own telegram, in which you request material to enable you to support a political campaign in this country against His Majesty's Government, was despatched within a few weeks of the warning conveyed to your Government, in my note to you of 23 February last, adducing specific instances of anti-British propaganda and requesting its cessation.

3. His Majesty's Government had hoped that the Soviet Government would take the opportunity, given them in accordance with the provisions of article 13 of the Trade Agreement, of "furnishing an explanation or remedying the default." They did neither; on the contrary, the hostility of the Soviet Government, together with the subversive propaganda, carried on by their associates, the Russian Communist party and the Third International, in the United Kingdom itself and in British overseas territories, has continued unchecked, to culminate in the abuse of diplomatic privilege revealed by your attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of this country.

4. There are, as I warned you in my note of 23 February last, limits to the patience of His Majesty's Government and of public opinion here, and these limits have now been reached. In view of the facts stated above, His Majesty's Government in Great Britain must now regard themselves, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 13 of the Trade Agreement of 16 March 1921, as free from the obligations of that agreement. The privileges conferred on M. Khinchuk and his assistants in accordance with the agreement are accordingly terminated, and I have to request their departure from this country.

5. His Majesty's Government, while compelled to take this step for the reasons stated above, do not wish to interfere with the ordinary course of legitimate Anglo-Russian trade, and will therefore place no obstacles in the way of genuine commerce between the two countries. They will raise no objection to the continuance of the legitimate commercial operations of "Arcos" Limited in the same conditions as those applicable to other trading organizations in this country, and with this object they are prepared to allow a reasonable number of Russian employees of the company, whose names will be communicated to you, to remain in this country, provided that they comply with the law of the land and confine their activities to legitimate commerce. But His Majesty's Government cannot suffer the existence here of a privileged organization which, under the guise of peaceful trading, carries on espionage and intrigues against the country in which it is established.

6. Finally, His Majesty's Government have decided that they can no longer maintain diplomatic relations with a Government which permits and encourages such a state of things as has been disclosed. The existing relations between the two Governments are hereby suspended, and I have to request that you will withdraw yourself and your staff from this country within the course of the next ten days. I am instructing His Majesty's

representative at Moscow to leave Russia with his staff, and should be glad if you would request your Government to afford him, to Mr. Preston at Leningrad and to Mr. Paton at Vladivostok, the necessary facilities for the departure of themselves and their assistants.

7. Suitable arrangements, the details of which will be communicated to you in due course, will be made for the departure from this country of yourself and your staff and of the Russian members of the Trade Delegation.

*British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part II, Series A. Vol. 8, 58.*



## SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE RUPTURE OF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

M. LITVINOV'S NOTE TO BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

Moscow, 28 May 1927

Sir,

I have the honor to request you to convey the following to your Government.

The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with the contents of the note handed yesterday to citizen Rozengolts in which the announcement is made of the denunciation by the British Government of the Trade Agreement of 1921, and of the severance of diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Great Britain.

This decision was no surprise to the Soviet Government. It has already for long been aware that a rupture of relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was being prepared by the whole policy of the present British Conservative Government, which has declined all the proposals of the Soviet Government for the settlement of mutual relations by means of negotiations.

The Soviet Government once again decisively rejects all accusations that it infringed at any time whatever the Trade Agreement of 1921 as quite without proof and entirely groundless. The sole source of these accusations, as has been repeatedly and absolutely incontestably established, is dishonest information drawn from most suspicious White *émigré* sources and forged documents with which the British Government has willingly operated throughout the whole course of the existence of relations between it and the Soviet Government. The lack of results of the search of the Trade Delegation, which was carried out with the utmost thoroughness over several days, is the most convincing proof of the loyalty and correctitude of the official agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet Government passes over with contempt the insinuations of British Ministers regarding espionage by the Trade Delegation and considers it beneath its dignity to reply to them.

The Soviet Government places on record that the British Government had no legitimate grounds either for the first infringement of the Trade Agreement of 1921 in the form of a police raid on the extraterritorial premises of the Soviet official agent or for the second infringement, consisting in denouncing this agreement without the six months' notice provided for therein.

For the whole world it is quite clear that the basic cause of the rupture is the defeat of the policy of the Conservative Government in China and an attempt to cover this defeat by a diversion in the direction of the Soviet Union, while the immediate grounds are the desire of the British Government to distract public attention from the failure of the senseless police raid on "Arcos" and the Trade Delegation and to extract the British Minister of Home Affairs from the dreadful fix into which he has fallen, thanks to that raid.

The Peoples of the Soviet Union and their Government cherish no enmity towards the peoples of the British Empire and wished to maintain with them normal and friendly relations. The peoples of the British Empire undoubtedly desire the same. But the present British Government did not, and does not, want these normal relations and has tried from the very first day of its existence to keep relations with the Soviet Union in a state of constant stress and to exacerbate them still further. The British Government preferred to a system of normal relations a system of violence and enmity. It has decided on the rupture of diplomatic relations, for which it must take the whole responsibility upon itself, taking into full account the shock which this rupture will inevitably cause to existing political and economic international relations. It could not fail to appreciate that the rupture will increase the economic chaos from which Europe has not yet emerged after the world war, and that it will deal a heavy blow to the cause of peace. It decided, however, on this act, sacrificing the interests of the broad masses of the British Empire and even of British industry.

The Soviet Government takes cognizance of this act in the full conviction that it will be condemned not only by the toilers but also by all the progressive elements of the whole world. At the same time it expresses its assurance that the time is near when the British people will find the possibility of realizing without hindrance its striving for peace and for the establishment of normal friendly relations with the peoples of the Soviet Union.

*A Selection of Papers Dealing with the Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, 1917-1927, Cmd 2895, 71-72.*



#### LITVINOV, SOVIET ENVOY TO POLAND ASSASSINATED

7 June 1927

*On the heels of the failure of Soviet policy in China, the Arcos Raid, and the rupture of diplomatic relations with Great Britain, came the assassination of the Soviet envoy in Poland by a Russian emigré. Litvinov blamed Great Britain for unleashing terrorist activities against the Soviet Union and accused the Polish government of ignoring warnings about these activities.*

M. LITVINOV

#### PROTEST TO THE POLISH MINISTER IN MOSCOW

Mr. Minister,

The Soviet Government just received a short telegram about the murder by a Russian monarchist of P. L. Voikov, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Poland.

The Soviet Government places this unprecedented act in connection with a whole series of acts directed at destroying the diplomatic representation of the USSR abroad and creating a direct threat to peace. The raids on the Peking Embassy of the USSR, the siege of the consulate in Shanghai, the police attack on the Trade Delegation in London, the provocative rupture of diplomatic relations on the side of England—the entire series of acts has unleashed the activity of terrorist groups of counterrevolutionaries, in their impotent and blind hatred of the working class seizing on the weapon of political assassinations.

The Soviet Government sees the assassination of its Ambassador also the result of the Polish Government's not taking the necessary measures against the activities on Polish territory of Russian counterrevolutionary terrorist groups, which are especially dangerous to the cause of peace in the present tense international situation.

The Soviet Government some time ago brought to the attention of the Polish Government of the activity of White-Guard terrorists and repeatedly warned the Polish Government about the possibility of provocative crimes from these elements. Making therefore an emphatic and indignant protest and believing that the Polish Government cannot repudiate the responsibility for what has happened, the Soviet Government reserves the right to revert to the question after receiving more detailed and exhaustive information about the crime committed in Warsaw.

Requesting you, Sir, to bring the above to the cognizance of your Government. I beg you, Mr. Minister, to accept the assurance, etc.

*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki, 1927, 289.*



### THE GPU UNCOVERS BRITISH ESPIONAGE AND CONSPIRACY WITH RUSSIAN EMIGRÉS

9 June 1927

*The Soviet government made public that the United State Political Administration (OGPU) uncovered a series of British and Polish-sponsored acts against Soviet officials and institutions at home and abroad. One such disclosure was the arrest and confession of the professed British spy Sidney George Riley. The OGPU uncovered and foiled arson, bombing, and assassination attempts.*

TO THE WHOLE WORKING POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION!

TO THE TOILERS OF THE WHOLE WORLD!

#### COMMUNIQUE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The accredited representative of the Soviet Union to Poland, Voikov, has been murdered in Warsaw. This shocking act, which has roused the whole world, underlines strongly the criminal policy of the reactionary forces who, in the present international situation, are striving to destroy the peace of Europe. The assassination of Voikov is one of the links in a chain of events which as a whole seriously threaten the peace of the world. Despite all the very great efforts of the Soviet Union to maintain peace, the danger is growing ever greater.

In connection with the perfidious assassination of Voikov, which has followed a series of direct and indirect attacks upon Soviet institutions by the British Government and the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union by the former, the Soviet Government considers it necessary at the present moment to make known a number of other facts concerning the work of the British Government and its subordinate organizations upon the territory of the Soviet Union.

In the Summer of 1925 an alleged "merchant" carrying a Soviet passport made out in the name of Steinberg was wounded and arrested by the Soviet frontier guards whilst attempting to cross the Finnish-Soviet frontier. At his examination the arrested man declared that his name was not Steinberg, but Sidney George Riley and that he was a prominent member of the British Secret Service and a Captain in the Royal Air Force. He further admitted that he was one of the chief organizers of the conspiracy of [Bruce—AGC] Lockhart who, on 3 December 1918, was declared by a revolutionary tribunal to be outside the law. Riley

declared further that he had come to the Soviet Union with the definite intention of organizing terrorist attempts, arson, insurrections etc. He declared further that he had personally interviewed the present Chancellor of the Exchequer of the British Government, Winston Churchill, and that the latter had personally given him instructions for the organization of terrorist attempts and other divers acts in the Soviet Union. The written statements of Sidney George Riley corroborating the above statements are in the possession of the Soviet Government. The material confiscated during the course of further arrests completely corroborated the statements of Riley.

At the end of 1926 the GPU successfully frustrated an attempt on the life of Petrovsky, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union and of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, as also an attempt on the life of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine, Chubar.

At about the same time an attempt was carried out on the life of the Chairman of the Leningrad district of the GPU, Messing. The instrument of this attack proved to be the one of a former Colonel of the Petliura forces, named Truba, who was at one time Commandant of Khar'kov, and who is now living in Warsaw. The young man had been a member of the Young Communist League for some time in order to utilize it as a cover for the counterrevolutionary white terror. He belonged to the same group as the authors of the attempts on Petrovsky and Chubar.

At the same time a one-time volunteer in the army of Denikin, named Biliukov was arrested. Biliukov was also a member of the YCL and tried to join the Communist Party. Biliukov had prepared an attempt on the lives of the representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

An attempt on the life of Bukharin was planned for 12 March 1927 to take place during Bukharin's speech upon the Anniversary of the February Revolution. Only a fortunate accident prevented the carrying out of the plan. The terrorist responsible, one Gurevich, the son of a merchant, then prepared a combined attempt upon Rykov and Stalin. The GPU was successful in effecting his arrest in good time.

On 10 May of this year, a group of former officers of the Kolchak army and inmates of the Institution of Orphans of Deceased Noblemen in Leningrad were arrested in the last named town. According to the admissions of the members of this group, the group was in constant and direct touch with Mr. White, the head of the Consular Department of the British Mission in Moscow. Under the instructions of the British Mission this group was preparing to blow up the Kremlin and to blow up the Bolshoi Theater during a meeting.

On the night of 3 June of this year, the GPU was successful in preventing the blowing up of a house in the neighborhood of the headquarters of the GPU in Moscow. A melinite bomb weighing four Kilograms (one Kilogram equals 2.2 lbs. avdp.) was found. The melinite was of French origin and the bomb case of British make. There is therefore no doubt that the component parts of the bomb were imported from abroad. Other objects left behind by the terrorists also give evidence to the same effect.

On 7 June of this year, the accredited representative of the Soviet Union to the Polish Republic was murdered by a Polish national in Warsaw. British newspapers have already published an insolent interview with the ex-Tsarist diplomat Sablin who is in touch with British Ministers and who justifies the murder. The British hand which guided the pistol of the Polish assassin can be clearly seen here.

On 7 June a railway catastrophe was organized between the stations Zhdanovichi and Minsk which resulted in the death of the authorized representative of the GPU for the White Russian military district, Opansky, who was accompanying an arrested Polish spy, an officer. Apart from Opansky, a chauffeur was killed and two other persons wounded.

Also on 7 June at 9:20 p.m. two bombs, one of which failed to explode, were hurled into a meeting in the Communist Party Club in Leningrad wounding thirty people, some

of them seriously. Objects left behind by the terrorists in their flight also prove clearly their foreign origin.

At the same time incendiary fires in factories, works, military magazines etc., were discovered in various districts.

At the end of May 1927 a powder magazine was discovered in flames in Leningrad. The person responsible for the incendiarism proved to be the commander of the magazine, Ussid, an Estonian working for Estonian agents in the service of the British Government.

At an earlier date, an incendiary fire was discovered in a factory in Dubrovka near Leningrad. The incendiary proved to be a Finn working for Finnish agents in the service of the British Government.

From all this it is completely clear that the British Government which is feverishly preparing for war against the Soviet Union, is using all the means in its power to interfere with the peaceful constructive work of the workers and peasants of our State.

Characteristic is the fact that all these adventurous attempts have no social basis whatever in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is experiencing a rapid economic growth, and the well-being of the masses is on the upward grade. The alliance of the workers and peasants is stronger today than ever it was, and the State power of the proletarian dictatorship is growing. The wretched and criminal attempts of a reactionary clique to hinder the development of the Soviet Union are in crying contradiction to the tremendous organizational growth of the great proletarian Union. The Government is defending its position of peaceful constructive work.

Whilst continuing this constructive work with all energy, the Soviet Government considers it to be its duty to inform the toilers of the world and above all the international working class of the criminality of the British Cabinet and its agents.

The Government appeals to the whole working population of the Soviet Union to oppose the furious attempts of the enemies of the working class and peasantry, with increased activity and still greater solidarity on the part of the workers and peasants.

The British Cabinet and its subordinates have been depressed by the results of our constructive work. Every new factory, every new power station, every new step forward in agriculture causes a wave of unbridled hatred in the ranks of the British capitalists who strive to turn our country into a dependent of the imperialist States and our workers into objects of foreign exploitation and our peasantry into yoked and landless slaves of imperialism who can be shot down at will, just as Chinese and Egyptian peasants are shot down now.

The Government appeals to the working class of the Soviet Union to defend the factories, the works, the stations and all the achievements wrested from the landowners and capitalists by the October Revolution.

The Government expects from the GPU that it will take decisive measures to defend the country from foreign spies, incendiaries and murders and from their allies, the monarchist and white guardist criminals.

The Soviet Government sinks the red banner of the Soviet Union over the body of Voikov and of the other true proletarian fighters who have fallen victims to the mercenary assassins and provocateurs of a new world war.

The Government of the Soviet Union declares, that, supported upon the broad masses of the toilers and upon their boundless heroism, it will clear the country of its enemies and continue the work of building up socialism and defend it against all attacks.

*International Press Correspondence*, VII, No. 35 (16 June 1927), 725-726.



STALIN ON THE WAR SCARE OF 1927, CHINA QUESTION  
AND THE ZINOVIEV-TROTSKYIST OPPOSITION

28 July 1927

*The Zinoviev-Trotskyist Opposition remained relatively quiet in public criticism of the Communist Party leadership until the China fiasco unfolded, then increased its volume upon the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations and the assassination of Voikov in Warsaw. Communist Party Politburo and Central Committee sessions became stormy affairs, resulting in the decision not to publish stenographic records or articles submitted to them by the Opposition. The Opposition then went public, speaking to mass meetings and official gatherings. On 26 May 1927, eighty-three leading members of the Opposition, including Trotsky and Zinoviev, submitted a declaration to the Politburo accusing Stalin, Bukharin, and the Communist Party leadership of withholding information from the public, working to remove members of the Opposition from the Central Committee, and supporting and favoring anti-Marxist and nonproletarian elements and policies. Throughout the summer of 1927 capitalist plots and foreign economic and military threats were fabricated by the Communist Party leadership and supporters. Stalin publicly pronounced this threat of war, the so-called "war scare" of 1927, in the document below. He accused the Opposition of playing into the hands of foreign and internal enemies by attacking the Communist Party during this period of the real threat of war. He attacked the Opposition for its criticism of the China policy. Although he admitted the policy had sustained a temporary defeat, he argued that the Comintern's policy of joining and collaborating with the Kuomintang had borne fruit and paved the way for the inevitable victory of the proletarian dictatorship in China.*

J. STALIN

NOTES ON CONTEMPORARY THEMES

I

THE THREAT OF WAR

It can scarcely be doubted that the main issue of the present day is that of the threat of a new imperialist war. It is not a matter of some vague and immaterial "danger" of a new war, but of the real and actual *threat* of a new war in general, and of a war against the USSR, in particular.

The redivision of the world and of spheres of influence that took place as a result of the last imperialist war has already managed to become "obsolete". Certain new countries (America, Japan) have come to the fore. Certain old countries (Britain) are receding into the background. Capitalist Germany, all but buried at Versailles, is reviving and growing and becoming steadily stronger. Bourgeois Italy, with an envious eye on France, is creeping upwards.

A frantic struggle is in progress for markets, for fields of capital export, for the sea and land routes to those markets, for a new redivision of the world. The contradictions between America and Britain, between Japan and America, between Britain and France, between Italy and France, are growing.

The contradictions within the capitalist countries are growing, every now and again breaking out in the form of open revolutionary actions of the proletariat (Britain, Austria).

The contradictions between the imperialist world and the dependent countries are growing, now and again breaking out in the form of open conflicts and revolutionary explosions (China, Indonesia, North Africa, South America).

But the growth of all these contradictions signifies a growth of the crisis of world capitalism, despite the fact of stabilization, a crisis incomparably deeper than the one before



the last imperialist war. The existence and progress of the USSR, the land of the proletarian dictatorship, only deepens and aggravates this crisis.

No wonder that imperialism is preparing for a new war, in which it sees the only way out of the crisis. The unparalleled growth of armaments, the general tendency of the bourgeois governments towards fascist methods of "administration", the crusade against the Communists, the frenzied campaign of slander against the USSR, the outright intervention in China—all these are different aspects of one and the same phenomenon: the preparation for a new war for a new redivision of the world.

The imperialists would long ago have come to blows among themselves, were it not for the Communist Parties, which are waging a determined struggle against imperialist war, were it not for the USSR, whose peaceful policy is a heavy fetter on the instigators of a new war, and were it not for their fear of weakening one another and thus facilitating a new breach of the imperialist front.

I think that this last circumstance—that is, the imperialists' fear of weakening one another and thus facilitating a new breach of the imperialist front—is one of the chief factors which have so far restrained the urge for a mutual slaughter.

Hence the "natural" endeavor of certain imperialist circles to relegate the contradictions in their own camp to the background, to gloss them over temporarily, to create a united front of the imperialists and to make war on the USSR, in order to solve the deepening crisis of capitalism even if only partially, even if only temporarily, at the expense of the USSR.

The fact that the initiative in this matter of creating a united front of the imperialists against the USSR has been assumed by the British bourgeoisie and its general staff, the Conservative Party, should not come as a surprise to us. British capitalism has always been, is and will be the most malignant stranger of peoples' revolutions. Beginning with the great bourgeois revolution in France at the close of the eighteenth century and down to the revolution now taking place in China, the British bourgeoisie have always been in the front ranks of the suppressors of the movement for the emancipation of mankind. The Soviet people will never forget the violence, robbery and armed invasion to which our country was subjected some years ago thanks to the British capitalists. What, then, is there surprising in the fact that British capitalism and its Conservative Party are again undertaking to lead a war against the center of the world proletarian revolution, the USSR?

But the British bourgeoisie are not fond of doing their own fighting. They have always preferred to make war through the hands of others. And they have indeed succeeded at times in finding fools willing to serve as cat's-paws for them.

Such was the case at the time of the great bourgeois revolution in France, when the British bourgeoisie succeeded in forming an alliance of European states against revolutionary France.

Such was the case after the October Revolution in the USSR, when the British bourgeoisie, having attacked the USSR, tried to form an "alliance of fourteen states," and when, in spite of this, they were hurled out of the USSR.

Such is the case now in China, where the British bourgeoisie are trying to form a united front against the Chinese Revolution.

It is quite comprehensible that, in preparing for war against the USSR, the Conservative Party has for several years now been carrying out preparatory work for the formation of a "holy alliance" of large and small states against the USSR.

Whereas earlier, until recently, the Conservatives carried out this preparatory work more or less covertly, now, however, they have passed to "direct action", striking open blows at the USSR and trying to build their notorious "holy alliance" in sight of all.

The British Conservative government struck its first open blow in Peking, by the raid on the Soviet Embassy. This raid had at least two aims. It was intended to discover "terrible" documentary evidence of "subversive" activity on the part of the USSR which could

create an atmosphere of general indignation and provide the basis for a united front against the USSR. It was intended also to provoke an armed conflict with the Peking Government and embroil the USSR into a war with China.

The blow, as we know, failed.

The second open blow was struck in London, by the raid on ARCOS and the severance of relations with the USSR. Its aim was to create a united front against the USSR, to inaugurate a diplomatic blockade of the USSR throughout Europe and to provoke a series of ruptures of treaty relations with the Soviet Union.

This blow, as we know, also failed.

The third open blow was struck in Warsaw, by the instigation of the assassination of Voikov. Voikov's assassination, organized by agents of the Conservative Party, was intended by its authors to play a role similar to that of the Sarajevo assassination by embroiling the USSR in an armed conflict with Poland.

This blow also seems to have failed.

How is it to be explained that these blows have so far not produced the results which the Conservatives expected from them?

By the conflicting interests of the various bourgeois states, many of whom are interested in maintaining economic relations with the USSR.

By the peaceful policy of the USSR, which the Soviet Government pursues firmly and unwaveringly.

By the reluctance of the states dependent on Britain—whether it be the state of Chang Tso-lin or the state of Pilsudski—to serve as dumb tools of the Conservatives to the detriment of their own interests.

The noble lords apparently refuse to understand that every state, even the smallest, is inclined to regard itself as an entity, tries to live its own independent life, and is unwilling to hazard its existence for the sake of the bright eyes of the Conservatives. The British Conservatives have omitted to take all these circumstances into account.

Does this mean that there will be no more blows of this kind? No, it does not. On the contrary, it only means that the blows will be renewed with fresh strength.

These blows must not be regarded as a matter of chance. They are naturally prompted by the entire international situation, by the position of the British bourgeoisie both in the "metropolitan country" and in the colonies, by the Conservative Party's position as the ruling party.

The entire international situation today, all the facts regarding the "operations" of the British Government against the USSR—the fact that it is organizing a financial blockade of the USSR, the fact that it is secretly conferring with the powers on a policy hostile to the USSR, the fact that it is subsidizing the emigre "governments" of the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc., with a view to instigating revolts in these countries of the USSR, the fact that it is financing bands of spies and terrorists, who blow up bridges, set fire to factories and commit acts of terrorism against USSR ambassadors—all this unmistakably goes to show that the British Conservative Government has firmly and determinedly adopted the course of organizing war against the USSR. And it must be considered by no means out of the question that, under certain circumstances, the Conservatives may succeed in getting together some military bloc or other against the USSR.

What are our tasks?

It is our task to sound the alarm in all the countries of Europe over the threat of a new war, to rouse the vigilance of the workers and soldiers of the capitalist countries, and to work, to work indefatigably, to prepare the masses to counter with the full strength of revolutionary struggle every attempt of the bourgeois governments to organize a new war.

It is our task to pillory all those leaders of the labor movement who "consider" the threat of a new war to be a "figment of the imagination", who lull the workers with pacifist lies, who close their eyes to the fact that the bourgeoisie is preparing for a new war—for these people want the war to catch the workers by surprise.

The task is for the Soviet Government firmly and unwaveringly to continue its policy of peace, the policy of peaceful relations, notwithstanding the provocative acts of our enemies, notwithstanding pin-pricks to our prestige.

Provocative elements in the enemy camp taunt us, and will continue to taunt us, with the assertion that our peaceful policy is due to our weakness, to the weakness of our army. Some of our comrades are at times enraged by this, are inclined to succumb to the provocation and to urge the adoption of "vigorous" measures. That is a sign of weak nerves, of lack of stamina. We cannot, and must not, dance to the tune of our enemies. We must go our own way, upholding the cause of peace, demonstrating our desire for peace, exposing the predatory designs of our enemies and showing them up as instigators of war.

For only such a policy can enable us to weld the masses of the working people of the USSR into a single fighting camp if, or rather when, the enemy forces war upon us.

As regards our "weakness" or the "weakness" of our army, this is not the first time that our enemies have made such a mistake. Some eight years ago, too, when the British bourgeoisie resorted to intervention against the USSR and Churchill threatened a campaign of "fourteen states", the bourgeois press shouted about the "weakness" of our army. But all the world knows that both the British interventionists and their allies were ignominiously thrown out of our country by our victorious army.

Messieurs the instigators of a new war would do well to remember this.

The task is to increase the defensive capacity of our country, to expand our national economy, to improve our industry—both war and non-war—to enhance the vigilance of the workers, peasants and Red Army men of our country, steeling them in the determination to defend the socialist motherland and putting an end to the slackness which, unfortunately, is as yet far from having been eliminated.

The task is to strengthen our rear and cleanse it of dross, not hesitating to mete out punishment to "illustrious" terrorists and incendiaries who set fire to our mills and factories, because it is impossible to defend our country in the absence of a strong revolutionary rear.

Recently a protest was received from the well-known leaders of the British Labor movement, Lansbury, Maxton and Brockway, against the shooting of the twenty Russian princes and nobles who were guilty of terrorism and arson. I cannot regard those leaders of the British labor movement as enemies of the USSR. But they are worse than enemies.

They are worse than enemies because, although they call themselves friends of the USSR, by their protest they nevertheless make it easier for Russian landlords and British secret agents to go on organizing the assassination of representatives of the USSR.

They are worse than enemies because they by their protest they tend to bring about a state of affairs in which the workers of the USSR are left unarmed in face of their sworn enemies.

They are worse than enemies because they refuse to realize that the shooting of the twenty "illustrious" ones was a necessary measure of self-defense on the part of the revolution.

It is rightly said: "God save us from such friends; our enemies we can cope with ourselves."

As to the shooting of the twenty "illustrious" ones, let the enemies of the USSR, both internal and external enemies, know that the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR is alive and that its hand is firm.

What, after all this, should be said of our luckless opposition in connections with its latest attacks on our Party in face of the threat of a new war? What should be said of the fact that it, this opposition, has found the war threat an appropriate occasion to intensify its attacks on the Party? What is there credible in the fact that, instead of rallying around the Party in face of the threat, from without, it considers it appropriate to make use of the

USSR's difficulties for new attacks on the Party? Can it be that the opposition is against the victory of the USSR in the coming battles with imperialism, against increasing the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union, against strengthening our rear? Or, perhaps, it is cowardice in the face of the new difficulties, desertion, a desire to evade responsibility, masked by a blast of Leftist phrases?...

## II

### CHINA

Now that the revolution in China has entered a new phase of development, we can to some extent sum up the path already travelled and proceed to verify the line of the Comintern in China.

There are certain tactical principles of Leninism, without due regard for which there can be neither correct leadership of the revolution, nor verification of the Comintern's line in China. These principles have been forgotten by our oppositionists long ago. But just because the opposition suffers from forgetfulness, it has to be reminded of them again and again.

I have in mind such tactical principles of Leninism as:

a) the principle that the nationally peculiar and nationally specific features in each separate country must unfailingly be taken into account by the Comintern when drawing up guiding directives for the working-class movement of the country concerned;

b) the principle that the Communist Party of each country must unfailingly avail itself of even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally for the proletariat, even if a temporary, vacillating, unstable and unreliable ally;

c) the principle that unflinching regard must be paid to the truth that propaganda and agitation alone are not enough for the political education of the vast masses, that what is required for that is the political experience of the masses themselves.

I think that due regard for these tactical principles of Leninism is an essential condition, without which a Marxist verification of the Comintern's line in the Chinese Revolution is impossible.

Let us examine the questions of the Chinese Revolution in the light of these tactical principles.

Notwithstanding, the ideological progress of our Party, there are still, unfortunately, "leaders" of a sort in it who sincerely believe that the revolution in China can be directed, so to speak, by telegraph, on the basis of the universally recognized general principles of the Comintern, *disregarding* the national peculiarities of China's economy, political system, culture, manners and customs, and traditions. What, in fact, distinguishes these "leaders" from real leaders is that they always have in their pockets two or three ready-made formulas, "suitable" for all countries and "obligatory" under all conditions. The necessity of taking into account the nationally peculiar and nationally specific features of each country does not exist for them. Nor does the necessity exist for them of coordinating the general principles of the Comintern with the national peculiarities of the revolutionary movement in each country, the necessity of adapting these general principles to the national peculiarities of the state in each country.

They do not understand that the chief task of leadership, now that the Communist Parties have grown and become mass parties, is to discover, to grasp, the nationally peculiar features of the movement in each country and skillfully coordinate them with the Comintern's general principles, in order to facilitate and make feasible the basic aims of the Communist movement.

Hence the attempts to stereotype the leadership for all countries. Hence the attempts mechanically to implant certain general formulas, regardless of the concrete conditions of the movement in different countries. Hence the endless conflicts between the formulas and

the revolutionary movement in the different countries, as the main outcome of the leadership of these pseudoleaders.

It is precisely to this category of pseudoleaders that our oppositionists belong.

The opposition has heard that a bourgeois revolution is taking place in *China*. It knows, furthermore, that the bourgeois revolution in *Russia* took place in opposition to the bourgeoisie. Hence the ready-made formula for *China*: down with all joint action with the bourgeoisie, long live the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang (April 1926).

But the opposition has forgotten that, unlike the Russia of 1905, China is a semicolonial country oppressed by imperialism; that, in consequence of this, the revolution in China is not simply a bourgeois revolution, but a bourgeois revolution of an antiimperialist type; that, in China, imperialism controls the principal threats of industry, trade and transport; that imperialist oppression affects not only the Chinese laboring masses, but also certain sections of the Chinese bourgeoisie; and that, in consequence, the Chinese bourgeoisie may, under certain conditions and for a certain period, support the Chinese Revolution.

And that, as we know, is in fact what occurred. If we take the Canton period of the Chinese Revolution, the period when the national armies had reached the Yangtze, the period prior to the split in the Kuomintang, it has to be admitted that the Chinese bourgeoisie supported the revolution in China, that the Comintern's line that joint action with these bourgeoisie is permissible for a certain period and under certain conditions proved to be absolutely correct.

The result is the retreat of the opposition from its old formula and its proclamation of a "new" formula, namely, the Communists must not withdraw from the Kuomintang (April 1927).

That was the first punishment that befell the opposition for refusing to take into account the national peculiarities of the Chinese Revolution.

The opposition has heard that the Peking government is squabbling with the representatives of the imperialist states over the question of customs autonomy for China. The opposition knows that it is primarily the Chinese capitalists that need customs autonomy. Hence the ready-made formula: the Chinese Revolution is a national, antiimperialist revolution, because its chief aim is to win customs autonomy for China.

But the opposition has forgotten that the strength of imperialism in China does not lie mainly in the customs restrictions in China, but in the fact that it owns mills, factories, mines, railways, steamships, banks and trading firms in that country, which suck the blood of the millions of Chinese workers and peasants.

The opposition has forgotten that the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism is due first and foremost to the fact that imperialism in China is the force that supports and inspires the immediate exploiters of the Chinese people—the feudal lords, militarists, capitalists, bureaucrats, etc.—and that the Chinese workers and peasants cannot defeat their exploiters without at the same time waging a revolutionary struggle against imperialism.

The opposition forgets that it is precisely this circumstance that is one of the major factors making possible the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a socialist revolution.

The opposition forgets that anyone who declares that the Chinese antiimperialist revolution is a revolution for customs autonomy denies the possibility of the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a socialist revolution, for he places the revolution under the leadership of the Chinese bourgeoisie.

And, indeed, the facts have since shown that customs autonomy is in essence the platform of the Chinese bourgeoisie, because even such inveterate reactionaries such as Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek now declare in favor of the abolition of the unequal treaties and the establishment of customs autonomy in China.

Hence the opposition's divided stand, its attempts to wriggle out of its own formula about customs autonomy, its surreptitious attempts to renounce this formula and to hitch on to the Comintern's stand that the growing over of the bourgeois revolution in China into a socialist revolution is possible.

The opposition has heard that the merchant bourgeoisie have penetrated the Chinese countryside, leasing land to poor peasants. The opposition knows that the merchant is not a feudal lord. Hence the ready-made formula: feudal survivals, hence also the struggle of the peasantry against feudal survivals, are of no serious importance in the Chinese Revolution, and that the chief thing is China's state-customs dependence on the imperialist countries.

The opposition, however, fails to see that the specific feature of China's economy is not the penetration of merchant capital into the countryside, but a combination of the *domination* of feudal survivals with the existence of merchant capital in the Chinese countryside, *along with the preservation* of medieval feudal methods of exploiting and oppressing the peasantry.

The opposition fails to understand that the entire military-bureaucratic machine which today so inhumanly robs and oppresses the Chinese peasantry is essentially a political superstructure on this combination of the *domination* of feudal survivals and feudal methods of exploitation with the existence of merchant capital in the countryside.

And, indeed, the facts have since shown that a gigantic agrarian revolution has developed in China, directed first and foremost against the Chinese feudal lords, big and small.

The facts have shown that this revolution embraces tens of millions of peasants and is tending to spread over the whole of China.

The facts have shown that feudal lords—real feudal lords of flesh and blood—not only exist in China, but wield power in a number of provinces, dictate their will to the military commanders, subordinate the Kuomintang leadership to their influence, and strike blow after blow at the Chinese Revolution.

To deny, after this, the existence of feudal survivals and a feudal system of exploitation as the main form of oppression in the Chinese countryside, to refuse to recognize that the agrarian revolution is the main factor in the Chinese revolutionary movement at the present time, would be flying in the face of obvious facts.

Hence the opposition's retreat from its old formula regarding feudal survivals and the agrarian revolution. Hence the opposition's attempt to slink away from its old formula and tacitly to recognize the correctness of the Comintern's position.

That is the third punishment which has befallen the opposition for its unwillingness to take into account the national peculiarities of China's economy.

And so on and so forth.

Disharmony between formulas and reality—such is the lot of the opposition pseudoleaders.

And this disharmony is a direct result of the opposition's repudiation of the well-known tactical principle of Leninism that the nationally peculiar and nationally specific features in the revolutionary movement of each separate country must unflinchingly be taken into account.

Here is how Lenin formulates this principle:

"The whole point now is that the Communists of every country should quite consciously take into account both the main fundamental tasks of the struggle against opportunism and 'Left' doctrinairism and the *specific features* which this struggle assumes and inevitably must assume in each separate country in conformity with the peculiar features of its economic, politics, culture, national composition (Ireland, etc.), its colonies, religious divisions, and so on and so forth. Everywhere it is felt that dissatisfaction with the Second International is spreading and growing, both because of its opportunism and because of its inability, or incapacity, to create a really centralized, really leading, center capable of directing the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for a world Soviet

republic. We must clearly realize that *such a leading center cannot under any circumstances be built up on stereotyped, mechanically equalized and identical tactical rules of struggle*. As long as national and state differences exist among peoples and countries—and these differences will continue to exist for a very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale—the unity of international tactics of the communist working-class movement of all countries demands, not the elimination of variety, not the abolition of national differences (that is a foolish dream at the present moment), but such an application of the fundamental principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) as would *correctly modify* these principles in certain *particulars*, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state differences. *Investigate, study, seek, divine, grasp that which is nationally peculiar, nationally specific in the concrete manner in which each country approaches the fulfillment of the single international task, in which it approaches the victory over opportunism and Left doctrinaireism within the working-class movement, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, and the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship*—such is the main task of the historical period through which all the advanced countries (and not only the advanced countries) are not passing” (see *“Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Vol. XXV, pp. 227-28).

The line of the Comintern is the line of unfailingly taking this tactical principle of Leninism into account.

The line of the opposition, on the contrary, is the line of repudiating this tactical principle.

In that repudiation lies the root of the opposition’s misadventures in the questions of the character and prospects of the Chinese Revolution.

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Let us pass to the second tactical principle of Leninism.

Out of the character and prospects of the Chinese Revolution there arises the question of the allies of the proletariat in its struggle for the victory of the revolution.

The question of the allies of the proletariat is one of the main questions of the Chinese Revolution. The Chinese proletariat is confronted by powerful enemies: the big and small feudal lords, the military-bureaucratic machine of the old and the new militarists, the counter-revolutionary national bourgeoisie, and the Eastern and Western imperialists, who have seized control of the principal threads of China’s economic life and who reinforce their right to exploit the Chinese people by their troops and fleets.

To smash these powerful enemies requires, apart from everything else, a flexible and well-considered policy on the part of the proletariat, the ability to take advantage of every rift in the camp of its enemies, and the ability to find allies, even if they are vacillating and unstable allies, provided that they are *mass* allies, that they *do not restrict* the revolutionary propaganda and agitation of the party’s work of organizing the working class and the laboring masses.

This policy is a fundamental requirement of the second tactical principle of Leninism. Without such a policy, the victory of the proletariat is impossible.

The opposition regards such a policy as incorrect, unLeninist. But that only indicates that it has shed the last remnants of Leninism, that it is as far from Leninism as heaven is from earth.

Did the Chinese proletariat have such allies in the recent past?

Yes, it did.

In the period of the first stage of the revolution, when it was a revolution of an all-national *united* front (the Canton period), the proletariat’s allies were the peasantry, the urban poor, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, and the national bourgeoisie.

One of the specific features of the Chinese revolutionary movement is that the representatives of those classes worked jointly with the Communists within a single, bourgeois-revolutionary organization, called the Kuomintang.

Those allies were not, and could not be, all equally reliable. Some of them were more or less reliable allies (the peasantry, the urban poor), others were less reliable and vacillating (the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia), others again were entirely unreliable (the national bourgeoisie).

At that time the Kuomintang was unquestionably more or less a mass organization. The policy of the Communists within the Kuomintang consisted in isolating the representatives of the national bourgeoisie (the Rights) and utilizing them in the interests of the revolution, in impelling the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia (the Lefts) leftwards, and in rallying the peasantry and the urban poor around the proletariat.

Was Canton at that time the center of the Chinese revolutionary movement? It certainly was. Only lunatics can deny that now.

What were the achievements of the Communists during that period? Extension of the territory of the revolution, inasmuch as the Canton armies reached the Yangtse; the possibility of openly organizing the proletariat (trade unions, strike committees); the formation of the communist organizations into a party; the creation of the first nuclei of peasant organizations (the peasant associations); communist penetration into the army.

It follows that the Comintern's leadership during that period was quite correct.

In the period of the second stage of the revolution, when Chiang Kai-shek and the national bourgeoisie deserted to the camp of counterrevolution, and the center of the revolutionary movement shifted from Canton to Wuhan, the proletariat's allies were the peasantry, the urban poor, and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

How is the desertion of the national bourgeoisie to the camp of counterrevolution to be explained? By fear of the scope assumed by the revolutionary movement of the workers, in the first place, and, secondly, by the pressure exerted on the national bourgeoisie by the imperialists in Shanghai.

Thus the revolution lost the national bourgeoisie. That was a partial loss for the revolution. But, on the other hand, it entered a higher phase of its development, the phase of the agrarian revolution, by bringing the broad masses of the peasantry closer to itself. That was a gain for the revolution.

Was the Kuomintang at that time, in the period of the second stage of the revolution, a mass organization? It certainly was. It was unquestionably more of a mass organization than was the Kuomintang of the Canton period.

Was Wuhan at that time the center of the revolutionary movement? It certainly was. Surely only the blind could deny that now. Otherwise Wuhan's territory (Hupeh, Hunan) would not have been the base for the maximum development of the agrarian revolution, which was led by the Communist Party.

The policy of the Communists towards the Kuomintang at that time was to impel it leftwards and to transform it into the core of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

Was such a transformation possible at that time? It was. At any rate, there was no reason to believe such a possibility out of the question. We plainly said at the time that to transform the Wuhan Kuomintang into the core of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry at least two conditions were required: a radical democratization of the Kuomintang, and direct assistance by the Kuomintang to the agrarian revolution. It would have been foolish for the Communists to have refrained from attempting such a transformation.

What were the achievements of the Communists during that period?



The Communist Party during that period grew from a small party of 5-6 thousand members into a large mass party of 50-60 thousand members.

The workers' trade unions grew into a huge national federation with about three million members.

The primary peasant organizations expanded into huge associations embracing several tens of millions of members. The agrarian movement of the peasantry grew to gigantic proportions and came to occupy the central place in the Chinese revolutionary movement. The Communist Party gained the possibility of openly organizing the revolution. The Communist Party became the leader of the agrarian revolution. The hegemony of the proletariat began to change from a wish into a reality.

It is true that the Chinese Communist Party failed to exploit all the possibilities of that period. It is true that during that period the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party committed a number of grave errors. But it would be ridiculous to think that the Chinese Communist Party can become a real Bolshevik party at one stroke, so to speak, on the basis of the Comintern's directives. One has only to recall the history of our Party, which passed through a series of splits, secessions, betrayals, treacheries and so forth, to realize that real Bolshevik parties do not come into being at one stroke.

It follows, then, that the Comintern's leadership during that period, too, was quite correct.

Does the Chinese proletariat have allies today?

It does.

These allies are the peasantry and the urban poor.

The present period is marked by the desertion of the Wuhan leadership of the Kuomintang to the camp of counterrevolution, by the desertion of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia from the revolution.

This desertion is due, firstly, to the fear of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in face of the spread of the agrarian revolution and to the pressure of the feudal lords on the Wuhan leadership, and, secondly, to the pressure of the imperialists in the Tientsin area, who are demanding that the Kuomintang break with the Communists as the price of permitting its passage northward.

The opposition has doubts about the existence of feudal survivals in China. But it is now clear to all that not only do feudal survivals exist in China, but that they have proved to be even stronger than the onslaught of the revolution at the present time. And it is because the imperialists and the feudal lords in China have for the time being proved to be stronger that the revolution has sustained a temporary defeat.

On this occasion the revolution has lost the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

That indeed is a sign that the revolution has sustained a temporary defeat.

But, on the other hand, it has rallied the broad masses of the peasantry and urban poor more closely around the proletariat and has thereby created the basis for the hegemony of the proletariat.

That is a gain for the revolution.

The opposition ascribes the temporary defeat of the revolution to the Comintern's policy. But only people who have broken with Marxism can say that. Only people who have broken with Marxism can demand that a correct policy should always and necessarily lead to *immediate* victory over the enemy.

Was the policy of the Bolsheviks in the 1905 Revolution a correct one? Yes, it was. Why, then, did the 1905 Revolution suffer defeat, despite the existence of Soviets, despite the correct policy of the Bolsheviks? Because the feudal survivals and the autocracy proved at that time to be stronger than the revolutionary movement of the workers.

Was the policy of the Bolsheviks in July 1917 a correct one? Yes, it was. Why, then, did the Bolsheviks sustain defeat, again despite the existence of Soviets, which at that time

betrayed the Bolsheviks, and despite the correct policy of the Bolsheviks? Because Russian imperialism proved at that time to be stronger than the revolutionary movement of the workers.

A correct policy is by no means bound to lead always and without fail to direct victory over the enemy. Direct victory over the enemy is not determined by correct policy alone; it is determined first and foremost by the correlation of class forces, by a marked preponderance of strength on the side of the revolution, by disintegration in the enemy's camp, by a favorable international situation.

Only given those conditions can a correct policy of the proletariat lead to direct victory.

But there is one obligatory requirement which a correct policy must satisfy always and under all conditions. That requirement is that the party's policy must enhance the fighting capacity of the proletariat, multiply its ties with the laboring masses, increase its prestige among these masses, and convert the proletariat into the hegemon of the revolution.

Can it be affirmed that this past period has presented the maximum favorable conditions for the direct victory of the revolution in China? Clearly, it cannot.

Can it be affirmed that communist policy in China has not enhanced the fighting capacity of the proletariat, has not multiplied its ties with the broad masses, and has not increased its prestige among these masses? Clearly, it cannot.

Only the blind could fail to see that the Chinese proletariat has succeeded in this period in severing the broad mass of the peasantry both from the national bourgeoisie and from the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, so as to rally them around its own standard.

The Communist Party went through a bloc with the national bourgeoisie in Canton at the first stage of the revolution in order to extend the area of the revolution, to form itself into a mass party, to secure the possibility of openly organizing the proletariat, and to open up a road for itself to the peasantry.

The Communist Party went through a bloc with the Kuomintang Party petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in Wuhan at the second stage of the revolution in order to multiply its forces, to extend the organization of the proletariat, to sever the broad masses of the peasantry from the Kuomintang leadership, and to create the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat.

The national bourgeoisie has gone over to the camp of counterrevolution, having lost contact with the broad masses of the people.

The Kuomintang petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in Wuhan has trailed in the wake of the national bourgeoisie, having taken fright at the agrarian revolution and having utterly discredited itself in the eyes of the peasant millions.

On the other hand, however, the vast masses of the peasantry have rallied more closely around the proletariat, seeing in it their only reliable leader and guide.

Is it not clear that only a correct policy could have enhanced the fighting capacity of the proletariat?

Who but the pseudoleaders belonging to our opposition can deny the correctness and revolutionary character of such a policy?

The opposition asserts that the swing of the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership to the side of the counterrevolution indicates that the policy of a bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang at the second stage of the revolution was incorrect.

But only people who have forgotten the history of Bolshevism and who have shed the last remnants of Leninism can say that.

Was the Bolshevik policy of a revolutionary bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in October and after October, down to the spring of 1918, a correct one? I believe that nobody has yet ventured to deny that this bloc was correct. How did this bloc end? With a revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries against the Soviet government. Can it be affirmed *on these grounds* that the policy of a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries was incorrect? Obviously, it cannot.

Was the policy of a revolutionary bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang at the second stage of the Chinese Revolution a correct one? I believe that nobody has yet ventured to deny that this bloc was correct during the second stage of the revolution. The opposition itself declared at that time (April 1927) that such a bloc was correct. How, then, can it be asserted now, after the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership has deserted the revolution, and because of this desertion, that the revolutionary bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang was incorrect?

Is it not clear that only spineless people can employ such "arguments"?

Did anyone assert that the bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang would be eternal and unending? Do such things as eternal and unending blocs exist at all? Is it not clear that the opposition has no understanding, no understanding whatever, of the second tactical principle of Leninism, concerning a revolutionary bloc of the proletariat with nonproletarian classes and groups.

Here is how Lenin formulates this tactical principle:

"The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by making, *without fail*, the most thorough, careful, attentive and skilful use both of every, even the smallest, 'rift' among the enemies, every antagonism of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within individual countries, *as well as of every, even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though a temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional ally. He who has not understood this, has not understood even a particle of Marxism, or of scientific, modern socialism in general.* He who has not proved by *deeds* over a fairly considerable period of time, and in fairly varied political situations, his ability to apply this truth in practice has not yet learned to assist the revolutionary class in its struggle to emancipate all toiling humanity from the exploiters. And this applies equally to the period before and after the proletariat has conquered political power" (see "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Vol. XXV, pp. 210-11).

It is not clear that the line of the opposition is the line of repudiating this tactical principle of Leninism?

Is it not clear that the line of the Comintern, on the contrary, is the line of unflinchingly taking this tactical principle into account?

\* \* \*

Let us pass to the third tactical principle of Leninism.

This tactical principle concerns the question of change of slogans, the order and methods of such change. It concerns the question how to convert a slogan for the party into a slogan for the masses, how and in what way to bring the masses to the revolutionary positions, so that they may convince themselves by their own political experience of the correctness of the party's slogans.

And the masses cannot be convinced by propaganda and agitation alone. What is required for that is the political experience of the masses themselves. What is required for that is that the broad masses shall come to feel, from painful experience, the inevitability, say, of overthrowing a given system, the inevitability of establishing a new political and social order.

It was a good thing that the advanced group, the Party, had already convinced itself of the inevitability of the overthrow, say, of the Miliukov-Kerensky Provisional Government in April 1917. But that was not yet enough for coming forward and advocating the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power as a *slogan of the day*. In order to convert the formula "All power to the Soviets" from a *perspective* for the immediate future into a *slogan of the day*, into a slogan of immediate action, one other decisive factor was required, namely, that the masses themselves should become convinced of the correctness of this slogan, and should help the Party in one way or another to put it into effect.

A strict distinction must be drawn between a formula as a *perspective* for the immediate future and a formula as a *slogan of the day*. It was precisely on this point that the group of Petrograd Bolsheviks headed by Bagdatiev came to grief in April 1917, when they *prematurely* put forward the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government, all power to the Soviets." Lenin at the time qualified that attempt of the Bagdatiev group as dangerous adventurism and publicly denounced it.

Why?

Because the broad masses of the working people in the rear and at the front were not yet ready to accept that slogan. Because that group confused the formula "All power to the Soviets," as a perspective, with the slogan "All power to the Soviets," as a slogan of the day. Because that group was *running too far ahead*, exposing the Party to the threat of being completely isolated from the broad masses, from the Soviets, which at that time still believed that the Provisional Government was revolutionary.

Should the Chinese Communists have put forward the slogan "Down with the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan" six months ago, say? No, they should not.

They should not, because that would have been dangerously *running too far ahead*, it would have made it difficult for the Communists to gain access to the broad masses of the working people, who still believed in the Kuomintang leadership; it would have isolated the Communist Party from the broad masses of the peasantry.

They should not, because the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership, the Wuhan Central Committee of the Kuomintang, had not yet exhausted its potentialities as a bourgeois-revolutionary government, had not yet disgraced and discredited itself in the eyes of the broad masses of the working people by its flight against the agrarian revolution, by its fight against the working class, and by its swing over to the counterrevolution.

We always said that it would be wrong to adopt the course of discrediting and replacing the Wuhan Kuomintang leadership so long as it had not yet exhausted its potentialities as a bourgeois-revolutionary government; that it should first be allowed to do so before raising in practice the question of replacing it.

Should the Chinese Communists now put forward the slogan "Down with the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan? Yes, they certainly should.

Now that the Kuomintang leadership has disgraced itself by its struggle against the revolution and has taken up an attitude of hostility towards the broad masses of the workers and peasants, this slogan will meet with a powerful response among the masses of the people.

Every worker and every peasant will now understand that the Communists acted rightly in withdrawing from the Wuhan government and the Wuhan Central Committee of the Kuomintang, and in putting forward the slogan "Down with the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan."

For the masses of the peasants and workers are now faced with the choice: *either* the present Kuomintang leadership—which means refusing to satisfy the vital needs of these masses, repudiating the agrarian revolution; *or* agrarian revolution and a radical improvement of the position of the working class—which means that replacing the Kuomintang leadership in Wuhan becomes a slogan of the day for the masses.

Such are the demands of the third tactical principle of Leninism, concerning the question of change of slogans, the question of the ways and means of bringing the broad masses to the new revolutionary positions, the question how, by the policy and actions of the Party and the *timely* replacement of one slogan by another, to help the broad masses of the working people to recognize the correctness of the Party's line on the basis of their own experience.

Here is how Lenin formulates this tactical principle:

"Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position

either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would be not merely folly but a crime. *And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the working people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience.* Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, now confirmed with astonishing force and vividness not only in Russia but also in Germany. Not only the uncultured, often illiterate, masses of Russia, but the highly cultured, entirely literate masses of Germany had to realize through their own painful experience of the absolute impotence and spinelessness, the absolute helplessness servility to the bourgeoisie, the utter vileness, of the government of the knights of the Second International, the absolute inevitability of a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia, Kapp and Co. in Germany) as the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to turn resolutely towards communism. The immediate task that confronts the class-conscious vanguard of the international labor movement, i.e., the Communist Parties, groups and trends, is to be able to lead the broad masses (as yet, for the most part, slumbering, apathetic, bound by routine, inert and dormant) to their new position, or, rather, to be able to lead *not only* their own party, but also these masses, in their approach, their transition to the new position" (see "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Vol. XXV, p. 228).

The basic error of the opposition is that it does not understand the meaning and importance of this tactical principle of Leninism, that it does not recognize it and systematically violates it.

It (Trotskyists) violated this tactical principle at the beginning of 1917, when it attempted to "skip over" the agrarian movement which had not yet been completed (see Lenin).

It (Trotsky-Zinoviev) violated this principle when it attempted to "skip over" the reactionary character of the trade unions, failing to recognize the expediency of Communists working in reactionary trade unions, and denying the necessity for temporary blocs with them.

It (Trotsky-Zinoviev-Radek) violated this principle when it attempted to "skip over" the national peculiarities of the Chinese revolutionary movement (the Kuomintang), the backwardness of the masses of the Chinese people, by demanding, in April 1926, the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang, and, in April 1927, by putting forward the slogan of immediate organization of Soviets, at a time when the Kuomintang phase of development had not yet been completed and had not yet outlived its day.

The opposition thinks that if it has understood, has recognized, the half-heartedness, vacillation and unreliability of the Kuomintang leadership, if it has recognized the temporary and conditional character of the bloc with the Kuomintang (and that is not difficult for any competent political worker to recognize), that is quite sufficient to warrant starting "determined action" against the Kuomintang, against the Kuomintang movement, quite sufficient to induce the masses, the broad masses of the workers and peasants "at once" to support "us" and "our" "determined action."

The opposition forgets that "our" understanding all this is still very far from enough to enable the Chinese Communists to get the masses to follow them. The opposition forgets that what this also requires is that the masses themselves should recognize from their own experience the unreliable, reactionary and counterrevolutionary character of the Kuomintang leadership.

The opposition forgets that it is not only the advanced group, not only the party, not only individual, even if "exalted", "personalities", but first and foremost the vast masses of the people, that "make" a revolution.

It is strange that the opposition should forget about the state of the vast masses of the people, about their level of understanding, about their readiness for determined action.

Did we, the Party, Lenin, know in April 1917 that the Miliukov-Kerensky Provisional Government would have to be overthrown, that the existence of the Provisional Government was incompatible with the activity of the Soviets, and that the power would have to pass into the hands of the Soviets? Yes, we did.

Why, then, did Lenin brand as adventurers the group of Petrograd Bolsheviks headed by Bagdatiev in April 1917, when that group put forward the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government, all power to the Soviets," and attempted to overthrow the Provisional Government?

Because the broad masses of the working people, a certain section of the workers, millions of the peasantry, the broad mass of the army and, lastly, the Soviets themselves, were not yet prepared to accept that slogan as a slogan of the day.

Because the Provisional Government and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik petty-bourgeois parties had not yet exhausted their potentialities, had not yet sufficiently discredited themselves in the eyes of the vast masses of the working people.

Because Lenin knew that the understanding, the political consciousness, of the advanced group of the proletariat, the Party of the proletariat, was not enough by itself for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power—that this required also that the masses themselves should become convinced of the correctness of this line through their own experience.

Because it was necessary to go through the whole coalition orgy, through the betrayals and treacheries of the petty-bourgeois parties in June, July and August 1917; it was necessary to go through the shameful offensive at the front in June 1917, through the "honest" coalition of the petty-bourgeois parties with the Kornilovs and Miliukovs, through the Kornilov revolt and so on, in order that the vast masses of the working people should become convinced that the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power were unavoidable.

Because only under those circumstances could the slogan of Soviet power be transformed from a slogan that was a *perspective* into a *slogan of the day*.

The trouble with the opposition is that it continually commits the same error as the Bagdatiev group committed in their day, that it abandons Lenin's road and prefers to "march" along the road of Bagdatiev.

Did we, the Party, Lenin, know that the Constituent Assembly was incompatible with the system of Soviet power when we took part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly and when we convened it in Petrograd? Yes, we did.

Why, then, did we convene it? How could it happen that the Bolsheviks, who were enemies of bourgeois parliamentarism and who established Soviet power, not only took part in the elections but even themselves convened the Constituent Assembly? Was this not "khvostism", lagging behind events, "holding the masses in check", violating "long-range" tactics? Of course not.

The Bolsheviks took this step in order to make it easier for the backward masses of the people to convince themselves with their own eyes that the Constituent Assembly was unsuitable, reactionary and counterrevolutionary. Only in that way was it possible to draw to our side the vast masses of the peasantry and make it easier for us to disperse the Constituent Assembly.

Here is what Lenin writes about it:

"We took part in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November 1917. Were our tactics correct or not?... Did not we, the Russian Bolsheviks, have more right in September-November 1917 than any Western Communists to consider that parliamentarism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we did, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long time or a short time, but how far the broad masses of the working people are *prepared* (ideologically,

politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dispersed). That in Russia in September-November 1917, owing to a number of special conditions, the urban working class and the soldiers and peasants were exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the most democratic of bourgeois parliaments, is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did *not* boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before the proletariat conquered political and *after*....

"The conclusion which follows from this is absolutely incontrovertible: it has been proved that participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet Republic, and even *after* such a victory, not only does not harm the revolutionary proletariat, but actually helps it to *prove* to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it *helps* to make bourgeois parliamentarism 'politically obsolete'" (see "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Vol. XXV, pp. 201-02).

That is how the Bolsheviks applied the third tactical principle of Leninism in practice.

That is how Bolshevik tactics must be applied in China, whether in relation to the agrarian revolution, or to the Kuomintang, or to the slogan of Soviets.

The opposition is apparently inclined to think that the revolution in China has suffered a complete fiasco. That, of course, is wrong. That the revolution in China has sustained a temporary defeat, or that there can be no doubt. But what sort of defeat, and how profound it is—that is the question now.

It is possible that it will be approximately as prolonged a defeat as was the case in Russia in 1905, when the revolution was interrupted for a full twelve years, only to break out later, in February 1917, with fresh force, sweep away the autocracy, and clear the way for a new, Soviet revolution.

That prospect cannot be considered excluded. It is still not a complete defeat of the revolution, just as the defeat of 1905 could not be considered a final defeat. It is not a complete defeat, since the basic tasks of the Chinese Revolution at the present stage of its development—agrarian revolution, revolutionary unification of China, emancipation from the imperialist yoke—still await their accomplishment. And if this prospect should become a reality, then, of course, there can be no question of the immediate formation of Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in China, because Soviets are formed and flourish only in circumstances of revolutionary upsurge.

For that prospect can scarcely be considered a likely one. At all events, there are no grounds so far for considering it likely. There are none, because the counterrevolution is not yet united, and will not be soon, if indeed it is ever destined to be united.

For the war of the old and new militarists among themselves is flaring up with fresh force and cannot but weaken the counterrevolution, at the same time as it ruins and infuriates the peasantry.

For there is still no group or government in China capable of undertaking something in the nature of a Stolypin reform which might serve the ruling groups as a lightning conductor.

For the millions of peasantry, who have already begun to lay hands on the landlords' lands, cannot be so easily curbed and crushed to the ground.

For the prestige of the proletariat in the eyes of the laboring masses is growing from day to day, and its forces are still very far from having being demolished.

It is possible that the defeat of the Chinese Revolution is analogous in degree to that suffered by the Bolsheviks in July 1917, when the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Soviets betrayed them, when they were forced to go underground, and when, a few months later, the revolution again came out into the streets in order to sweep away the imperialist government of Russia.

The analogy, of course, is a qualified one. I make it with all the necessary reservations, bearing in mind the difference between the situation in China in our day and that of Russia in 1917. I resort to such an analogy only in order to indicate the approximate degree of defeat of the Chinese Revolution.

I think that this prospect is the more likely one. And if it should become a reality, if in the near future—not necessarily in a couple of months, but in six months or a year from now—a *new upsurge of the revolution should become a fact*, the question of forming Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies may become a live issue, as a slogan of the day, and as a counterpoise to the bourgeois government.

Why?

Because, if there is a *new upsurge of the revolution* in its present phase of development, the formation of Soviets will be an issue that has become fully mature.

Recently, a few months ago, it would have been wrong for the Chinese Communists to issue the slogan of forming Soviets, for that would have been adventurism, which is characteristic of our opposition, for the Kuomintang leadership had not yet discredited itself as an enemy of the revolution.

Now, on the contrary, the slogan of forming Soviets may become a really revolutionary slogan, *if (if!)* a new and powerful revolutionary upsurge takes place in the near future.

Consequently, alongside the fight to replace the present Kuomintang leadership by a revolutionary leadership, it is necessary at once, even before the upsurge begins, to conduct the widest propaganda for the idea of Soviets among the broad masses of the working people without running too far ahead and forming Soviets immediately, remembering that Soviets can flourish only at a time of powerful revolutionary upsurge.

The opposition may say that it said this "first", that this is precisely what it calls "long-range" tactics.

You are wrong, my dear sirs, absolutely wrong! That is not "long-range" tactics; it is haphazard tactics, the tactics of perpetually overshooting and undershooting the mark.

When, in April 1926, the opposition demanded that the Communists should immediately withdraw from the Kuomintang, that was *overshooting* tactics, because the opposition itself was subsequently compelled to admit that the Communists ought to remain in the Kuomintang.

When the opposition declared that the Chinese Revolution was a revolution for customs autonomy, that was *undershooting* tactics, because the opposition itself was subsequently compelled tacitly to admit its error.

When, in April 1927, the opposition issued the slogan of immediate formation of Soviets, that was *overshooting* tactics, because the oppositionists themselves were compelled at the time to admit the contradictions in their own camp, one of them (Trotsky) demanding adoption of the course of the overthrowing the Wuhan government, and another (Zinoviev), on the contrary, demanding the "utmost assistance" for the same Wuhan government.

But since when have haphazard tactics, the tactics of perpetually overshooting and undershooting the mark, been called "long-range" tactics?

As to Soviets, it should be said that, long before the opposition, the Comintern in its documents spoke of Soviets in China as a *perspective*. As to Soviets as a *slogan of the day*—put forward by the opposition in the spring of this year as a counterblast to the revolutionary Kuomintang (the Kuomintang was then revolutionary, otherwise there was no point in Zinoviev clamoring for the "utmost assistance" for the Kuomintang)—that was adventurism, vociferous running too far ahead, the same adventurism and the same running too far ahead that Bagdatiev was guilty of in April 1917.

From the fact that the slogan of Soviets may become a slogan of the day in China *in the near future*, it does not by any means follow that it was not dangerous and harmful adventurism on the part of the opposition to put forward the slogan of Soviets in *the spring of this year*.



Just as it by no means follows from the fact that Lenin recognized the slogan "All power to the Soviets" to be necessary and timely in *September* 1917 (the Central Committee's decision on the uprising), that it was not harmful and dangerous adventurism on the part of Bagdatiev to put forward his slogan in *April* 1917.

Bagdatiev, in September 1917, might also have also said that he had been the "first" to call for Soviet power, having done so in April 1917. Does this mean that Bagdatiev was right, and that Lenin was wrong in qualifying his action in April 1917 as adventurism?

Apparently, our opposition is envious of Bagdatiev's "laurels".

The opposition does not understand that the point is not to be "first" in saying a thing, running too far ahead and disorganizing the cause of revolution, but to say it *at the right time*, and to say it in such a way that it will be taken up by the masses and *put into practice*.

Such are the facts.

The opposition has departed from Leninist tactics, its policy is one of "ultra-Left" adventurism—such is the conclusion.

Stalin, *Works*, IX, 328-369.



METROPOLITAN SERGEI'S EPISTLE  
THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH REACHES  
ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET STATE

29 July 1927

*Following Patriarch Tikhon's death in April 1925 several church leaders vied for leadership of the Russian Orthodox church. Underlying the power struggle was the relationship between the church and the Soviet state. Emigré church leaders exacerbated the struggle by their antipathy toward the Soviet state and support of anti-Soviet émigrés. Soviet officials supported several of the leaders vying for power, obviously to keep the church splintered. Metropolitan Sergei of Nizhnii-Novgorod, who vacillated between support and nonsupport of the Soviet state, emerged as the leader of the church, with the title of Deputy Locum Tenens. He was supported by those bishops who wanted to reach accommodation with the Soviet state and obtain legalization of the church. Soviet authorities distrusted Sergei, rejected his selection, and arrested him on 13 December 1926. Negotiations ensued among church leaders, Sergei, and Soviet officials, led to Sergei's release, then stalled, and ended in Sergei's arrest again in December 1926. Finally a compromise apparently was reached. After Sergei's release in April 1927 a conference of bishops was convened in May 1927 resulting in the formation of a Temporary Patriarchal Synod to assist him in the administration and legalization of the church. Sergei's epistle of 29 July 1927 to all orthodox churches called for devotion and loyalty to the Soviet state in return for legalization of the church. It also informed the emigré clergy that disloyalty to the Soviet regime would result in expulsion from the Moscow Patriarchate.*

ADDRESS OF THE TEMPORARY PATRIARCHAL SYNOD

29 July 1927

God's most gracious, humble Sergei, metropolitan of Nizhnii Novgorod, deputy *locum tenens*, and temporary patriarch of the holy synod rejoices in the lord for the right

reverends, beloved bishops, sainted monastic life, and all true children of the holy all-russian orthodox church.

One of the concerns of our deceased holy father, our patriarch Tikhon prior to his end, was to place our russian orthodox church in the correct relationship with the soviet government and by this to give the church the possibility of a legal and peaceful existence. While on his death-bed, the patriarch said: "It would be necessary to live about three more years." And, of course, if his unexpected end had not stopped his holy work, he would have carried this work to conclusion. Unfortunately, various obstacles hindered the efforts of the holy father, and he was not fated during his life-time to see his efforts crowned with success. Primary among these obstacles was the attack of foreign enemies of the soviet state, among whom were not only rank-and-file believers of our church, but also their leaders, inciting the natural and just nonbelievers of the government against agents of the church in general.

At present the lot to be deputy *locum tenens* of our church has again fallen on me, unworthy metropolitan Sergei, and together with this lot has fallen on me the debt of continuing the work of our deceased [patriarch—AGC] and seeking to the utmost the peaceful organization of our church affairs. My efforts in this direction, being shared between me and the orthodox archbishops, so that they will not remain fruitless, are: By my establishment of the temporary holy patriarch of the holy synod there is the hope of strengthening the bringing of our entire church administration to the proper structure and order, and of increasing the confidence both in the possibility of a peaceful life and in our activities within the limits of the law.

Now, when we are almost at the end of reaching our goal, the attacks of foreign enemies have not ended: Assassinations, arsons, raids, bombings, and similar occurrences of underground warfare are here right before our eyes. All these threaten the peaceful course of life, creating an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and all kinds of suspicion. The more necessary for our church and the more binding for all of us, who are served by the interests of the church, who wish to take the church on the path of a legal and peaceful existence, the more binding it is for us now to show that we, agents of the church, are not enemies of our soviet state and are not the senseless weapons of their intrigues, and that we are with our nation and with our government.

To give evidence of this is the first goal of our (my and the synod's) genuine epistle. For that reason we are informing you that in may of this year, by my invitation and by permission of the authorities, a temporary patriarchal holy synod was organized, consisting of the signatories below. Absent were the right reverends metropolitan of Novgorod Arsenii, who still has not arrived, and archbishop of Kostroma Sevastian, because of illness. Our petition to permit the synod to begin work on the administration of the all-russian orthodox church has been crowned with success. Now our orthodox church in the [Soviet—AGC] Union not only has canon, but according to civil laws has a complete central administration; and we hope that the legalization will gradually extend also to our lower church administration: eparchy, uezd administration, etc. It is hardly necessary to explain the significance and all the consequences that have thus been accomplished in the position of our orthodox church, its clergy, all church agents and institutions... We offer up our thankful prayers to the lord, and who favors our holy church! We express publicly our gratitude to the soviet government for such attention to the spiritual needs of our orthodox population, and together with this we shall assure the government that we shall not abuse the trust shown to us.

Having begun our synodal work with the blessing of god, we clearly realize the entire magnitude of the task standing before us as well as to all church representatives. We need to show not in words but in deeds, that as true citizens of the Soviet Union, loyal to soviet authority, people can not only be indifferent to orthodoxy, not just traitors to it, be its most zealous devotees, for which it is as dear as truth and life, with all of its canon and

liturgical structure. We want to be orthodox and at the same time to call the Soviet Union our civil native land, whose joy and successes are our joy and successes, and failures our failures. Any attack directed against the [Soviet—AGC] Union, be it war, boycott, any social rogue or simply assassinations from around the corner, similar to the Warsaw one, is recognized by us as an attack directed against us. While remaining orthodox, we understand our debt to be citizens of the [Soviet—AGC] Union “not only from fear, but also according to conscience,” as the apostle taught us (Romans 13:5). And we hope that with the help of God, with your general assistance and support, this task will be solved by us.

What has prevented us in this can only be that in the first year of soviet power that which prevented the organization of church life on the basis of loyalty. This is the inadequate realization of the entire seriousness that has occurred in our country. The establishment of soviet power seemed to many as some misunderstanding, accidental, and then short-lived. People forgot that there is no chance for the christian and what has been accomplished, everywhere and always, effected also by the right hand of god, leading steadfastly each people to a goal destined for them. For such people, who do not wish to understand the “signs of the times”, it can appear that it is impossible to break with the previous regime and even with the monarchy, while not breaking with orthodoxy. This kind of mood of known church circles, that is expressed both in word and deed and incurs the suspicion of soviet authorities, impeded the efforts of the holy patriarch to establish peaceful relations between the church and the soviet government. It is not without reason that the apostle suggested to us that we can according to our own piety “live quietly and serenely”, obeying the legal authorities (1st Timothy 2:2), or we must depart from society. Only theoretical dreamers can think that such a large society, as our orthodox church with all its organization, can exist peacefully in the state, after taking cover from the authorities. Now, when our patriarchate, carrying out the will of our deceased patriarch, stands decisively and irrevocably on the path of loyalty, people of the above mood have either to separate themselves, and leaving their political sympathies at home, bringing to the church only faith and work with us only in the name of faith; or, if they cannot immediately separate themselves, not to impede us, removing themselves temporarily from the cause. We are sure that they will again and soon return to work with us, convinced that only the relationship to the authorities has changed, but that faith and orthodox-christian life remain permanent.

There is a special acuteness at the present time on the question about the clergy who emigrated abroad. Clearly, the antisoviet speeches of our metropolitans and bishops compelled our deceased patriarch to cancel the synod abroad ([scheduled for—AGC] 5 May-22 April 1922). But the synod has continued to exist up to the present time, politically unchanged, and by our recent pretensions to the authorities church society abroad has split into two camps. In order to bring this to an end, we demand that the clergy abroad give a written pledge of complete loyalty to the soviet government in all of its public activities. Those who do not give such a pledge or violate it will be expelled from the clergy, within the jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchate. We believe that, having thus broken off relations, we shall be protected from all sorts of surprises from abroad. On the other hand, our resolution will perhaps force many to think whether it is time for them to reexamine the question about their own relations with soviet authority, in order not to break off with their native church and land.

We consider it no less important in our task to prepare for and convene our second local sobor, which will elect for us not just a temporary, but a permanent central church administration, and will also decide on all “kidnappers of church authority” which tear the tunic of Christ. The agenda and date of the meeting, the topics to be covered at the sobor and other details will be developed later. Now we are really expressing only our strong conviction that our future sobor, having resolved many painful issues of our internal church,

will give at that time by its councilar wisdom and voice, the final approval to the matter undertaken by us to establish the correct relations of our church with the soviet government.

In conclusion, we diligently ask all of you, right reverend archbishops, bishops, brothers and sisters: help us each in order with your sympathy and assistance in our labor, with your zeal for god's work, your devotion and obedience to the holy church, and particularly with your prayers to the lord for us, so he will enable us successfully and pleasing to god to complete the work placed on us for the praise of his holy name, for the good of our holy orthodox church, and for our general salvation. Grace be to our lord Jesus Christ and dear lord and father and the communion of the holy spirit be with us all. Amen. 16/29 July 1927. Moscow.

For the patriarch locum tenens Sergei, metropolitan of Nizhnii Novgorod.

Members of the temporary patriarchal holy synod: Serafim, metropolitan of Tver', Silvestr, archbishop of Vologda, Aleksii, archbishop of Khutyn, administrator of the Novgorod eparchy, Anatolii, archbishop of Samara, Pavel, archbishop of Viatka, Filipp, archbishop of Zvenigorod, administrator of the Moscow eparchy, Konstantin, bishop of Sumi, administrator of the Khar'kov eparchy.

*Izvestiia*, 19 August 1927, 1.



## PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE CENSURES AND WARNS

### TROTSKY AND ZINOVIEV OF EXPULSION

9 August 1927

*The conflicts between the Opposition and Communist Party Leadership came to a head during the sessions of the Joint Plenum of the Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Trotsky, in particular, was criticized for his so-called Clemenceau letter written to dispel charges that the Opposition was trying to weaken the Soviet Union at a time when foreign powers were threatening. In the letter he compared the present situation to the period of the First World War when Clemenceau, who represented the opposition to the existing French government, criticized the government for feebleness, indecisiveness, ferocity, and ruthlessness, but did not betray his country and class. Although the Joint Plenum vindicated the unconditional loyalty of the Opposition to defend the country, it considered the Clemenceau-like action as nearly defeatist. Although the Plenum most likely desired to expel the Opposition leaders from the Central Committee, it finally decided to reprimand them for trying to split the Party and Comintern, and listed the consequences should they continue fractional activities.*

## RESOLUTION ON THE VIOLATION OF PARTY DISCIPLINE

### BY COMRADES ZINOVIEV AND TROTSKY

Since 1923, the opposition, at first headed by Comrade Trotsky, and from 1926 headed by Comrades Trotsky and Zinoviev, have made use of every difficulty which the Party has had to overcome in the work of socialist construction in the country, for the purpose of striking a blow at the unity of our Party and its leadership, and in so doing has not shrunk from violating Party discipline.

In 1923, at the moment when the first serious difficulties arose in connection with the NEP as a result of the market crisis and the money reform, Comrade Trotsky and his group, whose attitude reflected the vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie, attempted to exploit these difficulties for fractional purposes, and declared that the country had been brought to the verge of ruin by the policy of the Party. Facts have proved, however, that the opposition were wrong, and that what they took to be the ruin of the country was their own defeat in the eyes of the masses. At this time the Party and Comintern condemned the standpoint of the Trotsky opposition as a petty bourgeoisie deviation.

At the end of 1925, when fresh difficulties arose in the sphere of the relations between the working class and the peasantry, Comrades Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others went over to the standpoint of Trotskyism.

The Fourteenth Party Congress (December 1925) pronounced a unanimous judgment on the deviation of the "new opposition" (Comrade Zinoviev, et. al.) from Leninist views, as expressed in their denial of the socialist character of our industry, in their underestimation of the middle peasantry, in their demand for the freedom to form groups and fractions, etc. In the spring and summer of 1926 the bloc of the "new opposition", with Comrade Trotsky and the other fractional groups, whose views have been repeatedly condemned by the Party, took a definite form, the "new opposition" headed by Comrade Zinoviev going over finally to the ideological standpoint of Trotskyism.

In the summer of 1926 the opposition, in the course of their continuous attacks upon the Party, accomplished the complete organization of their fraction, the conversion of the same into an illegal fraction, and even the holding of illegal mass meetings in the forest (Lashevich affair, etc.). Developing their fractional activity further, the opposition proceeded from illegal meetings to open fractional actions (in the nucleus of the "Aviapribor", of the "Red Putilov Works" etc.), and endeavored to force the Party into a discussion on questions which had already been settled by the Party Congress. Thanks to the unanimous front presented by the whole Party and to the determined resistance of the workers' nuclei of the Party, the opposition was obliged to capitulate, and to promise the Party to abstain from any further fractional struggle. (Declaration of 16 October 1926.)

In this declaration the opposition recognized it as "their duty to carry out the activities of persons who have already been expelled from the Comintern, such as Ruth Fischer, Maslow, etc."—who had solidarized with our opposition—was "especially inadmissible".

In this declaration the opposition declared that:

"The decisions of the Fourteenth Party Congress, of the CC of the Party and of the CCC are absolutely binding for us; we subordinate ourselves unconditionally to them and shall carry them out."

At this time the opposition further declared:

"We deny categorically that anyone carrying on any kind of agitation against the Comintern, the CPSU, or the Soviet Union, has the right to claim any solidarity with us."

In this declaration they decisively condemned any "criticism of the Comintern, or of the policy of our Party, which passes into a campaign likely to weaken the position of the Comintern as a fighting organization of the proletariat, the position of the CPSU as the vanguard of the Comintern, or the position of the Soviet Union as the first state of the proletarian dictatorship."

The activities of the opposition since these October pledges show, however, that they have not fulfilled a single one of these pledges. They have not only failed to diminish their fractional work, but have on the contrary directed their efforts towards a definite split and the organization of another Party.

Although the Fifteenth Party Conference, whose decisions were confirmed by the ECCI, emphatically condemned the line of the opposition as a social democratic deviation, a Right deviation masked by Left phrases, and although the opposition failed to find support from

even a single Party nucleus, they obstinately continued their fractional activity, and threatened the unity of the Party to an ever increasing extent.

Recently the opposition concentrated its attack on the Party on the line of our international policy (England, China), in connection with the special difficulties confronting the Soviet Union in the international situation, and of the partial defeat of the Chinese Revolution. The sole reply of the opposition to the daily increasing danger of war threatening the Soviet Union has been to bring forward declarations which undermine the work of the Party for the mobilization of the masses for the struggle against war danger and for the increased defensive powers of the Soviet Union. The declaration on the Thermidor degeneration of the CC, on the national conservative course, on the kulak tendency in the Party a la Ustrialov, further, the declaration that "the greatest danger is the Party regime" and not the war danger—all these declarations which lead to an undermining of the will of the international proletariat for the defense of the Soviet Union, were estimated by the Plenum of the ECCI as "means resorted to, in the face of the war danger, to conceal from the workers their own desertion."

All this has been accompanied by anti-Party fractional work, assuming lately an entirely inadmissible character. The opposition, instead of fulfilling the pledge to observe Party discipline which they undertook on 16 October, have issued and published fractional literature, not only among the Party members, but among non-Party circles; have organized illegal fractional groups, circles, and conferences; and have spread the profoundly anti-Party declaration of the 83, containing unheard of calumnious accusations against the Party. Further we must recollect the attitude adopted by Comrade Trotsky at the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI in May 1927, unanimously designated as hostile to the Party by the ECCI, and the flagrantly fractional action of Comrade Zinoviev, who on 9 May 1927 came forward at a non-Party meeting with an appeal to non-Party circles against the Party and its leading organs, an action violating every tradition of the Bolshevik Party and the most elementary Party discipline. And finally, at the session of the Presidium of the CCC (July 1927), Comrade Trotsky came forward with an unheard of slander, accusing the Party of Thermidor degeneration.

Although the question of the disruptive standpoint of Comrade Zinoviev had been submitted by the CC of the Party to the CCC for judgment, and although the ECCI had condemned the attitude of Comrade Trotsky as being obviously fractional, Comrades Trotsky and Zinoviev, on 9 July 1927, at a time when the Soviet Union was exposed to the sharpest attack on the part of English imperialism, took part in a political, anti-Party demonstration, organized by the opposition on the pretext of a send off for Comrade Smilga, who had sabotaged for some weeks the decision of the CC with respect to his departure to work in the Far East. At this demonstration at the Iaroslav station, participated in both by the opposition convened by the fractional apparatus and by the general public, Comrade Trotsky delivered a speech.

By this Comrades Trotsky and Zinoviev have proved that:

- a) their promise to observe discipline was merely a tactical maneuver intended to deceive the Party;
- b) at the moment of war danger, when the main task of the Party is to strengthen the home front, and the main condition for consolidating the home front lies in the increased preparedness to fight and discipline of the Party—at this moment the opposition seeks to destroy Party discipline for the sake of its own fractional ends, and furthers the unfettering of the anti-Soviet forces in our country.

As early as the Tenth Party Congress, Lenin pointed out, in the resolution on the unity of the Party, that the Party must be made to realize "the experience gained in former revolutions, where counterrevolution has supported the petty bourgeois groups standing nearest to the revolutionary party, in order to shake the revolutionary dictatorship, and to smooth the path for the complete victory of the counterrevolution of the capitalists and landowners."

The Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC draws the attention of the whole Party to the fact that the opposition, thanks to their fractional action against the Party, have become objectively the center around which those anti-Party and anti-Soviet forces are gathering, and upon whose disintegrating activities counterrevolution both at home and abroad is already calculating at the present time.

The Party has for several years displayed the utmost patience and tolerance, has warned the opposition again and again, and attempted to induce the leaders of the opposition to submit to Party discipline.

The latest actions of Comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky show, however, that the Party, after exhausting all means of warning, has been unable to attain any real subordination to discipline from the leaders of the opposition, that the leaders of the opposition continue to violate, grossly and systematically, the principles of the Party and Party discipline, binding on every Party member without exception, and that the opposition, under the leadership of the oppositional members of the CC, are carrying on a fractional activity, undermining the unity of the Party, and heading directly for a split.

The Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC therefore found themselves compelled, in view of the above facts, and in consideration of the discussions heard at the present Plenum, do declare as follows:

1. The opposition (Comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky), in their fractional blindness, have strayed on to a path leading away from the unconditional and unreserved defense of the Soviet Union in its fight against imperialist intervention. The opposition endeavor to justify their erroneous course by the allegation that the existing organs of the CPSU and the Soviet Union have fallen into a "Thermidorian" degeneration, so that in the opinion of the opposition, the first necessity is the removal of these organs, in order to proceed to the organization of the defense of the Soviet Union. (Theses of Comrade Trotsky on Clemenceau.)

2. The opposition (Comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky) are following the path of a direct split of the Comintern by forming a second Party in Germany with Maslow and Ruth Fischer, who have been expelled from the Comintern at the head, and converting it into a means to split the other European sections of the Comintern.

3. The opposition (Comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky) follow the path of organizing a new party against the CPSU of bringing about an open split in the CPSU by their systematic violation of the decisions of our Party, of Party obligations, and Party discipline, by which they actually aid in disarming the proletariat of the Soviet Union in the face of the approaching war danger.

The Joint Plenum of the CC and CCC cannot but place on record that the leaders of the opposition (Trotsky and Zinoviev), thanks to all these crimes against the Party and the proletariat, have run themselves into a blind alley, into hostile relations with the Party, and have placed the Party under the necessity of applying to the decision of the Tenth Party Congress of our Party with respect to Party unity.

The decision of the Tenth Party Congress on Party unity makes it the duty of the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC to raise the question not only of the expulsion of obvious splitters and disorganizers of the Party from the CC and the Comintern, but from the Party. In spite of this the Presidium of the CCC, prompted by the desire to afford the leaders of the opposition the opportunity of correcting their errors and making good their crimes against the Party, confined itself to a proposition for the expulsion of Comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky from the CC of the CPSU.

Besides this, the Presidium of the CCC and the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC, actuated by the desire to find a means of escape for the leaders of the opposition from the blind alley, and to secure the peace of the Party, made a last attempt to retain Comrades Trotsky and Zinoviev in the CC and proposed to them, to this end, the acceptance of a number of elementary conditions absolutely binding on the members of the Bolshevik Party and indispensable for the peace of the Party. These are:

1. To abandon the semidefeatist theory of Comrade Trotsky in view of the war danger (Comrade Trotsky's theses on Clemenceau), to adopt the line of unconditional and unreserved defense of our socialist Fatherland against imperialism and to condemn the oppositional slander with regard to a Thermidor degeneration of the leaders of the Party and the Soviet Union.

2. To abandon splitting policy in the Comintern, to condemn the Party of Maslow and Ruth Fischer, expelled from the Comintern, to break off all connection with this anti-Leninist and splitting party, and to carry out all decisions of the Communist International.

3. To abandon the splitting policy in the CPSU, to condemn the attempt to create another party, to disband the fraction, and to undertake the obligation to carry out all the decisions of the CPSU and of the Central Committee.

Despite the conciliatory attitude of the Plenum of the CC and the CCC, and despite the elementary nature of these conditions, the leaders of the opposition refused to accept them.

It was not until the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC had been compelled by this refusal to accept the resolution on the expulsion of Comrades Trotsky and Zinoviev from the CC of the Party that the opposition found it necessary to beat a retreat, to abandon a number of their errors, and to declare themselves, in the main, though with certain reservations, and after submitting a corresponding "declaration" in agreement with the proposition of the Plenum of the CC and the CCC.

As a result the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC decided to withdraw the question of the expulsion of Comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky from the CC of the Party from debate, and to give them a severe reprimand and warning.

The Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC is of the opinion that this may signify a certain step towards peace in the Party. The Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC is, however, far from regarding the peaceful "declaration" of the opposition as an adequate action, capable of ensuring the necessary peace in the Party.

Nevertheless, the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC has every reason to place on record, with satisfaction, that:

1. The opposition have found themselves obliged, in their "declaration", to abandon a number of errors and vacillations in the question of the character of the future war of the Soviet Union against the intervention and in the question of the unconditional defense of the Soviet Union against imperialism. The opposition have, however, by their refusal to pronounce a direct condemnation of the semidefeatist theses of Comrade Trotsky on Clemenceau, left themselves a back door for the entry of possible future vacillations with respect to the unconditional defense of the USSR.

2. The opposition have found themselves obliged to abandon their anti-Party slander on the Thermidorian degeneration of the Party leaders, although in this case they again leave themselves a back door for further attacks on the Party in this direction, by means of their reservation with reference to the inadequacy of the fight conducted by the Party against the Thermidor tendencies in the country.

3. The opposition, if only out of formal considerations, have found themselves obliged to abandon organizational connections with the schismatic and anti-Leninist Urbahns-Maslow group. Their refusal to abstain from an support of this group, however, again leaves a back door open for future attacks on the Comintern.

4. The opposition have found themselves obliged to abandon the formation of fractions within the CPSU and to acknowledge the necessity of exterminating the elements of this fractional formation. Here again, a back door for fresh attacks on the CPSU is provided by the attempt at a reservation, and at justifying their present splitting activity by accusations against the "regime of the Party".

The Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC has no reason to undertake a guarantee that the retreat of the opposition, and their abandonment of a number of their errors, is perfectly sincere. The experience already gained with a similar "declaration" given on 16 October



1926 shows that the opposition are not always inclined to carry out the assurances which they have given the Party. The reservations of the opposition in their present declaration with respect to the questions set the opposition at the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC go to show that the opposition have no intention of giving up all further struggle against the leaders of the Party and the Comintern. In view of this consideration, the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC makes it the binding duty of the opposition to disband the fraction at once, and calls upon all organizations and all members of our Party, to take every measure necessary for the unconditional liquidation of all fractional forming, fractional action, and fractional groupings.

The Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC, whilst carrying out a systematic inner-Party democracy, and placing no hindrance whatever in the way of purposeful and comrade-like criticism of the defects of the Party, is of the opinion that the Party organization must let itself be guided hereby by the decision of the Tenth Party Congress, which states:

"It is necessary that every organization of the Party takes the strictest care that the absolutely necessary criticism exercised on the deficiencies of the Party, every analysis of the general line of the Party or the resumes of practical experience, the inquiries into the carrying out of decisions, the methods of correcting errors, etc. are never to be submitted to the judgment of groups formed on this or that "platform", but solely to the judgment of the Party members."

The Party organizations, if they are to destroy all fractional formations, and safeguard the unity and iron discipline of the Party, must further be guided by the decision of the same Tenth Party Congress, as follows:

"The Party Congress orders that all groups formed on this or that platform are to be dissolved at once, without exception, and commissions all organizations to devote the strictest attention to the prevention of any fractional action. Failure to carry out this decision involves the immediate and unconditional expulsion from the Party."

*International Press Correspondence*, VII, No. 48 (11 August 1927), 1076-1078.



N. SEMASHKO STATES THAT SOVIET HEALTH  
SERVICES MEET SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND  
MEDICAL NEEDS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

6 October 1927

*In preparation for a women's congress scheduled to meet on 10 October 1927 Nikolai Semashko, the People's Commissar for Health, advertized the successes of the Soviet government in the area of maternity and child welfare. He singled out the success of the creche, a public nursery where working mothers could leave their children during the day. According to Semashko, the creches, consultation rooms, and other Soviet institutions presented opportunities to offer medical and health services to women and children as well as to educate women on child-rearing methods, eradicate superstitious medical and social prejudices, and provide them a refuge from local and family maltreatment ostensibly battering and abuse. Semashko's article articulates his frustration in obtaining financial support from the central government for health institutions to decrease the mortality rate, which was 21 percent in 1926. It also indicates the gap which existed between the modern, social goals of the Soviet state and the traditional, social and health realities in Soviet society.*

N. SEMASHKO  
THE WORKING WOMEN OF THE SOVIET UNION  
AND THE PROTECTION OF HEALTH

The All-Union Working and Peasant Women's Congress will no doubt give an impetus to the further development of self-activity among women. Already now we can say that women are becoming more and more active in all branches of work. This process is bound to be accelerated by the Congress.

There is one sphere in which women's self-activity is given a great natural scope—work for the protection of national health. That women are particularly interested in this work is shown by the fact that there is a strong desire among them to become doctors: in medical colleges women already constitute more than half of the students, and in some medical faculties they constitute up to 70 percent of the students. This is eloquent testimony to the women's strong desire for medical knowledge.

But of still greater social importance is the fact that women, and first of all working and peasant women, are drawn into actual work connected with the organization of protection of national health. Work connected with protection of motherhood and childhood is at present not only in medical, but in ordinary working and peasant women's hands. It is significant that one of the best and oldest managers of protection of motherhood and childhood departments is an Ivanovo-Voznesensk weaver, Comrade Shustova. Moreover, 601 peasant women became last summer managers of village creches. Such direct control over work connected with the protection of motherhood and childhood on the part of working and peasant women is rather the rule than the exception.

This is but natural; protection of motherhood and childhood would be of enormous interest to women and particularly mothers even if it were kept in narrow medical bounds. But as practiced here this work assumes enormous social importance. Our institutions for the protection of motherhood and childhood are at the service of women in multitudinous ways, they help her to solve the most difficult problems of life. Women come to our consultation rooms to get legal advice in case of family difficulties; they come also to get advice in connection with the bringing up of children; deserted and homeless women know that they and their children will find in our consultation rooms a refuge, useful advice and kind treatment. Social help for women plays as big a role in our institutions as medical help.

That is why reports on protection of motherhood and childhood are so popular at women's meetings; that is why women from the bench and peasant from the plough are so interested in this subject. We are justly proud of our success in regard to the development and extension of institutions for the protection of motherhood and childhood in towns and even in villages. We are glad to be able to say that although we had not very much support from the center last summer, our network of village creches reached 6000 throughout the USSR; we hope to increase this figure considerably this year. But there would have been no such success to place on record in towns if working women had not done their share; there would have been no such rapid success in the villages if it had not been for the help and participation of conscious peasant women.

But even this small and simple institution—creches in the villages while the women are doing field work—how enormously important it is not only from the medical, but also from the social-cultural viewpoint! Village creches not only help us to liquidate the accursed heritage of Tsarism—abnormally high infantile mortality; they are also a school for peasant women where they learn to bring up children, to overcome time-honored prejudices and superstitions and to build up a healthy family and social life. It is of course true that creches are important because they save life and health of the 20 or 30 babies to whom they give shelter. But they are even more important by being a convincing example and an object lesson to all the surrounding villages in the matter of bringing up children and getting rid of quack doctors, priest rule and belief in the devil. All pedagogues tell us that an object

lesson is much more convincing than theoretical arguments. Creches are schools of the new social order.

Institutions for the protection of motherhood and childhood are of particular importance in national regions, above all to Eastern women. There, consultation rooms are the gates through which these women who have been enslaved for ages enter into a more conscious and free life. To the timid and enslaved women of the East it is more difficult and risky than to western women to go to a club; but it is much easier, simpler and more natural to go to a women's consultation room. That is why these institutions are so loved and respected, particularly in national regions; that is why local quack and witch doctors, etc. are, as they say themselves, more afraid of these institutions than of judicial courts.

We have already a fairly big network of these institutions in factories and works, and some success has also been achieved in this direction in villages. According to statistics the practical result of this work is rapidly decreasing mortality (from 26 percent under the Tsar, to 21 percent including the countryside in 1926). But it is self-evident that this network and these successes are not enough; what are 6000 and even 8000 village creches for a rural population 100,000,000 strong.

This work must be extended. There should not be a single factory or works of any size without an institution for the protection of motherhood and childhood. There should not be a single volost without at least summer creches.

There is no doubt whatever that the forthcoming congress, which will raise the activity and self-confidence of working and peasant women, will give an impetus to this work. Working and peasant women will pay attention to this work in proportion to its social-political importance.

*International Press Correspondence*, VII, No. 56 (6 October 1927), 1248-1249.



## THE OCTOBER PARTY ENROLLMENT OF 1927

13 October 1927

*A decline in the number of workers in the Communist Party in 1927 paved the way for a new recruitment drive, the October Enrollment, in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. This recruitment drive was predicated on increasing Communist Party membership of industrial and peasant workers at the expense of white collar workers.*

## THE REGULATION OF [PARTY] GROWTH IN CONNECTION WITH THE CENSUS RESULTS

The review of the regulation of party growth and the preliminary results of the party census show that the party has continued to grow since the Fourteenth Congress (from 1,078,185 and candidate members on 1 January 1926 to 1,199,616 on 1 July 1927) and that the basic mass of those admitted during the past three years have remained in its ranks (more than 800,000 persons, and of these more than half a million workers, were taken into the party between 1924 and 1926).

The party, on the whole, has coped with the task of educating the vast stratum of proletarians taken into its ranks, especially in connection with the first Lenin Enrollment and the mass enrollment of 1925. Not only has the overwhelming majority (more than 90 percent) of those newly admitted remained in the party's ranks but, at the same time, out of

this stratum has grown and been trained a very considerable party aktivs which is working in party, trade union, soviet, and other organs.

The rapid party growth was inevitably accompanied by a weeding out of a certain part of those newly admitted. Thus, in 1925—3.7 percent, in 1926—4.3 percent, and in the first half of 1927 (the period of the party census)—5 percent were expelled for various reasons or left the party voluntarily. Thus the party census led to an additional departure of about three percent of the party's membership (i.e., 36,000 persons of whom about 20,000 were production workers). Data from the Central Control Commission's selective investigation of thirty-four cells indicate that the overwhelming majority of the workers who left the party during the census were candidates and persons who had been party members only since 1924 or later, i.e., who entered the party during the mass recruitment. And the greater part of those who left (more than 80 percent) never participated in social work—either before entering the party or subsequently. This shows that poor work of the cells prevented the party from retaining the allegiance of these more backward elements of the working class. An investigation of 65 large enterprises has also confirmed that the number weeded out was still larger due to the weak involvement of newly admitted workers in both educational and party organizational work.

The intensified attention, during the last two years, of the Central Committee and local organs to the regulation of party growth through the composition of new admissions has led to a systematic increase in the number of production workers (from 42 percent in 1925 to 56 percent in 1927), with a corresponding reduction in the number of white collar workers (from 25.6 percent to 16.3 percent). But the rate of this increase is, without any doubt inadequate, since as a result of the inevitable weeding out of a part of those admitted, the advancement of production workers to leading economic, trade union, and soviet positions, transfers to study in high educational institutions, etc. (preliminary calculations indicate that every year more than 20,000 persons transfer to work outside factories or higher educational institutions, which is about 6 percent of the production workers in the party or about 2.5 percent of the total party membership), the party not only fails to take in enough production workers to cover the losses but there is even a slight reduction in the ratio of production workers to total party membership (from 40.8 percent on 1 January 1926, to 37.5 percent on 1 July 1927) with an absolute increase in the number of party members of worker origin (from 582,000 on 1 January 1926 to 621,000 on 1 July 1927).

The overall increase in the activity of the worker masses and the growth of the nonparty worker aktiv in enterprises makes possible a significant intensification of the admission of production workers into the party (data from a survey of 65 enterprises indicate that only about 30 percent of the nonparty worker aktiv has been brought into the party). It must be noted in particular that the Komsomol and the meetings of women delegates have done too little to prepare their activists for admission into the party.

On the basis of the resolutions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Party Congresses on intensifying the admission of production workers into the party, and considering the observed increase in working-class activity, the Central Committee directs the attention of all party organizations to the necessity of intensifying the recruitment of production workers will make up not less than half the party's total membership.

On the basis of the above, the Central Committee orders as follows:

1. While developing the recruitment of workers into the party, principally and primarily in large enterprises, party committees must carry this effort into the shops and devote primary attention to bringing into the party activist workers who are involved in trade union, soviet, and other social organizations. Workers are to be drawn into the party in this way through systematic selection of the best elements of the working class. It is necessary, in particular, to strengthen the individual ties between the most politically developed party members and the nonparty activists, to attract more of them to open cell and party school meetings, and to involve them in practical work on party assignments.

2. In view of the weakness of the Komsomol and party organizations in training Komsomol and worker youth for entry into the party, and in view of the presence in many enterprises of a significant number of persons who are backward in this respect; finally, in view of the fact that the greater part of the worker youth activists must, as they develop politically, be drawn into the party's ranks, the party organizations are hereby ordered to intensify their assistance to Komsomol organizations in the party training of youth.

3. In view of the low percentage of Communists among women workers, especially in the textile industry, party organizations are hereby ordered to take steps to intensify the work of meetings of women workers dealing with political education of women worker delegates, especially those working in production, for the purpose of their joining the party. Greater attention must be directed to improving the work of political cells, to involving women worker activists in political education schools, and to strengthening the organizational links between party organizations and delegates' meetings and also by having women delegates participate in open party cell meetings, etc.

4. Noting the still inadequate recruitment, by village party organizations, of farm laborers and agricultural workers, and also of the poor peasants' aktiv, the Central Committee orders party organizations to concentrate their attention on the training, and on drawing into the party, of the farm laborer and poor peasants' aktiv which is developing in the union of agricultural workers, in poor peasant groups, in practical soviet and cooperative work, etc., by having them participate in open cell meetings, schools of political education and advancement, etc.

Village organizations must direct attention to intensifying the political education of women farm laborers, through meetings of delegates and through the union of agricultural workers.

5. The limitations on the admission of white collar workers established by the Thirteenth Congress must be strictly applied, and before each new member is admitted a thorough check must be made of his activity in social work among workers and his readiness and capability to be of genuine and substantial assistance to the party and the proletarian dictatorship. Before admitting white collar workers to party membership or candidate membership, party committees must become personally acquainted with them and must interrogate the persons giving them recommendations.

Gregor/McNeal, 302-304.



## LUNACHARSKY ON THE STATE OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

15 October 1927

*Anatolii Lunacharsky, People's Commissar for Education, who held undefined authority over the arts, was a proponent of the arts as a means of raising the educational and communist level of the masses. In his report on the status of Soviet education and culture, presented to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union on 15 October 1927 in Leningrad, he outlined the progress of the Soviet battle against illiteracy since the October Revolution. He presented statistics about the increase of students, schools, literary and press publications, and domestic film-making. He described the various successes concerning languages in several republics and differences in education vis-a-vis the RSFSR. He argued that funding was lacking and that vocational education was not adequate to support industrialization.*

## CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TEN YEARS

[LUNACHARSKY'S REPORT]

The subject of this report, the cultural development of the past ten years, is a very extensive one, and can scarcely be fully dealt with under the heading of the education of the people.

## POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND EDUCATION ARE INDIVISIBLE

Lenin was right when he asserted that political achievements can only be secured by raising the cultural level of the masses. In his essay on the cooperatives he writes as follows:

"The Soviet power once established, all we need is culture among the masses, in order to realize socialism."

This method of treating the question accords due importance to the cultural development of the country.

The enthusiasm for economic and cultural progress, to which Comrade Rykov referred in his report, is observable everywhere. But this enthusiasm is not only peculiar to the present stage of our cultural and economic development. This enthusiasm could be seen at the very beginning of the October Revolution. Our network of schools extended enormously in 1917, 1918, and 1919. We witnessed an elementary growth of the number of universities. This increase in the number of schools and colleges during the initial stage of the October Revolution expressed indeed our wishes and strivings towards education, but it was little in accord with our material possibilities. This continued until 1921. At this time we fell short of means enabling us to realize our wishes, and many of the schools had to be closed again.

In 1923 the foundation was laid for the education of the people in the RSFSR. In the other republics of the Union this foundation was laid somewhat later in accordance with the establishment of their education commissariats. In 1923 the positions on the field of education we permanently reconquered. The enthusiasm of the masses for education grows from year to year, and the material basis for the realization of these strivings is becoming more and more secure.

Above all, the population of the Union is thirsting for a general elementary education. The grant by the government of the Union of 15 million rubles for schools on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, as proclaimed in the manifesto, will therefore be welcomed with special appreciation by the population. The population is however equally demanding that more second grade schools be established. The slogan of the masses is: "Give us schools!"

We observe a great urge of the people for education. This urge is moving millions of workers and peasants.

## THE STRUGGLE TO STAMP OUT ILLITERACY: EDUCATION

The latest data issued by the Central Statistical Administration show incontestable progress in stamping out illiteracy in our country. In 1920, in the European part of the RSFSR, there were 355 persons of both sexes, out of every thousand, who were able to read and write; today this number has increased to 445 out of every thousand of the population. During the last five years we can record a general progress of about 28 to 29 percent.

The women are behind the men in knowledge of reading and writing. During these last five years, however, the number of men learning to read and write has increased by 25 percent, and that of women by 32 percent. These figures refer to the RSFSR, with the exception of a few governments.

On the basis of this fundamental knowledge a many-sided cultural building is rising. To this belong the higher Soviet schools of every description, the technical schools, the colleges.

Another branch of these efforts is the widely ramified education of the population by means of the political enlightenment afforded by the reading huts, libraries, and clubs. We are further occupied with the science of working out the fresh problems of science, of spreading the knowledge won, and of applying science to actual practice. And here we have art, which is being made more and more accessible to the masses as we advance towards the realization of socialism.

#### THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF EDUCATION

In 1913 the total sum granted by the state and local budgets for the education of the people was 276.1 million prewar rubles. In 1925/26 the sum total of the grants for educational purpose drawn from the state and local budgets, and from the resources of the People's Commissariat for Means of Communication (for purposes of education in transport service), amounted to 302.6 million prewar rubles. In the year just passed, 1926/27, the grants for the education, drawn from these same budgets, amounted to 396.2 million prewar rubles.

In 1913 the grants for education amounted to 7.76 percent of the total state budget; in 1925/26 to 10.88 percent, and in 1926/27 to 10.62 percent.

The budget has not yet been completely drawn up for the current year, but the grants for education of the people will be increased all over the Union, both absolutely and relatively.

The expenditure for education per head of the population, in the years above mentioned, is as follows: 1913 2 rubles 68 kopeks; 1925/26 3 rubles 86 kopeks, and 1926/27 4 rubles 79 kopeks.

#### THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, FIRST GRADE

Before the war, in 1914, the number of schools totalled something over 104,000. During the period of tempestuous increase of educational institutions, immediately after the October Revolution, the total number of schools sank to 87,500, rising again by 1926/27 to 108,000, a plus of 3.6 percent as compared with 1914. In 1914 the number of schools was 7.2 million, during the period of rapid extension of the school network 9.2 million, and finally, during the past year, 9.9 million in the elementary schools of the first grade.

At the present time 65 to 70 percent of our children attend our schools. The Soviet Government has set itself the enormous task of extending the network of schools until, by 1933, all children of school age will be attending school.

Qualitatively, our schools still leave much to be desired; the financial support is insufficient, the equipment inadequate, the education of the teachers frequently imperfect.

The schools with four years' course of instruction can however lately record rapid progress. New programs are being taken up everywhere; there is no doubt that much is being achieved here.

The system of instruction in our schools has been highly approved by foreign pedagogic authorities and scholars who have visited the Soviet Union. This appreciation pronounced by foreigners who are far away from communism shows that the Soviet schools are the leading educational laboratories of the world.

#### THE REORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOLS ON THE BASIS OF THE NATIONAL LANGUAGES

The most important factor in the education of the people is the reorganization of all schools for the respective national languages. For the first classes of the elementary schools this reorganization is compulsory, even for the nationalities possessing their own culture. This reorganization of schools for instruction in national languages is an exceedingly difficult task, for before the war such schools did not exist at all, or dragged on a miserable

existence. But despite the enormous difficulties of the undertaking, considerable progress can be recorded.

In the Ukraine, for instance, the number of schools conducted in the national language increases from year to year. On 1 January 1924 the number of these schools amounted to 66 percent of all schools, on 1 January 1925 to 77 percent, and on 1 January 1926 to more than 79. The same increase in the number of schools teaching in the national languages may be observed in the other republics and autonomous provinces of the Union.

#### THE EDUCATION OF THE CHILDREN BEFORE THE SCHOOL AGE

The education of the children before the school age has made noticeable progress in the Soviet Union since the October Revolution.

A gigantic extension of the preschool institutions was observable in the years immediately following the revolution. In 1920/21, for instance, there were 4723 kindergartens and nurseries, accommodating over 245,000 children. When these preschool institutions ceased to receive state support, and became dependent on local finances, their number diminished for the time being, but they have increased again in recent years. Whilst there were 1139 kindergartens and nurseries in 1924/25, the number rose to 1364 in the following year, and to 1629 in 1926/27. The number of children increases correspondingly.

The great increase in the network of children's playgrounds in recent years is especially conspicuous. These increased from 1500 in 1924/25 to 4000 in 1926/27. At the present time 200,000 children spend their time in these playgrounds.

#### THE STRUGGLE AGAINST DESTITUTION

The struggle against destitution among children is being carried on in various ways. This evil is diminishing gradually. The number of homeless and uncared for children is diminishing, as also the number of children living in children's homes at the expense of the state. The children are being better prepared for life, and take their places in the process of production as young workers.

The peasantry has done much to reduce the number of homeless children, taking many of these children to be brought up in their own families.

#### THE MIDDLE GRADE SCHOOL

The chief defect of the middle grade schools is that their network does not extend far enough. They do not reach more than one tenth of the children who have passed through the first grade schools. And yet it is a fact that the Soviet Union has gone far beyond the wretched inheritance bequeathed it by the bourgeois social order. As early as 1923 the number of pupils attending middle grade schools exceeded the number in 1914, and at present the number of children in these schools is already more than four percent above the prewar figure.

In connection with the middle grade schools it must be pointed out that the system pursued by these schools in the RSFSR differs essentially from that in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. In the RSFSR there are two types of schools, a second grade school with a five-year course and a second grade school with a seven-year course. In the Ukraine there is one uniform middle grade school with a seven-year course. To this school belongs further the so-called "professional" school with a three-year course. The professional school is followed by college.

The existence of two systems of middle grade schools is naturally undesirable. Both types will however have to be maintained for a certain period, in order that experience may show which system best serves the interests of the development of the country.



### THE SCHOOLS FOR YOUNG PEASANTS

A special type of the middle grade schools in the Soviet Union are the schools for "young peasants". The instruction given by these schools is making the peasant an educated man with cooperative knowledge.

The following data give an idea of the development of the schools for peasant youth: In 1924/25 these schools numbered 229, the number of scholars over 20,000; in 1925/26 the number of schools had risen to 491, the number of scholars to more than 36,000, in 1926/27 the schools numbered 686, the scholars approximately 50,000.

### THE FACTORY SCHOOLS

The factory schools are to be classified with the middle grade schools.

We frequently hear the opinion expressed that the factory schools have become superfluous, since the advancement of the industrialization of the country tends to reduce the work of the qualified worker to the mere superintendence of a machine. This standpoint is wrong. The factory school has every prospect of successful development. This is demonstrated by the expansion of its network of schools, and by the enormous increase in the number of scholars. Whilst there were only 789 factory schools in the Soviet Union in 1923/24, 1678 could be counted in 1926/27. During this period the number of students rose from 60,000 to 110,000.

### VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

The industrialization of the country renders vocational education one of the most important departments of our culture. Here a very close cooperation is necessary between the economy and the people's commissariats representing them on the one hand, and the people's commissariats for education on the other.

This cooperation does not however exist in reality as yet, and for this reason the work done towards the organization of professional education is not yet entirely satisfactory. The lower professional schools especially are at a disadvantage. There are but few schools, and these not well adapted to practical needs. Once more a legacy from the Russia of the Tsar. And yet the lower professional schools are essential for the instruction of properly qualified country workers, of which there is a great shortage. Many complaints come from the provinces on the lack of smiths, saddlers, joiners, etc.

### THE TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

The network of technical schools, like that of the professional schools, has been taken over by us to a great extent from old Russia. Neither their number nor their structure correspond to the character of the various districts of our Union and their economic needs. The opening of a large number of new technical schools is contemplated for the near future, and this will do much to improve matters in this line.

The expansion of the technical school network and the increase in the number of students are enormous. During the period from 1920/21 to 1926/27 the number of technical schools has risen from 585 to 1017, or almost doubled, whilst the number of scholars has increased from 70,000 to 180,000, or more than 2 1/2 times the number.

### COLLEGE AND WORKERS' FACULTIES

Tsarist Russia has here left us an inheritance which requires much remodeling. The syllabus of instruction and the college system have had to be changed, and above all the country has been faced by the highly important task of proletarianizing these higher schools.

At the present time the colleges are predominantly workers' and peasants' colleges. This is due in no small measure to the workers' faculties, which act as preparatory schools bringing the more talented of the young workers and peasants into the colleges.

At present all possible steps are being taken to improve the instruction in the workers' faculties, without interrupting the connection of the worker students with production. For this reason the People's Commissariat for Education arranges the instruction for the evenings.

Our task is not the increase in the number of colleges, but the improvement of the instruction which they give. The period of the rapid increase of colleges in our country is ended, and has been succeeded by a period of selection of the best colleges, and of improved instruction. The present network of colleges comprises 160,000 more students than that of the prewar colleges.

The following figures show the social strata from which the students are recruited. As compared with 1924, the proportion of workers studying in the colleges has risen from 10 percent to over 25 percent, the proportion of peasants from 22 percent to 26 percent. In spite of the higher demands made by the syllabus, the percentage of Party members and young workers enrolling at the colleges has greatly increased. The students differ from those of former years by taking a profound interest in the subjects of their study. The teaching staff is adapting itself gradually to the modern conditions of teaching, and to the activity of the youth. Young scientifically educated teachers are being prepared to take up this work in place of the older professors.

#### POLITICAL ENLIGHTENMENT

The organs of the People's Commissariat for Education, both central and local, are working with the most intense energy in the field of political enlightenment.

The first step in this direction is the abolition of illiteracy among adults. A comprehensive network of centers for the liquidation of illiteracy has been created. The number of these centers has increased from 41,000 in 1921 to almost 47,000 at the present moment, whilst the number of pupils has risen from 1 million to 1 1/2 million. During the last seven years about seven million adults have been taught reading and writing.

The general public takes an active part in the struggle against illiteracy. At present the association "Away with illiteracy!" comprises about 27,000 nuclei, reaching 1.2 million men and women, of whom about 65 percent belong to the country and 35 percent to the towns.

The general educational institutions (schools, courses, etc.) must also be classified under political enlightenment. Whilst in 1921 there were 780 such institutions, the present number is 866, the number of students about 100,000. Parallel with this runs the extension of the network of workers' universities. At the present time we possess 31 workers' universities with 7868 students, who are at the same time working at the bench.

Apart from these general educational institutions, an eminent role is played by the men and women workers teaching in the reading huts in the country. This army of young workers gives instruction in 22,000 huts.

The workers' clubs find their sphere of activity in drawing the working masses into centers in which it is possible for them to pass their leisure hours in the clubs. It happens at times that the club functionaries rather overdo in activity of instruction and organization, providing a superfluity of general courses of instruction, sections, etc., and thereby frightening away from the clubs many of the workers, too tired for such exertions after their day's work. These clubs must be made into real places of recreation and sensible entertainment for the workers. The women must take a leading part in this work, in which they have proved the best organizers and leaders.

The cause of political enlightenment has lately found a mighty ally in the radio. Only four years ago very few people had any clear idea of the wireless, and the reports from America sounded like fairy tales—that the wireless could be simply switched on at any time, and concerts, lectures, etc. heard at will. Today almost every house in the towns has

its wireless set. There are 47 broadcasting stations, supplying almost one quarter of the population of the whole Union.

The cinema has developed with equal rapidity.

Before the revolution 75 percent of the films were imported from abroad whilst the other 25 percent was fairly worthless stuff. At present our production and quality have reached a high level, and the foreign films are being gradually ousted.

#### PRESS

Clear witness of our cultural progress is borne by the data referring to our press and publishing works. We issue 556 newspapers, the total of their editions running to 8 million copies. This greatly exceeds the prewar standard in newspaper circulation. As compared with the time before the war, the influence exercised over the masses has increased immeasurably.

The publication of scientific works has made equal progress. The number of editions published of scientific works, as also various other data, shows an undoubted increase of interest in the population for the scientific book. Whilst the year 1910, and especially favorable year for this type of publication, brought 464 new publications, this year's assortment of new publications numbers 945.

#### SCIENCE

The status of science is of immense importance for the building up of socialism. The advancement of scientific work in the Soviet Union synchronizes, as we are informed by the Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, S. F. Oldenburg, with the founding of the Central Committee for the Improvement of the Material Position of the Scientists, in 1920. Since this time science has been enabled to develop on systematic lines. The scientists work not only in the colleges and scientific institutions, but to a considerable extent in the state institutions, beginning with the State Planning Commission of the Union. They are thus incontestably able to contribute greatly to the progress of the construction of socialism.

The growth of Marxism in our science is of paramount importance. Here we must emphasize the increased publication of the works of great Marxists, the development of general Marxist literature and journalistic work, and on the other hand the rapprochement of various leading scientists and entire scientific institutes to the principles of the Marxist standpoint.

The first place is here occupied by the Marxist institutions established by the revolution, for instance the Marx-Engels Institute, which can claim thanks to the leadership of Comrade Riasanov to be, in its organization and scientific labors, the leading institution of scientific Marxism in the world.

Mention must also be made of the enormous amount of work done by the Communist Academy, the Lenin Institute, and a great number of other scientific institutions, which are working indefatigably for the penetration of the Marxist principles into every department of scientific research.

The Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union has increased its activities to a colossal extent during this period.

#### ART

The public, the Party, and the authorities are beginning to take an interest in art. We have been able to observe a general increase of creative artistic activity on the one hand, and a tendency in art to express our ideology on the other. A purely proletarian literature has sprung up, of which we have already some striking and beautiful examples, worthy of a permanent place in the history of our literature.

Our theater, which we guarded carefully even during the hardest periods since the revolution, has been kept supplied with fresh forces, and at the present time is undoubtedly the best in the world, both with respect to management and acting. There is a strong tendency towards the representation of real life in our theater, an impetus towards participation in the general trend of cultural development.

Just after the revolution our painters and sculptors lost their heads slightly after being freed from the influence of their former patrons. During the first period most of the futuristic painters went over to our side, but failed to produce what the revolutionary proletariat was seeking. It is only just lately that painting and sculpture have struck the right note for the masses. The artist who succeeds in responding to the real needs of the people, whether by brush or chisel finds himself gratefully accepted by the masses.

The art of music can also record great progress.

#### NATIONAL CULTURE

Whilst the Tsarist regime enforced the use of the Russian language in all national territories, the October Revolution proclaimed absolutely equal rights for all the languages and dialects of the national minorities. At present the children in the backward national districts are being instructed in schools, vast amounts of work are being done for the distribution of national literature and in training women for public Soviet work.

Human society can only be formed on the basis of harmonious reforms if we first ensure the cultural development of the national minorities, the development of national culture on the basis of the equal rights of all nations.

#### THE NEXT GENERATION

One of the greatest levers of our cultural development is the Young Communist League, whose growth simultaneously signifies the enormous cultural growth of the whole Union.

This generation, already our most active collaborator, is being followed by the younger generation belonging to our Pioneer organizations. Here a powerful auxiliary is developing, a successor in whose hands we can place without fear the great cause of building up the new society of mankind.

\* \* \*

The whole cultural development of the West European States is adapted for the gratification of egoistic interests, whilst our culture pursues the goal of the cultural advance and improved standard of life for the whole of mankind.

We are best made aware of this difference if we visit a foreign country. When we return from a rich foreign land to our poor Soviet Union, we feel a profound sensation of joy; the joy of work, the joy of our cause in our own country. (*Enthusiastic applause*)

*International Press Correspondence*, VII, No. 62 (3 November 1927), 1383-1386.



#### TROTSKY ON OPPOSITION DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

7 November 1927

*Throughout September and October 1927 members of the Opposition took every opportunity to attend meetings and demonstrations in Moscow, Leningrad, Khar'kov, and other cities to*

*criticize the international and economic policies of the Communist Party leadership. At the Joint Plenum of the Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission, which met from 23 to 26 October 1927, charges, countercharges, and recriminations were hurled on all sides. Finally the Plenum approved unanimously to propose to the Fifteenth Party Congress the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee and resolution of the question of fractional activity against them. The Opposition was not dismayed. The celebration of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow offered them an opportunity to gain popular support. Matters turned violent when police and leadership supporters broke up the demonstrations, threatened Opposition leaders, and seized and destroyed banners. Similar events occurred in Leningrad where Zinoviev participated in demonstrations. Surprised and infuriated, Trotsky sent a letter to the Party Politburo and the Central Control Commission to protest the events and call for an investigation. In the letter he described the events in vivid detail. Trotsky was coy in presenting the offenses from his point of view.*

L. TROTSKY  
LETTER TO POLITBURO AND CCC  
9 November 1927

We formally demand an immediate and precise investigation and the institution of proceedings against those guilty for a series of excesses, violence and actions of an enormous nature taken during the anniversary demonstration on 7 November 1927.

1. We are writing to you about a group, consisting primarily of soldiers—by no means were all common Red Army soldiers—that burst into the apartment of Comrade Smilga, a member of the TsK VKP(b), broke down the door, and forcibly seized the red panel with the portraits of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Trotsky.

At the same time attempts were made from the roof by means of a hook, plank, etc., to tear off the placard with the slogan: “We will carry out Lenin’s testament.” Window glass was also smashed.

Prior to the break-in, GPU agents and others repeatedly knocked on the apartment doors and declared that they be allowed to enter to take down the placards. Comrade Smilga’s wife was forced to take her children to another room. The house-breakers occupied all the doors and stairways, checked and controlled all who entered and departed. To ascertain those guilty of devastating Comrade Smilga’s apartment does not present any difficulty. One of the organizers of the raid, according to the data we have, was Lashuk, chief of the TsIK’s military school. We can point to a number of witnesses who saw the house-breakers and can without difficulty identify them. The names of a number of the house-breakers are now known.

2. The second raid was organized on the balcony of the “Paris” hotel. Comrades Smilga, Preobrazhensky, Griunstein, Al’sky and others gathered on this balcony. The organizer of the fascist group here was the familiar Boris Volgin, whose moral physiognomy there is no need to evaluate. The raiders, after bombarding the balcony with potatoes, lemons, etc., broke into the room, and by beating and shoving they forced the named comrades from the balcony and then subjected them to detention, i.e., they actually put them under arrest in one of rooms of the “Paris” hotel for several hours. A number of the oppositionists were beaten up. Comrade Trotsky’s wife was knocked down. The beatings were accompanied by the most foul swearing, and there were drunkards among the raiders.

3. During the passage of the automobile, containing Comrades Kamenev, Muralov and Trotsky, along Semenovskiy Street there took place a mysterious incident, which would not constitute very much difficulty, if you desire, to explain. In driving by a number of demonstrators, the automobile was welcomed by the majority with shouts and applause and by

the paltry minority with whistles. Driving towards this automobile, along the demonstrators, was the automobile containing Comrades Budeny, Tsikhon and others. It is completely clear that the movement of both these automobiles was equally legal. When the automobile containing Comrades Kamenev, Muralov and Trotsky had already stopped behind a column of demonstrators, four shots rang out and reached the automobile—one after the other. The shots during the anniversary demonstration were so sudden, that those sitting in the automobile assumed first that the sounds had another origin/blown-out tires, firecrackers, etc./But several figures rushed toward and caught up with the automobile. The driver slowed down the automobile. From one side, a fireman/from among the commanders/jumped onto the footboard/, from the other side, two suspicious figures quickly grabbed the steering wheel. The fireman burst out with vulgar swearing. Several men ran toward him to help to bring this affair to a physical end. A part of the demonstrators was only able to restrain them in time. The fireman-commander had in his mouth a cornea whistle, the type used by fascists-whistlers. One of the passengers in the automobile ripped the whistle from the fireman, and the whistle can be produced for the investigation of the affair. Amongst the crowd they said that policemen fired the shots. None of the policemen, however, approached the automobile and no claims were presented to us. There would not be any difficulty in identifying/in the eyes of Budeny and Tsikhon/those who fired the shots as well as those who chased after the automobile.

4. In various parts of the procession they fell upon the oppositionists, subjecting them to assault and battery. In most of these cases the raids were accompanied by unruly yells of a black-hundred, particularly antisemitic, nature, that were completely independent of the nationality to which the assaulted belonged. Here was repeated word for word as what was observed during the assault on bolsheviks on the streets of Leningrad in July 1927, when the most black-hundred elements were the most energetic and determined. A number of the communists who suffered this are known to us. On the basis of their testimony, and even the testimony of witnesses, the guilty can be identified without difficulty. All of these type of actions in the smallest degree did not bear resemblance to the crowd. On the contrary, they were all done behind the backs of the crowd, except for a few observers, by a small group led by official and semiofficial individuals whom, as already said, it would not be hard to find.

We ask you: whether you intend to conduct a formal, open and impartial investigation into the many of our named and unnamed hooligan excesses made against the oppositionists and those suspected of opposition. The significance of this question for the further internal development of our country does not require explanation. In case that we do not receive an answer from you we will take those measures, to bring to light this entire affair, that result from the interests of our party, our revolution and the international workers' movement.

Trotsky Archive, bMS Russ 13, T-1048.



#### LITVINOV ON TOTAL DISARMAMENT

Geneva, 30 November 1927

*The Soviet Union joined the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, which was in session since 18 May 1926. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet delegate, attended the session on 30 November 1927*

*and delivered a speech calling for the complete and total elimination of military weapons and forces. The speech, which included criticism of capitalism and the League, was considered a communist trick.*

M. LITVINOV

#### DECLARATION OF USSR DELEGATION

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been unable to participate in the three sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, entrusted to its delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission the task of making a declaration covering all questions connected with the problem of disarmament.

The Soviet Government adheres to the opinion it has always held that under the capitalist system no grounds exist for counting upon the removal of the causes which give rise to armed conflicts. Militarism and big navies are the essentially natural consequences of the capitalist system. By the very fact of their increase they intensify existing differences, giving a great impetus to all potential quarrels, and inevitably convert these into armed conflicts.

The peoples of all countries, however, enfeebled and impoverished by the imperialist world order, are imbued with determination to struggle against new imperialist wars, and to guarantee peace between the nations.

This is precisely what makes it possible for the Soviet Government to accept the invitation of the League of Nations, the latter having expressed itself in favor of disarmament. In so doing the Soviet Government demonstrates before the whole world its will to peace between the nations, and makes clear to all the real aspirations and true desires of the capitalist States in regard to disarmament.

Despite the fact that the world war was called "the war to end war," the whole history of postwar international relations has been one of continuous systematic increase of armed forces in the capitalist States and of a great increase in the general burden of militarism. So far none of the solemn promises of the League of Nations have been even partially fulfilled, while in all its activities in this regard the League has systematically evaded setting the question in a practical light.

All the work done by the Preparatory Commission in this regard has been of a purely decorative nature. Indeed, the League of Nations only approached the question of general disarmament in 1924. It was decided to call a conference on general disarmament on 1 May 1925, but up to the present not only has the matter of disarmament not advanced a single step, but no date for the conference has been fixed. Likewise the League of Nations has been fruitlessly engaged upon the question of the limitation of war budgets since 1920.

The reluctance to put into practice the policy of disarmament, both on the part of the League and individual imperialist States, was manifested both in the methods adopted and the alternation of the questions of disarmament and guarantees, while simultaneous attempts are made to sum up in detail all the factors determining the armed power of the various countries concerned. Such a setting of the question, evoking endless fruitless arguments on so-called military potentials, affords an opportunity for indefinite postponement of the fundamental and decisive question of the actual dimensions of disarmament. There can be no doubt that by setting the question thus at the coming Disarmament Conference not only will it be impossible to achieve curtailment of the existing armaments, but the States belonging to the League of Nations may even receive legal sanction for increasing their armaments.

The Soviet Government has systematically endeavored to get the question of disarmament definitely and practically formulated. Its endeavors have, however, always encountered determined resistance from other States. The Soviet Government, the only one to

show in deeds its will to peace and disarmament, was not admitted to the Washington Conference of 1921-22, devoted to questions of the curtailment of marine armaments.

The proposal of general disarmament made by the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference was rejected by the conference. Despite this opposition, the Soviet Government never relaxed its determined endeavors in regard to disarmament.

In December 1922, a Conference was called in Moscow by the Soviet Government of representatives of the Border States for joint discussion of the problem of the proportional curtailment of armaments. The Soviet Government agreed to a considerable diminution of its armaments, despite the fact that this would not affect many of the Great Powers, always ready, whether under its obligation of treaties or not, to come to the assistance of other countries represented at the Moscow Conference, should these be involved in conflicts with the Soviet Union. A definite and thorough scheme for the diminution of armaments was proposed at that Conference by the Soviet Government. This was, however, rejected.

Despite the skeptical attitude of the Soviet Government towards the labors of the League, it accepted the invitation of 12 December 1925, to attend the coming Disarmament Conference, and only the Soviet-Swiss conflict, evoked by the assassination of Vorovskiy and the subsequent acquittal of the assassin by the Swiss court, has prevented the Soviet Government from attending previous sessions of the Preparatory Commission.

In now sending a delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference the Soviet Government has authorized it to present a scheme for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet delegation is authorized by its Government to propose the complete abolition of all land, marine, and air forces. The Soviet Government suggests the following measures for the realization of this proposal:—

- a. The dissolution of all land, sea and air forces, and the nonadmittance of their existence in any concealed form whatsoever.
- b. The destruction of all weapons, military supplies, means of chemical warfare, and all other forms of armament and means of destruction in the possession of troops, or military or general stores.
- c. The scrapping of all warships and military air vessels.
- d. The discontinuance of the calling up of citizens for military training, either in armies or public bodies.
- e. Legislation for the abolition of military service, either compulsory, voluntary, or recruited.
- f. Legislation prohibiting the calling up of trained reserves.
- g. The destruction of fortresses and naval and air bases.
- h. The scrapping of military plants, factories, and war industry plants in general industrial works.
- i. The discontinuance of assigning funds for military purposes both in State budgets and those of public bodies.
- j. The abolition of military, naval, and air Ministries, the dissolution of general staffs and all kinds of military administrations, departments and institutions.
- k. Legislative prohibition of military propaganda, military training of the population, and military education both by State and public bodies.
- l. Legislative prohibition of the patenting of all kinds of armaments and means of destruction, with a view to the removal of the incentive to the invention of the same.
- m. Legislation making the infringement of any of the above stipulations a grave crime against the State.
- n. The withdrawal of corresponding alteration of all legislative Acts, both of national and international scope, infringing the above stipulations.

The Soviet delegation is empowered to propose the fulfillment of the above program of complete disarmament as soon as the respective Convention comes into force in order



that all necessary measures for the destruction of military stores may be completed in a year's time. The Soviet Government considers that the above scheme for the execution of complete disarmament is the simplest and the most conducive to peace.

In the case of the capitalist States rejecting the immediate abolition of standing armies, the Soviet Government, in its desire to facilitate the achievement of practical agreement on complete disarmament, is prepared to make a proposal for complete disarmament to be carried out simultaneously by all the contracting States by gradual stages during a period of four years, the first stage to be accomplished in the course of the coming year.

Under this proposal, the national funds freed from war budgets are to be employed by each State at its own discretion, but exclusively for productive and cultural purposes. While insisting upon the views just stated, the delegation is nevertheless ready to participate in any and every discussion on the questions of the limitation of armaments, whenever practical measures really leading to disarmament are proposed. The delegation declares that the Soviet Government fully subscribes to the Convention on the prohibition of the application to military purposes of chemical and bacteriological substances and processes, and expresses its readiness to sign the Convention immediately. While insisting on an early date being fixed for the ratification by all States, it considers that in order to ensure the practicability of the Convention, it is necessary to raise the question of the establishment of control by the workers in those chemical industries capable of being rapidly converted to war purposes in States which have a highly-developed chemical industry.

We have laid before you our program of disarmament. At first sight its radical and exhaustive nature may make it seem to you complex, little possible of realization, indeed utopian, but such an impression is only due to the freshness of the theme. It must be definitely stated that the question of general disarmament has so far never been seriously dealt with. Up to the present it has been forbidden ground. The realization of our program may not, of course, correspond with certain political interests, above all, those of the Great Powers, or with the interests of the heavy industries, and the numerous groups of speculators. We know that very well, but the problem of complete disarmament itself presents no difficulties and can be solved rapidly and completely. This program at any rate is far more simple and demands far less time for detailed study than do those schemes which have up to the present been the basis of the work of the Preparatory Commission.

I must confess that I have been studying these schemes and have been appalled by their complexity, by the confusion of questions which have been brought forward side by side with the question of disarmament, and indeed the Commission has already devoted several sessions to the discussion of the mere enumeration and headings of the clauses which might form the basis for an international convention on partial disarmament. Unanimity has been reached only on the most insignificant questions. The vast majority of questions or more correctly their mere headings have given rise to a difference of views which no Commission has yet succeeded in reconciling, nor has greater success attended the private negotiations between Governments; but it is only when these disagreements have been removed (if that ever happens), that the Commission will be faced with the beginning of its fundamental difficulties. The Commission will have to obtain unanimity in order to determine the degree of security of each separate country, to define the extent and importance of each country's international obligation, geographical and other peculiarities; and the Commission will have to be in a position to lay down the maximum number of armed men, armaments, fleets, aeroplanes, that each country may possess, and so on.

The enumeration of the above points is surely sufficient to show the absolute hopelessness, if indeed not utopia, of such a treatment of the question of disarmament. To treat the question as the Commission has been treating it, affords no hope whatever of a solution of the problem in the present international position. Recent events, the treaties concluded a short time ago, lead not to the unity but to the further division of the European and non-European States into political groups, and to the intensification of their mutual antagonisms, but this is not all. Attempts have been made to suspend the work of the Preparatory

Commission pending the solution of a whole series of political questions no less confused and intricate than those of which I have just spoken. Should the present basis of the work of the Preparatory Commission not be altered and if in spite of that, the Commission is not overwhelmed by the load of innumerable discussions with which it is afflicted, then it will be doomed to labor for years, for scores of years, without results, or at any rate without any appreciable results. This is absolutely certain.

At the same time, we are living in an epoch when the danger of war is not merely a theoretical possibility, but a very real menace. We are not the only ones to affirm this. These same fears were expressed a short time ago by many responsible statesmen of capitalist countries. The shadow of the threatening inevitable war is to be seen and felt everywhere. If war is to be averted then it is necessary to act without any further delay. We consider that complete immediate disarmament is the very best guarantee of security for all peoples. This problem must be dealt with immediately and solved in the shortest possible period. States which refuse to face this problem take upon themselves heavy responsibilities. It is for this reason that I beg permission in the name of the Soviet Delegation to read the following resolution:—

*Whereas the existence of armaments and their evident tendency to continuous growth by their very nature inevitably lead to armed conflicts between nations, diverting the workers and peasants from peaceful, productive labor and bringing in their train countless disasters, whereas an armed force is a weapon in the hands of the Great Powers for the oppression of the peoples of small and colonial countries, and whereas the complete abolition of armaments is at present the only real means of guaranteeing security and affording a guarantee against the outbreak of war, this fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament resolves:—*

- 1. To proceed immediately to the working out in detail of a draft convention for complete general disarmament on the principles proposed by the Soviet Union Delegation, and*
- 2. Proposes the convocation not later than March 1928, of a Disarmament Conference for the discussion and confirmation of the proposals provided in Clause 1.*

Since no serious points can be urged against the essence of our program, we foresee that certain groups of people will endeavor to describe our program and resolution as mere propaganda. This time we are prepared to accept the accusation and we declare that this is indeed propaganda for peace. We are conducting such propaganda and shall continue to conduct it. If the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament is not the place for conducting such propaganda, then we can only conclude that we are here under a misapprehension. The Soviet Government is pursuing and always pursued a policy of peace with all possible energy, not only words but by deeds.

Only a few days ago, when it seemed that the war clouds had become particularly heavy on the horizon of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Government did everything in its power to prevent the catastrophe. It used every argument it possibly could to influence the Lithuanian Government and to convince the latter of the necessity of making a declaration that the state of war between Lithuania and Poland is being terminated. The Soviet Government had also taken the initiative of persuading two other neighbors of Lithuania of the necessity to give similar advice, on their part, to Lithuania. Similar steps for the maintenance of peace were taken by the Soviet Government in Warsaw. This peace policy of the Moscow Government gives us the right to declare unequivocally that we shall miss no opportunity of intensifying our propaganda for disarmament and peace.

Barbusse, 137-143.



## FIFTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS RESOLUTIONS

7-19 December 1927

*The Fifteenth Party Congress, called the "Industrialization Congress" and at times the "Five Year Plan Congress," was significant for several reasons. It expelled Trotsky, Zinoviev, and other members of the Opposition from the Party. It decided to move toward industrialization and present a Five Year Plan to the next session of the Congress of Soviets. It approved the formation of collective and state farms. The Central Committee Report, Five Year Plan, and the decision on collective and state farms are from a translation and abridgement of the decisions and resolutions of the Fifteenth Party Congress, and augmented by selections from the Soviet source.*

## ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT

7 December 1927

The Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) entirely supports the political and organizational line of the Central Committee.

The Congress hereby notes that under the very difficult conditions of the reporting period the correct policy of the Central Committee strengthened the international power of the USSR, enhanced our country's role as a factor for international peace, and ensured the growth in authority of the USSR as the home of the world-wide revolutionary movement.

Within the country the Central Committee's policy led to major successes in socialist construction, the steady growth of productive forces in the city and the countryside with the increasing preponderance of socialist elements throughout the whole economy, elevation of the material and cultural level of the worker and peasant masses, a strengthening of the Leninist nationality policy, consolidation of the union of the working class and the peasantry, a growth in the leading influence of the proletariat and its party; and on the whole, a systematic strengthening of the position of the proletarian dictatorship.

At present the proletarian state, the working class, and the party are commencing their work in international and domestic circumstances which in many respects have changed.

As regards the *international* situation, the reporting period has disclosed a number of new elements and characteristics both within the imperialist camp and in the relations between the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union. The partial stabilization of capitalism already noted by the Fourteenth Congress has by now sufficiently revealed its essence and displayed its latent contradictions. Despite a certain forward movement by the capitalist states, despite the growth of world production to the prewar levels, despite the restoration of world commodity trade and the strengthening of currencies, despite a certain "normalization" of international relations, despite the partial technical progress and rationalization of capitalism, despite all this—and to a certain extent as a result of it—the irreconcilable contradictions within the world capitalist system have become *intensified*. The unevenness in the development of the capitalist countries has become more intense and, consequently, so has the struggle for spheres of economic and political influence and for the division of the world. The international *struggle for markets*, for raw materials, for spheres of capital investment, has become more intense because of the discrepancy between the productive capacities of the imperialist economy and the purchasing power of the popular masses disinherited by capitalism, because of the loss of the gigantic USSR market to the world capitalist economic system.

The contradictions have become intensified between the European-American metropolitan areas, on the one hand, and the dependent countries and colonies on the other, with the struggle of the dependent countries against imperialist oppression assuming the form of armed uprisings, colonial wars, and colonial revolutions (China and Indonesia).

There is an intensification of the class struggle in the imperialist countries where, in response to the liquidation of the eight-hour day and the rationalization of exploitation, in response to the reactionary-militaristic policies of the ruling bourgeois groupings, the working class is starting to take the counteroffensive.

Contradictions have become intensified between the countries of the bourgeois encirclement and the USSR whose triumphant development has undermined the foundations of world capitalist rule. The growth of socialist elements in the USSR, the collapse of bourgeois hopes for a degeneration of the proletarian dictatorship, and the increased international-revolutionary influence of the USSR are the principal factors in this intensification.

Thus the whole development of capitalism has disclosed a tendency to reduce the historical period of the "breathing space", to bring nearer a new era of major imperialist wars, and to speed up the revolutionary outcome of world conflicts. For the USSR this means, above all, increasingly tense relations with the bourgeois states whose policies, despite a number of internal contradictions among states and individual bourgeois groups which still impede the formation of a unified capitalist front, become increasingly hostile to the USSR and give rise to the immediate threat of an imperialist attack from the outside.

The preceding two-year period of international development has once again graphically demonstrated the futility of the efforts of bourgeois and pacifist politicians to "bring together" and "conciliate" states on a capitalist basis. The endless unifying conferences and commissions of the League of Nations, the so-called "Bankers' Manifesto" (declaration against a post-Versailles tariff bacchanalia), the international economic conference, the pacifist "Pan-Europe" project, the tripartite Geneva "disarmament" conference, have all shown themselves to be new deceptions of the working class. The attempts at "unification" only concealed the frenzied behind-the-scenes competition of the imperialists, the struggle for division of the colonial spoils, the unending armaments race, the formation of secret and open military blocs which directly prepare new imperialist wars. As a matter of fact fascist, chauvinist, and militarist tendencies have been growing. Under the guidance of the conservative cabinet in London, reactionary elements of the international bourgeoisie have started to prepare the ground for an armed assault on the USSR, after entangling it in a whole cluster of provocations (assaults on USSR diplomatic representatives, murder of Soviet diplomats).

The Fifteenth Congress of the VKP(B) notes that, together with the growth and intensification of fascist and militaristic-aggressive tendencies in the policies of the capitalist states, preconditions are being created for a revolutionary solution of contemporary international and internal contradictions. The British general miners' strike of 1926, the Indonesian uprising, the great Chinese Revolution, the revolutionary behavior of the workers in "stabilized" Austria (July 1927), together with the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR—abruptly lay bare the contradictory nature and the rottenness of the world capitalist regime. In Europe, at present, the brief ebb of the revolutionary surge (after the defeat of the 1923 German Revolution) has again become a flow, with a heightening of the militant activities of the proletariat, differentiation and radicalization of the workers' movement, the closing of ranks in the Comintern and its sections, growth of the mass revolutionary movement (the demonstrations in connection with the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti, the electoral successes of a number of communist parties, the October delegations of foreign workers of the USSR, etc.).

Considering these circumstances, characterizing the present international situation, the Fifteenth Congress orders the Central Committee to continue its work:

a) on the basis of the continued implementation of an undeviating policy of peace, which is nothing other than a policy of struggling against the threat of imperialist wars and which at the same time is the fundamental condition of the further growth of socialism in the USSR;

b) on the basis of the comprehensive consolidation of the fraternal ties of the USSR workers with the workers of the Western European countries and with the toiling masses of the oppressed countries;

c) on the basis of the continued systematic development of economic ties with capitalist countries, at the same time ensuring the growth of the economic independence of the Soviet Union;

d) on the basis of the continued strengthening of the defense capacity of the country, of the power and military capacity of the workers' and peasants' Red Army, Air Force, and Navy;

e) on the basis of the accumulation of the necessary economic reserves (grain, commodity, monetary, special defense reserves).

The Fifteenth Congress also views as completely correct the Central Committee's line and its efforts in *domestic policy and economic construction*.

The Central Committee's Leninist policy has ensured the development of state industry to the prewar level with an increase in the number of workers employed and a growth in labor productivity and wages. The development of state heavy industry has been accompanied by a continuous growth in the share of production of the instruments of production. Industry's surpassing of its prewar levels, the renovation of the fixed capital of socialist industry, the initiation of radical technical and productive transformation, the considerable successes of electrification, the creation and development of whole new branches of industrial production (machinery, machine tools, automobiles, turbines, the aviation, and chemical industries), the building of new factories, large constructions and installations, and the radical reequipping of old factories—such are the substantial achievements of the party and the working class on the road to the industrialization of our country of our country as proclaimed by the Fourteenth Party Congress.

Along with the growth of socialist state industry, there has also been an enhancement of the significance of the remaining system of the economic commanding heights of the proletarian state: transport, the state budget, the banking and credit network, the trade apparatus. The state cooperative sector has taken a decisive position in the market and is systematically squeezing out private commercial capital. And despite the semiboycott maneuvers of the capitalist encirclement, our foreign trade relations have also expanded on the basis of the foreign trade monopoly, and a favorable trade balance has been achieved.

Through a gradual strengthening of the leading role of the socialist city the party's economic policy in the period covered has promoted the further development of agriculture, an increase in the sown area and in the marketed share of the crop, and the introduction of elements of a more advanced agricultural technique; multifold crop rotation systems, technical crops, and the mechanization of agriculture. The economic bond between the city and the countryside has been considerably strengthened. Together with the growth of agriculture, the supply of the countryside with urban industrial goods also grew and the significance of agricultural cooperatives increased.

However, the Fifteenth Congress of the VKP(B) considers it necessary to point out that the above achievements are inadequate and that the level of agriculture still remains extremely low. Therefore the Congress directs the Central Committee to take practical measures to intensify the advance of agriculture, one of these fundamental measures being, in view of the Congress, the speediest production of land management measures. The primary task must be—on the basis of continued peasant cooperative—the gradual transition from fragmented peasant farms to large-scale production (collective cultivation of land through the intensification and mechanization of agriculture), in every way supporting and encouraging the beginnings of collectivized agricultural labor. Such an intensification of the advance of agriculture is necessary both to heighten the well-being of the basic mass of the peasantry and to expand the market for heavy industry (as an outlet and as a source of raw

materials), and also for the technical reconstruction of the village and the establishment of socialist cooperative there—in this way overcoming the capitalist elements in the countryside.

The elapsed period of economic development is an undoubted step forward to socialism. This overall success, however, does not signify the disappearance of the difficulties, dangers, and contradictions associated with the characteristics of our growth, with our country's technical and economic backwardness, and with the pressure exerted by social class forces harmful to the proletariat; only through systematic struggle against these forces can the above difficulties be overcome and further progress be made toward socialism. To the number of major difficulties must be added the following: the problem of exports and imports, which has become extremely complex due to the aggravation of the international situation; the problem of fixed capital; the problem of production costs and of the reduction of industrial prices; the problem of unemployment and of agrarian overpopulation; the problem of the scarcity of goods, on the one hand, and of an improved supply of agricultural products to the cities, on the other; finally, the problem of accumulating reserves (commodity and currency). The Congress directs the attention of the whole party to the fact that these problems may be successfully solved only if the party makes a special effort to apply all its forces, maintains its will unified, and carries out party directives in a concerted manner.

The Fifteenth Congress considers that a policy of economic displacement should and can be applied even more resolutely to the private capitalist economic elements whose absolute mass is increasing although to a much lesser extent than the socialist sector of the economy. The prerequisites for a further economic offensive against the capitalist elements have been created by the previous successes of economic development on the basis of growing commodity exchange and the liquidation of the remnants of War Communism (by decision of the Fourteenth Party Conference), which have concentrated in the hands of the proletarian state suitable material and economic resources both for successfully overcoming capitalist elements in the countryside (a joint offensive with the middle peasant against the kulak, more help for the poor peasants, the strengthening of cooperation between the poor and middle peasants, production cooperatives) and for continuing to displace private capital in the city.

The Fifteenth Congress instructs the Central Committee to continue, without slowing down, its policy of socialist *industrialization* which has already yielded its first positive results. In every way consolidating the industrial power of the USSR, the party must continue, using available financial and economic means, to develop production of the means of production, in particular, metallurgy and machine building, to develop within the country the production of industrial raw materials (cotton, wool, leather, etc.), to reduce production costs, and steadily to reduce the prices of industrial products.

The general objective of industrializing our country must be accompanied by a resolute course aimed at the *rationalization* of production and administration. Along with the improvement and simplification of the state and cooperative apparatus, the rationalization of production is the main task in the forthcoming period. In the interests of heightening the material and cultural standard of living of the proletariat and also in the interest of rationalization of the productive process the party has proclaimed gradual transition to the seven-hour working day, to be accompanied by a continued improvement in the living standard of the working class; this is the principal difference between our methods of rationalization and those of capitalism where rationalization, on the contrary, is accompanied by a reduction in the living standard of the masses and by a lengthening of the working day. While appealing to all party, economic, trade union, and soviet organizations to apply all their energy to the solution of this most important task of socialistic rationalization, the Fifteenth Congress of the VKP(B) holds that only on its basis will it be possible to

industrialize the country (including the industrialization of agriculture), to absorb unemployment, to root out bureaucratic perversions of the proletarian state, increasingly to satisfy the needs of the worker-peasant masses, to ensure their continued cultural growth, and to overcome the principal difficulties of socialist construction.

Despite the leading and still growing role of the socialist economic nucleus, the advance of the productive forces of the USSR economy is inevitably accompanied by a partial growth of class contradictions. The private capitalist strata of the city and village join forces with certain bureaucratic elements in the soviet and economic apparatus and strive to intensify their opposition to the working-class offensive, to exert influence on certain strata of employees and intellectuals, on backward strata of handicraftsmen and artisans, peasants, and workers, which are hostile to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This influence is also manifested in the cultural-political and the ideological realms (the smenovekh doctrine, [that the USSR is returning to capitalism] the kulak slogan of a "peasant union", chauvinism, antisemitism, the doctrine of bourgeois-democratic "liberties" and the petty-bourgeois opposition "two-party" slogan associated with it, etc.). The working class headed by the VKP(B) has counteracted this harmful influence, and the growing activity of capitalist elements, by strengthening the proletarian dictatorship, by a still greater advance in the activity, initiative, and culture of the proletarian masses (stimulation of the soviets, development of trade union democracy and the cooperatives, strengthening the ideological influence of the proletariat on the village, mass cultural-educational work, etc.) as well as by strengthening the ideological influence of the proletariat upon the broad strata of the Soviet intelligentsia. While noting a series of unquestioned victories on this battlefield, the Congress considers it necessary in the future to mobilize the proletariat in every way and to intensify the struggle on the ideological and cultural front.

While noting that our party has grown quantitatively and qualitatively since the Eleventh Congress, wholly supporting the Central Committee's policy on regulating the social composition of the party, and noting the success of the "October Enrollment" of workers in the party on the tenth anniversary of Soviet power, the Fifteenth Congress of the VKP(B) hereby states that the directing role of the VKP(B) as the fundamental lever of the dictatorship may be preserved, secured, and strengthened only through the Leninist cohesiveness and the proletarian discipline of the party ranks, through a steady heightening of the ideological-theoretical and cultural level of its members, through the consistent implementation of intra-party democracy, and through a systematic improvement of the party's social composition by steady recruitment into the party of men and women production workers.

Especially in view of the complexity of the tasks before the party and in order to increase the activity of the whole mass of party members, the Congress considers it necessary to develop intrademocracy, to subject defects in the soviets, and in the party itself, to businesslike criticism, to intensify the struggle against careerism, etc. At the same time the Congress directs the party's attention to the necessity of intensifying work in the Komsomol, among working youth generally, and among women.

The Fifteenth Congress notes that, despite the warning of the Thirteenth Party Congress against the "petty bourgeois deviation" of Trotsky's group and despite the warning of the Fifteenth All-Union Party Conference against the "social democratic deviation" of the opposition united under Trotsky's leadership, the latter continues from month to month to deepen its revisionist errors, to struggle against the VKP(B) and the teachings of Lenin, having formed its own special party, carrying the struggle outside the VKP(B), and appealing to nonproletarian elements in the country against the regime of the proletarian dictatorship. The ideology of the opposition, who have openly formed a bloc with renegades of international communist (Maslow, Souvarine, and Co.), has now taken the shape of a particular trotskyite form of *menshevism*. Denial of the socialist character of Soviet state enterprises, denial of the possibility of the victorious construction of socialism in our country, denial of

the policy of a union between the working class and the basic masses of the peasantry, and denial of bolshevik organizational principles (the policy of splitting the VKP(B) from the Comintern) have logically led the trotskyite-menshevik opposition to slander the USSR as a degenerate thermidorian state, to deny the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR, and to wage a counterrevolutionary struggle against it.

The outcome has been the opposition's ideological break with Leninism, its degeneration into a menshevik group, its taking the course of capitulating before the forces of international and domestic bourgeoisie, and its objective transformation into an instrument of a third force against the regime of the proletarian dictatorship. That is why the opposition has been so overwhelmingly rejected both by the mass of the party members and by the working class as a whole.

The Fifteenth Congress views all decisions of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission directed against the disruptive work of the trotskyites as absolutely correct and as the necessary minimum and directs the Central Committee to continue in the future to ensure the Leninist unity of the party at whatever cost.

Considering that the tactical differences between the party and the opposition have grown into programmatic ones, that the trotskyite opposition has become an objective factor in the anti-Soviet struggle, the Fifteenth Congress declares that adherence to the trotskyite opposition and the propagation of its views are incompatible with membership in the ranks of the bolshevik party.

In the name of the VKP(B) and of the working class of the Soviet Union, the Fifteenth Congress declares its firm proletarian conviction of the victory of socialism in our country, despite all difficulties. The world-wide historic experience of the decade of existence of the proletarian dictatorship have brilliantly confirmed the correctness of the Leninist path followed by the VKP(B). The Fifteenth Congress orders the Central Committee to proceed undeviatingly along this path, to rally ever greater masses of the toilers of our country under the banner of socialist construction, to strengthen the fraternal ties of solidarity with the proletariat of all countries, and with each year to make the USSR an ever mightier outpost of the world socialist revolution.

McNeal/Gregor, 311-319.



## ON THE DIRECTIVES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

19 December 1927

### I. RESULTS AND PREREQUISITES OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

1. The results of the decade elapsed since the October Revolution disclose the gigantic international significance of this revolution as a component part of the great international revolutionary process which is transforming capitalist society into a socialist one. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletarian nationalization of the means of production, of transport, of credit, and of foreign trade, the nationalization of land—all are preconditions of the development of the USSR economy on essentially different, socialist principles. The *social class content of the economic commanding heights*, determining the development of the economy as a whole, has become essentially different. The *relationship between the city and the village* has become essentially different, for industry has “turned its



face toward the countryside" and has become a mighty factor in its socialist transformation, and the growth of the domestic market has started to take the form of increased village prosperity—not, as under capitalism, of its destruction. The *organizational form* of the economy has become essentially different inasmuch as the possibility has arisen of *planned guidance of the economy*, increasingly suppressing the anarchy of the capitalist commodity market, on the basis of the nationalization of heavy industry and of the other commanding heights. The *distribution of national income* has also become essentially different as a result of the virtually complete liquidation of the former ruling classes and the concomitant destruction of a considerable part of the nonproductive consumption generally. These distinguishing characteristics of the USSR economy have made possible a much more rapid reconstruction process than in the capitalist countries and a much more rapid rate of economic growth generally.

2. The results of economic development since the so-called "New Economic Policy", which laid the foundation for the correct combination of state socialist industry and the small or very small business of simple commodity-producing peasants, have completely confirmed Lenin's thesis that in our country we have everything that is necessary and sufficient for the building of socialism, that the objective internal conditions of the economic and social development of the USSR by no means make the collapse or degeneration of the proletarian dictatorship inevitable, that the existence of a large number of peasant farms and the tie between them and the state economy by no means transforms our country into a land of peasant narrowmindedness....

3. Experience with planning has demonstrated that planning proposals time and again have needed to have corrections made, that they bore a theoretical nature, and that a realistic plan inevitably takes form on the basis of the actual growth of the organized state of the national economy and the increasing possibility of an accurate calculation and prediction based on the growing socialization of the economy. Dependence on the harvest; the impossibility of getting accurate statistics before procuring grain; dependence on market elements which are moreso lacking a planning basis, but do not yet conform to its framework; the fluctuation of the free-market world economy and the dependence of the latter on it; finally, foreign economic factors which are connected primarily with the hostile capitalist encirclement and which affect the economic relations with foreign countries as well as the economic relations within the country—all these are conditional generally on the relativity of the value of planning and numerical assumptions. The five year plan of the economy must be subject to the special pressure of international events in connection with the exacerbation of relations between capitalist states and the USSR.

Considering the possibility of a military attack against the proletarian state by capitalist states, it is necessary during the development of the five year plan to pay maximum attention to the rapid development of those branches of the economy, in general, and industry, in particular, on which fall the primary role in securing the defense and economic stability of the country during the time of war....

4. During the drawing up of the five year plan of the economy as well as any economic plan calculated more or less for an extended period of time, it is necessary to attempt to attain the most favorable combination of the following elements: expanded consumption by workers and peasant masses; expanded reproduction (accumulation) in state industry on the basis of expanded reproduction in the economy in general; faster pace, than in capitalist countries, of economic development and the absolute systematic increase in the proportion of the socialist sector of the economy that is the decisive and main element in the entire economic policy of the proletariat....

With regard to the relationship between *production* and *consumption*, it must be borne in mind that they cannot both be maximized *simultaneously* (as the opposition is now demanding), since this is an insoluble problem. Similarly, at the present time, the policy

of one-sided (capital) *accumulation* (as Trotsky demanded when in 1923 when he adopted the watchword of rigid concentration and intensified pressure on the workers) or the policy of one-sided *consumption* cannot be adopted. Considering both the relative degree of contradiction among these aspects and their interaction and the constraints they exert upon one another, and also the fact that from the point of view of long-term development these interests generally coincide, what is required is to find the optimum combination of both of these factors.

The same must be said about the city and the village, socialist industry and peasant economy. It is wrong to demand the maximum transfer of funds from the peasant economy into industry, as this demand would mean not only a political break with the peasantry but also undermining of the raw-materials basis of industry itself, undermining of its domestic market, undermining of export, and upset of the equilibrium of the whole economy. On the other hand, it would be incorrect to refrain from taking funds from the village in order to build industry; that, at the present time, would slow down the rate of development and would upset the balance to the detriment of the country's industrialization.

With regard to the *pace* of development, it is equally necessary to bear in mind the extreme complexity of the task. Here the aim must not be to maximize the pace of accumulation for the *immediately following* year or years, but to combine economic elements in such a way as to ensure the most rapid *long-term* pace of development. From this point of view the opposition's slogan of raising prices is to be condemned resolutely and once and for all: this slogan would not only lead to the bureaucratic degeneration and monopolistic decay of industry, not only would it strike a blow at the consumer and, in the first place, at the working class and the city and village poor, not only would it deal considerable trump cards to the kulak—but after a time it would sharply lower the rate of development, narrowing the domestic market, subverting industry's agricultural base, and bringing technical progress in industry to a standstill.

It is equally necessary to reach an optimum combination of both factors as regards the relationship *between the development of heavy and light industry*. While we consider it correct to transfer the center of gravity to production of the means of production, here note must be taken of the danger of tying down too large a proportion of state capital in heavy industry, which is amortized in the market only in a number of years; on the other hand, it is also necessary to bear in mind that the more rapid turnover in light industry (production of goods of foremost necessity) enables its capital to be used also for heavy industrial construction, provided that *light* industry itself develops.

Only if both of these facts are taken into account and combined in a planned fashion will it be possible to conduct the economy along the course of a more or less planned, more or less crisis-free, development.

5. From the point of view of the *class struggle and the deployment of class forces* the period we are entering is characterized by the growing class power of the proletariat and the consolidation of its alliance with the mass of poor and middle peasants, with a relative decline—although still possibly an absolute increase—in the private capitalist elements in the city and countryside.

The decisions of the Fourteenth Conference and the Fourteenth Party Congress have served as the basis for a correct policy toward the village in the present period in that they strengthened the alliance between the working class and the basic mass of the peasantry. Having overcome the antimiddle peasant deviation in its party, and on the basis of the consolidation of the worker-peasant bloc, the proletariat can now proceed, *together* with the whole mass of the poor and middle peasants, to more systematic and insistent restrictions on the kulak and the private property owner. This must be the basic class orientation of the five year plan for the national economy.

## II. THE PROBLEM OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN AND THE PARTY'S ECONOMIC POLICY

1. The basic difficulties and problems of the economic policy of the proletariat are in regulating the *relations between the city and the village*. The five year economic plan must be structured in such a way as to resolve the problems arising out of the fundamental disproportions of our economy; the disproportion *between industry and agriculture* which is far from being overcome despite the more rapid growth of industry over that of agriculture; the disproportion between the prices of industrial and agricultural products (market "scissors"); the disproportion between the demand for *industrial raw materials* (cotton, leather, wool, etc.) and its supply; and finally, the disproportion between the quantity of working hands in the countryside and the real possibility of their economic employment (the so-called "rural overpopulation")....

2. Overcoming these disproportions can conceivably be achieved by various methods. Thus, for example, establishing equilibrium between supply and demand of industrial products can be achieved by *increasing industrial prices* (the method of the opposition, which it has propagandized up to the very present time); however, this method, for reasons already mentioned above, must be firmly rejected by the party. It [establishing equilibrium—AGC] could be achieved by a sharp *decrease in agricultural prices*; on the contrary, this method would reduce the entire rate of growth, curtailing the possibility of exports and severely damaging still more the raw material base of industry. It could be achieved by a sharp intensification of *peasant taxation*. But this particular method, since it concerns not only the kulak but all the peasant masses, cannot be accepted because of the same reasons as the policy of high prices for industrial goods or the policy of extremely low prices for agricultural products. Similar methods for destroying the fundamental disproportions are ingenuous or in the final analysis would lead to establishing equilibrium not on the rapidly increasing growth curve of productivity, but on their extremely *delayed* movement. On the other hand, such methods, while establishing a certain equilibrium in the market, not only could not but lead to the softening or, moreso, to the liquidation of rural overpopulation and connected with this unemployment in the cities, but, on the contrary, lead to a still greater acute situation and would severely affect the entire political life of the country. Likewise must be rejected is the general setting up of the "temporary" accelerated granting of credit to agriculture and the maximum expansion of grain exports at the expense of industrial investment. This policy, which within the bounds of the foreign trade monopoly would give the greatest expansion of foreign trade operations, would contradict the policy of the industrialization of the country, retard the growth of our industry, and economically disarm the Union before the face of the foreign capitalist enemy.

3. *The only correct way to overcome these disproportions* is by lowering the *production costs of industrial products* through an energetic rationalization of industry and its expansion, consequently, on the basis of a policy of *lowering industrial prices*; by developing *labor-intensive crops in the countryside and industrializing agriculture* (primarily by developing industries involved in the primary processing of agricultural products); by the comprehensive *encouragement of small-scale savings* (internal loans, savings banks, by encouraging the acquisition of shares in cooperatives and building new cooperative factories) and by tying them in with the credit system....

4. Proceeding from the general course of foreign trade (the maximum of trade relations under conditions of strengthening our own production basis and growing independence from the capitalist world), it is necessary to construct a foreign trade plan with the purpose of an *active balance*. An active trade balance together with the increase of gold extraction in the country is the fundamental source for the formation of a currency reserve, which is especially necessary in connection with the exacerbation of relations between the capitalist world and the USSR as well as with the possibility of the future of the harvest or a bad harvest....

5. With respect to *industry* the following major problems must be noted: in the first place, the correlation between *production of the means of production and their scheduled dates of completion* (because of the danger of freezing excessive funds over too broad a front of capital construction with too long a period of amortization); in the third place, the correlation between production for the internal market and for export, on the one hand, and for the country's defense, on the other.

The policy of industrializing the country requires, in the first place, a strengthening of the *production of the means of production* so that the growth of heavy and light industry, transport, and agriculture, i.e., their production requirements, will be basically met from the domestic industrial production of the USSR. Those branches of heavy industry must develop most rapidly which in the shortest time strengthen the economic might and defense capacity of the USSR, guarantee the possibility of developing in case of an economic blockade, lessen our dependence on the capitalist world, and promote reorganization of agriculture on the basis of higher technology and collectivization of the economy. Therefore, particular attention must be devoted to the fastest possible implementation of the electrification plan, the development of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy especially as regards high-quality metals, the development of chemical production especially of artificial fertilizers, the further development of coal and peat mining and of oil production, the building of general and agricultural machinery, shipbuilding, electrical industry, and the gold and platinum industry.

The *consumer goods* industry must improve the quantity and quality of its production to a level which will ensure a substantial elevation of the per capita consumption of the toilers. Particular attention must be directed to the development of textile, leather, and food industries which, since they ensure the growth of agricultural raw materials production, particularly stimulate the increasing industrialization of agriculture and absorption of the agricultural overpopulation....

6. With respect to *transport* it is necessary to take on the task of extending such a transportation network and its work that would cover the demands of an expanding production and the circulation of goods, while introducing new regions to the economic life of the country, opening enormous sources to increase productive forces, and meeting the needs of defense. While taking into account the slowness of transportation in the transition from repair to decisive restructuring and rationalization, special attention must be paid to the radical reconstruction of the transportation economy and the rationalization of its work along the type of the more technically advanced countries and together with this more complete adaptation to the consumers' interests. These measures with respect to water transport must be especially shown in the five year plan, because the overloading of railroads promotes urgently the more complete utilization of water transport and the combination of water and railway transportation....

7. The plan for *agriculture* must take into account, not only the categorical necessity of an overall advance of agriculture (in the first place, increasing yield and expanding the sown area) but also a correct combination of the basic economic elements in the regional as well as in the branch sectors (grain crops, technical crops, and animal husbandry), while these agricultural branches must develop with sufficient rapidity to: 1) ensure an expansion of mass consumption, 2) ensure a sufficient increase in exports to meet the import and currency accumulation needs of the five year plan. The five year plan's price policy for agricultural products must ensure that the relations among the various developing branches of agriculture will be stable and will correspond to the plans for the country's industrial and personal consumption and for export. The *distribution of resources* among the various branches of agriculture is determined by the above factors and also by the need to eliminate the disproportion between the available labor power and its actual employment: hence the need to force the development of *labor-intensive crops* and to *industrialize agriculture* rapidly, mainly by increasing the primary processing of agricultural products.

Hence also the inadmissibility of an overall approach to problems of agricultural technology and the necessity to distinguish from one another the grain-producing regions (requiring tractors, machinery, select seed, etc.), regions of intensive technical crops (requiring land improvements, drainage, irrigation, fertilizers, etc.), and finally, animal-raising regions (requiring improved breeds and the organization of marketing). In particular, the plan must expand the area sown to wheat and barley and heighten yield and the marketed share of these crops in such a way as to cover both the growing demand within the country and the necessary volume of exports. At the same time the plan must incorporate measures relating to forestry, especially regarding their rational management (forest management and land improvement, reforestation) to ensure a proper and fuller use of the country's forest resources.

The plan must provide for *capital investments* in agriculture, both by the peasants themselves and from the state budget, aimed at the mechanization of agriculture and at accomplishing the most important irrigation projects and land improvement generally, with particular attention being directed at projects designed to prevent possible crop failures. The plan must incorporate measures for supplying the villages with complex agricultural machinery, especially tractors, which in our conditions is one of the means of strengthening the collectivization of agricultural production.

The five year plan must foresee accelerated work on *land management* as the elementary prerequisite for a general transition of all agriculture to a higher level and for introducing collective methods of farming, as well as for securing the interests of the poor and middle peasants in the struggle against the kulak. It is also necessary to make up a plan for resettlement and on its basis to intensify resettlement efforts which, promoting the advance of the productive forces of agriculture and improving the situation of the peasant groups which possess little or nothing, will serve to reduce "rural overpopulation".

The plan must be based upon the party's fundamental class orientation, namely, the policy of relying on the poor peasants, a firm alliance with the middle peasants, and an offensive against the kulak. Therefore the plan must aim at supporting the *cooperatives* (here decisively rejecting the opposition's proposal that the cooperatives be deprived of their capital, which would be a blow to Lenin's whole cooperative plan); it must be based upon a correct policy *within the cooperatives* (credit to the smallholders, struggle against kulak tendencies, and a corresponding policy within the farm machinery associations, etc.); it must, furthermore, proceed from the premise that, together with the comprehensive development of *marketing* cooperatives, now extensive support must be given to all viable forms of *producer* cooperatives (communes, kolkhozes, artels, production associations, cooperative factories, etc.), and also to sovkhoses which require advancement to a higher level.

8. A major task of socialist construction in the organization of trade is *to overcome the anarchy of the market*, and the waste of materials inherent in the capitalistic mode of distribution, through the further development and rationalization of the socialized sector of commodity trade.

The socialized trade sector, which is expanding by displacing private capital and is introducing the planning principle into commodity trade by rationalizing the trade network and by minimizing nonproductive expenditures in trade, will secure all the gigantic economic advantages of the new social system of distribution and, in the future, with the successes of socialist construction, will be transformed into an apparatus for the socialist distribution of products....

9. With respect to the *circulation of money and credit* the plan must be based on the necessity of systematically *increasing the purchasing power of the chervonets*. The issuing of paper money must be limited by the amount depending on the rise of commodity trade....

10. The five year plan must devote special attention to the question of raising the economy and culture of backward nationality regions, proceeding from the need to liquidate gradually their economic and cultural backwardness, correspondingly predicting the more rapid pace of development of their economy and culture, emanating from the linking of the needs and demands of these regions with the needs and demands of the Union.

11. The proper resolution of central problems of the five year plan is conditional on such an *increase in national income and its distribution* that achieves the growth of the welfare of the working class, poor and middle peasantry while preserving the maximum tempo in the growth of the entire economy....

12. The five year plan in connection with the tasks of socialist construction must bear in mind the necessity of the decisive increase in the cultural level of the population in the city and village, the rise of the nationality culture of the USSR, and linking the plan of cultural construction with the industrialization of the country as an integral part of the general plan for the socialist construction of the USSR. On the basis of the plan for cultural construction those tasks for national education must be established to achieve the cultural growth of the broad masses of laborers (general education, liquidation of illiteracy, mass professional-technical training, etc.) as well as the task to prepare qualified specialists and scientific workers.

13. By establishing a significant step forward in setting up planning tasks, the congress considers it necessary, in view of the growing complexity of planning and its growing practical importance, to intensify planning discipline, strengthen planning organs, and improve planning leadership. With the goal of more complete involvement of the planning leadership in the economic life of the country the congress considers it necessary in the course of the upcoming five years to complete the regionalization of the entire country.

### III. SOCIALIST RATIONALIZATION, SIGNIFICANCE AND ROLE OF MASS ORGANIZATIONS

With the goal of authorizing the above-mentioned tasks the Fifteenth Congress VKP(B) considers it necessary to put into effect a series of directives which can only achieve the carrying out of the correct plan of the economy.

1. At the center of everything must stand the most energetic, most intensive work for rationalization: rationalization of industry, at first priority the rationalization of the trade apparatus, rationalization of the state apparatus, etc.

This rationalization cannot be put into effect without increasing the role of science and technology....

2. This work on the rationalization of the entire economy by its most important and firm preconditions has widespread involvement in it of the workers' and peasant masses.... An energetic struggle is needed for the decisive reconstruction of the welfare, struggle for culture, against drunkenness, for the urgent liquidation of illiteracy, for labor consciousness and labor discipline of the workers' and peasant masses.

3. For this the especially important task falls on the part of the proletarian trade union organizations, from their lower to the highest levels....

4. It is necessary to mobilize in accelerating steps, around the idea of the economic lifting of the country, the broad peasant masses, the poor and middle peasants, primarily through the *cooperatives*....

5. The congress draws attention to the large role of the *komsomol* and the tasks which stand before them. The *komsomol* must be the initiator and conductor of new beginnings in cities and countryside for the rationalization of the economy, labor, and welfare....

6. The congress equally draws the party's attention to the entire importance of the still increasing involvement of widespread layers of the women proletariat and leading masses of women peasants in the construction of socialism and rationalization of the economy,

while increasing by this the carrying out of measures such as raising the labor qualifications of women workers as well as increasing their social emancipation....

7. In view of the enormity of the tasks which stand before the country with respect to economic construction in the upcoming five year period, the congress emphasizes that party members, whatever positions they hold—from the workbench to the highest leadership organs of the country—must serve as an example of labor heroism, labor discipline, and intensive, precise, and rationally applied work.

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Confirming the correctness of the Central Committee's economic policy during the preceding period, the Congress is of the view that the implementation of the five year plan, which must considerably enhance the welfare of the masses and consolidate the position of socialism, depends first and foremost upon the harmony, cohesion, and creative energy of the party itself. From this point of view, the Congress categorically condemns the activities of comrade Trotsky's opposition faction which is disrupting the great constructive effort and disturbing its course and is trying to disorganize the whole soviet apparatus as well.

The Congress categorically condemns the opposition's economic line. Contrary to Lenin's statement that complete victory of socialism in our country is possible provided the party follows a correct policy and there are no attacks from the outside, the opposition assumes that the victory of socialism is impossible. Therefore, instead of a confident and well thought-out policy, it proposes to the party either the greatest unprincipled vacillations or a policy which has nothing in common with Leninism. In the sphere of economic rationalization the Trotskyite opposition, accusing the opponents of this policy of an "'agitator' approach", has gone from the slogan of "rigid concentration" and pressure on the workers (with the closings of such giants of proletarian industry as the Putilov factory, the Briansk factory, etc.) all the way to essentially denying rationalization itself.

Lenin's major proposition, which is at the *basis* of the whole economic orientation, namely, the proposition that proletarian industry must give the peasant *cheaper* goods than he got from the capitalist system, has clearly been scorned by the opposition. In complete opposition to Lenin, it has advanced the proposition that more must be taken from the peasants than was taken by the old regime, that the policy must be to *elevate* the already *extremely high* prices, etc., etc. Only the pressure of extremely severe criticism compelled the opposition to break away from this policy which was a policy of breaking with the peasantry and fleecing the worker-consumer, a policy of helping the kulak in the village, a policy of monopolistic parasitism and bureaucratic degeneration of the industrial apparatus. In full and in principle contradicting *Lenin's whole cooperative plan* which insisted on the *financing* of the cooperatives, the opposition has put forward the proposition that cooperative capital must be withdrawn from trade, in this way thinking to lighten the position of industry. But this bureaucratic-administrative policy would hand over the real and vital tie with the peasants to *private capital*, would be a blow against the economic initiative of the peasants, would block off their road to socialism, placing private capital in command, during the conversion process, between state industry and the peasantry. Fully contradicting Lenin, who issued a direct *warning* against the "superindustrializing" point of view, pointed out the necessity of moving ahead with the whole basic mass of the peasants, and swept aside lightweight *phrases* about "peasant narrowmindedness", the trotskyite opposition fully *adheres* to the "peasant narrowmindedness" thesis ridiculed by Lenin and proposes moving ahead without this peasant mass, thus inevitably condemning the party's policy to failure. Deriving from this the thesis of "degeneration, Thermidor", and others taken from the Ustrialov-Menshevik arsenal [Ustrialov propagated in exile the idea that the Bolsheviks were ceasing to be revolutionary], the opposition is trying to demobilize the

working class ideologically, abandoning the Bolshevik track of the very energetic construction of socialism in favor of the Menshevik track of a "critical" attitude toward the very class essence of this construction. Taking a negative, or at best a "neutral", attitude toward the rationalization of industry, the opposition in its demagogic-agitational demands is attempting to find support in the prejudices and khvostims [tail-endism; following in the wake of events] of the most backward proletarian strata with a semipeasant consumer psychology. From this attitude of the opposition toward rationalization, and its lack of confidence in the latter's success, flows its negative attitude toward the seven-hour working day, whose successful implementation is a function of the harmonious and energetic accomplishment of rationalization.

The objective result of this policy would be the bureaucratic *stagnation* of our industry and the proletariat's conversion from allies and leaders of the peasantry into *consumers* who do not set themselves the task of *remaking* the peasant economy. Such a policy would inevitably lead to the collapse of the proletarian dictatorship. On the other hand, the opposition hides behind the banner of *internationalism* while in fact it advocates the sort of economic tie with *international capital* which would lead to a loss of economic independence by the Union and to the thwarting of socialist construction.

The Congress instructs the Central Committee to have a five year plan developed for consideration by the next Congress of Soviets and to ensure that all local soviet, trade union, party, and other organizations are involved in the thorough and comprehensive discussion of the draft plan.

McNeal/Gregor, 319-26.

*Kommunisticheskaia Partiia v rezoliutsiakh*, Vol. 4, 31-51.



## ON WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

19 December 1927

### I. DISTINCTIVE PECULIARITIES IN THE GROWTH OF THE PEASANT ECONOMY UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

1. The dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR changes the fundamental form of conditions, and consequently, also a course of agricultural development, while creating a principally different type of developing rural relationships, a different type of class regrouping in the countryside, and a different direction in the development of economic forms. The dictatorship of the proletariat, and the nationalization of land, heavy industry and banks not only give the possibility of carrying agriculture with it, but even creating a completely different *relationship between city and village*, different than that seen in capitalist society....

2. *The leading source* of the entire economic growth is the commanding heights of the economy, primarily *heavy industry*....

3. These general preconditions of the proletarian dictatorship showed to a distant dissimilar degree the different stages of the revolution. In the period *immediately following the introduction of the new economic policy*, having established the correct basis for combining state heavy industry and small rural production, the commanding heights of the



proletariat were extremely weak, private capital was in a period of its own initial accumulation and was on the offensive, the petty bourgeois elements represented the greatest small property threat to socialist construction, because the peasant by experience had not yet evidence of the successes of socialist construction and the correct organization of the goods exchange between socialist industry and the peasant economy.

In the *following* period, on the basis of the growth of productive forces in general and primarily socialist industry, there occurred the regrouping of forces and economic forms on the side of increasing the role of socialist elements....

4. The *third* period is characterized by the further growth of the socialist economy sector and the still greater regrouping of forces on the side of the still greater increase in the base of socialist construction.

With respect to the economy, on the basis of the further rise of the economy, state industry not only exceeded the prewar level, but had even transitioned to its own reequipping and growth on a new technical base....

## II. STRUGGLE OF SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST ELEMENTS IN AGRICULTURE

5. One of the fundamental preconditions for the growth of the USSR toward socialism is the *raising of the productive forces in the countryside and the rise in the welfare of the broad peasant masses*....

6. The greatest negative feature of today's countryside, which expresses its historical past and remnants of the country's general backwardness, is the so-called "rural overpopulation", i.e., a large number of "superfluous" laborers who cannot find employment in the countryside and a significantly increasing number of unemployed in the city. Another negative phenomenon, which slows down the rate of agricultural growth, that needs to be considered is the poor organization of a significant part of arable land and the lack of implements possessed by the less powerful layers of the peasantry, that entail also insufficient familiarity with arable land by these layers of peasantry. Finally, a negative feature of the present situation, concerning the relationship between city and village, is the so-called "scissors", i.e., the divergence of prices for industrial products, on the one hand, and for agricultural products, on the other. These negative features can be eliminated only as a result of a series of measures on a great economic scale....

7. By examining it from the *social-class point-of-view*, the process of developing agriculture at the present time is characterized by the struggle of socialist and capitalist tendencies....

8. The gravest error of the opposition consists in that it mechanically transfers the law of the development of the peasant economy during capitalism totally and completely to the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, while thus falling in behind the bourgeois ideologues. The opposition does not see that the path of the development of the countryside is determined by the development of the city and that against the capitalist elements in the countryside are under our conditions standing not only the hired hand, poor and middle peasant, but also the entire system of the dictatorship of the proletariat with its powerful commanding heights of the economy (first and foremost is socialist industry), cooperatives, and other levers of planning that influence agriculture....

9. Of late it is necessary to establish a *significant increase in the planning-regulating role of the proletarian state on agriculture and the increase in the influence of socialist elements in the countryside itself*....

10. *With respect to supply* we have already arrived at such a situation, where more than half of all the mass commodities received by the countryside are going directly through cooperatives and state organs, and entirely in the hands of cooperatives and state organs the countryside is supplied with machines. Private capital is playing an insignificant role in a whole series of industrial goods (manufactured goods, salt, kerosene, etc.)....

11. The experience of the past years, the last few in particular, has confirmed totally and completely the correctness of Lenin's cooperative plan, according to which socialist industry namely through the cooperatives will carry the small-scale peasant economy along the path toward socialist, while remaking the individual and fragmented production units—through the process of conversion and even moreso through the reorganization and unification of production itself—into large-scale collectivized farms on the basis of new technology (electrification, etc.)....

12. The development of agricultural, consumer, and cottage-artisan cooperatives and their inclusion in the most important positions with respect to the commodity trade between city and countryside lead to the economic necessity and economic possibility of moving from operating on sales and supply to *production*....

13. Increasing the influence of planning on the production process through cooperatives has already found its own expression in the form of direct orders by cooperative producers for a given quality and quantity of products, as takes place in the sugar industry and particularly in cotton production (the so-called system of contracts, etc.), so that customers, i.e., state industry, have the possibility of improving the quality of the production process, stipulating in a contract better production methods (sowing in drills, quality of seed, soil fertilizers, etc.) and offering assistance in their implementation.

14. Along the course of production cooperatives there is the development of the very first forms of the production association, such as the *artel*, various types of production societies, and agricultural communes, which in an overwhelming majority unite the poor and less powerful peasantry....

15. An important factor affecting the peasantry are the large land improvement construction projects, such as, for example, irrigation work in Central Asia (cotton farming) and in the Caucasus....

16. The growth of industry and raising the productive forces of the country in general, and the increase of state funds for forming millions of poor-middle peasants into cooperatives allow more and more for carrying out the technical restructuring of the entire economy, including agriculture, on the basis of electrification. While transforming the technology of all industry, electrification on an accelerated scale will bring a new and complete technical foundation to all of agriculture, transforming its methods and competently pushing it to a path of collective labor....

The gravest error of the opposition is its attempts to set the electrification plan off against Lenin's cooperative plan. These attempts show the complete misunderstanding by the opposition of the undoubted fact that the electrification plan and the cooperative plan are indissoluble parts of Lenin's plan for the construction of socialism in our country.

### III. THE STATE OF PRACTICAL WORK AND ITS INADEQUACIES.

#### PERVERSION OF THE PARTY LINE

17. Although the general policy is entirely correct and the growing influence of the proletarian state, its organs, and the cooperatives upon agriculture is becoming increasingly powerful, it is necessary to point out a number of major inadequacies, errors, distortions, and sometimes even scandalous violations of the party's political line.

With respect to the activities of *state organs*, errors must first of all be noted in the regulation of prices for agricultural products (mistakes of 1925/26) which led to the disruption of our export-import plan and thus of the production programs of industry, a reduction in the area sown for technical crops, etc. It must be noted that the *land organs*, the organs of cooperation and agricultural credit, devote far from adequate attention to implementing a correct proletarian policy in the village (machinery supply, credit, rental policies, land management, etc.) and frequently do not adequately repulse the claims of the kulaks. It is equally necessary to note that the organs of the *People's Commissariat for*

*Finance*, despite major successes in implementing a progressive tax structure, do not always cope with the task of accounting for all taxable income of kulak groups and of establishing a suitable tax rate. It is further necessary to point out that the state delivery organs frequently under-rate the significance of the cooperatives as mass organizations whose goal is to socialize agricultural production, and tend to play down the role of the cooperatives and convert the cooperative movement itself into nothing but a branch of the corresponding state delivery organizations.

18. In the cooperative movement itself are to be noted a number of unhealthy phenomena which signal a distortion of the party's policy. The *composition* of the cooperatives, on the whole unconditionally poor peasant and middle peasant, none the less frequently reveals relatively slight involvement of the poor peasants in the cooperatives and a disproportionately extensive involvement of the prosperous village apex. The make-up of the *electoral organs* of the cooperatives manifests the same inadequacies despite the decision that the kulaks are not to be admitted to these organs. The result is that in the matter of *machinery supply* there have been frequent instances where precisely the upper village strata have had relatively better access to machinery. The same must be said about the distribution of *credit*. It must also be pointed out that party directives are not obeyed by cooperative organs which often do not use up funds directly allocated for the poor peasants in the cooperatives. Despite the recent turn for the better with respect to these facts, and despite the VKP(B) Central Committee straightforward directives on the matter, such distortions of the party line continue to occur. Attention should also be directed to the existence of false cooperatives which serve to mask kulak "associations" enjoying all the rights and privileges of cooperatives. Another considerable inadequacy in the organizational work of the cooperatives is the existence of a mass of so-called "wild" cooperatives not yet incorporated into the centralized cooperative system.

A general defect in the work of the land organs, economic organs, cooperatives, and credit institutions, is the frequent absence of coordination among them leading even to the mutual incompatibility of the measures which they practice.

19. With regard to the *work of the soviets*, the party's policy of rehabilitating the village soviets has been an undoubted success. The soviets (their sections and commissions) are increasingly becoming centers for organizing economic and political life, schools of administration, instruments for promoting new poor peasant and middle peasant cadres, etc. The organization of the nonparty aktiv around the soviets has enhanced their authority in the eyes of the broad masses. At the same time it is necessary to mention the increasing degree of self-discipline of the poor peasants and agricultural laborers displayed in the elections to the soviets, the cooperative organs, etc.; at the same time it must be recognized that this work is still far from adequate.

20. With regard to *party work*, it must next be noted that it is still inadequate among the farm workers (as is also reflected in the composition of the village cells), and that party political work in the village generally is still insufficiently tied in with economic and cultural construction. However, the campaigns for reelections to the soviets, conducted under party direction and on the basis of broad democracy for the toilers, show that the authority of the party organizations has grown among the peasant masses. A very important role in the village is played by the *Komsomol* organization which at the present time must set itself the task of regulating its composition so as to increase its nucleus of farm laborers and poor peasants, of training extensive new cadres of Komsomol activists from among its members, of implementing the party line more precisely, of giving the party aktiv assistance in organizing the poor peasants and agricultural workers, and of educating its members politically. In the village the Komsomol organization must be the party's principal lever for the advancement and collectivization of agriculture, the development of broad cultural initiative, and the training of new cadres of workers for socialism. In the matter of transforming farm worker and poor peasant women into activists, of elevating the cultural level of the peasantry and improving their cooperatives, an important role is played

by the delegates' meetings of women peasants which must intensify their work on the comprehensive involvement, in all village socialist construction, of the peasant strata which are closest to the party.

#### IV. CURRENT TASKS OF THE PARTY

In that way we can state: 1) that the socialist sector of the economy has grown very significantly, and together with it, the relative influence of the working class; 2) that private capital has been forced out of a number of very important positions; 3) that in the countryside both the fundamental contradictions and the levers of socialist development have become outlined with perfect clarity, i.e., on the one hand, some growth of the kulaks, and on the other hand, strengthening of the middle peasant group and growth in the organization of the village poor, rapid development of the cooperatives which, according to Lenin, under conditions of the proletarian dictatorship is equivalent to the "growth of socialism", and strengthening of the role of the state organs in planning and regulating the peasant economy.

The corresponding party policy since the Fourteenth Party Conference and the Fourteenth Party Congress has led to a number of major changes in another respect: 1) the sown area has increased, and there has been a sharp reduction in the amount of uncultivated land, this being due to the overall economic advance of the basic mass of the peasantry; 2) the middle peasant has moved further away from the kulak politically, the union between the working class and the mass of middle peasants has become stronger, and there has been a decisive breakthrough in the matter of isolating the kulaks.

Thus the goals set by the party at the Fourteenth Conference and the Fourteenth Congress must basically be considered as having been attained. The party won these successes by struggling both against an underestimation of the kulak threat and, especially, against the opposition's antimiddle peasant deviation. The party would not have been able to achieve these successes if it had not concentrated its fire against the opposition's opportunistic antimiddle peasant deviation, as this deviation, undermining the bond between the proletariat and the middle peasant masses and making it more difficult to split the middle peasant away from the kulak, in fact serves to heighten kulak influence in the village. The party's Leninist policy of union with the middle peasant must be continued. The successes of party policy in the village, and the new situation thus created, permit the party of the proletariat, by employing the whole power of the economic organs, and relying, as before, upon the poor and middle peasant masses, to develop further the offensive against the kulaks and to adopt a number of new measures limiting the development of capitalism in the countryside and leading the peasant economy along the road to socialism.

This is the background of the following current tasks of the party:

##### *1. Elements of regulation of agriculture by the state plan*

*a* the successes of the state organs and the cooperatives in taking over the sale of industrial goods (including the products of cottage industry) in the village and the deliveries of agricultural products to the city are to be consolidated and developed as the prime condition for overcoming the anarchy of the market, extending the planning principle to agriculture, and safeguarding the leading role of socialist industry throughout the whole economy.

*b* the policy of bringing down the prices of industrial goods while maintaining the stability of agricultural prices is to be maintained undeviatingly as the major condition for improving the material position of the toiling masses and strengthening the bond between the city and the village.

*c* the developing practice of establishing contractual relations (contractualization, etc.) between the peasants in cooperatives and the state organs is to be supported in every way since it creates a direct link between the peasant economy and the corresponding branches of socialized industry (sugar and textile industries, etc.) and facilitates regulation by the state plan of the agriculture of these raions and branches.

*d* in accordance with the task of comprehensive encouragement of the unification of small peasant farms into large collective farms, the agricultural credit system must direct its main attention to the support and development of producer cooperatives among the broad masses of poor and middle peasants, devoting increased attention both to securing peasant deposits in the cooperatives and especially to organizing processing cooperatives, etc.

*e* with the strengthening of the cooperatives (agricultural, consumer, and cottage industry) and with the exclusion of the kulak and the small private trader from the area of commodity trade, it will be necessary to establish such relations between the cooperatives and the state organs which will ensure a further expansion of the sphere of work of the cooperatives by unconditional safeguarding of the interests and the leadership of the Soviet state.

## 2. *Taxation*

*a* The decision of the party and Soviet power releasing peasant smallholders (35 percent of the peasant farms in the Union) from the agricultural tax is to be implemented with all due precision.

*b* In order to tax the growing income of the most prosperous village strata, the Central Committee is charged with developing the question of transfer to a fully progressive income tax.

## 3. *The cooperatives*

*a* The network of consumer, agricultural, and cottage industry cooperatives is to be broadened and strengthened with the aim of drawing all the poor peasants and most of the middle peasants into the cooperatives in the near future; the funds made available by the cooperatives for organizing poor peasant cooperatives are to be increased.

*b* The involvement of peasant women in the cooperatives is to be intensified, especially of those who are working in agricultural branches employing considerable amounts of women's labor (poultry farming, various branches of cottage industry, etc.)

*c* In order further to exclude private capital from cottage industry, the state organs are to give more extensive support to cottage industry cooperatives, their mechanization is to be intensified, etc.

*d* The so-called "wild" cooperatives which have arisen through the organizational weakness of the cooperative movement, are to be included immediately into the cooperative system.

*e* Approval is hereby given to the practice of forming specialized forms of agricultural cooperatives (reorganized Agricultural Union, bread center, butter center, flax center, sugar beet cooperative, etc.) and, since these are the most reliable instruments for inducing the individual peasant farmers to pass gradually from marketing and supply cooperatives to socialized forms of production, their further development is recognized as essential.

*f* The struggle to free the smallholders who lack equipment from their dependence on kulak elements, who use their equipment (agricultural machines, etc.) to enslave the poor peasants, must be intensified and to this end a broad network of equipment supply points must be developed in the agricultural cooperatives, in addition to the state equipment supply points, for renting machinery to smallholders on advantageous terms and for furthering the development of socialized land cultivation techniques, harvesting techniques, etc.

*g* The supplying of agricultural equipment to the kolkhozes and the peasant smallholders is to be facilitated in every way, with special credit advantages, repayment conditions, etc., being worked out. In order to limit the supply of agricultural machinery to kulak elements appropriate forms are to be developed (reduction of the kulak share in the sum total of equipment produced, payment in cash, etc.).

*h* The funds assigned by state and local budgets to poor peasant needs must be increased and employed for the development of producer cooperatives (kolkhozes); at the same time the poor peasants' share of other credits is to be increased,

*i* Existing successes in advancing the most reliable poor peasant and middle peasant elements to leading positions in cooperatives must be consolidated, and from them must be created new and broad cadres of socialist cooperative members; the struggle must be intensified against the attempts of kulak elements to take over the lower-level cooperative organizations.

*j* Approval is hereby given to the creation of a union of agricultural cooperative unions as a center for unifying all aspects of agricultural cooperation and as an organ called upon to broaden the cooperative base in the village, together with the consumer and the cottage industry cooperatives, and to instil socialist cooperative methods in the millions of peasants.

#### 4. *Kolkhozes and sovkhazes*

*a* The Central Committee decision on the results of kolkhoz and sovkhaz construction since 30 December 1926, is hereby approved, and all party organizations and party workers in soviet and cooperative organs are ordered to intensify their assistance to kolkhoz construction and to strengthen the sovkhazes, converting them into truly exemplary large-scale farms of the socialist type and at the same time intensifying their assistance to the peasant farms (organizing equipment supply points, agricultural information points, tractor columns, etc., in the sovkhazes).

*b* While rendering all possible support to the expansion of the network of poor peasant and middle peasant associations for the purchase and joint use of agricultural machinery, a resolute struggle must be conducted against pseudo associations (and against pseudo cooperatives generally) which usually act as shields for kulak elements in their acquisition of all sorts of illegal advantages in matters of credit, supply, etc.

#### 5. *Land use and management*

*a* The foundation of the nationalization of land is to be consolidated in every way, and (direct or indirect) attempts to undermine the nationalization of the land, such as buying and selling or the giving of land as occurs, for example, in certain regions of the Caucasus and of Central Asia, are to be prosecuted as serious crimes.

*b* In those regions where the leasing of land leads to the growth of kulak elements the amount of land leased is gradually to be reduced. The period of the lease is to be limited to not longer than one crop rotation, but in any case no longer than six years. With regard to persons who, despite the assistance extended to them by the state and the cooperatives, do not cultivate their assigned land themselves or with the help of their families but lease it out from year to year, their right to lease land is to be limited by decision of the volost (raion) executive committees to from three to six years in a row, at the expiration of which they are to be deprived of the right to hold land, and their lands are to be transferred into the possession of the land association.

Persons guilty of violating the law prohibiting all and any forms of sublease are to be resolutely punished as criminals.

State land funds are primarily to be leased to farms of the laboring type, with the period of lease being limited to six years. Waivers of this rule with respect to state funds are permitted in individual raions only with the assent of the central land organs.

*c* Those forms of land use which most favor the development of agricultural cooperatives and mechanization (small settlements set apart from the village, etc.) are to be comprehensively encouraged and extended; the practice of assigning land to separate holdings, and especially to individual farmsteads, is to be limited, and completely ended wherever it leads to the growth of kulak elements.

*d* The state is to be in charge of the organization of land use by the poor peasant and smallholder strata. This must be closely tied in with other organizational and economic measures (agricultural assistance, credit, land improvement, supply of equipment, etc.). Care must be taken to ensure that in the organization of land use the interests of the poorest strata are safeguarded even with respect to the quality and location of the land allocated.

The planned deadline for completing work on the organization of land use in the USSR is to be shortened.

*e* The urgency of establishing the fundamental principles of land management and land use on an all-union scale is hereby recognized.

#### 6. *Hired labor and the Union of Agricultural and Timber Workers*

*a* Care must be taken to ensure undeviating implementation of the labor Code with respect to men and women agricultural workers on farms of the kulak type, with Code violators being held strictly accountable.

*b* The "Provisional Rules" must be implemented undeviatingly in peasant farms employing hired labor, and violators of the "Provisional Rules" are to be held strictly accountable.

*c* The laws on social insurance of agricultural and forest workers, both men and women, must be implemented strictly.

*d* To recognize as necessary, the intensification of efforts of the Agricultural and Timber Workers' Union to organize the still unorganized farm laborers, and similarly the facilitation of admission, into the Agricultural and Timber Workers' Union, of those semiproletarian elements in the village who are still outside the union and for whom hired labor is the basic means of subsistence.

#### 7. *Insurance for smallholders. Peasant assistance associations*

*a* The Central Committee is hereby ordered to undertake to prepare the conditions necessary for the adoption, at the next Congress of Soviets, of laws on the old-age insurance of peasant smallholders.

*b* The peasant mutual assistance associations are to be strengthened in every way so that they would become a truly mass organization of the poor peasant and middle peasant village strata for extending mutual assistance and for organizing economic measures alleviating the position of the smallholders. While work is to be continued on individual assistance to poor peasants, the efforts of the Peasants' Mutual Aid Society are more and more to be concentrated on extending collective-productive assistance to peasant smallholder strata.

#### 8. *Soviets. Cultural Work*

*a* While continuing the policy of reactivation of the soviets as centers for political education of the broad masses of toiling peasants under the leadership of the proletariat, particular attention is to be directed to forming and enlarging a nonparty aktiv of poor and middle peasants, intensifying the involvement of the farm laborers and smallholders in this aktiv. Here attention must be directed to enlisting in the aktiv women peasants and farm laborers (women delegates, members of soviets) and to promoting them to leading positions in the soviets.

*b* In connection with the reelections to soviets to be held at the beginning of 1928, a broad campaign of reporting on the work of the soviets is to be launched, the poor peasant and middle peasant strata are to be involved to the maximum in the elections, the party must provide leadership throughout the preelectoral campaign, and the standards for excluding kulak and other antiproletarian elements from electoral lists, as set forth in the appropriate electoral instruction (1926), are to be strictly applied.

*c* The Central Committee is ordered to work on the question of improving the relations between the soviets and the land associations with a view to safeguard the leading role of the soviets and to take away the right to vote in land associations (at their assemblies) from persons who are excluded from the electoral lists of the soviets.

*d* Measures must be adopted for the resolute implementation of universal compulsory primary education, and the initiative of the population and of the local soviets in this respect must be supported in every way.

Cultural, and especially school, construction in the national regions must be strengthened, with particular attention directed to the most backward ones.

A considerable increase must be achieved in school attendance (all grades) of children of agricultural workers, farm laborers, and poor peasants, for which a special school fund must be set up to assist these children.

All measures must be adopted to give the children of poor peasants, and especially those under age, working as hired hands, adopted children, etc., a real opportunity to study in the schools.

*e* Special attention must be directed to the development of professional and technical schools and various types of training work shops, and to the inclusion in school curricula of course in trades needed in agriculture.

*f* More attention must be directed to the creation of new cadres of rural intellectuals and to raising the skills of the existing ones, making them into active and conscious agents of the socialist transformation of the village.

Particular attention must be directed to the creation of cadres of specialists in the organization of kolkhozes and model large sovkhozes in the village.

*g* Political education work in the village must be strengthened and its quality heightened. Particular attention is to be directed at developing village radio stations and cinemas, at strengthening the library network, etc.

*h* The network of schools for peasant youth is to be extended, and a series of measures must be adopted to strengthen in them the nucleus of farm laborer and peasant youth (increasing the number of scholarships, assigning funds for the upkeep of dormitories for the children of farm laborers and poor peasant smallholders, etc.).

*i* Demobilized Red Army and Red Navy men must in every way be drawn into soviet and cultural construction in the village, for which the necessary improvements, in accordance with the present decisions, must be introduced into their socio-political training in the ranks of the Red Army and Navy.

*j* The execution of the new tasks in the collectivization of agriculture requires the trade unions to intensify in every way their participation in the whole social life of the village. In particular, there must be a considerable strengthening, and improvement of supervisory work and work with associations of villagers, as well as a considerable expansion of cultural work by trade unions in the village (radio, cinema, libraries), especially among trade union members who for a considerable part of the year are involved in peasant farming (seasonal workers, etc.).

#### *9. Party organizational matters*

*a* Existing groups of poor peasants in the soviets and cooperatives must be strengthened, and new ones formed, in order from time to time to hold meetings of these groups in the village and volost (raion) for purposes of enriching their work experience.

*b* Sections for village work are to be set up in party committees (from the okrug and guberniia levels to the Central Committee) and are to be entrusted, in particular, with the organization and preparation, as needed, of uezd and guberniia conferences of poor peasant groups.

*c* Attention is to be concentrated on training and involving in party work primarily the farm laborer and poor peasant activists who are being developed in the agricultural workers' union, in poor peasant groups, in practical work in the soviets, the cooperatives, meetings of women peasant delegates, etc.

*d* New party forces are to be assigned to cooperative and soviet organs in order to ensure correct implementation of the party line in their village work.

McMeal/Gregor, 326-335.

*Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia v rezoliutsiakh*, Vol. 4, 51-70.





### 3 THE YEAR 1928

#### OPPOSITION APPEALS TO COMINTERN

January 1928

*In addition to expulsion from the Communist Party, members of the Opposition were informed of their deportation from Moscow. Trotsky and his supporters were sent to remote parts of the Soviet Union. Early in January 1928 they were informed by the State Political Administration (GPU) of their deportation. The document below represents an appeal by Trotsky and his supporters to the Comintern for assistance against expulsion and deportation. The appeal was published in "Die Fahne des Kommunismus" on 20 January 1928.*

#### APPEAL OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION TO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

We, the undersigned, expelled from the ranks of the All-Union Communist Party by a resolution of the Fifteenth Party Congress, decided to appeal to the Sixth Congress of the Communist International with a protest against this resolution. But at the order of the GPU we, old Bolshevik party workers, are being exiled to the remotest parts of the Soviet Union, without the presentation of any accusation against us and with the sole purpose of breaking our connections with Moscow and other working-class centers, and likewise with the Sixth Congress. We consider it necessary, therefore, on the eve of our enforced departure to remote parts of our Union, to address the present explanation to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the International, and ask them to bring it to the attention of the Central Committees of all the Communist parties. This banishment, of old party workers by administrative order of the GPU, is only a new link in the whole chain of events which is now shaking the All-Union Communist party. These events will have immense historic significance for a period of years. The present disagreements are of supreme importance in the history of the international revolutionary movement. It is a question of preserving the dictatorship of the proletariat, won in October 1917. The struggle in the Russian Communist party is going on, to all intents and purposes, behind the back of the International, without its participation, and even without its knowledge. The most important documents of the Opposition, dedicated to the fundamental problems of our epoch, are unknown to the International. On every critical occasion, the Communist parties are placed before a *fait accompli*. They put their signature to decisions already made. We maintain that such a situation grows out of a radically wrong regime within the Russian Communist party and the Communist International. In an announcement with the signatures of Comrades Smilga, Muralov, Rakovsky, and Radek, addressed to the Fifteenth Congress, we gave notice of our subordination to that congress and our readiness to cease factional work. In spite of this, we have been expelled and are being exiled because we do not renounce our opinions. We have already stated, and we repeat, that we cannot renounce our opinions, as expounded in our platform and theses, since the whole course of events is confirming their correctness. The Sixth Congress of the International should be prepared for as in the time of Lenin: publish all the most important documents touching the questions under debate; put a stop to the persecution of Communists guilty only of acting upon their rights as members of the party; raise in its full dimensions, in the discussion preceding the congress,

the question of the situation within the All-Union Communist party and the political course pursued by the party.

The debated questions cannot be settled by reenforcing the political terror. Terror can play a great affirmative role if it is based on a correct political line and promotes the dissolution of reactionary groups. As Bolsheviks we fully understand the role of the revolutionary terror. We applied it to the bourgeoisie and their agents, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and not for one moment do we intend in the future to renounce the revolutionary terror as against enemies of the proletariat. We well remember, however, that the terror of the parties hostile to the Bolsheviks was powerless. The issue is decided, in the last analysis, by the correctness of the political line. The banishment of us, soldiers of the October Revolution and comrades in arms of Lenin, is a clear proof of the retrograde class movement taking place in the country and the resultant political deviation to the side of opportunism. In spite of all this, we remain firmly convinced that the wielder of Soviet power is still the proletariat. It is still possible, by way of a decisive change of the mistakes already made, and without new revolutionary disturbances to put in order and reenforce the system of proletarian dictatorship. This possibility may become a reality, if the Communist International decisively interferes in the Russian Communist party. We appeal to all the Communist parties and to the Sixth Congress of the International, urgently demanding that they judge these questions in their present aspect with the real participation of the party mass. The Testament of Lenin never sounded more prophetic than at this moment. Nobody knows how much time will be demanded by the course of historic events to correct the mistakes already made. We are suffering violence and abandoning our posts in the party and Soviet work, for a meaningless and futile exile. But in doing so we do not for one minute doubt that each one of us will, not only be useful to the party, but will again, in the great struggles to come, occupy his place in its ranks.

We raise before the Sixth Congress of the Communist International the question of restoring us to our party.

*Signed by Trotsky, Rakovsky, Radek, Smilga, I. N. Smirnov, Valentinov, Serebriakov, Preobrazhensky, Maliota, Yeltsin, Vaganian, Itsenko, Nevenson, and a number of other old Bolsheviks.*

Trotsky, 354-357.



#### STALIN ON HIS VISIT TO SIBERIA AND "EMERGENCY MEASURES"

15 January-6 February 1928

*After two years of successful harvests the 1927 harvest slowed significantly due to poor crops in several grain-producing regions and increasing numbers of producers refusing to deliver grain while allegedly waiting for grain prices to rise. Faced with this sudden deficit, unknown at the time of the Fifteenth Party Congress, the Soviet government launched so-called "emergency measures" (also translated as "extraordinary" measures) entailing actual seizure of grain by government and Party officials. Stalin personally visited parts of Siberia where harvests were considered favorable. While in Siberia from 15 January to 6 February 1928 he observed that peasants, primarily kulaks, were hoarding grain and speculating, and that government and Party officials allowed these activities. He recommended several ideas to prevent reoccurrence of grain-procurement shortfalls. These included periodic and extended*

*visits of Communist Party officials to grain-producing regions, enforcement of laws against hoarding and speculating, and formation of collective and state farms. Stalin noted the Soviet Union should not have to rely on "emergency measures" to feed the towns, the Red Army and support industrialization.*

J. STALIN

GRAIN PROCUREMENT AND THE PROSPECTS  
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE

*I have been sent to you here in Siberia for a short visit.* I have been instructed to help you to fulfill the plan for grain procurements. I have also been instructed to discuss with you the prospects for the development of agriculture, the plan for developing the formation of collective farms and state farms in your territory.

You are no doubt aware that this year our country's grain accounts show a shortage, a deficit, of more than 100,000,000 puds. Because of this the Government and the Central Committee have had to tighten up grain procurements in all regions and territories so as to cover this deficit in our grain accounts. The deficit will have to be met primarily by the regions and territories with good harvests, which will have not only to fulfill, but to overfulfill the plan for grain procurements.

You know, of course, what the effect of the deficit may be if it is not made good. The effect will be that our towns and industrial centers, as well as our Red Army, will be in grave difficulties; they will be poorly supplied and will be threatened with hunger. Obviously, we cannot allow that.

What do you think about it? What measures are you thinking of taking in order to perform your duty to your country? I have made a tour of the districts of your territory and have had the opportunity to see for myself that your people are not seriously concerned to help our country to emerge from the grain crisis. You have had a bumper harvest, one might say a record one. Your grain surpluses this year are bigger than ever before. Yet the plan for grain procurements is not being fulfilled. Why? What is the reason?

You say that the plan for grain procurements is a heavy one, and that it cannot be fulfilled. Why cannot it be fulfilled? Where did you get that idea from? Is it not a fact that your harvest this year really is a record one? Is it not a fact that Siberia's grain procurement plan this year is almost the same as it was last year? Why, then, do you consider that the plan cannot be fulfilled? Look at the kulak farms: their barns and sheds are crammed with grain; grain is lying in the open under pent roofs for lack of storage space; the kulaks have 50,000-60,000 puds of surplus grain per farm, not counting seed, food and fodder stocks. Yet you say that the grain procurement plan cannot be fulfilled. Why are you so pessimistic?

You say that the kulaks are unwilling to deliver grain, that they are waiting for prices to rise, and prefer to engage in unbridled speculation. That is true. But the kulaks are not simply waiting for prices to rise; they are demanding an increase in prices to three times those fixed by the government. Do you think it permissible to satisfy the kulaks? The poor peasants and a considerable section of the middle peasants have already delivered their grain to the state at government prices. Is it permissible for the government to pay the kulaks three times as much for grain as it pays the poor and middle peasants? One has only to ask this question to realize how impermissible it would be to satisfy the kulaks' demands.

If the kulaks are engaging in unbridled speculation on grain prices, why do you not prosecute them for speculation? Don't you know that there is a law against speculation—Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, under which persons guilty of speculation are liable to prosecution, and their goods to confiscation in favor of the state? Why

don't you enforce this law against the grain speculators? Can it be that you are afraid to disturb the tranquility of the kulak gentry?!

You say that enforcement of Article 107 against the kulaks would be an emergency measure, that it would not be productive of good results, that it would worsen the situation in the countryside. Comrade Zagumenny is especially insistent about this. Supposing it would be an emergency measure—what of it? Why is it that in other territories and regions enforcement of Article 107 has yielded splendid results, has rallied the laboring peasantry around the Soviet Government and improved the situation in the countryside, while among you, in Siberia, it is held that it is bound to produce bad results and worsen the situation? Why, on what grounds?

You say that your prosecuting and judicial authorities are not prepared for such a step. But why is it that in other territories and regions the prosecuting and judicial authorities were prepared for it and are acting quite effectively, yet here they are not prepared to enforce Article 107 against speculators? Who is to blame for that? Obviously, it is your Party organizations that are to blame; they are evidently working badly and are not seeing to it that the laws of our country are conscientiously observed. I have seen several dozen of your prosecuting and judicial officials. Nearly all of them live in the homes of kulaks, board and lodge with them, and, of course, they are anxious to live in peace with the kulaks. In reply to my question, they said that the kulaks' homes are cleaner, and the food there is better. Clearly, nothing effective or useful for the Soviet state is to be expected from such prosecuting and judicial officials. The only thing that is not clear is why these gentry have not yet been cleared out and replaced by other, honest officials.

I propose:

a) that the kulaks be ordered to deliver all their grain surpluses immediately at government prices;

b) that if the kulaks refuse to obey the law they should be prosecuted under Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and their grain surpluses confiscated in favor of the state, 25 percent of the confiscated grain to be distributed among the poor peasants and economically weaker middle peasants at low government prices or in the form of long-term loans.

As for your prosecuting and judicial officials, all who are unfit for their posts should be dismissed and replaced by honest, conscientious Soviet-minded people.

You will soon see that these measures yield splendid results, and you will be able not only to fulfill, but even overfulfill the plan for grain procurements.

But this does not exhaust the problem. These measures will be sufficient to correct the situation this year. But there is no guarantee that the kulaks will not again sabotage the grain procurements next year. More, it may be said with certainty that so long as there are kulaks, so long will there be sabotage of the grain procurements. In order to put the grain procurements on a more or less satisfactory basis, other measures are required. What measures exactly? I have in mind developing the formation of collective farms and state farms.

Collective and state farms are, as you know, large-scale farms capable of employing tractors and machines. They produce larger marketable surpluses than the landlord or kulak farms. It should be borne in mind that our towns and our industry are growing and will continue to grow from year to year. That is necessary for the industrialization of the country. Consequently, the demand for grain will increase from year to year, and this means that the grain procurement plans will also increase. We cannot allow our industry to be dependent on the caprice of the kulaks. We must therefore see to it that in the course of the next three or four years the collective farms and state farms, as deliverers of grain, are in a position to supply the state with at least one-third of the grain required. This would relegate the kulaks to the background and lay the foundation for the more or less proper supply of grain to the workers and the Red Army. But in order to achieve this, we must develop the

formation of collective and state farms to the utmost, sparing neither energy nor resources. It can be done, and we must do it.

But even that is not all. Our country cannot live with an eye only to today's needs. We must also give thought to the morrow, to the prospects for the development of our agriculture and, lastly, to the fate of socialism in our country. The grain problem is part of the agricultural problem, and the agricultural problem is an integral part of the problem of building socialism in our country. The partial collectivization of agriculture of which I have just spoken will be sufficient to keep the working class and the Red Army more or less tolerably supplied with grain, but it will be altogether insufficient for:

a) providing a firm basis for a fully adequate supply of food to the whole country while ensuring the necessary food reserves in the hands of the state, and

b) by securing the victory of socialist construction in the countryside, in agriculture.

Today the Soviet system rests upon two heterogeneous foundations: upon united socialized industry and upon individual small-peasant economy based on private ownership of the means of production. Can the Soviet system persist for long on these heterogeneous foundations? No, it cannot.

Lenin says that so long as individual peasant economy, which engenders capitalists and capitalism, predominates in the country, the danger of a restoration of capitalism will exist. Clearly, so long as this danger exists there can be no serious talk of the victory of socialist construction in our country.

Hence, for the consolidation of the Soviet system and for the victory of socialist construction in our country, the socialization of industry alone is quite insufficient. What is required for that is to pass from the socialization of industry to the socialization of the whole of agriculture.

And what does that imply?

It implies, firstly, that we must gradually, but unswervingly, unite the individual peasant farms, which produce the smallest marketable surpluses, into collective farms, kolkhozes, which produce the largest marketable surpluses.

It implies, secondly, that all areas of our country, without exception, must be covered with collective farms (and state farms) capable of replacing not only the kulaks, but the individual peasants as well, as suppliers of grain to the state.

It implies, thirdly, doing away with all sources that engender capitalists and capitalism, and putting an end to the possibility of the restoration of capitalism.

It implies, fourthly, creating a firm basis for the systematic and abundant supply of the whole country not only with grain, but also with other foodstuffs, while ensuring the necessary reserves for the state.

It implies, fifthly, creating a single and firm socialist basis for the Soviet system, for Soviet power.

It implies, lastly, ensuring the victory of socialist construction in our country.

Such are the prospects for the development of our agriculture.

Such is the task of victoriously building socialism in our country.

It is a complex and difficult task, but one that is quite possible to fulfill; for difficulties exist in order to be surmounted and vanquished.

We must realize that we can no longer make progress on the basis of small individual peasant economy, that what we need in agriculture is large farms capable of employing machines and producing the maximum marketable surpluses. There are two ways of creating large farms in agriculture: the capitalist way—through the wholesale ruin of the peasants and the organization of big capitalist estates exploiting labor; and the socialist way—through the union of the small peasant farms into large collective farms, without ruining

the peasants and without exploitation of labor. Our Party has chosen the socialist way of creating large farms in agriculture.

Lenin pointed out that:

a) "The small-farming system under commodity production cannot save mankind from the poverty and oppression of the masses" (Vol. XX, p. 122);

b) "If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall be faced with inevitable ruin" (Vol. XX, p. 417);

c) "Only with the help of common, artel, cooperative labor can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war has landed us" (Vol. XXIV, p. 537).

Lenin further points out:

"Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, cooperative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of cooperative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry. Hence the importance of every kind of measure to promote cooperative, artel agriculture can hardly be overestimated. We have millions of individual farms in our country, scattered and dispersed in the depths of the countryside.... Only when it is proved in practice, by experience easily understood by the peasants, that the transition to the cooperative, artel form of agriculture is essential and possible, only then shall we be entitled to say that in this vast peasant country, Russia, an important step towards socialist agriculture has been taken" (Vol. XXIV, pp. 579-80).

Such are Lenin's directives.

In pursuance of these directives, the Fifteenth Congress of our Party stated in its resolution on "Work in the Countryside":

"In the present period, the task of uniting and transforming the small individual peasant farms into large collective farms must be made the Party's principal task in the countryside."

That, comrades, is how matters stand in regard to the socialization of agriculture in our country.

Our duty is to carry out these directives.

Stalin, *Works*, XI, 3-11.



## FROM THE EIGHT-HOUR TO SEVEN-HOUR WORKING DAY

### DECREE

17 January 1928

*The eight-hour working day was proclaimed as one of the major achievements of the October Revolution and flaunted before capitalist countries for propaganda purposes. The decision to adopt the seven-hour working day was possibly an attempt to resolve unemployment problems and move from the two-shift, eight-hour system to three seven-hour shifts. The Communist Party leadership perhaps reacted to charges by the Opposition of exploiting workers. Wages remained the same. In spite of positive praise for the seven-hour working day, there was concern that productivity would decrease. The new hours for the working day were introduced in the textile industry in January 1928.*

### DECREE ON PREPARATION FOR INTRODUCING SEVEN-HOUR WORKING DAY

In the development of article 1 of the manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, dated 15 October 1927, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decrees:

1. Work on the preparation to introduce the 7-hour working day is entrusted to a government commission which was formed by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, dated 11 November 1927.

2. The government commission is instructed to present to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR no later than 1 July 1928 a plan for introducing the 7-hour working day in those enterprises which will be identified for transferring to the 7-hour working day in the course of 1928-1929.

3. With the goal of achieving a planned transfer of industry to the 7-hour working day, the transfer of industrial enterprises to the 7-hour working day is allowed solely in accordance with the plan approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Prior to the approval of the plan, referred to in article 2, individual enterprises can be transferring to the 7-hour working day only in exceptional cases and precisely in each individual case with the permission of the government commission.

4. The People's Commissariat for Labor of the USSR is instructed in the time stated in article 2 to present to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR a plan for changes and revisions of the existing legislation necessary for introducing the 7-hour working day.

*Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiazhenii*, No. 8 (1928), Article 72, 172-173.



### ARTISTS AND PROLETARIAN REALISM DECLARATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ARTISTS OF THE REVOLUTION

February 1928

*By the mid-1920s the Association of Artists of Revolutionary Russia, enjoying government support, was the most influential single group of artists in the Soviet Union. In opposition to the leftists it attempted to depict the everyday activities of the proletariat, peasantry, and soldiers. Artists of the association visited factories, farms, and other locales to acquaint themselves with proletarian reality. The association held its first all-union convention in February 1928 and declared victory over leftist tendencies in art. It changed its name to the Association of Artists of the Revolution.*

The Great October Revolution, having emancipated the forces of the worker and peasant masses, has summoned artists to participate in the class struggle and Socialist construction in the ranks of the proletariat and toiling peasantry.

"Art belongs to the people. With its deepest roots it should penetrate into the very thick of the toiling masses. It should be understood by these masses and loved by them" (Lenin).

As artists of the Proletarian Revolution, we have the duty of transforming the authentic revolutionary reality into realistic forms comprehensible to the broad masses of the workers and of participating actively in Socialist construction by our socioartistic work.

The tasks of artistically designing everyday life (architecture, clubs, leisure, mass celebrations) and also of artistically finishing articles of mass consumption (duplicating designs, textiles, ceramics, the processing of wood, metal, etc.) confront the artists of the Proletarian Revolution as urgent, present-day tasks.

The heroic class struggle, the great workdays of construction, should be the mainsprings of the content of our art. The subjects of our immediate work are not only the past and present of the struggle, but also the prospects created by the Proletarian Revolution. We consider this profound content—invested in an artistically perfect, realistic form organically engendered by it—a sign of truth in a contemporary work of visual art.

In actively realizing the slogans of the cultural revolution on the visual-arts front, in organizing the feelings, thoughts, and will of the toiling masses by our artistic and social work, we set as our primary objective: to assist the proletariat in the realization of its class objectives.

In national cultures, October is creating a diverse but united current of revolutionary, realistic art of all republics and autonomous provinces of the USSR. This is also true of the art of revolutionary artists of other countries, and in setting as our task the development of keen artistic interaction between peoples liberated and those being liberated, we aspire to unite the revolutionary artists of all countries in a single organization—INTERNAKhR.

“Proletarian culture is not something that has come out of the blue; it is not the invention of people who call themselves specialists in proletarian culture.... Proletarian culture should be the legitimate development of the reserves of knowledge that mankind produced under the yoke of capitalist society, landowner society, and bureaucratic society.”

With these words of V.I. Lenin in mind, and on the basis of continuity and critical assimilation of world artistic culture, we will come to the creation of a proletarian art.

Advancing along this path, perfecting the forms of our language with persistent work and labor, we will come, by means of a new content, to the creation of a monumental style—the expression of our epoch, the style of heroic realism.

*Art—to the masses.*

Bowlit, 271-272.



#### LITVINOV ON PARTIAL DISARMAMENT

Geneva, 23 March 1928

*Disarmament topics and activities became another weapon in the Soviet diplomatic and propaganda arsenal. Litvinov's speech below, presented at a session of the League's Preparatory Disarmament Commission, illustrates how this weapon was used. After the Soviet convention for total disarmament was rejected, Litvinov returned to the world stage at the Preparatory Disarmament Commission and called for partial reduction of military armaments and forces. He criticized the League of Nations for failing to accomplish the purpose of the Commission, yet he stressed the desire to work with the League in any endeavor for peace and the reduction of arms. By engaging in international activities as these the Soviet Union sought to divide the major powers and enlist a segment of world opinion against attempts by the major powers to threaten the Soviet Union with economic boycotts, military intervention, or propaganda.*



M. LITVINOV  
DRAFT CONVENTION FOR PARTIAL  
REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

I pointed out in my speech yesterday that the opinion expressed by most of the delegates here with regard to our draft convention leaves no room for doubt as to the fate awaiting it at the hands of the Preparatory Commission. If the slightest doubts could have remained, these would have been immediately dissipated by the wording of the resolution drawn up today, the clarity of which left nothing to be desired.

The Soviet Delegation notes with profound regret—which I am sure will be shared by the broad mass of the people in all countries whose aspirations have been so little understood by many of the speakers here—that the Preparatory Commission and most of the delegates represented here, completely and resolutely reject on behalf of their Governments, not only our Draft Convention for total disarmament but the very idea of total general disarmament itself. I say the idea because the resolution drawn up today refutes the principle of total and general disarmament even as a basis for the further work of the Preparatory Commission. The Resolution does not even speak of transmitting our proposals to the Governments or the Disarmament Conference, as the honorable representative of Turkey proposed today but merely mentions the possible extracting from our Draft Convention of individual articles which may serve as material for other schemes quite foreign to the spirit of our proposal. As I remarked yesterday, we claim no copyright for our Draft Convention, and anyone is welcome to make any use he cares of any articles for any purpose. I must insist however that the Soviet Government will take no responsibility for, nor give its name to, any partial use of its schemes. Moreover, the Soviet Delegation and the Soviet Government will not consider themselves bound, either formally or politically, by isolated articles torn from their context, should these not tend to serve the ultimate end for which the draft was drawn up—total general disarmament. The Soviet Delegation therefore reserves to itself the right to oppose or vote against individual articles from its own draft convention should these be included in any other schemes foreign to its spirit and ultimate aim.

In its note of 16 January 1926 in reply to the invitation from the Council of the League of Nations to send a delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated that the Soviet Government attributed great importance to all endeavors to reduce the dangers of war and lighten the burden of militarism weighing down the shoulders of the popular masses. I said in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in my declaration on 30 November last, that, while insisting in every way on the necessity for total disarmament, "the Soviet Delegation was ready to take part in every consideration of the question of reducing armaments in so far as practical measures really aimed towards general disarmament were under consideration." In accordance with these declarations, the Soviet Delegation is now forced to ask itself, faced with the *fait accompli* of the rejection by the Preparatory Disarmament Commission of the draft convention for total disarmament, what ought to be its next step towards the achievement of the aim it has set itself, which still remains, and always will remain—total general disarmament. Since most of the delegates here countered our proposals for general total disarmament with the idea of a partial gradual disarmament—that is to say the reduction of existing armaments by easy stages—the Soviet Delegation has decided to look for common ground with the other Delegates, if only in the sphere of such partial disarmament. Let the other Delegates regard such disarmament as an end in itself, beyond which they consider it impossible or inexpedient to go—the Soviet Delegation will regard it as the first stage on the way to total disarmament. The lack of an ultimate aim in common with the other delegations ought not to be allowed to prevent us from working together for the achievement of the immediate aim—the *reduction* of armaments, if we can only hit upon a common *idiom*, if only in this limited field.

The Soviet Delegation considers that the substitution of the principle of total, by that of partial, disarmament by no means tends to the *abolition* of armed conflicts, although it is ready to admit that it is possible that it might tend to the diminution of their frequency, inasmuch as the increase of armaments is in itself one of the causes of the incidence of war.

The reduction of armaments may, moreover, has extremely desirable effects in easing the burden of militarism and relaxing the screw of taxation for the people of all countries, as well as freeing human forces for more productive labor and budgetary means for more useful ends. The reduction of disarmament, if it proceeds along the channels which will be suggested by the Soviet Delegation, might also result in minimizing the horrors of war.

The Soviet Delegation notes that the Preparatory Disarmament Commission has not at its disposal any scheme for partial disarmament which might serve as the object of immediate consideration.

While refraining from any criticism of those schemes which got so far as the first reading (although the Soviet Delegation could say a great deal about them if it had the opportunity), we regard it as established that they evoked among the Commission itself dissensions to this day impossible to reconcile, despite the fact that twelve months have elapsed since their first reading. The Preparatory Disarmament Commission has met twice during these months, but the dissensions mentioned have made it impossible for it even to consider with the projects. I am perhaps anticipating your decision with regard to the third point on the agenda that is being considered by us, but it is quite clear from the proposed resolution that there is scarcely any hope of proceeding to the second reading of these projects during the present session. Nay, more, some of the delegates, including a member of the Bureau of our Commission, Mr. Politis, acting upon their knowledge of the matter and the proposals of their Governments, suggested adjourning the present session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission without fixing a date for the next. This shows that they have very little hope of ever getting the existing differences settled, within any period of time that can be fixed. If these differences could not be settled in the course of twelve months and as we have received no information as to a single difference having been reconciled during this period, what guarantee have we that they will be settled during the next twelve months or at any time whatsoever? This actually means that we are face to face with the liquidation of the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission either provisionally or finally, since its further convening appears to depend, not on its own wish, or on its President's, to whom its convocation is entrusted, but on external factors, over which neither the Commission nor its President has any control. This makes it all the more appropriate and timely to present a fresh convention. I therefore have the honor to inform the Preparatory Disarmament Commission that such a draft will be presented by the Soviet Delegation and distributed to the delegates through the Secretariat of the League of Nations tomorrow morning or, if it is convenient, even today. After this has been done I will venture to offer some explanation of the principles of which its individual parts have been constructed. The Soviet Delegation will ask the Preparatory Disarmament Commission to proceed at the present session to the first reading of this Draft Convention, first expressing their preliminary opinion on its fundamental principles. To avoid misunderstandings I hasten to add that I offer this Draft Convention by way of a base for consideration, attributing enormous importance to the acceptance of its fundamental principles and leaving its less essential articles open for possible correction, alteration and supplement, or even substitution by others.

In conclusion, I consider it necessary once more to declare that we regard our proposal merely as a first step to the carrying out of total disarmament and that the Soviet Delegation reserves to itself the right to present a fresh proposal for further reduction of armaments not later than two years after the acceptance of this new Draft Convention. The Delegation also reserves to itself the right, independently of acceptance or non-acceptance

of its draft convention, to return to its original draft convention for total and general disarmament at the coming International Disarmament Conference.

Barbusse, 198-202.



## STALIN'S SPEECH ON RESPITE IN PARTY CONFLICT, SUCCESS OF "EMERGENCY MEASURES," AND THE SHAKHTY AFFAIR

13 April 1928

*Stalin noted in this speech on the results of the concluding meeting of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission that there was focus on practical business matters instead of inner-Party conflicts and dissension which the Opposition fostered for the past two years. He praised the success of the "emergency measures" for collecting grain, excusing certain related abuses, and stopped short of condoning such measures for the future. Stalin and other Communist Party leaders learned early in March 1928 of the arrest of engineers and other technical personnel for sabotaging the coal mines of the Shakhty district in the Donbas. The so-called Shakhty Trial began on 18 May and ended on 4 July 1928 with the sentencing of about fifty individuals, about ten to death. The trial and sentencing destroyed the tacit alliance which existed between the technical intelligentsia and the Communist Party.*

J. STALIN

### THE WORK OF THE APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF THE CC AND CCC

Comrades, the Joint Plenum of the CC and CCC that has just concluded has one feature which distinguishes it from the series of plenary meetings held in the past two years. This feature is that it was a plenum of a purely business-like character, a plenum where there were no inner-Party conflicts, a plenum where there were no inner-Party dissensions.

Its agenda consisted of the most burning questions of the day: the grain procurements, the Shakhty affair, and, lastly, the plan of work of the Politburo and Plenum of the Central Committee. These, as you see, are quite serious questions. Nevertheless, the debates at the plenum were of a purely business-like character, and resolutions were adopted unanimously.

The reason is that there was no opposition at the plenum. The reason is that the questions were approached in a strictly business-like manner, without factional attacks, without factional demagoguery. The reason is that only after the Fifteenth Congress, only after the liquidation of the opposition, did it become possible for the Party to tackle practical problems seriously and thoroughly.

That is the good aspect and, if you like, the inestimable advantage of that phase of development which we have entered since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party, since the liquidation of the opposition.

## I

### SELF-CRITICISM

A characteristic feature of the work of this plenum, of its debates and its resolutions, is that from beginning to end, its key-note was the sternest self-criticism. Moreover, there

was not a single question, not a single speech, at the plenum which was not accompanied by criticism of shortcomings in our work, by self-criticism of our organizations. Criticism of our shortcomings, honest and Bolshevik self-criticism of Party, Soviet and economic organizations—that was the general tone of the plenum.

I know that there are people in the ranks of the Party who have no fondness for criticism in general, and for self-criticism in particular. Those people, whom I might call “skin-deep” Communists (*laughter*), every now and then grumble and shrug their shoulders at self-criticism, as much as to say: Again this accursed self-criticism, again this raking out of our shortcomings—can’t we be allowed to live in peace? Obviously, those “skin-deep” Communists are complete strangers to the spirit of our Party, to the spirit of Bolshevism. Well, in view of the existence of such sentiments among those people, who greet self-criticism with anything but enthusiasm, it is permissible to ask: Do we need self-criticism; where does it derive from, and what is its value?

I think, comrades, that self-criticism is as necessary to us as air or water. I think that without it, without self-criticism, our Party could not make any headway, could not disclose our ulcers, could not eliminate our shortcomings. And shortcomings we have in plenty. That must be admitted frankly and honestly.

The slogan of self-criticism cannot be regarded as a new one. It lies at the very foundation of the Bolshevik Party. It lies at the foundation of the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since our country is a country with a dictatorship of the proletariat, and since the dictatorship is directed by one party, the Communist Party, which does not, and cannot, share power with other parties, is it not clear that, if we want to make headway, we ourselves must disclose and correct them for us? Is it not clear, comrades, that self-criticism must be one of the most important motive forces of our development?

The slogan of self-criticism has developed especially powerfully since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. Why? Because after the Fifteenth Congress, which put an end to the opposition, a new situation arose in the Party, one that we have to reckon with.

In what does the novelty of this situation consist? In the fact that now we have no opposition, or next to none; in the fact that, because of the easy victory over the opposition—a victory which in itself is a most important gain for the Party—there may be a danger of the Party resting on its laurels, beginning to take things easy and closing its eyes to the shortcomings in our work.

The easy victory over the opposition is a most important gain for our Party. But concealed within it is a certain drawback, which is that the Party may be a prey to self-satisfaction, to self-admiration, and begin to rest on its laurels. And what does resting on our laurels mean? It means putting an end to our forward movement. And in order that this may not occur, we need self-criticism—not that malevolent, and actually counterrevolutionary criticism which the opposition indulged in—but honest, frank, Bolshevik self-criticism.

The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was alive to this, and it issued the slogan of self-criticism. Since then the tide of self-criticism has been mounting, and it laid its imprint also on the work of the April Plenum of the CC and CCC.

It would be strange to fear that our enemies, our internal and external enemies, might exploit the criticism of our shortcomings and raise the shout: Oho! All is not well with those Bolsheviks! It would be strange if we Bolsheviks were to fear that. The strength of Bolshevism lies precisely in the fact that it is not afraid to admit its mistakes. Let the Party, let the Bolsheviks, let all the upright workers and laboring elements in our country bring to light the shortcomings in our work, the shortcomings in our constructive effort, and let them indicate ways of eliminating our shortcomings, so that there may be no stagnation, vegetation, decay in our work and our construction, so that all our work and all our constructive measures may improve from day to day and go from success to success. That is the chief thing just now. As for our enemies, let them rant about our shortcomings—such trifles cannot and should not disconcert Bolsheviks.

Lastly, there is yet another circumstance that impels us to self-criticism. I am referring to the question of the masses and the leaders. A peculiar sort of relation has begun to arise between the leaders and the masses. On the one hand there was formed, there came into being historically a group of leaders among us whose prestige is rising and rising, and who are becoming almost unapproachable for the masses. On the other hand the working-class masses in the first place, and the mass of the working people in general are rising extremely slowly, are beginning to look up at the leaders from below with blinking eyes, and not infrequently are afraid to criticize them.

Of course, the fact that we have a group of leaders who have risen excessively high and enjoy great prestige is in itself a great achievement for our Party. Obviously, the direction of a big country would be unthinkable without such an authoritative group of leaders. But the fact that as these leaders rise they get further away from the masses, and the masses begin to look up at them from below and do not venture to criticize them, cannot but give rise to a certain danger of the leaders losing contact with the masses and the masses getting out of touch with the leaders.

This danger may result in the leaders becoming conceited and regarding themselves as infallible. And what good can be expected when the top leaders become self-conceited and begin to look down on the masses? Clearly, nothing can come of this but the ruin of the Party. But what we want is not to ruin the Party, but to move forward and improve our work. And precisely in order that we may move forward and improve the relations between the masses and the leaders, we must keep the valve of self-criticism open all the time, we must make it possible for Soviet people to "go for" their leaders, to criticize their mistakes, so that the leaders may not grow conceited, and the masses may not get out of touch with the leaders.

The question of the masses and the leaders is sometimes identified with the question of promotion. That is wrong, comrades. It is not a question of bringing new leaders to the fore, although this deserves the Party's most serious attention. It is a question of preserving the leaders who have already come to the fore and possess the greatest prestige by organizing permanent and indissoluble contact between them and the masses. It is a question of organizing, along the lines of self-criticism and criticism of our shortcomings, the broad public opinion of the Party, the broad public opinion of the working class, as an instrument of keen and vigilant moral control, to which the most authoritative leaders must lend an attentive ear if they want to retain the confidence of the Party and the confidence of the working class.

From this standpoint, the value of the press, of our Party and Soviet press, is truly inestimable. From this standpoint, we cannot but welcome the initiative shown by Pravda in publishing the *Bulletin of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection*, which conducts systematic criticism of shortcomings in our work. Only we must see to it that the criticism is serious and penetrating and does not just skate on the surface. From this standpoint, too, we have to welcome the initiative shown by *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* in vigorously and spiritedly attacking shortcomings in our work.

Critics are sometimes abused because of imperfections in their criticism, because their criticism is not always 100 percent correct. The demand is often made that criticism should be correct on all accounts, and if it is not correct on every point, they begin to decry and disparage it.

That is wrong, comrades. It is a dangerous misconception. Only try to put forward such a demand, and you will gag hundreds and thousands of workers, worker correspondents and village correspondents who desire to correct our shortcomings but who sometimes are unable to formulate their ideas correctly. We would get not self-criticism, but the silence of the tomb.

You must know that workers are sometimes afraid to tell the truth about shortcomings in our work. They are afraid not only because they might get into "hot water" for it, but

also because they might be made into a "laughing-stock" on account of their imperfect criticism. How can you expect an ordinary worker or an ordinary peasant, with his own painful experience of shortcomings in our work and in our planning, to frame his criticism according to all the rules of the art? If you demand that their criticism should be 100 per cent correct, you will be killing all possibility of criticism from below, all possibility of criticism from below, all possibility of self-criticism. That is why I think that if criticism is even only 5 or 10 percent true, such criticism should be welcomed, should be listened to attentively, and the sound core in it taken into account. Otherwise, I repeat, you would be gagging all those hundreds and thousands of people who are devoted to the cause of the Soviets, who are not yet skilled enough in the art of criticism, but through whose lips speaks truth itself.

Precisely in order to develop self-criticism and not extinguish it, we must listen attentively to all criticism coming from Soviet people, even if sometimes it may not be correct to the full and in all details. Only then can the masses have the assurance that they will not get into "hot water" if their criticism is not perfect, that they will not be made a "laughing-stock" if there should be errors in their criticism. Only then can self-criticism acquire a truly mass character and meet with a truly mass response.

It goes without saying that what we have in mind is not just "any sort" of criticism. Criticism by a counterrevolutionary is also criticism. But its object is to discredit the Soviet regime, to undermine our industry, to disrupt our Party work. Obviously, it is not such criticism we have in mind. It is not of such criticism I am speaking, but of criticism that comes from Soviet people, and which has the aim of improving the organs of Soviet rule, of improving our industry, of improving our party and trade-union work. We need criticism in order to strengthen the Soviet regime, not to weaken it. And it is precisely with a view to strengthening and improving our work that the Party proclaims the slogan of criticism and self-criticism.

What do we expect primarily from the slogan of self-criticism, what results can it yield if it is carried out properly and honestly? It should yield at least two results. It should, in the first place, sharpen the vigilance of the working class, make it pay more attention to our shortcomings, facilitate their correction, and render impossible any kind of "surprises" in our constructive work. It should, in the second place, improve the political culture of the working class, develop in it the feeling that it is the master of the country, and facilitate the training of the working class in the work of administering the country.

Have you considered the fact that not only the Shakhty affair, but also the procurement crisis of January 1928 came as a "surprise" to many of us? The Shakhty affair was particularly noteworthy in this respect. This counterrevolutionary group of bourgeois experts carried on their work for five years, receiving instructions from the anti-Soviet organizations of international capital. For five years our organizations were writing and circulating all sorts of resolutions and decisions. Our coal industry, or course, was making headway all the same, because our Soviet economic system is so virile and powerful that it got the upper hand in spite of our blockheadedness and our blunders, and in spite of the subversive activities of the experts. For five years this counterrevolutionary group of experts was engaged in sabotaging our industry, causing boiler explosions, wrecking turbines, and so on. And all this time we were oblivious to everything. Then "suddenly," like a bolt from the blue, came the Shakhty affair.

Is this normal, comrades? I think it is very far from normal. To stand at the helm and peer ahead, yet see nothing until circumstances bring us face to face with some calamity—that is not leadership. That is not the way Bolshevism understands leadership. In order to lead, one must foresee. And foreseeing is not always easy, comrades.

It is one thing when a dozen or so leading comrades are on the watch for and detect shortcomings in our work, while the working masses are unwilling or unable either to

watch for or to detect shortcomings. Here all the chances are that you will be sure to overlook something, will not detect everything. It is another thing when, together with the dozen or so leading comrades, hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are on the watch to detect shortcomings in our work, disclosing our errors, throwing themselves into the general work of construction and indicating ways of improving it. Here there is a greater guarantee that there will be no surprises, that objectionable features will be noted promptly and prompt measures taken to eliminate them.

We must see to it that the vigilance of the working class is not damped down, but stimulated, that hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are drawn into the general work of socialist construction, that hundreds of thousands and millions of workers and peasants, and not merely a dozen leaders, keep vigilant watch over the progress of our construction work, notice our errors and bring them into the light of day. Only then shall we have no "surprises". But to bring this about, we must assimilate and carry out the slogan of self-criticism.

Lastly, as regards promoting the cultural powers of the working class, developing in it the faculty of administering the country in connection with the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism. Lenin said:

"The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer.... Economically and politically, NEP fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. It is "only" a matter of the cultural forces of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard."

What does this mean? It means that one of the main tasks of our constructive work is to develop the working class the faculty and ability to administer the country, to administer the economy, to administer industry.

Can we develop this faculty and ability in the working class without giving full play to the powers and capacities of the workers, the powers and capacities of the finest elements of the working class, for criticizing our errors, for detecting our shortcomings and for advancing our work? Obviously, we cannot.

And what is required in order to give full play to the powers and capacities of the working class and the working people generally, and to enable them to acquire the faculty of administering the country? It requires, above all, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan of criticism from below of shortcomings and errors in our work. If the workers take advantage of the opportunity to criticize shortcomings in our work frankly and bluntly, to improve and advance our work, what does that mean? It means that the workers are becoming active participants in the work of directing the country, economy, industry. And this cannot but enhance in the workers the feeling that they are the masters of the country, cannot but enhance their activity, their vigilance, their culture.

This question of the cultural powers of the working class is a decisive one. Why? Because, of all the ruling classes that have hitherto existed, the working class, as a ruling class, occupies a somewhat special and not altogether favorable position in history. All ruling classes until now—the slaveholders, the landlords, the capitalists—were also wealthy classes. They were in a position to train in their sons the knowledge and faculties needed for government. The working class differs from them, among other things, in that it is not a wealthy class, that it was not able formerly to train in its sons the knowledge and faculty of government, and has become able to do so only now, after coming to power.

That, incidently, is the reason why the question of a cultural revolution is so acute with us. True, in the ten years of its rule the working class of the USSR has accomplished far more in this respect than the landlords and capitalists did in hundreds of years. But the international and internal situation is such that the results achieved are far from sufficient. Therefore, every means capable of promoting the development of the cultural powers of the working class, every means capable of facilitating the development of the working class

of the faculty and ability to administer the country and industry—every such means must be utilized by us to the full.

But it follows from what has been said that the slogan of self-criticism is one of the most important means of developing the cultural powers of the proletariat, of developing the faculty of government in the working class. From this follows yet another reason why the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism is a vital task for us.

Such, in general, are the reasons which make the slogan of self-criticism imperative for us as a slogan of the day.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the key-note of the April plenum of the CC and CC was self-criticism.

Let us pass now to the question of grain procurements.

## II

### THE QUESTION OF GRAIN PROCUREMENTS

First of all, a few words about the nature of the grain procurement crisis that developed here in January of this year. The essence of the matter is that in October of last year our procurements began to decline, reached a very low point in December, and by January of this year we had a deficit of 130,000,000 puds of grain. This year's harvest was, perhaps, no worse than last year's; it may have been a little less. The carry-over from previous harvests was bigger than it was last year, and it was generally considered that the marketable surplus of grain in our country this year was not smaller, but larger than in the previous year.

It was with this consideration in mind that the procurement plan for the year was fixed at slightly above last year's plan. But in spite of this, the procurements declined, and by January 1928 we had a deficit of 130,000,000 puds. It was an "odd" situation: there was plenty of grain in the country, yet the procurements were falling and creating the threat of hunger in the towns and in the Red Army.

How is this "oddity" to be explained? Was it not due to some chance factor? The explanation many are inclined to give is that we had been caught napping, had been too busy with the opposition and had let our attention slip. That we really had been caught napping is, of course, true. But to put it all down to an oversight would be the grossest error. Still less can the procurement crisis be attributed to some chance factor. Such things do not happen by chance. That would be too cheap an explanation.

What, then, were the factors that led up to the procurement crisis?

I think there were at least three such factors.

*Firstly.* The difficulties of our socialist construction in the conditions of our international and internal situation. I am referring primarily to the difficulties of developing urban industry. It is necessary to pour goods of every kind into the countryside in order to be able to draw out of it the maximum quantity of agricultural produce. This requires a faster rate of development of our industry than is the case now. But in order to develop industry more swiftly, we need a faster rate of socialist accumulation. And to attain such a rate of accumulation is not so easy, comrades. The result is a shortage of goods in the countryside.

I am referring, further, to the difficulties of our constructive work in the countryside. Agriculture is developing slowly, comrades. It should be developing with gigantic strides, grain should become cheaper and harvests bigger, fertilizers should be applied to the utmost and mechanized production of grain should be developed at high speed. But that is not the case, comrades, and will not come about quickly.

Why?

Because our agriculture is a small-peasant economy, which does not readily lend itself to substantial improvement. Statistics tell us that before the war there were about 16,000,000



individual peasant farms in our country. Now we have about 25,000,000 individual peasant farms. This means ours is essentially a land of small-peasant economy. And what is small-peasant economy? It is the most insecure, the most primitive, the most underdeveloped form of economy, producing the smallest marketable surpluses. That is the whole crux of the matter, comrades. Fertilizers, machines, scientific agriculture and other improvements—these are things which are inapplicable or practically inapplicable in small-peasant economy. That is the weakness of small-scale economy, and that is why it cannot compete with the large kulak farms.

Have we any large farms at all in the countryside, employing machines, fertilizers, scientific agriculture and so on? Yes, we have. Firstly, there are the collective farms and state farms. But we have few of them, comrades. Secondly, there are the large kulak (capitalist) farms. Such farms are by no means few in our country, and they are still a big factor in agriculture.

Can we adopt the course of encouraging privately owned, large capitalist farms in the countryside? Obviously, we cannot. It follows then that we must do our utmost to develop in the countryside large farms of the type of the collective farms and state farms and try to convert them into grain factories for the country organized on a modern scientific basis. That, in fact, explains why the Fifteenth Congress of our Party issued the slogan of the maximum development in forming collective and state farms.

It would be a mistake to think that the collective farms must only be formed from the poorer strata of the peasantry. That would be wrong, comrades. Our collective farms must comprise both poor and middle peasants, and embrace not only individual groups or clusters, but entire villages. The middle peasant must be given a prospect, he must be shown that he can develop his husbandry best and most rapidly through the collective farm. Since the middle peasant cannot rise into the kulak group, and it would be unwise for him to sink, he must be given the prospect of being able to improve his husbandry through the formation of collective farms.

But our collective farms and state farms are still all too few, scandalously few. Hence the difficulties of our constructive work in the countryside. Hence our inadequate grain output.

*Secondly.* It follows from this that the difficulties of our constructive work in town and country are a basis on which a procurement crisis can develop. But this does not mean that a procurement crisis was bound to develop precisely this year. We know that these difficulties existed not only this year. We know that these difficulties existed not only this year, but also last year. Why, then, did a procurement crisis develop precisely this year? What is the secret?

The secret is that this year the kulak was able to take advantage of these difficulties to force up grain prices, launch an attack on the Soviet price policy and thus slow up our procurement operations. And he was able to take advantage of these difficulties for at least two reasons:

firstly, because three years of good harvests had not been without their effect. The kulak grew strong in that period, grain stocks in the countryside in general, and among the kulaks in particular, accumulated during that time, and it became possible for the kulak to attempt to dictate prices;

secondly, because the kulak had support from the urban speculators, who speculate on a rise of grain prices and thus force up prices.

This does not mean, of course, that the kulak is the principal holder of grain. By and large, it is the middle peasant who holds most of the grain. But the kulak has a certain economic prestige in the countryside, and in the matter of prices he is sometimes able to get the middle peasant to follow his lead. The kulak elements in the countryside are thus in a position to take advantage of the difficulties of our constructive work for forcing up grain prices for purposes of speculation.

But what is the consequence of forcing up grain prices by, say, 40-50 percent, as the kulak speculating elements did? The first consequence is to undermine the real wages of the workers. Let us suppose that we had raised workers' wages at the time. But in that case we should have had to raise prices of manufactured goods, and that would have hit at the living standards both of the working class and of the poor and middle peasants. And what would have been the effect of this? The effect would undoubtedly have been directly to undermine our whole economic policy.

But that is not all. Let us suppose that we had raised grain prices 40-50 percent in January or in the spring of this year, just before the preparations for the sowing. What would have been the result? We should have disorganized the raw materials base of our industry. The cotton-growers would have abandoned the growing of cotton and started growing grain, as a more profitable business. The flax-growers would have abandoned flax and also started growing grain. The beet-growers would have done the same. And so on and so forth. In short, we should have undermined the raw materials base of our industry because of the profiteering appetites of the capitalist elements in the countryside.

But that is not all either. If we had forced up grain prices this spring, say, we should certainly have brought misery on the poor peasant, who in the spring buys grain for food as well as for sowing his fields. The poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants would have had every right to say to us: "You have deceived us, because last autumn we sold grain to you at low prices, and now you are compelling us to buy grain at high prices. Whom are you protecting, gentlemen of the Soviets, the poor peasants or the kulaks?"

That is why the Party had to retaliate to the blow of the kulak speculators, aimed at forcing up grain prices, with a counterblow that would knock out of the kulaks and speculators all inclination to menace the working class and our Red Army with hunger.

*Thirdly.* It is unquestionable that the capitalist elements in the countryside could not have taken advantage of the difficulties of our constructive work to the degree they actually did, and the procurement crisis would not have assumed such a menacing character, if they had not been assisted in this matter by one other circumstance. What is that circumstance?

It is the slackness of our procurement bodies, the absence of a united front between them, their competition with one another, and their reluctance to wage a determined struggle against speculating on higher grain prices.

It is, lastly, the inertia of our Party organizations in the grain procurement areas, their reluctance to intervene as they should have done in the grain procurement campaign, their reluctance to intervene and put an end to the general slackness in the procurement front.

Intoxicated by the successes of last year's procurement campaign, and believing that this year the procurements would come in automatically, our procurement and Party organizations left it all to the "will of God", and left a clear field to the kulak speculating elements. And that was just what the kulaks were waiting for. It is scarcely to be doubted that, had it not been for this circumstance, the procurement crisis could not have assumed such a menacing character.

It should not be forgotten that we, that is to say our organizations, both procurement and other, control nearly 80 percent of the supply of manufactured goods to the countryside, and nearly 90 percent of all the procurements there. It need scarcely be said that this circumstance makes it possible for us to dictate to the kulak in the countryside, provided that our organizations know how to utilize this favorable position. But we, instead of utilizing this favorable position, allowed everything to go on automatically and thereby facilitated—against our own will, of course—the fight of the capitalist elements of the countryside against the Soviet Government.

Such, comrades, were the conditions which determined the procurement crisis at the end of last year.

You see, therefore, that the procurement crisis cannot be considered a matter of chance.

You see that the procurement crisis is the expression of the first serious action, under the conditions of NEP, undertaken by the capitalist elements of the countryside against the Soviet Government in connection with one of the most important questions of our constructive work, that of grain procurements.

That, comrades, is the class background of the grain procurement crisis.

You know that, in order to end the procurement crisis and curb the kulaks' appetite for speculation, the Party and the Soviet Government were obliged to adopt a number of practical measures. Quite a lot has been said about these measures in our press. They have been dealt with in fairly great detail, in the resolution of the Joint Plenum of the CC and CCC. Hence I think that there is no need to repeat that here.

I only want to say something about certain emergency measures which were taken because of the emergency circumstances, and which, of course, will lapse when these emergency circumstances cease to exist. I am referring to the enforcement of Article 107 of the law against speculation. This article was adopted by the Central Executive Committee in 1926. It was not applied last year. Why? Because the grain procurements proceeded, as it is said, normally, and there were no grounds for applying this article. It was called to mind only this year, at the beginning of 1928. And it was recalled because we had a number of emergency circumstances which resulted from the speculating machinations of the kulaks and which held out the threat of hunger. It is clear that if there are no emergency circumstances in the next procurement year and the procurements proceed normally, Article 107 will not be applied. And, on the contrary, if emergency circumstances arise and the capitalist elements start their "tricks" again, Article 107 will again appear on the scene.

It would be stupid on these grounds to say that NEP is being "abolished", that there is a "reversion" to the surplus-appropriation system, and so on. Only enemies of the Soviet regime can now think of abolishing NEP. Nobody benefits more from the New Economic Policy now than the Soviet Government. But there are people who think that NEP means not intensifying the struggle against capitalist elements, including the kulaks, with a view to overcoming them, but ceasing the struggle against the kulaks and other capitalist elements. It need scarcely be said that such people have nothing in common with Leninism, for there is not, and cannot be, any place for them in our Party.

The results of the measures taken by the Party and the Soviet Government to put an end to the food crisis are also known to you. Briefly, they are as follows:

Firstly, we made up for lost time and procured grain at a tempo which equalled, and in places surpassed, that of last year. You know that in the three months January-March we succeeded in procuring more than 270,000,000 puds of grain. That, of course, is not all we need. We shall still have to procure upwards of 1,000,000,000 puds. Nevertheless, it constituted that necessary achievement which enabled us to *put an end* to the procurement crisis. We are now fully justified in saying that the Party and the Soviet Government have scored a signal victory on this front.

Secondly, we have put our procurement and Party organizations in the localities on a sound, or more or less sound, footing, having tested their combat readiness in practice and purged them of blatantly corrupt elements who refuse to recognize the existence of classes in the countryside and are reluctant to "quarrel" with the kulaks.

Thirdly, we have improved our work in the countryside, we have brought the poor peasants closer to us and won the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of the middle peasants, we have isolated the kulaks and have somewhat offended the well-to-do top stratum of the middle peasants. In doing so, we have put into effect our old Bolshevik slogan, proclaimed by Lenin as far back as the Eighth Congress of our Party: Rely on the poor peasant, build a stable alliance with the middle peasant, never for a moment cease fighting against the kulaks.

I know that some comrades do not accept this slogan very willingly. It would be strange to think that now, when the dictatorship of the proletariat is firmly established, the alliance

of the workers and the peasants means an alliance of the workers with the entire peasantry, including the kulaks. No, comrades, such an alliance we do not advocate, and cannot advocate. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, when the power of the working class is firmly established, the alliance of the working class with the peasantry means reliance on the poor peasants, alliance with the middle peasants, and a fight against the kulaks. Whoever thinks that under our conditions alliance with the peasantry means alliance with the kulaks has nothing in common with Leninism. Whoever thinks of conducting a policy in the countryside that will please everyone, rich and poor alike, is not a Marxist, but a fool, because such a policy does not exist in nature, comrades. (*Laughter and applause*) Our policy is a class policy.

Such, in the main, are the results of the measures we took to increase the grain procurements.

Undoubtedly, in the practical work of carrying out these measures there were a number of excesses and distortion of the Party line. A number of cases of distortion of our policy which, because of our blockheadedness, hit primarily at the poor and middle peasant—cases of incorrect application of Article 107, etc.—are familiar to all. We punish, and shall punish, people guilty of such distortions with the utmost severity. But it would be strange, because of these distortions, not to see the beneficial and truly valuable results of the Party's measure, without which we could not have emerged from the procurement crisis. To do so would be closing one's eyes to the chief thing and giving prominence to that which is minor and incidental. It would be overlooking the very substantial achievements of the procurement campaign because of a handful of individual instances of distortion of our line, distortions which have absolutely no warrant in the measures adopted by the Party.

Were there any circumstances which facilitated our procurement achievements and our fight against the attack of the capitalist elements in the countryside?

Yes, there were. One might mention at least two such circumstances.

Firstly, there is the fact that we secured the intervention of the Party in the procurement campaign and the blow at the kulak speculating elements after the Fifteenth Congress of our Party, after the liquidation of the opposition, after the Party had attained the maximum unity by routing its Party enemies. The fight against the kulaks must not be regarded as a trifling matter. In order to defeat the machinations of the kulak speculators without causing any complications in the country, we need an absolutely united party, an absolutely firm rear and an absolutely firm government. It can scarcely be doubted that the existence of these factors was in a large degree instrumental in forcing the kulaks to beat an instantaneous retreat.

Secondly, there is the fact that we succeeded in linking our practical measures for curbing the kulak speculating elements with the vital interests of the working class, the Red Army and the majority of the poorer sections of the rural population. The fact that the kulak speculating elements were menacing the laboring masses of town and country with the specter of famine, and in addition were violating the laws of the Soviet Government (Article 107), could not but result in the majority of the rural population siding with us in our fight against the capitalist elements in the countryside. The kulak was scandalously speculating in grain, thereby creating the gravest difficulties both in town and country; in addition he was violating Soviet laws, that is, the will of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Men's Deputies—is it not obvious that this circumstance was bound to facilitate the work of isolating the kulaks?

The pattern was in a way similar (with the appropriate reservations, of course) to the one we had in 1921, when, because of the famine in the country, the Party, headed by Lenin, raised the question of confiscating valuables from the churches with a view to acquiring food for the famine-stricken regions, and made this the basis of an extensive antireligious campaign, and when the priests, by clinging to their valuables, were in fact opposing the starving masses and thereby evoked the resentment of the masses against the

Church in general and against religious prejudices in particular, and especially against the priests and their leaders. There were some queer people at that time in our Party who thought that Lenin had come to realize the necessity of combating the Church only in 1921 (*Laughter*)—that he had not realized it until then. That, of course, was silly, comrades. Lenin, of course, realized the necessity of combatting the Church before 1921 too. But that was not the point. The point was to link a broad mass antireligious campaign with the struggle for the vital interests of the masses, and to conduct it in such a way that it was understood by the masses and supported by them.

The same must be said of the Party's maneuver at the beginning of this year in connection with the grain procurement campaign. There are people who think that the Party has only now come to realize the necessity of a struggle against the kulak danger. That, of course, is silly, comrades. The Party has always realized the necessity for such a struggle and has waged it not in words, but in deeds. The specific feature of the maneuver undertaken by the Party had the opportunity to link a determined struggle against the kulak speculating elements in the countryside with the struggle for the vital interests of the broad masses of the working people, and by means of this link it succeeded in winning the following of the majority of the laboring masses in the countryside and isolating the kulaks.

The art of Bolshevik policy by no means consists in firing indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless of whether the masses are ready to support this or that step of the leadership. The art of Bolshevik policy consists in being able to choose the time and place and to take all the circumstances into account in order to concentrate fire on the front where the maximum results are to be attained most quickly.

What results, indeed, should we now be having if we had undertaken a powerful blow at the kulaks three years ago, when we did not yet have the firm backing of the middle peasant, when the middle peasant was infuriated and was violently attacking the chairmen of our volost executive committees, when the poor peasants were dismayed at the consequences of NEP, when we had only 75 percent of the prewar crop area, when we were confronted with the basic problem of expanding the production of food and raw materials in the countryside, and when we did not yet have a substantial food and raw materials base for industry?

I have no doubt that we would have lost the battle, that we would not have succeeded in enlarging the crop area to the extent that we have succeeded in doing now, that would have undermined the possibility of creating a food and raw materials base for industry, that we would have facilitated the strengthening of the kulaks, and that we would have repelled the middle peasants, and that, possibly, we would now be having most serious political complications in the country.

What was the position in the countryside at the beginning of this year? Crop areas enlarged to prewar dimensions, a securer raw materials and food base for industry, the majority of the middle peasants firmly backing the Soviet Government, a more and less organized poor peasantry, improved and stronger Party and Soviet organizations in the countryside. Is it not obvious that only because of these conditions were we able to count on serious success in organizing a blow at the kulak speculating elements? Is it not clear that only imbeciles could fail to understand the vast difference between these two situations in the matter of organizing a broad struggle of the masses against the capitalist elements in the countryside?

There you have an example of how unwise it is to fire indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless of the relation between the contending forces.

That, comrades, is how matters stand with regard to the grain procurements.

Let us pass now to the Shakhty affair.

## III

## THE SHAKHTY AFFAIR

What was the class background of the Shakhty affair? Where do the roots of the Shakhty affair lie hidden, and from what class basis could this economic counterrevolution have sprung?

There are comrades who think that the Shakhty affair was something accidental. They usually say: We were properly caught napping, we allowed our attention to slip; but if we had not been caught napping, there would have been no Shakhty affair. That there was an oversight here, and a pretty serious one, is beyond all doubt. But to put it all down to an oversight means to understand nothing of the matter.

What do the facts, the documents in the Shakhty case, show?

The facts show that the Shakhty affair was an economic counterrevolution, plotted by a section of the bourgeois experts, former coal owners.

The facts show, further, that these experts were banded together in a secret group and were receiving money for sabotage purposes from former owners now living abroad and from counterrevolutionary anti-Soviet capitalist organizations in the West.

The facts show, lastly, that this group of bourgeois experts operated and wrought destruction to our industry on orders from capitalist organizations in the West.

And what does all this indicate?

It indicates that it is a matter here of economic intervention in our industrial affairs by West-European anti-Soviet capitalist organizations. At one time there was military and political intervention, which we succeeded in liquidating by means of a victorious civil war. Now we have an attempt at economic intervention, for the liquidation of which we do not need a civil war, but which we must liquidate all the same, and shall liquidate with all the means at our disposal.

It would be foolish to believe that international capital will leave us in peace. No, comrades, that is not true. Classes exist, international capital exists, and it cannot look on calmly at the development of the country that is building socialism. Formerly, international capital thought it could overthrow the Soviet regime by means of outright armed intervention. The attempt failed. Now it is trying, and will go on trying, to undermine our economic strength by means of inconspicuous, not always noticeable but quite considerable, economic intervention, organizing sabotage, engineering all sorts of "crises" in this or that branch of industry, and thereby facilitating the possibility of armed intervention in the future. All this is woven into the web of the class struggle of international capital against the Soviet regime, and there can be no question of anything accidental here.

One thing or the other:

*either* we continue to pursue a revolutionary policy, rallying the proletarians and the oppressed of all countries around the working class of the USSR—in which case international capital will do everything it can to hinder our advance;

*or* we renounce our revolutionary policy and agree to make a number of fundamental concessions to international capital—in which case international capital, no doubt, will not be averse to "assisting" us in converting our socialist country into a "good" bourgeois republic.

There are people who think that we can conduct an emancipatory foreign policy and at the same time have the European and American capitalists praising us for doing so. I shall not stop to show that such naive people do not and cannot have anything in common with our Party.

Britain, for instance, demands that we join her in establishing predatory spheres of influence somewhere or other, in Persia, Afghanistan or Turkey, say, and assures us that if we made this concession, she would be prepared to establish "friendship" with us. Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession?

*Chorus of shouts.* No!

*Stalin.* America demands that we renounce in principle the policy of supporting the emancipation movement of the working class in other countries, and says that if we made this concession everything would go smoothly. Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession?

*Chorus of shouts.* No!

*Stalin.* We could establish "friendly" relations with Japan if we agreed to join her in dividing up Manchuria. Can we make this concession?

*Chorus of shouts.* No!

*Stalin.* Or, for instance, the demand is made that we "loosen" our foreign trade monopoly and agree to repay all the war and prewar debts. Perhaps we should agree to this, comrades?

*Chorus of shouts.* No!

*Stalin.* But precisely because we cannot agree to these or similar concessions without being false to ourselves—precisely because of this we must take it for granted that international capital will go on playing us every sort of scurvy trick, whether it be a Shakhty affair or something else of a similar nature.

There you have the class roots of the Shakhty affair.

Why was armed intervention by international capital possible in our country? Because there were in our country whole groups of military experts, generals and officers, scions of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, who were always ready to undermine the foundations of the Soviet regime. Could these officers and generals have organized a serious war against the Soviet regime if they had not received financial, military and every other kind of assistance from international capital? Of course not. Could international capital have organized serious intervention without the assistance of this group of whiteguard officers and generals? I do not think so.

There were comrades among us at that time who thought that the armed intervention was something accidental, that if we had not released Krasnov, Mamontov and the rest from prison, there would have been no intervention. That, of course, is untrue. That the release of Mamontov, Krasnov and the other whiteguard generals did play a part in the development of civil war is beyond doubt. But that the roots of the armed intervention lay not in this, but in the class contradictions between the Soviet regime on the one hand, and international capital and its lackey generals in Russia on the other, is also beyond doubt.

Could certain bourgeois experts, former mine owners, have organized the Shakhty affair here without the financial and moral support of international capital, without the prospect of international capital helping them to overthrow the Soviet regime? Of course not. Could international capital have organized in our country economic intervention, such as the Shakhty affair, if there had not been in our country a bourgeoisie, including a certain group of bourgeois experts who were ready to go to all lengths to destroy the Soviet regime? Obviously not. Do there exist at all such groups of bourgeois experts in our country as are ready to go to the length of economic intervention, of undermining the Soviet regime? I think there do. I do not think that there can be many of them. But that there do exist in our country certain insignificant groups of counterrevolutionary bourgeois experts—far fewer than at the time of the armed intervention—is beyond doubt.

It is the combination of these two forces that creates the soil for economic intervention in the USSR.

And it is precisely this that constitutes the class background of the Shakhty affair.

Now about the practical conclusions to be drawn from the Shakhty affair.

I should like to dwell upon four practical conclusions indicated by the Shakhty affair.

Lenin used to say that selection of personnel is one of the cardinal problems in the building of socialism. The Shakhty affair shows that we selected our economic cadres

badly, and not only selected them badly, but placed them in conditions which hampered their development. Reference is made to Order 33, and especially to the "Model Regulations" accompanying the order. It is a characteristic feature of these model regulations that they confer practically all the rights on the technical director, leaving to the general director the right to settle conflicts, to "represent", in short, to twiddle his thumbs. It is obvious that under such circumstances our economic cadres could not develop as they should.

There was a time when this order was absolutely necessary, because when it was issued we had no economic cadres of our own, we did not know how to manage industry, and had willy-nilly to assign the major rights to the technical director. But now this order has become a fetter. Now we have our own economic cadres with experience and capable of developing into real leaders of our industry. And for this very reason the time has come to abolish the obsolete model regulations and to replace them by new ones.

It is said that it is impossible for Communists, and especially communist business executives who come from the working class, to master chemical formulas or technical knowledge in general. That is not true, comrades. There are no fortresses that the working people, the Bolsheviks, cannot capture. (*Applause*) We captured tougher fortresses than these in the course of our struggle against the bourgeoisie. Everything depends on the desire to master technical knowledge and on arming ourselves with persistence and Bolshevik patience. But in order to alter the conditions of work of our economic cadres and to help them to become real and full-fledged masters of their job, we must abolish the old model regulations and replace them by new ones. Otherwise, we run the risk of maiming our personnel.

Were some of our business executives who have now deteriorated worse than any of us? Why is it that they, and other comrades like them, began to deteriorate and degenerate and come to identify themselves in their way of living with the bourgeois experts? It is due to our wrong way of doing things in the business field; it is due to our business executives being selected and having to work in conditions which hinder their development, which convert them into appendages of the bourgeois experts. This way of doing things must be discarded, comrades.

The second conclusion indicated to us by the Shakhty affair is that our cadres are being taught badly in our technical colleges, that our Red experts are not being trained properly. That is a conclusion from which there is no escaping. Why is it, for example, that many of our young experts do not get down to the job, and have turned out to be unsuitable for work in industry? Because they learned from books, they are book-taught experts, they have no practical experience, are divorced from production, and, naturally, prove a failure. But is it really such experts we need? No, it is not such experts we need, be they young experts three times over. We need experts—whether Communists or non-Communists makes no difference—who are strong not only in theory but also in practical experience, in their connections with production.

A young expert who has never seen a mine and does not want to go down a mine, a young expert who has never seen a factory and does not want to soil his hands in a factory, will never get the upper hand over the old experts, who have been steeled by practical experience but are hostile to our cause. It is easy to understand, therefore, why such young experts are given an unfriendly reception not only by the old experts, and not only by our business executives, but often even by the workers. But if we are not to have such surprises with our young experts, the method of training them must be changed, and changed in such a way that already in their first years of training in the technical colleges they have continuous contact with production, with factory, mine and so forth.

The third conclusion concerns the question of enlisting the broad mass of the workers in the management of industry. What is the position in this respect, as revealed by the



Shakhty evidence? Very bad. Shockingly bad, comrades. It has been revealed that the labor laws are violated, that the six-hour working day in underground work is not always observed, that safety regulations are ignored. Yet the workers tolerate it. And the trade unions say nothing. And the Party organizations take no steps to put a stop to this scandal.

A comrade who recently visited the Donbas went down the pits and questioned the miners about their conditions of work. It is a remarkable thing that not one of the miners thought it necessary to complain of the conditions. "How is life with you, comrades?" this comrade asked them. "All right, comrade, we are living not so badly," the miners replied. "I am going to Moscow, what should I tell the center?" he asked. "Say that we are living not so badly," was their answer. "Listen, comrades, I am not a foreigner, I am a Russian, and I have come here to learn the truth from you," the comrade said. "That's all one to us, comrade, we tell nothing but the truth whether to foreigners or to our own people," the miners replied.

That's the stuff our miners are made of. They are not just workers, they are heroes. There you have that wealth of moral capital we have succeeded in amassing in the hearts of workers. And only to think that we are squandering this invaluable moral capital so iniquitously and criminally, like profligate and dissolute heirs to the magnificent legacy of the October Revolution! But, comrades, we cannot carry on for long on the old moral capital if we squander it so recklessly. It is time to stop doing that. High time!

Finally, the fourth conclusion concerns checking fulfillment. The Shakhty affair has shown that as far as checking fulfillment is concerned, things could not be worse than they are in all spheres of administration—in the Party, in industry in the trade unions. Resolutions are written, directives are sent out, but nobody wants to take the trouble to ask how matters stand with the carrying out of those resolutions and directives, whether they are really being carried out or are simply pigeon-held.

Ilyich used to say that one of the most serious questions in administering the country is the checking of fulfillment. Yet precisely here things could not possibly be worse. Leadership does not just mean writing resolutions and sending out directives. Leadership means checking fulfillment of directives, and not only their fulfillment, but the directives themselves—whether they are right or wrong from the point of view of the actual practical work. It would be absurd to think that all our directives are 100 percent. That is never so, and cannot be so, comrades. Checking fulfillment consists precisely in our leading personnel testing in the crucible of practical experience not only the way our directives are being fulfilled, but the correctness of the directives themselves. Consequently, faults in this field signify that there are faults in all our work of leadership.

Take, for example, the checking of fulfillment in the purely Party sphere. It is our custom to invite secretaries of okrug and guberniia committees to make reports to the Central Committee, in order to check how the CC's directives are being carried out. The secretaries report, they confess to shortcomings in their work. The CC takes them to task and passes stereotyped resolutions instructing them to give greater depth and breadth to their work, to lay stress on this or that, to pay serious attention to this or that, etc. The secretaries go back to those resolutions. Then we invite them again, and the same thing is repeated about giving greater depth and breadth to the work and so and so forth. I do not say that all this work is entirely without value. No, comrades, it has its good sides in educating and bracing up our organizations. But it must be admitted that this method of checking fulfillment is no longer sufficient. It must be admitted that this method has to be supplemented by another, namely, the method of assigning members of our top Party and Soviet leadership to work in the localities. (*A voice*: "A good idea!") What I have in mind is sending of leading comrades to the localities for temporary work, not as commanders, but as ordinary functionaries placed at the disposal of the local organizations. I think that this idea

has a big future and may improve the work of checking fulfillment, if it is carried out honestly and conscientiously.

If members of the Central Committee, members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, People's Commissars and their deputies, members of the Presidium of the AUCCTU, and members of presidiums of trade-union central committees were to go regularly to the localities and work there, in order to get an idea of how things are being done, to study all the difficulties, all the good sides and bad sides, then I can assure you that this would be the most valuable and effective way of checking fulfillment. It would be the best way of enriching the experience of our highly respected leaders. And if this were to become a regular practice—I can assure you that the laws which we write here and the directives which we elaborate would be far more effective and to the point than is the case now.

So much, comrades, for the Shakhty affair.

#### IV

#### GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

We have internal enemies. We have external enemies. This, comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment.

We had a procurement crisis, which has already been liquidated. The procurement crisis marked the first serious attack on the Soviet regime launched by the capitalist elements of the countryside under NEP conditions.

We have the Shakhty affair, which is already being liquidated and undoubtedly will be liquidated. The Shakhty affair marks another serious attack on the Soviet regime launched by international capital and its agents in our country. It is economic intervention in our internal affairs.

It need scarcely be said that these and similar attacks, both internal and external, may be repeated and in all likelihood will be repeated. Our task is to exercise the maximum vigilance and to be on the alert. And, comrades, if we are vigilant, we shall most certainly defeat our enemies in the future, just as we are defeating them now and have defeated them in the past. (*Stormy and prolonged applause*)

Stalin, *Works*, IX, 30-68.



#### NEW RIFT IN PARTY LEADERSHIP

#### SECRET MEETING BETWEEN

#### BUKHARIN AND KAMENEV

11 July 1928

*By May 1928 grain collection began declining. The threat of "emergency measures" resurfaced in news reports and in Communist Party circles. Bukharin, Rykov, and their supporters decried such measures as harsh attempts against the peasantry. Reports circulated about disturbing unrest in the countryside. During the meetings of the July Plenum, 4-12 July 1928, Bukharin and others resisted Stalin's attempts to reintroduce the "emergency measures." Incensed, Bukharin went secretly to Kamenev's apartment to solicit his support or to*

*promise not to support Stalin. Bukharin characterized Stalin as treacherous, devious, and a supporter of a policy that would destroy the revolution. He suggested that Stalin's policies were those of the War Communism period.*

[SECRET MEETING]

*Kamenev:* Is the struggle really serious?

*Bukharin:* Well this is just what I wanted to talk about. We feel that Stalin's line is ruinous for the entire revolution. With this we could be done for. *The disagreements between us and Stalin are many times more serious than the previous disagreements we had with you.* I, Rykov, and Tomsy agree on formulating the position thus: "It would be much better if now we had in the Politburo instead of Stalin—Zinoviev and Kamenev." I have spoken with Rykov and Tomsy quite frankly about this. I have not spoken to Stalin for several weeks. This is an unprincipled intriguer, who subordinates everything to the preservation of his own power. He changes his theory to please whom he at the present moment should remove. In the "Seven" we argued with him to the point of saying, "false", "you lie", etc. He has now made concessions, in order to cut our throats. We understand this, but he maneuvers so as to make us appear to be splitters. The resolution was carried unanimously, because he repudiated Molotov, declaring that on 9/10 he accepted my resolution which I read at the "Seven", *while not showing his hand. One should not hand him any scrap of paper.* His goal is to take the Leningrad and Moscow "Pravda" away from us and replace Uglanov/with Kaganovich/ who is completely with us. His line is/which he pronounced at the plenum/: 1) Capitalism grew either on account of colonies, or loans, or the exploitation of the workers. We have no colonies, we can get no loans, *therefore our basis is tribute (dan') from the peasantry.* You understand this is also what Preobrazhensky's theory is. 2) The more socialism grows, the greater will be the resistance to it./Take a look at the resolution right away/. This is idiotic illiteracy. 3) Since tribute is necessary and resistance will grow, firm leadership is necessary. Self-criticism must not apply to the leadership, but only to those who carry out orders. Self-criticism is in fact aimed at Tomsy and Uglanov. As a result we are getting a police regime. Now this is not a "cuckoo" matter, but will actually decide the fate of the revolution. With this theory everything can perish. At this time on the outside Stalin is conducting the correct policy: he expelled the Comintern from the Kremlin. He proposed that no one be shot on the Shakhty affair/we voted against/, all the discussions led to compromises. Tomsy formulated thus: I /Tomsy/ am more to the right than you /Bukharin/ by 30 kilometers in international affairs, but I /Tomsy/ am 100 kilometers more to the left than Stalin. The line is ruinous, but he does not offer the possibility of discussing it. He seizes, focuses on deviations. The sentence in his speech, in which it is said, that only "landowners" can debate such—a literal citation from one of Ul'ianov's speeches. He will cut our throats.

*Kamenev:* And what forces do you have?

*Bukharin:* I + Rykov + Tomsy + Uglanov. /absolutely/. The Petersburg people are in general with us, but they got scared when the talk got to the possibility of removing Stalin, and so Komarov repudiated Stetsky's speech, but that evening Ugarov ran up to me and apologized for Komarov. Andreev is for us. Stalin has bought the Ukrainians, having removed Kaganovich from the Ukraine. Our potential forces are vast, but 1) the middle-ranking Central Committee member still does not understand the depth of the disagreements, 2) there is a terrible fear of a split. Therefore, when Stalin conceded on the emergency measures, he made it difficult for us to attack him. We don't want to come forth as splitters, for then they would slaughter us. But Tomsy in his latest speech at the plenum showed clearly that Stalin is the splitter. Iagoda and Trillser are ours. There are 150 opportunities

for little insurrections. Voroshilov and Kalinin changed to us at the last moment. Stalin holds them with some kind of special chain. Our goal is to explain Stalin's disastrous role and bring the middle-ranking Central Committee member away from him. The Organizational Bureau is ours.

*Kamenev:* But he may remove you in the meantime!

*Bukharin:* So what is to be done? The removal will not take place at the Central Committee. At nights I usually think: "Whether we have the right to keep silent? Whether there is enough courage for this? But calculation says: act carefully. Rykov's report is on Friday. Later we will dot our i's and cross our t's in "Pravda". I will publish a series of articles. Perhaps an attack is still needed, so that the Party understands where he is leading it.

In the enclosure to this and among these enclosures there are heaps of "exposures" about the "Seven", etc. The tone is of absolute hatred toward Stalin and of an absolute rupture. Together with this—fulminations—to come out openly or not to? To come out they will undo this in the article about the split, but not to do so will undo a petty chess game, and pile up more, shoulder the responsibility if there will not be grain in October.

*Kamenev:* And how do they hope to get the grain?

*Bukharin:* That's just the point, on the reproduction of the emergency measures when there is a reproduction of difficulties. But this is war communism and disaster.

*Kamenev:* And you?

*Bukharin:* Perhaps will have to make a more intense maneuver to reconcile ourselves with the middle peasant. The kulak can be exterminated as much as one likes, but it is necessary to reconcile ourselves with the middle peasant. But for Stalin and the *blockhead Molotov, who instructs me on Marxism and whom we call "the Stone Buttocks"*, they will do nothing, it is impossible.

*Kamenev:* So what do you want from us?

*Bukharin:* Stalin boasts that he has you in his pocket. Your /personally a rogue! [people] are engaged everywhere for Stalin. *This would be terrible.* You yourself, of course, form your own line. But I would ask that you not help Stalin to strangle us by approval of him. Stalin will most likely seek contact with you. I wanted you to know what is going on. It is not necessary that anyone know about our meeting. Don't talk to me by telephone, for they're eavesdropping on my telephones. The GPU follows me and the GPU stands watch over your [apartment]. I wanted you to get the information, but not through a secretary or intermediaries. That I have spoken with you only Rykov and Tomsy know. Also do not tell anyone, but tell your [people], so that they would not attack us.

*Kamenev:* Did Stalin show you Zinoviev's note?

*Bukharin:* No, this is the first time I've heard about this.

*Kamenev:* What will they do with us?

*Bukharin:* They are not telling us about this. Either Stalin will try to "buy" you with a high appointment or appoint you to such places in order to engage [you]. Goodbye. In the next few days I'll be very busy with the [Comintern] Congress. I will not see you. On the whole I must observe the rules of security.

Trotsky Archive, bMS Russ 13, T-1897.



STALIN ON THE COMINTERN, "EMERGENCY MEASURES,"  
AND THE SHAKHTY AFFAIR  
13 July 1928

*In a speech to a meeting of the leadership of the Leningrad Party Organization Stalin reported on the results of the recent Party plenum. His speech reflected the concessions which Bukharin communicated to Kamenev two days before. The "emergency measures" would be employed but with limits on the seizure and expropriation methods used. The Plenum approved the draft program of the Sixth Communist International that hailed the possibility of socialism in separate countries, support of the "united front" policy, and the rise of acute tensions and contradictions within and among capitalist countries. Smarting from the Shakhty Affair, the Plenum called for a truce with non-Party specialists and promised 40,000,000 additional rubles to train a new technical intelligentsia.*

J. STALIN

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE CC, CPSU(B)

Comrades, the plenum of the Central Committee which has just concluded concerned itself with two sets of questions.

The first set consists of questions relating to major problems of the Communist International in connection with the impending Sixth Congress.

The second set consists of questions relating to our constructive work in the USSR in the sphere of agriculture—the grain problem and grain procurements—and in the sphere of providing a technical intelligentsia, cadres of intellectuals coming from the ranks of the working class, for our industry.

Let us begin with the first set of questions.

I

THE COMINTERN

1. MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN

What are the major problems which confront the Sixth Congress of the Comintern at the present time?

If one looks at the stage passed through between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses, it is necessary first of all to consider the contradictions which have ripened in this interval within the imperialist camp.

What are these contradictions?

At the time of the Fifth Congress very little was said about the Anglo-American contradiction as the principal one. It was even the custom at that time to speak of an Anglo-American alliance. On the other hand quite a lot was said about contradictions between Britain and France, between America and Japan, between the victors and vanquished. The difference between that period and the present period is that, of the contradictions in the capitalist camp, that between American capitalism and British capitalism has become the principal one. Whether you take the question of oil, which is of decisive importance both for the development of the capitalist economy and for purposes of war; whether you take the question of markets, which are of the utmost importance for the life and development of world capitalism, because goods cannot be produced if there is no assured sale for them, which is one of the most characteristic features of the imperialist stage; or whether, lastly, you take the question of the lines of communication with markets or sources of raw material—you will find that all these main questions drive towards one principal problem, the struggle between Britain and America for world hegemony. Wherever America, a country where capitalism is growing gigantically, tries to butt in—whether it be China, the colonies,

South America, or Africa—everywhere she encounters formidable obstacles in the shape of Britain's firmly established positions.

This, of course, does not do away with the other contradictions in the capitalist camp; between America and Japan, Britain and France, France and Italy, Germany and France and so on. But it does mean that these contradictions are linked in one way or another with the principal contradiction, that between capitalist Britain, whose star is declining, and capitalist America, whose star is rising.

With what is this principal contradiction fraught? It is very likely fraught with war. When two giants come into collision, when they find the earth is too small for both of them, they strive to cross swords in order to decide their dispute over world hegemony by war.

That is the first thing to bear in mind.

The second contradiction is that between imperialism and the colonies. This contradiction existed at the time of the Fifth Congress too. But only now has it assumed an acute character. We did not at that time have such a powerful development of the revolutionary movement in China, such a powerful shaking up of the vast masses of the Chinese workers and peasants as occurred a year ago and as is occurring now. And that is not all. We did not at that time, at the time of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, have that powerful stirring of the labor movement and the national-liberation struggle in India which we have now. These two major facts bring squarely to the fore the question of the colonies and semicolonies.

With what is the growth of this contradiction fraught? It is fraught with national wars of liberation in the colonies and with intervention on the part of imperialism.

The circumstance also must be borne in mind.

There is, lastly, a third contradiction—that between the capitalist world and the USSR, one that is growing not less but more acute. Whereas at the time of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern it could be said that a certain equilibrium, unstable, it is true, but more or less prolonged, had been established between the two worlds, the two antipodes, the world of Soviets and the world of capitalism, now we have every ground for affirming that the days of this equilibrium are drawing to a close.

It goes without saying that the growth of this contradiction cannot fail to be fraught with the danger of armed intervention.

It is to be presumed that the Sixth Congress will take this circumstance also into consideration.

Thus all these contradictions inevitably lead to one principal danger—the danger of new imperialist wars and intervention.

Therefore, the danger of new imperialist wars and intervention is the main question of the day.

The most widespread method of lulling the working class and of diverting it from the struggle against the danger of war is present-day bourgeois pacifism, with the League of Nations, its preaching of "peace", its "prohibition" of war, its talk of "disarmament" and so forth.

Many think that imperialist pacifism is an instrument of peace. That is absolutely wrong. Imperialist pacifism is an instrument for the preparation of war and for disguising this preparation by hypocritical talk of peace. Without this pacifism and its instrument, the League of Nations, preparation for war in the conditions of today would be impossible.

There are naive people who think that since there is imperialist pacifism, there will be no war. That is quite untrue. On the contrary, whoever wishes to get at the truth must reverse this proposition and say: since imperialist pacifism and its League of Nations are flourishing, new imperialist wars and intervention are certain.

And the most important thing in all this is that Social-Democracy is the main channel of imperialist pacifism within the working class—consequently, it is capitalism's main support among the working class in preparing for new wars and intervention.

But for the preparation of new wars pacifism alone is not enough, even if it is supported by no serious force as Social-Democracy. For this, certain means of suppressing the masses in the imperialist centers are also needed. It is impossible to wage war for imperialism unless the rear of imperialism is strengthened. It is impossible to strengthen the rear of imperialism without suppressing the workers. And that is what fascism is for.

Hence the growing acuteness of the inherent contradictions in the capitalist countries, the contradictions between labor and capital.

On the one hand, preaching of pacifism through the mouths of the Social-Democrats in order more effectively to prepare for new wars; on the other hand, suppression of the working class in the rear, of the Communist Parties in the rear, by the use of fascist methods, in order then to conduct war and intervention more effectively—such are the ways of preparing for new wars.

Hence the tasks of the Communist Parties:

Firstly, to wage an unceasing struggle against Social-Democratism in all spheres—in the economic and in the political sphere, including in the latter the exposure of bourgeois pacifism with the task of winning the majority of the working class for communism.

Secondly, to form a united front of the workers of the advanced countries and the laboring masses of the colonies in order to stave off the danger of war, or, if war breaks out, to convert imperialist war into civil war, smash fascism, overthrow capitalism, establish Soviet power, emancipate the colonies from slavery, and organize all-around defense of the first Soviet Republic in the world.

Such are the principal problems and tasks confronting the Sixth Congress.

These problems and tasks are being taken into account by the Executive Committee of the Comintern, as you will see if you examine the agenda of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern.

## 2. THE PROGRAM OF THE COMINTERN

Closely linked with the question of the main problems of the international working-class movement is the question of the program of the Comintern.

The cardinal significance of the program of the Comintern is that it scientifically formulates the basic tasks of the communist movement, indicates the basic tasks of the communist movement, indicates the principal means of accomplishing these tasks, and thus creates for the Comintern sections that clarity of aims and methods without which it is impossible to move forward with confidence.

A few words about the specific features of the draft program of the Comintern submitted by the Program Commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. At least seven such specific features might be noted.

1) The draft provides a program not for particular national Communist Parties, but for all Communist Parties taken together, covering what is common and basic for all of them. Hence it is a program based on principle and theory.

2) It was the custom formerly to provide a program for the "civilized" nations. The draft program differs from this in that it is intended for all the nations of the world—both white and black, both of the metropolitan countries and of the colonies. Hence its all-embracing, profoundly international character.

3) The draft takes as its point of departure not some particular capitalism of some particular country or portion of the world, but the entire world system of capitalism, counterposing to it the world system of socialist economy. Hence its distinction from all hitherto existing programs.

4) The draft proceeds from the uneven development of the capitalist countries and draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in separate countries, thus envisaging the prospect of the formation of two parallel centers of attraction—the center of world capitalism and the center of world socialism.

5) Instead of the slogan of a United States of Europe, the draft puts forward the slogan of a federation of Soviet Republics which consists of advanced countries and colonies that have dropped, or are dropping, out of the imperialist system, and which is opposed in its struggle for world socialism to the world capitalist system.

6) The draft stresses opposition to Social-Democracy as the main support of capitalism in the working class and as the chief enemy of communism, and holds that all other trends in the working class (anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, guild socialism, etc.) are in essence varieties of Social-Democraticism.

7) The draft puts in the forefront the task of consolidating the Communist Parties both in the West and in the East as a preliminary condition for ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat, and then also the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The plenum of the Central Committee approved in principle the draft program of the Comintern, and charged comrades having amendments to the draft to submit them to the Program Commission of the Sixth Congress.

So much for questions concerning the Comintern.

Now let us turn to questions concerning our internal development.

## II

### QUESTIONS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN THE USSR

#### 1. GRAIN PROCUREMENT POLICY

Permit me to give a little historical information.

What was the position by 1 January of this year? You know from the Party documents that by 1 January of this year we had a deficit of 128,000,000 puds of grain as compared with the corresponding period last year. I shall not dilate on the reasons for this; they are set forth in the Party documents published in the press. The important thing for us now is that we had a deficit of 128,000,000 puds. Yet only two or three months remained until the spring thaw on the roads. We were faced with the alternative: either to make up for lost time and establish a normal rate of grain procurement in the future, or to face the inevitability of a serious crisis of our entire economy.

What had to be done to make up for lost time? It was necessary, in the first place, to strike at the kulaks and speculators who were forcing up grain prices and threatening the country with hunger. It was necessary, in the second place, to consign the maximum quantity of manufactured goods to the grain-growing regions. It was necessary, lastly, to rouse all our Party organizations into activity and bring about a radical change in all our grain procurement work by putting an end to the practice of allowing things to go of their own accord. Thus we were compelled to resort to emergency measures. The measures we took proved effective, and by the end of March we had been able to secure 275,000,000 puds of grain. We not only made up for lost time, we not only averted a crisis of our whole economy, we not only caught up with last year's rate of grain procurement; we also had every possibility of emerging from the procurement crisis painlessly, if we maintained any normal rate of procurement in the subsequent months (April, May and June).

Owing, however, to the failure of the winter crops in the South Ukraine, and partly in the North Caucasus, the Ukraine, and partly in the North Caucasus, the Ukraine completely, and the North Caucasus partially, dropped out as supplying regions, depriving the Republic of 20,000,000-30,000,000 puds of grain. This circumstance, combined with the fact that we had permitted an overexpenditure of grain, faced us with the unavoidable necessity of pressing harder on the other regions and thus of encroaching on the peasants' emergency stocks, and this could not but worsen the situation.



Whereas we had succeeded in January-March in securing nearly 300,000,000 puds affecting only the peasants' maneuvering stocks, in April-June we failed to secure even a hundred million puds, owing to the fact that we had to encroach on the peasants' *emergency* stocks, and at a time, moreover, when the harvest prospects were not yet clear. Nevertheless, grain had to be secured. Hence the renewed recourse to emergency measures, the arbitrary administrative measures, the infringements of revolutionary law, the house-to-house visitations, the unlawful searches and so on, which worsened the political situation in the country and created a threat to the bond.

Was this a rupture of the bond? No, it was not. Was it, perhaps, some trifling matter not worthy of consideration? No, it was not a trifling matter. It was a threat to the bond between the working class and the peasantry. That, in fact, explains why some of our Party workers lacked the calmness and firmness necessary for appraising the situation soberly and without exaggeration.

The subsequent good harvest prospects and the partial withdrawal of the emergency measures helped to calm the atmosphere and improve the situation.

What is the nature of our difficulties on the grain front? What is the basis of these difficulties? Is it not a fact that we now have a grain crop area nearly as large as before the war (only five percent smaller)? Is it not a fact that we are now producing nearly as much grain as before the war (about 5,000 million puds, or only 200,000,000-300,000,000 puds less)? How is it that, in spite of this, we are producing only half as much marketable grain as in the prewar period?

It is because of the highly scattered character of our agriculture. Whereas before the war we had about 16,000,000 peasant farms, now we have not less than 24,000,000; moreover, the splitting up of the peasant households and peasant holdings is showing no tendency to cease. And what is small-peasant farming? It is the form of husbandry that produces the smallest marketable surplus, is the least remunerative, and is in the highest degree a natural, consuming form of husbandry, yielding a surplus of only 12-15 percent of marketable grain. Yet our towns and industry are growing rapidly, construction is growing at incredible speed. That is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

Here is what Lenin said on this score in his speech "The Tax in Kind":

"If peasant farming can develop further, we must firmly assure its transition to the next stage too, and this transition to the next stage will inevitably consist in the small, isolated peasant farms, the least profitable and most backward, gradually uniting to form socially-conducted, large farms. That is how Socialists have always conceived it. That is how our Communist Party conceives it" (Vol. XXVI, p.299).

There, then, is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

What is the way out?

The way out is, firstly, to improve small- and middle-peasant farming, giving it every encouragement to expand its yield, its productivity. Our task is to replace the wooden plough by the steel plough, to supply pure seed, fertilizer and small types of machines, to embrace the individual farms in a broad cooperative network by conducting agreements (contracts) with whole villages. There exists the method of concluding contracts between agricultural cooperatives and entire villages, the purpose of which is to supply the peasants with seed and thus obtain higher crop yields, to ensure the prompt delivery of grain by the peasants to the state, giving them in return a bonus in the shape of a certain addition to the contractual price, and to create stable relations between the state and the peasantry. Experience shows that this method is producing tangible results.

There are people who think that individual peasant farming has exhausted its potentialities and that there is no point in supporting it. That is not true, comrades. These people have nothing in common with the line of our Party.

There are people, on the other hand, who think that individual peasant farming is the be-all and end-all of agriculture. That also is not true. Moreover, these people are obviously sinning against the principles of Leninism.

We need neither detractors nor eulogizers of individual peasant farming. We need sober-minded politicians capable of obtaining from individual peasant farming the maximum that can be obtained from it, and at the same time capable of gradually transferring individual farming to collectivist lines.

The way out, secondly, is gradually to unite the isolated small- and middle-peasant farms into large collective and cooperative farms, which should be absolutely voluntary associations operating on a new technical basis, on the basis of tractors and other agricultural machines.

In what does the advantage of collective farms over small farms consist? In the fact that they are large farms and are therefore able to utilize all the results of science and technology; they are more remunerative and stable; they are more productive and yield larger marketable surpluses. It should not be forgotten that the collective farms yield a surplus of from 30 to 35 percent of marketable grain, and that their yield is sometimes as high as 200 puds per desiatin or more.

The way out, lastly, is to improve the old state farms and establish new large state farms. It should be remembered that the state farms are the economic units which produce the largest marketable surpluses. We have state farms which yield a surplus of not less than 60 percent of marketable grain.

The task is correctly to combine all these three tasks and to work strenuously along all these three lines.

The specific feature of the present moment is that fulfillment of the first task, that of improving individual small- and middle-peasant farming, while it is still our chief task in the sphere of agriculture, is already insufficient for the solution of the problem as a whole.

The specific feature of the present moment is that the first task must be supplemented by two new practical tasks: promotion of collective farming and improvement of state farming.

But besides the basic causes, there were also specific, temporary causes which converted our procurement difficulties into a procurement crisis. What are these causes? The resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee includes among them the following:

a) a disturbance of market equilibrium, aggravated by a more rapid increase of peasants' effective demand than of the supply of manufactured goods, owing to the rise of rural incomes resulting from a series of good harvests, and especially to the rise of incomes of the well-to-do kulak strata;

b) an unfavorable relation between grain prices and the prices of other agricultural produce, which lessened the incentive to sell grain surpluses, and which the Party, however, could not change in the spring of this year without damaging the interests of the economically weaker strata of the rural population;

c) mistakes in planned management, chiefly as regards the timely consignment of manufactured goods to the countryside and the incidence of taxation (the low tax on the wealthier strata of the rural population), and also as regards proper expenditure of grain stocks;

d) defects of the Party and Soviet procurement organizations (no united front, lack of energetic action, reliance on things going of their own accord);

e) infringement of revolutionary law, arbitrary administrative measures, house-to-house visitations, partial closing of local markets, etc.;

f) exploitation of all these unfavorable factors by the capitalist elements of town and country (kulaks, speculators) in order to undermine grain procurement and worsen the political situation in the country.

'While it will require several years to put an end to the general causes, it is quite possible to do away at once with the specific, temporary causes and thus avert the possibility of a repetition of the grain procurement crisis.

What is required in order to put an end to these specific causes?

It requires:

- a) putting an immediate stop to the practice of house-to-house visitations, unlawful searches and all other infringements of revolutionary law;
- b) putting an immediate stop to any kind of reversion to the surplus-appropriation system and to all attempts whatsoever to close peasant markets, with the adoption by the state of flexible forms of regulating trade;
- c) a certain increase of grain prices, differentiated according to region and kind of grain;
- d) proper organization of the consignment of manufactured goods to the grain procurement areas;
- e) proper organization of the supply of grain, not permitting overexpenditure;
- f) formation, without fail, of a state grain reserve.

An honest and systematic carrying out of these measures, taking into account this year's favorable harvest, should create a situation that will rule out the necessity of resorting to emergency measures of any kind in the coming grain procurement campaign.

It is the immediate task of the Party to see to it that these measures are carried out faithfully.

The grain difficulties have faced us with the question of the bond, of the future of the alliance between the workers and peasants, of the means of strengthening this alliance. Some say that the bond no longer exists, that the bond has been replaced by estrangement. That, of course, is foolish and worthy only of panicmongers. When there is no bond, the peasant loses faith in the morrow, he retires into himself, he ceases to believe in the stability of the Soviet Government, which is the chief purchaser of peasant grain, he begins to reduce his crop area, or at any rate does not risk enlarging it, fearing that there will again be house-to-house visitations, searches and so on and that his grain will be taken away from him.

But what do we find in reality? We find that the spring crop area has been enlarged in all areas. It is a fact that in the principal grain-growing areas the peasant has enlarged his spring crop area by from 2 percent to 15 and 20 percent. Is it not clear that the peasant does not believe that the emergency measures will be permanent, and has every ground for believing that grain prices will be raised. Does that look like estrangement? This, of course, does not mean that there is no threat, or that there has been no threat, to the bond. But to conclude from this that there is estrangement is to lose one's head and become a slave to elemental forces.

Some comrades think that, in order to strengthen the bond, the main stress must be shifted from heavy industry to light industry (textiles), believing that textiles are the principal and exclusive "bond" industry. That is not true, comrades. It is quite untrue!

Of course, the textile industry is of enormous importance for the establishment of goods exchange between socialist industry and peasant farming. But to think for this reason that textiles are the exclusive basis of the bond is to commit a very gross error. Actually, the bond between industry and peasant farming is maintained not only through cotton goods, which the peasant requires for his personal consumption, but also through metals and through seed, fertilizer and agricultural machines of all kinds, which the peasant requires as a producer of grain. That is apart from the fact that the textile industry itself cannot develop or exist unless heavy industry, machine-building develops.

The need for the bond is not in order to preserve and perpetuate classes. The bond is needed in order to bring the peasantry closer to the working class, to reeducate the peasant, to remold his individualist mentality, to remake him in the spirit of collectivism, and

thus pave the way for the elimination, the abolition of classes on the basis of a socialist society. Whoever does not realize this, or refuses to recognize it, is not a Marxist, not a Leninist, but a "peasant philosopher", who looks backward instead of forward.

And how is the peasant to be remade, remolded? First and foremost, he can be remolded only through new technical equipment and through collective labor.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

"The remaking of the small tiller, the remolding of his whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale. That is what would remake the small tiller fundamentally and with immense rapidity" (Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

Quite clearly, he who thinks that the bond can be guaranteed only through textiles, and forgets about metals and machines, which transform peasant farming through collective labor, help to perpetuate classes; he is not a proletarian revolutionary, he is a "peasant philosopher".

Here is what Lenin says in another passage:

"Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, cooperative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of cooperative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry" (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

That is how to ensure that the vast masses of the peasantry are really and durably won over to the side of the working class, to the side of socialism.

It is sometimes said that to guarantee the bond we have only one reserve—concessions to the peasantry. On this assumption the theory of continuous concessions is sometimes advanced, in the belief that the working class can strengthen its position by making continuous concessions. That is not true, comrades. It is quite untrue! Such a theory can only ruin matters. It is a theory of despair.

In order to strengthen the bond, we must have at our disposal, besides the reserve of concessions, a number of other reserves, in the shape of economic strong points in the countryside (developed cooperatives, collective farms, state farms), and also in the shape of political strong points (energetic work among the poor peasants and assured support on the part of the poor peasants).

The middle peasantry is a vacillating class. If we do not have the support of the poor peasant, if the Soviet Government is weak in the countryside, the middle peasant may swing towards the kulak. And, on the contrary, if we have the sure support of the poor peasant, it may be said with certainty that the middle peasant will swing towards the Soviet Government. Hence, systematic work among the poor peasants and ensuring them both seed and low-cost grain is an immediate task of the Party.

## 2. TRAINING OF CADRES FOR THE WORK OF INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION

Let us pass now to the question of providing our industry with new cadres of a technical intelligentsia.

This question concerns our difficulties in industry, difficulties which came to light in connections with the Shakhty affair.

What is the essence of the Shakhty affair from the point of view of the improvement of industry? The essence and significance of the Shakhty affair lies in the fact that we proved to be practically unarmed and absolutely backward, scandalously backward, in the matter of providing our industry with a certain minimum of experts devoted to the cause

of the working class. The lesson of the Shakhty affair is that we must expedite the formation, the training, of a new technical intelligentsia consisting of members of the working class devoted to the cause of socialism and capable of technically directing our socialist industry.

That does not mean that we shall discard those experts who are not Soviet-minded or not Communists, but who are willing to cooperate with the Soviet Government. It does not mean that. We shall continue to strive with might and main to enlist the cooperation of nonparty technicians, who are prepared to work hand in hand with the Soviet Government in building our industry. We by no means demand that they should renounce their social and political opinions at once, or change them immediately. We demand only one thing, and that is that they should cooperate with the Soviet Government honestly, once they have voluntarily agreed to do so.

But the point is that such old experts who are prepared to work hand in hand with the Soviet Government are becoming relatively fewer and fewer. The point is that it is absolutely necessary to have a new force of young experts to succeed them. Well, the Party considers that the new replacements must be brought into being at an accelerated rate if we do not want to be faced with new surprises, and that they must come from the working class, from among the working people. That means creating a new technical intelligentsia capable of satisfying the needs of our industry.

The facts show that the People's Commissariat for Education has failed to cope with this important task. We have no reason to believe that, if left to itself, the People's Commissariat for Education, which has very little connection with industry, and which is inert and conservative into the bargain, will be able to cope with this task in the near future. The Party, therefore, has come to the conclusion that the work of speedily forming a new technical intelligentsia must be divided among three People's Commissariats—the People's Commissariat for Education, the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the People's Commissariat for Transport. The Party considers that this is the most expedient way of ensuring the required speed in this important work. That is why a number of technical colleges have been transferred to the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the People's Commissariat for Transport.

This, of course, does not mean that transfer of technical colleges is all that is required for speedily forming new cadres of a technical intelligentsia. Undoubtedly, material provision for the students will be a highly important factor. The Soviet Government has therefore decided to rate the expenditure on the training of new cadres on the same level of importance as expenditure on the capital development of industry, and has decided to allocate annually an additional sum of over 40,000,000 rubles for this purpose.

### III

#### CONCLUSION

It must be admitted, comrades, that we have always learned from our difficulties and blunders. At any rate, it has been the case so far that history has taught us and tempered our Party in the school of difficulties, of crises of one kind or another, of mistakes of one kind or another that we have committed.

So it was in 1918, when, as a result of our difficulties on the Eastern Front, of our reverses in the fight against Kolchak, we realized at least the necessity of creating a regular infantry, and really did create it.

So it was in 1919, when, as a result of the difficulties on the Denikin Front, of Mamontov's raid into the rear of our armies, we realized at last the necessity of having a strong regular calvary, and really did create it.

I think that this is more or less the case today. The grain difficulties will not have been without their value for us. They will stir Bolsheviks into action and impel them to tackle in earnest the work of developing agriculture, especially of developing grain farming. Had it not been for these difficulties, it is doubtful whether the Bolsheviks would have tackled the grain problem seriously.

The same must be said of the Shakhty affair and the difficulties resulting from it. The lessons of the Shakhty affair will not and cannot be without their value for our Party. I think that these lessons will impel us to face squarely the problem of creating a new technical intelligentsia capable of serving our socialist industry.

By the way, you see that we have already taken the first serious step towards the solution of the problem of creating a new technical intelligentsia. Let us hope that this step will not be the last. (*Stormy and prolonged applause*)

Stalin, *Works*, Vol. XI, 206-227.



### STALIN ON THE DNEIPER HYDROELECTRIC POWER STATION

31 August 1928

*The Party Central Committee approved the construction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station in November 1927 following years of discussion and debate. The construction project, called Dneprostoi, was envisioned seven years earlier in the plan of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia. Stalin voted against the project at the Party plenum in April 1926. Although the project symbolized the movement toward industrialization and planning, the need to satisfy Ukrainian interests had to be considered. Controversy arose about the type of dam and station to be constructed. The chief engineer of the project, A. Vinter, favored a German design, whereas Hugh Cooper, the American expert brought in as an advisor, and the project's technical council preferred an American method of construction. Cooper's design was chosen. The letter below from Stalin to Kuibyshev demonstrates Stalin's preference for Cooper's design. It also illustrates the political conflict between Stalin and Tomsky.*

### LETTER TO COMRADE KUIBYSHEV

Greetings, Comrade Kuibyshev!

Cooper arrived today. The talk will take place tomorrow. We shall see what he has to say about the American plans.

I have read Cooper's sixth report letter on the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station. Of course, the other side must be heard too. However, it seems to me (such is my first impression) that Cooper *is right* and Vinter is wrong. The generally recognized fact that the Cooper type of coffer-dam (which Vinter opposed) has proved to be the only suitable one—this fact alone shows that what Cooper has to say must certainly be listened to attentively. It would be well if Cooper's sixth letter were examined in the proper quarters and accepted *in principle*.

How are things with you? I have heard that Tomsky has it in for you. He is a malicious fellow and not always clean in his methods. It seems to me he is wrong. I have read your report on rationalization. It is the right sort of report. What more does Tomsky want of you?

How are things going at the Tsaritsyn tractor works and the Leningrad tractor workshops? Can we hope they will be a success?

Stalin, *Works*, XI, 229.



## COMINTERN MANIFESTO ON THE NEW PROGRAM

1 September 1928

*The need for a new program of the Communist International was discussed at its Fourth Congress in December 1922. The Fifth Congress, which met from 17 June to 8 July 1924, decided to adopt only a draft program for submission to Comintern parties and final approval by the executive committee and the Sixth World Congress on 1 September 1928. The program was the first official and comprehensive formulation of Comintern theory and presented communists a common basic document. The document below is the manifesto of the congress. It contains the basic tenets of the new program. These were building socialism in the Soviet Union, capitalist disintegration abroad, defense of the Soviet Union against capitalist countries, fostering revolutionary movements in colonial countries, and the threat of fascism. It also contains vivid and colorful criticisms of capitalist countries and conspiracies, particularly those of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.*

MANIFESTO OF THE SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS  
OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

*To the Workers of the World! To All Workers and Peasants! To All Oppressed Colonial Peoples! To the Soldiers and Sailors of the Capitalist Armies and Navies!*

Comrades, Fellow workers!

The sixth congress of the communist international, the representative of the revolutionary workers all over the world, of all nations, peoples and races, appeals to you from Moscow, the red capital of the new world, to prepare yourselves for a struggle against the ever more indolent forces of capitalism.

The master of the world, capital, which exploits the labor power of the workers in the most brutal fashion, which sucks out their strength, which turns the proletariat into a unit of capitalist technique, which wears out its proletarian slaves in the process of production, which places the most wonderful discoveries of science in the service of the golden calf, which introduces ever more complicated and splendid machines, which introduces to an ever-increasing extent the conveyor and flings millions of workers on to the streets, which gives them stones instead of bread, capital is now marching into the struggle against the rights and freedom of the working class. It is pressing the standard of living of the workers down ever lower, raising the bloody sword of the white terror and preparing for a new world war under the cloak of lying and bombastic phrases of world peace.

Imperialism has once again placed the question of war upon the agenda. From day to day the competition between the great powers and their finance-capitalist cliques is sharpening. Their attacks upon the colonies are becoming ever more brutal, their attempts to encircle the tremendous body of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ever more determined.

The United States of America, at whose gateway the great statue of liberty rears its head to the sky, is laying its hands more firmly on new countries and continents, including also lands belonging to its chief rival, Great Britain. American capitalism, firmly seated upon the treasuries bursting with gold recently minted from the blood and horror of the late imperialist war, is attempting to undermine the Republic of Mexico, is sending punitive expeditions to Nicaragua, and stations its warships in Chinese harbors. American capitalism has fettered a number of European and South American countries with the gold chains of credit, and does not hesitate to call these countries sharply to heel like dogs when they show any sign of resisting its sacred will.

Along the coasts of the Pacific Ocean and in the boundless territories of China, American capitalism collides with the predatory, insolent, cunning and deceitful imperialism of

Japan, whose troops have occupied a considerable part of China. Japanese imperialism is carrying on a war of extermination against all the forces of the Chinese people which are not prepared to subordinate themselves to its barbaric regime of terror. Millions of Chinese workers, peasants and handworkers are bowed down under the iron yoke of Japanese imperialism, which is brutally crushing the Chinese people and preparing for a terrible duel with its American rival and at the same time purchasing itself a breathing space with provocative excesses against the Soviet Union.

These excesses form a link in the chain of the general hostility of the imperialist States to the State of the proletarian dictatorship, which is alive and developing, carrying out constructive work everywhere regardless of the venomous howls of rage and the threatening rattle of sabres in the camp of the enemies who would like to intimidate the land of the socialist dictatorship of the workers and force it to its knees.

Despite all the contradictions and antagonisms which exist between the capitalist powers, and despite their deep and growing mutual hatred, they are preparing, with Great Britain at their head, a war against the Soviet Union. They are systematically preparing for war. They are preparing for war with all the means at their disposal. Every hour is filled with war preparations. The attempts of a number of powers, from the powerful United States to pitiful Austria, the mutilated invalid in the ranks of the European nations, to blockade the Soviet Union financially, the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by Great Britain, the conclusion of diplomatic and military alliances against the Soviet Union, the constant provocative threats of the republic of Marshal Pilsudski, this insolent militarist who has placed the so-called representation of the people into the category of prostitution and who rattles with the sabre to the same degree as he licks the boots of the generals and ministers of Great Britain and France, the almost open work of the general staffs of the entente in the Baltic states and in Rumania, and finally the insolent provocations of Japanese imperialism—all these things must act as a warning to all honest workers, for all proletarians and for all the oppressed all over the world who see in the Soviet Union their fatherland wrung from the hands of the capitalists and rich landowners by the hot blood of the sons of the working class.

The "civilized" robbers, the bloodhounds of the general staffs, the swindlers of secret diplomacy, the bank magnates and the trust kings who are carrying on a criminal war in China, bombarding Chinese towns, occupying Chinese territory, robbing the Chinese people of the means of its existence and destroying its most active sons, preparing attacks upon each other, organizing their forces for a common action against the Soviet Union, arming themselves to the teeth, on land, on the sea and in the air, who are using science to prepare the most barbarous, destructive and inhuman war which will stifle the workers with poison gas and slaughter them in great agony with artificially injected sicknesses, who conduct "monkey trials" against the teachings of Darwin, the most prominent contributor to science in the nineteenth century, who issue laws against "dangerous ideas", who murdered Sacco and Vanzetti in the electric chair, such a horrible atrocity that millions held their breath in anxiety only to groan for vengeance and curse the murderers, these civilized robbers, with their scholastic and non-scholastic lackeys, are raising a howl about the barbarism of the bolsheviks and about their own "love of peace".

The history of humanity has never known anything so hypocritical and sanctimonious, so lying and disgusting as the present ideology of modern "pacifist" imperialism, whose foreign political tasks consist in the most criminal, most barbarous, most counterrevolutionary, most destructive form of warfare ever known. The more furious the armament race becomes, the more energetic become the official and unofficial agents of imperialism in their howls of "peace" and in the production of "peace pacts" and in the organization of conferences and discussions, in the elaboration of projects and proposals for "peace".

The "League of Nations", the product of Versailles, the most shameless robber treaty of the last decade, cloaks the warlike work of its members by working out projects for



disarmament. The Soviet Union has exposed this game: the great friends of peace refused to disarm when their bluff was called. The diplomatic comedy turned into a vulgar farce. The mask of peace fell to the ground and the brutal features of imperialism were revealed to the whole world.

The "League of Nations" is first of all a counterrevolutionary organization, but it is also directed against America. In consequence, Dollar imperialism has put its own "pact" upon the agenda through the mouth of its agents. The hegemony of American capitalism, which possesses the most modern machinery, the greatest gold resources and the best military technique, must secure its juridical recognition. War is "outlawed". Japan is not carrying on war against China, but only "protecting her interests". The USA is not conducting war against Nicaragua, but only "maintaining order". All the capitalist countries are not arming for war, but only to maintain "civilization".

The business managers of imperialist policy who are attempting to conceal their imperialist desires and warlike intentions with a cloud of pacifist pacts and by the narcotic poison of pacifist phrases, are at the same time doing everything possible to cast the workers into chains and to break the backbone of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and to weaken the hinterland of the Soviet Republics. The signs of the times are terror and corruption, a ruthless exploitation of the workers, the corruption of their leaders, a united front against the mass-organizations of the workers when they threaten to become dangerous, the policy of disruption in the ranks of the workers, the increasing attacks of the police upon the communists parties, etc. A wave of repression in Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan meets with a terrible wave of terror in Italy and in the Balkans and with mass executions in China. The bloody axe of bourgeois "civilization" is at work unceasingly. The imperialist murderers survey their victims without moving an eyelid, although they feel inwardly that thousands of fighters crying for vengeance will arise in their stead.

In this period, when the whole air smells of powder and lead, when the antagonisms of capitalism are strained to their utmost, when the class-struggle of the proletariat is intensified, when the million masses of the colonial slaves are rising, when ever new columns of the toilers are mobilizing to defend the Soviet Union, the bulwark of the movement for freedom, in this period the treacherous role of the second international, the social democracy and its Amsterdam department, the IFTU, advances once again into the foreground.

From the standpoint of the class interests of the proletariat it is more than ever necessary today for the workers to realize their class independence and to realize that their interests are diametrically opposed to the interests of the capitalists and the capitalist states. A proletarian counterattack is the only possible answer to the insolent attacks of capitalism, to the inhuman exploitation of labor power, to the unemployment, to the policy of dissolving the working class organizations and to the fascist terror. And in this period the high priests of the social democratic parties, who have shamelessly betrayed all the old traditions of the class struggle and who tread the elementary pride of the proletariat into the dust, in this period they preach the collaboration of the classes, "industrial peace" and "economic democracy". Peace and democracy under the iron-shod heel of trust capitalism! "Industrial peace" in economy and coalition with the bourgeoisie in politics, that is the treacherous sum of social democratic wisdom.

From the standpoint of the class interests of the proletariat it is more than ever necessary at the present time to expose every warlike action of the bourgeoisie, to draw the attention of the masses to the danger of war and to sound the alarm. And in this period the social democratic politicians are building armored cruisers, acting as the initiators of brutal military laws, grovel before militarism, actively "improve" the capitalist armies, praise the imperialist league of nations, slander the USSR, praise the deceptive and deceitful document of the hangmen of Sacco and Vanzetti, and are full of foul pacifist slime. Whilst they

themselves are whitewashing as well as they can the military preparations of the imperialists, they at the same time accuse the Soviet Union of imperialism. The social democrats, the heroes of 1914, are already grovelling before the imperialist general staffs. Already their hands are outstretched to receive the reward of their work on the day when they join the ranks of the bourgeoisie in a war against the soldiers of the proletarian revolution.

From the standpoint of the class-interests of the proletariat the unity of the industrial proletariat with the working masses in the colonies is more necessary than ever before. In this question, however, the social democrats are on the side of the exploiters, on the side of the imperialists, on the side of the imperialist robber states and their agents. The French socialists supported their government when the French troops razed the villages of the Riffi and laid Syrian towns in ruins with heavy artillery fire. The government of MacDonald appeared openly as the oppressor of India and Egypt. Members of the labor party now in India are fulfilling the direct instructions of the British bourgeoisie. All social democratic parties are supporting their own governments in the Chinese question and only allow themselves a polite and respectful criticism when the pressure of the masses forces their hands. The Brussels congress of the second international, which failed to support the Kuomintang in the period of its revolutionary struggles, openly sided with the Kuomintang after it had become the bloodhound of imperialism and the hangman of the Chinese working class. In the colonial question the Brussels congress made decisions which were practically copied from the documents of the league of nations.

Social democracy has thus become the chief force which makes for separating the workers in the industrial countries from the toiling masses in the colonies.

Finally, from the standpoint of the interests of the proletariat as a class, the unity of the working class is more than ever necessary. The struggle against the powerful organized enemy, against the gigantic trusts, against the state power of capitalism, which protects the interests of the finance-capitalist oligarchy, the maximum of unity in the ranks of the workers is necessary. But just at this present moment the social democratic agency of the imperialist bourgeoisie is at work to carry out its instructions and disrupt the ranks of the workers! The leaders of the social democratic parties and of the reformist trade unions, the heralds of unity with the bourgeoisie and its trusts, the apostles of industrial peace and political coalition with the representatives of the banks and the stock exchange, are doing everything possible to expel the communists and all revolutionary proletarians from the mass organizations of the working class. They are splitting the trade unions, they are splitting the sport organizations, they are smashing up the ranks of the proletarian free-thinkers. The more they fight for unity with the bourgeoisie, the more brutal becomes their struggle against the unity of the working class.

The communist international appeals to all workers and to all toilers to close their ranks still more firmly, to fight for the unity of the whole working class, to fight for the unity of the workers with the peasants and to fight for the alliance of the workers with the oppressed colonials peoples in the struggle against the exploitation and oppression of the class enemy.

The sixth world congress of the communist international adopted an international program which is binding equally for all sections. For the first time since the existence of the revolutionary working class movement, the working class will have a document in its hand whose passages are law for the millions of organized workers in all countries and amongst all races and nations of the globe. This document is not one of peaceful grovelling before the bourgeoisie; it is not a document making for dishonorable peace with the bourgeoisie. It is not a declaration of pharisaical degenerate and treacherous unity with the bourgeoisie, a unity which means nothing but the desertion of the ranks of the proletariat for the camp of the enemy, desertion, treachery and renegacy. This program is the guiding star of millions of exploited and oppressed toilers in the struggle against the oppressors, in the

struggle of the proletarian masses, in the struggle of the white, black and yellow toilers in the tropics, in the farthest corners of the earth, in the plantations, in the factories, in the mines and on the railways, in the woods and in the desert, in the large towns and in the country, everywhere where the class-struggle is being carried on. It is the program of the unity of the working class and of a life and death fight with the bourgeoisie. It is the program of the inevitable world dictatorship of the proletariat.

The communist international appeals to all toilers to rally closely around the banner of the class struggle, the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the working class. With the exertion of all its energy the capital world has again reared itself up upon the backs of the workers exploited by the gigantic slave machine of capitalism. Under the crack of slave whips capitalism has emerged from the ruins of the first imperialist world war. But capitalism is beginning to suffocate under the weight of its own contradictions. Its historical fate drives it once again with tremendous elemental force into the vortex of tremendous catastrophes, the deadly breath of which will scorch the whole world. The imperialist cliques, which are afraid of their own historical fate, but are nevertheless its instruments, the capitalist cliques who cannot decide to let loose the dogs of war, but who are nevertheless doing everything possible to break the chains and let loose the carnage, the imperialist cliques who are trying to deceive everyone with murmurs of peace and pacifism, but whose fingers are at the same time feeling for the trigger, are driving the world steadily to the brink of a new and terrible catastrophe.

The communist international appeals to all toilers to arise in their own defense. Now at once, day for day, the ranks of the fighters must be set up, the masses of the toilers must be mobilized, loyal messengers of the working class sent into the armies and the fleets of capitalism to prepare the soldiers and sailors to turn their guns in the hour when imperialism calls upon them to slaughter each other, against the imperialists themselves, the best target during the imperialist war.

The imperialist beast with its dull eyes can only see the historical past and is unable to penetrate the curtain which hides the future. It is consoling itself with the comparative state of peace which prevails in Europe, which from time to time is given an injection of life-giving gold elixir from the transatlantic vampire, the United States. But the sober glance of the proletariat, which has felt all the glories of capitalist rationalization and all the burdens of "industrial peace" upon its own skin, can see clearly the gigantic accumulation of capitalist contradictions and the steady and rapid intensification of the class struggle everywhere. The general strike in Great Britain, the insurrection in Vienna, the strikes in Germany, the electoral results in France and Germany, the reaction of the German workers to the new treachery of the social democrats in the armored cruiser question, the violent resistance put up by the Chinese workers and peasants, the growing thunder of the revolutionary volcano in India, which is already sending up preliminary smoke signals, the steadily growing dissatisfaction in South America, the growth of self-confidence amongst the Negroes and thousands of other signs, do they now show that the mole of history is burrowing?

The communist international appeals to all toilers, and in particular to the industrial workers, to take up the struggle for every inch of ground that has been won, to fight against the policy of the imperialists and against imperialist war. The communist international appeals to all workers and to all oppressed peoples devotedly to defend the Chinese revolution, whose heroes and martyrs have fallen under the axe of the executioner. The communist international appeals to all honest proletarians to form a wall of iron around the Soviet Union against which imperialism is raising the sword of war. The communist international appeals for increased watchfulness and for a direct fight against the pacifist lies and pacifist deception. The communist international appeals for a complete break with the bourgeoisie and for the unity of the ranks of the workers in a ruthless struggle against the class enemies of the proletariat.

Against the social democratic unity with the bourgeoisie—for the class unity of the proletarians!

Against social imperialism—for the heroic support of our brothers in the colonies!

Against the pacifist lies—for the devoted fight against imperialist war!

Against reformism and fascism—for the proletarian revolution!

Long live the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union!

Long live the proletarian world revolution!

Batsell, 798-806.



PRAVDA REPORTS ON THE CELEBRATION  
OF THE CENTENARY OF LEO TOLSTOY'S BIRTH

10 September 1928

*Soviet and foreign literary figures met at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow to celebrate the centenary of Leo Tolstoy's birth. Foreign writers participating in the festivities, such as Stefan Zweig, stressed Tolstoy's contributions to world literature. The celebration and adulation of Tolstoy appeared momentarily to reduce considerably conflicts among Soviet writers. The centenary offered an opportunity to search for the revolutionary character of Tolstoy. Art and culture under NEP seemed to be flourishing and were attracting worldwide attention. Expatriates, such as Maxim Gorky and Sergei Prokofiev recently were returned to their homeland.*

*We honor him from here and everywhere!*

So, with these words by G. B. Plekhanov, did A. V. Lunacharsky end his speech about Tolstoy as a revolutionary during the celebration ceremony on 10 September at the Bolshoi Theater. A Marxist analysis of Tolstoy as a personality, artist, and thinker must have consisted of this narrow-minded admission of the legacy left by the great writer, in order to give him, according to that expressed by the speaker, "practical and possibly more important use" in our times. Namely, because, not rejecting the value of Tolstoy's legacy, the party and soviet society now draw to him the attention of millions of the masses.

Marxists do not regard social phenomena separately from the epoch and class, in which they occur.

To understand Tolstoy, without taking into consideration his noble birth, is impossible! emphasized the speaker, and who characterized the nobility of the second half of the nineteenth century as an epoch which brought to life such "a talented spokesman of the gigantic dissonances of the times as well as some kind of harmonic chord," as Tolstoy.

This was a time of stormy crises. Young industrial capital attacked, inflicting severe blows against the feudal structure. It beat the nobles and the peasantry.

Tolstoy does not believe in the forces of capitalism's progress. He wants to break it and appeal to the forces of the past. He is frightening to bourgeois "civilization" and, imbued with noble-lord hatred, must oppose some kind of positive ideal. How? The nobility became a perishing class. It was struggling, powerlessly with rapidly growing capitalism. Tolstoy fastens his eyes on the peasantry. Tolstoy extols the peasant and becomes his ideology. In him, he sees the bearer of higher social truth. In striving for material enrichment, he sees the embryo of a great "sin" of violence, exploitation, and, calling for victory of this sin, he returns back, to the old style of life, that is illuminated by the name of an ancient god whom "the people recognized from of old."

Comrade Lunacharsky said: If Tolstoy had survived the burden of the world war and the comedy of pacificism which preceded it, he would have found anew the words which brand the falsehood and horror of bourgeois civilization. We are revolutionaries, and we brand bourgeois progress and see its contradictions. These contradictions will find their exit only in a terrible fight from which the proletariat will emerge the victor, so as to unite mankind, secure man's power over nature, reign over social equality and triumphant love in order to expand all possibilities which are placed in man.

Did Tolstoy know all of this? We do not know. But, a supporter of days past, he is alien to the present. As a representative of a fallen class, there was no reason for him to create a genuine sermon of struggle. In the name of his own method of saving mankind, he preached nonresistance to evil.

From our point of view, as Comrade Lunacharsky concluded in his speech, from the point of view of those who must recruit possibly the largest masses of fighters against capitalism, these weak echoes of evangelical teachings are completely unacceptable. We cannot not carry the struggle against them. Therefore we praise Tolstoy for his enormous vitality, we praise him as the strongest critic of social defects, and declare with the words of our teachers: "We honor him from here and everywhere."

\* \* \*

Professor P. N. Sakulin gave a speech on Tolstoy as the artist.

As a literary rebel and innovator, Tolstoy until the end of his days thought and worked on the problem of art. While consistently working on himself, he was creating a new aesthetic, rejecting "manorial" art, which was constructed on the principles of beauty and accompanied the fancifulness of form and the absence of substance. Old literature, in Tolstoy's opinion, could not satisfy the masses. The value of art is determined by its content. The goal of art is to serve the relations of people. Brevity, simplicity, so this is what is necessary above all. And Tolstoy proceeded along this path. He found that it is necessary to learn to write among the peasants. ("Singing of the village grandmother at times was no less than a Beethoven sonata.").

The revolution freed the creative forces of the people, spoke P. N. Sakulin. The proletarian and peasant writers of our day are creating a genuine national style. Tolstoy, then, was in this connection the superlative messenger of the literary revolution.

The old people's teacher Comrade Shatsky spoke to the session about the practical activity of Leo Nikolaevich in the area of pedagogy, and together with this subjected to criticisms those ideas which the celebrated [Tolstoy—AGC] attempted to drive into the heads of his pupils.

The speeches were interrupted for an hour by Beethoven's Fifth Symphony.

The Austrian writer Stefan Zweig was at the podium.

The writer spoke: I am extremely distressed that I must speak before Russians not in the Russian language, but this is the result of the scornful relationship of bourgeois Europe to the Russian people that has been extolled up to the present time. Now, after the revolution and in the schools, all the young of the West look at the Russian language and Russian culture as a source of value, which revives, renews European culture. One of these values is Leo Tolstoy. Whoever reads Tolstoy, has already lived in Russia. The hypnotic power of his works is like when I walked out of the October Station, and in front of me were presented scenes from Russian life which were given by Tolstoy in "Anna Karenina".

Tolstoy is significantly bigger than any of the other Russian writers, and promoted the familiarity of the masses of the West with Russian culture. Today's celebration is therefore not only a Russian, but also an all-mankind holiday. Many millions of people are celebrating him at the same time we are.

I personally, exclaimed Zweig, am happy to celebrate in the USSR the centenary of the great writer.

The German writer Werngardt Kellerman spoke: When I traveled the Russian countryside, the magnificent figure of Tolstoy is inserted before me. He is for our time a myth. Tolstoy as an artist is the one and only phenomenon in our human race.

Professor Dana (America) in his speech pointed out that in America the influence of Tolstoy is so strong, that they see in him there as the greatest prophet.

Lo Gatto (Italy) expressed the feeling of admiration for Tolstoy from Italian admirers of the great artist and "great son of the Russian people."

Mr. Wright (England) declared that writers of the whole world must follow in the footsteps of Tolstoy.

Speeches were also given by: Volominsky (Czechoslovakia), Alvaredel-Vaio (Spain), Somper (Estonia), Forgun (Persia), and representatives of other countries.

Greetings were also heard from the Academy of Sciences, Communist Academy, Institute of Red Professors, GAKHI, Society of Lovers of Russian Literature, Federation of Writers, and numerous other public organizations.

Telegrams of greetings were received from abroad from Knute Hamsun, Anton Sinkler, and numerous societies of "Friends of Russia".

*Pravda*, 12 September 1928.



## KUIBYSHEV CALLS FOR RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ATTEMPTS TO MOLLIFY THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA

19 September 1928

*The July Party Plenum hesitated about deciding the specifics of industrialization. Apparently this was due to the grain-procurement issue and conflict about investment in heavy and light industry. Textiles and other components of light industry were considered extremely important by many Communist Party leaders for improving the living conditions of poor and middle peasants and for accumulating resources for industrialization without destroying the equilibrium between industry and agriculture. In a report to a meeting of the Leningrad Party Organization, V. Kuibyshev, chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (Vesenkha), called for acceleration in the growth of industry, particularly heavy industry, at any price and to the greatest degree possible. He also used the occasion to soften the blow against the non-Party technical intelligentsia struck by the Shakhty Affair. His report reflected the concern of Communist Party elements about gradual development of industry in view of the growing international isolation reflected by the War Scare of 1927. It also exuded confidence in a successful grain harvest for the upcoming economic year.*

## V. KUIBYSHEV THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

### THE PROSPECTS FOR THE ECONOMIC YEAR 1928/29

Though there have been many changes for the better in comparison with the state of affairs one year ago, the general economic position at the commencement of the economic year 1928/29 embodies certain specific difficulties, which must be mentioned here. It is a

fact in our favor that we are entering upon the new economic year with the fourth satisfactory harvest in succession. According to the computations of the Central Statistical Administration, the total of cereals exceeds last year's total by 312 million puds. In this connection, however, the following point must be taken into consideration. In the first place, the distribution of the entire harvest among the different kinds of grain is unfavorable, the result being that, in the case of the general increase of the harvested grain, there will be a certain recession in the total output of bread-cereals. This is the first unfavorable factor. The second consists in the unfavorable geographic distribution of the harvests garnered for the year 1928/29. An increase in the bread-cereal crops is precisely in those areas which are far distant from the proletarian centers. While a diminution is to be observed in those districts, which are wont to furnish the industrial centers with grain. The difficulties with which we are faced in our grain-procurement work can and will nevertheless be overcome, if all the resolutions passed by the July Plenum of the CC are realized and if the task of procurement receives the degree of attention due to this economic operation. The attention of the Party must in this connection not be diminished by a single iota, for if this section of our front is broken there will inevitably be complications on all lines of our economic life.

In the coming year there will also be difficulties, but by organization, discipline, and hard work we shall be able to overcome them, just as we overcame the difficulties of the grain-procurement in 1927/28. It is the present moment (the close of September and the first half of October) that proves the most difficult, since it is not until the end of October that the grain from Siberia, Kazakhstan, and the Volga area will be available in the industrial centers. But a good organization, together with the observance of all the measures worked out and accepted by the CC and the Government, will render it possible to weather the year now commencing without experiencing such difficulties as characterized by the year 1927/28. We must, however, constantly be on the watch and the Party must concentrate its entire efforts on this sector of the economic front.

As regards the agricultural raw materials, we shall experience every bit as great a tension, which will be yet enhanced by two moments. It is true, we shall have a greatly increased amount of technically farmed products at our disposal. We shall thus have 16 million puds of cotton and a great deal of flax (according to some calculations as much as 11 million puds) in excess of what we had last year. The position as regards oil-seeds, however, is worse than it was last year, for although there has been a great increase in the area under cultivation in this respect, the oil-seed crops are likely to fall slightly short of last year's total. The dearth of vegetable-fats will therefore also be felt in the coming year. With reference to cotton, the difficulties will arise in connection with the importation of foreign cotton, although our own production has increased very considerably.

In regard to linseed, we shall probably be in a much better position this year than last.

This, comrades, is the first circumstance we must take into consideration in regarding the economic year which is about to commence. The situation on the grain market will not be easy: there will be a certain tension. But the efforts of the Party and of all organs of Soviet authority must be directed towards mitigating it. This also applies to raw materials. If we speak of the coming economic year, however, we must in the very first place consider that output will be increased. According to provisional and merely approximate calculations there will be an increase of supply and demand in connection with industrial goods.

As I have already pointed out, we shall increase our output by more than 20 percent. The demand, however, grows exceedingly fast and outstrips the increase in the output of goods. In regard to those branches of industry which work for the broad rural markets, we are increasing our output by 9.3 percent since it is the output of means of production which in the first place will be increased. According to provisional and merely approximate calculations, it is to be assumed that the demands of the rural population will increase by

about 14 percent in the coming year. Thus demand grows faster than supply. Naturally these figures may only be taken quite conditionally; but apparently we shall not be able to satisfy the demand for goods in the coming twelve months and our industrial output will not suffice. According to some computations, this deficit of industrial production will be even greater than was the case last year, in the first place in view of the rise in the prices of agricultural products which will tend to enhance the demand for industrial rather than the further output of agricultural goods. The latter is but slightly on the increase, while the peasants who sell their produce at higher prices are anxious to acquire more industrial goods for the money received.

The occurrence of a deficit in the coming year too forces us once more to return to the question of the rate of development of our industry. At any price we must absolutely accelerate the growth of our industry as far as possible. What are we likely to attain in the coming twelve months? We reckon with an increase of 20 percent, i.e., 22 percent in the case of industry producing means of production, and 18 percent, in the case of the industry catering for direct consumption. The heavy industries manufacturing articles of production will be the object of particular attention in this connection.

The question arises whether we are right in our program. Is it right that we should particularly accelerate the rate of development of industry producing the means of production in regard both to the investment of funds and to an augmentation of the quantities produced, while the peasant question becomes more and more acute and there is an ever-increasing demand for mass-articles on the rural market? I believe such a line of procedure to be absolutely correct, for he is blind who does not notice that a very important change has come about in the rural demand and that the rural markets are calling for machinery and other means of production more than for anything else. The rural districts are gradually transferring their demands from the industries producing articles of daily use to those which produce agricultural machinery, corrugated sheeting, nails and other such objects, which the peasants require in ever greater quantities. Naturally we are ourselves regulating this demand to a great extent.

The further question arises: what form of alliance between industry and the peasantry would be the most useful for the purpose of solving the tasks of Socialist construction? Surely such a form as remodeled agriculture, and prepares the way for an introduction of socialism among the peasants by means of collective forms of tillage and an enlargement and industrialization of the farms. Therefore we must ourselves so regulate the demands of the peasantry as constantly to increase their supply with means of production. If we increase the rate of development of the manufacture of the means of production more than that of the manufacture of other commodities, this greater acceleration means at the same time a more vigorous increase in the production of agricultural machinery, a greatly increased output of fertilizers, an increase in the metals required in the rural areas, etc.

The prospects of satisfying the rural population in this respect are not very good. In spite of a considerable advance on the part of the industries manufacturing means of production, in which regard even the rate of annual increase is augmenting, there is not only no diminution, but even a growth in the deficit of articles of this kind. The percentage of satisfied requirements for unwrought metals is on the decline.

The necessity of giving prime consideration to the satisfaction of the demands for metal on the part of the armament industries, of transport, and of other industrial branches, renders the satisfaction of such consumers as the peasants and the artisans yet more precarious.

In the coming year we stand to increase the output of fertilizers by 74 percent. No other branch of industry can record such an increase in output. And yet the agricultural requirements for fertilizers will barely be satisfied to 50 percent. And this only refers to the demands of the central organizations and other State institutions in contact with the rural



districts. It is obvious that if we are to satisfy the appetite of the peasants for fertilizers, the industry will never be able to keep pace with our requirements, not even if it doubles or triples its output. The experience of the last economic year has shown that in a whole series of places prior to the seed campaign, the requirements of the peasants in the way of articles of a productive nature are far greater than we can hope to satisfy.

Finally, the problem of a radical technical reconstruction of the light industries arises again and again with increasing urgency. The rapidity with which this problem is solved is, however, directly dependent on the success and the rate of development of our machinery output. For it would be a great mistake to assume that the technical reequipment of our light industries can simply be effected by the importation of machines from abroad. That would be a serious political blunder, a renunciation of all the resolutions accepted by the Party, entailing a fatal degree of dependence of the development and rapidity of our reconstruction on the industry of the capitalist countries.

#### THE DIFFICULTIES WITH WHICH WE ARE FACED MUST NOT HINDER THE RATE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

All this tends to show that those assertions cannot be too energetically repudiated which speak of an "overindustrialization" and accuse us of employing unduly great funds or the manufacture of means of production, i.e., for the metal industry, engineering, for anthracite coal, petroleum, and the like, also maintaining that rate of development of our industry is exceeding our strength and must therefore be reduced. Such talk, which arises out of a feeling of panic in view of the difficulties with which we are faced and which can only be overcome by as great as possible an increase in the output capacity of our industry, are in direct opposition to the interests and requirements of our country. We are confronted with the immediate danger of a deficit in regard to metals. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy recently treated the question of the importation of cast iron. That suffices to show how disagreeable and anomalous is the position in which we are at present. It is altogether absurd to assert that part of the money we spend on great industrial constructions ought to be employed for the lighter industries.

Our *engineering industry* is advancing very rapidly and can show results excelled by no other branch. But the results are by no means such as we can for a moment content ourselves with. The dearth of machinery continues to be an obstacle to our economic progress. The want of machinery impedes the economy in general and agriculture in particular. The importation of machinery is still the first item on the import side of our trade balance and contributes to the prevailing currency tension. We are, however, still dependent on these imports, seeing that the want of machinery was part and parcel of our heritage and could not yet be made good despite all our achievements, in this direction.

How can people maintain that our engineering output ought to be reduced or that the rate of its development should be diminished? All this talk of our alleged "overindustrialization" and of the necessity of slowing-down in this connection is, as I have already pointed out, only the result of the prevailing difficulties. Our economic development cannot be expected to proceed quite without failure, disproportions, or anomalies. We shall constantly be involved in anomalies, seeing that we had not the possibility during the first years of the existence of the Soviet Union to live in peace and to proceed smoothly and uninterruptedly with all branches of our development. We were deprived of this possibility because a great number of contradictions existed even in former times in our economy and in all other branches of our economy, in which connection it must be borne in mind that, the more successfully we progress in our Socialist development, the greater will be the difficulties that will be laid in our path by our opponents at home and abroad. The elimination of class differences, which is the final aim of our entire development, will and must be effected in the form of ever greater class struggle. Naturally we shall need more than a

decade to eradicate these differences and to ensure a smooth and harmonious development of our economic organism without disproportions and anomalies. These differences and anomalies are inevitable and we shall be occupied with them for a long time to come. They will lead to new difficulties and complications in our economic life. But they will not hinder us, they must not be allowed to diminish the energy with which we carry on development along the lines laid down by our Party. The industrialization of the country and the enhancement of the rate of industrialization are both tasks continually confronting us.

We have incurred a very great and serious task not only in regard to industry but also with reference to the economy as a whole. We do not only desire to develop our industry, but also to create a far higher technical basis; besides this, we desire to transform our rural economy. At any cost we must ensure the strengthening and further growth of the individual farms on the basis of a systematic improvement of the technical and material foundations of their production. We have taken in hand the organization of large Soviet farms and grain works, which are intended to alter the entire system of grain procurement on a very large scale. We are advancing towards a collective system of farming and towards socialist development on the basis of an alteration of material and technical condition of production. This will involve a greater use of mechanical accessories, the electrification of agriculture, the employment of chemical products, and the like. All these are tasks which it will be extremely difficult to solve, all the more so in view of the discontent of the kulak elements and of the peasantry in general. The kulaks, who will be harmed by the new forms of rural economy, exercise a certain influence on the middle peasant strata in the rural districts. Seeing that in our program of industrialization we have most decidedly set ourselves the task of destroying local influences of this kind, we must be prepared to meet with discontent and active resistance in certain sections of the population, which will increase the difficulties with which we are faced in an economic respect. On the other hand, this same discontent penetrates through all sorts of channels even as far as certain parts of our Soviet apparatus, the result being doubts as to the possibility of executing such great tasks and as to the wisdom of aspiring to such difficult objectives as are involved in the industrialization of agriculture and the industrialization of our entire economy. By penetrating into our Soviet apparatus, such sentiments also find ingress in a small measure into our Party. The Party will have recourse to all available measures for the purpose of nipping in the bud such sentiments as pessimism or lack of confidence. The July Plenum of the CC openly stated that apart from its energetic struggle against pseudoradical tendencies of the nature of Trotskyism, "left" tendencies which in reality hide a pessimistic Social Democratic core, the Party must also combat such pessimistic currents as are occasioned by the existing difficulties and tend to diminish the energy and activity essential for the solution of the tremendous tasks with which we are faced. Seeing that the difficulties before us are very great and that the unity, discipline, and solidarity of our Party are our only guarantees of success, we must seek not only to combat the pessimistic tendencies, which are to a great part no more than the reflection of the discontent of the petty-bourgeois chaos at our policy or industrialization, but also to combat the attitude of tolerance observed with regard to these tendencies. We are often told that these tendencies are exaggerated, that they do not really exist, or that they are far less dangerous than e.g. Trotskyism, which, as a countercurrent to that of the Party, constitutes a very serious danger, while these tendencies are vague, but half-formed, and innocuous, for which reason we may restrict our efforts to opposing Trotskyism. It is absolutely true that Trotskyism should be opposed as vigorously as possible and that there are in our Party certain remnants of war communism which become apparent in connection with the grain-procurement campaign. That alone is, however, not sufficient. And therefore I am of the opinion that the leading article published in the Leningrad "Pravda" of 18 September assumes a wrong attitude in this regard in speaking of Trotskyism as the very greatest existing danger and in completely ignoring the

pessimistic tendencies which occur in certain degenerated sections of our Party organism. I second everything said in the article in question against Trotskyism, but to write an entire leading article against Trotskyism and not to have a single word to say about the other dangers—such as pessimism and defeatism—is a sign of short-sightedness, a sign of undue tolerance in regard to the said tendencies, and a failure to pursue the directives set up by the July plenum on the subject of a fight upon two fronts. We must be fully aware that it would be wrong from every point of view to speak of a reduction of the rate of industrialization, just as wrong from the standpoint of the interest of the next few economic years as from that of the prospects of socialist construction.

In the next few years the industry of Leningrad will be faced with a number of highly important and responsible tasks, which must be fulfilled by the Leningrad proletariat at any cost. I may mention one or other of them. It is for you to lay the foundations of our production of tractors, which is as much as to say, the foundations of the industrialization of agriculture. Can this be done without a technical adaptation of the concerns which were formally not intended for such work or without the investment of certain funds? In the ensuing year we are earmarking a considerable sum, more than 7 million rubles, for the purpose of adapting the Putilov works to the construction of tractors.

Let us take another task you will have to fulfill. Let us take engineering in general and the construction of turbines in particular. We are now constructing the gigantic power station "Dneprostoi". This power station will require dynamos and turbines. If you do not create the foundations for our native construction of machinery, we shall have to procure it from abroad, which is practically impossible in view of the present influx of foreign currency. The requirements of our economy in the immediate future will call for great investments, if our native construction of turbines is to be raised to the desired level. This task must be realized, and that not only from the standpoint of industrialization and of socialist development. It must be realized in view of the demands of our economy in the future. And yet it is just in such instances that we are told we are "overindustrializing" and "biting off more than we can chew." History, however, will not permit us to proceed more slowly, otherwise the very next year may lead to a series of even more serious anomalies than are apparent today. Any careful student of our economy will, I am sure, agree with me that the most serious disproportion, which is most disadvantageous in its effect on our economy, is that between the output of the means of production and the requirements of the country. If we were to delay the rate of development in regard to the production of fertilizers, which calls for such tremendous investments, if we were to slow down the output of agricultural machinery, we should not be solving the problem of an increase in our productive capacity, a problem which furnishes the key to the problem of our alimentation in general and the alimentation of the industrial centers in particular. If we do not promote and do not accelerate our development in this regard, we shall make no special progress in our task of placing agriculture on a collective basis, simply because there can be no cooperative system without machinery and without fertilizers.

If we do not properly ensure the rate of development of that particular branch of our engineering industry, which works for the finishing industries, by a new construction and a new equipment of the respective works, we shall not be in a position to solve the envisaged tasks of a reduction of the initial costs and prices of finished goods, nor yet to realize our intention of increasing wages and raising the material and cultural level of the peasantry.

Thus it is in the relation between the output of and the demand for means of production, metals, chemicals, cast iron, machinery, and the like, that the fundamental anomalies of our epoch are to be sought. These are anomalies that we must eliminate at any price, since it is only thus that we can hope to guarantee a smooth and harmonious socialist development of our economy.

## THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS OF THE ENSUING ECONOMIC YEAR

Permit me next briefly to enter upon the tasks confronting us in the ensuing economic year 1928/29.

The necessity of such an increase in capital investments as compared with last year is absolutely obvious. If we are not to suspend a whole number of operations we have already begun, we cannot possibly do with less than that.

In the first place we must increase our activity in connection with exportation. The entire position requires of us as great as possible a development of exportation and to this end we must invest funds in the exporting industries (petroleum, timber, export goods of the second order). The investments must be large, if exportation is to be materially increased. We are making great efforts in this direction. In 1927/28 we increased our exportation of industrial products by 40 percent over the preceding year, but this increase is insufficient for the purpose of ensuring our industry such a quota of exports as it merits in keeping with our international position. This was the first item that had to be increased. In the second place, we cannot always continue to have such a shortage of building materials as has characterized our building operations hitherto. The same thing may be said in regard to metal production. In regard to the industry producing building materials we intend to invest twice as much as last year. I believe this is only right. Nor yet can the height of our investments in the metal-producing industries remain unchanged.

Thirdly, it must be remembered that in the course of the last economic year we commenced a number of important constructions, which must be carried on at a normal rate. In this connection small sums are of no use to us, for this would merely result in an extension of our operations over a great number of years, while it is imperative for us to proceed with these constructions as speedily as possible. The amounts earmarked last year for certain purposes must necessarily be increased this year. Finally, we are still faced with the task of developing our chemical industry energetically and at an accelerated rate. All these facts suffice to justify the necessity of still greater investments than in 1927/28.

If we are to carry out our extensive plans, therefore, we must in the first place be certain of our financial resources. We cannot burden the State budget with the entire weight of these financial requirements. Our restricted means and our limited possibilities of opening up new monetary sources, make it imperative for industry in the interest of a realization of these great constructional plans, to make every effort towards increasing the accumulation within industry itself. To this end the most necessary step is a reduction of prime costs, which according to schedule is to amount in the forthcoming business year to six percent (i.e. 6.7 percent for group A and 5.4 percent for group B). With a total production valued at 13,000 million rubles, a reduction of prime costs by 6 percent in the face of stable market prices would mean an increase of the internal industrial accumulation by 770 million rubles, a sum which has been booked as part and parcel of the financial and production plan for 1928/29 and which will to a great extent determine both the volume of the building activity and the financial position of industry, in short, the execution of the entire program. If this degree of reduction in the prime costs, as estimated here, is not realized, the entire plan will thereby be jeopardized, and it is for this reason that the reduction of prime costs to the extent indicated must form one of the most responsible and absolutely vital tasks of industry in the coming year, a matter of utmost urgency despite the circumstance that a number of factors are exercising an adverse influence on the dynamics of prime costs, while quite a number of articles of rural origin will experience an advance in price this year.

The question arises whether such a reduction of prime costs by 6 percent is actually possible. I believe it to be possible, though it will call for a very great effort. Many comrades declare this task to be beyond our strength, pointing out that in the coming year there will be many unfavorable circumstances in regard to prime costs. That is a fact. Certain

raw materials are getting dearer, wages are rising, and so is the price of grain, factors which may have an indirect influence on the prices of timber-felling and other rustic forms of work. In short, there are a whole number of such tendencies which may have an appreciative influence on the prime costs of production. There will be difficulties with certain raw materials; a suspension of operations will also ensue in certain works—another fact which will adversely influence prime expenditure. On the other hand there are a great number of circumstances favoring a reduction of prime costs and which must not be ignored when initial expenditure is discussed. In this regard there is in the first place far-reaching reequipment of our industry, which permits us to demand of our economists, of the working class and of the trade unions that those concerns which have received considerable sums for modernization should reduce their initial expenditure. If we really get busy, I believe this work can be done, although the solution of such a task imposes tremendous tasks on every economist and renders great attention to these matters essential. To gain this end, we shall have to be highly active in the way of rationalization, improving all the elements of production (in regard to the exploitation of fuel, in regard to our working forces, and in the better exploitation of the plant). This renders necessary a reinforcement of discipline and a complete elimination of the laxity that has been noticeable of late in the industrial concerns (e.g., unexcused absence from work); added to this, the productivity of labor must be increased. All this calls for improvement. It is only at the cost of a great effort and only by means of zealous activity on the part of the entire industrial apparatus that we shall be able to attain the envisaged object of a reduction of prime costs.

The second presumption for the realization of this great plan of industrial construction is a cheapening of construction costs. Here again conditions are far from satisfactory. At the price of a certain effort, however, great results can be attained in this respect too. In the past year we had set ourselves the task of reducing the index of construction costs by 15 percent. All in all, the index probably decreased by about 10 percent, which would mean that the task was fulfilled to the extent of two-thirds. In this respect I must admit we have done very little. If in spite of small efforts in this direction certain results have been attained in the reduction of building expenses, it will obviously be possible to bring about a decisive change for the better by the exercise of every effort.

One of our most important tasks for 1928/29 in an industrial respect is that of ensuring a certain degree of order in regard to our great constructions, without which it will be impossible to attain any palpable results in the reduction of time employed, in the diminution of the building index, and in the augmentation of the construction effect. In the very first place, we must fight energetically against the execution of any construction projects which have not been previously sufficiently well worked out. Disagreeable as it may sometimes prove, it will yet be essential, save perhaps in certain exceptionally important cases, to prohibit the commencement of building operations completely if no fully worked-out plans can be submitted. "Rather fewer and better" must be our maxim in connection with large industrial constructions. It is a carefully projected and well thought-out construction activity, confirmed by the competent authorities and coupled with a careful preparation of all organizational work, that can afford a guarantee of efficacy, of an adherence to stipulated terms and the estimated expenditure. This severe measure must be carried out and obeyed at all costs, since there is no other way of counteracting the present lawlessness, expensiveness, and irregularity of our building activity.

The difficulty of the economic tasks before us upon the one hand and the growth of the hostile forces arrayed against us (both by international capitalism and by the capitalistic elements within our country) upon the other, are naturally reflected in the attitude of the engineers and other technical strata.

The process of differentiation among the technical staff has greatly increased, dividing them into a very small group of outright enemies of the Soviet authority and underminers

of our economy on the one side and upon the other such of the engineers and technical operatives as are wholly devoted to the object of socialist development and inspired with the pathos of the grand task before us. This process of differentiation not only deserves our closest attention, but must also furnish us with various valuable conclusions. While most energetically opposing the enemies of our economy, who are direct agents of the bourgeoisie, we must give all possible aid and encouragement to the honest and devoted technical operatives and see to it that the conditions of their activity are such as will facilitate the execution of the tasks with which they are charged.

Before all we must strive by word and deed to relieve the technical staffs of all work with which they are not directly concerned. More has been said on this subject than was necessary, without the words having been accompanied by deeds. What is needed is the elaboration of a series of organizational measures guaranteeing the liberation of the technical operatives from work not falling within their sphere of activity and permitting them to concentrate their entire energy and attention on the tasks immediately confronting them. At the same time, as the plenum of the CC has already pointed out, the problem of a "legislation of a certain risk in the execution of various measures of rationalization and of the premium system of technical operatives and engineers" will have to be thoroughly worked out and determined.

If we set ourselves the task of creating as favorable conditions as possible for the work of the technical staffs, we must at the same time accord such engineers as are faithful and devoted to our cause real comrade-like support and aid in their activity. In default thereof and in the case of reactionary and conservative attitude towards these active and willing scientific and technical workers, the tasks before us cannot be solved.

At the present moment the position of the technical staffs cannot be called normal. In this connection we have been guilty of exaggeration. The Shakhty trial was of great significance in this regard, since it imposed the utmost vigilance upon working class and upon our entire Party in the sense of a healthy distrust of such individuals among the technical staffs as had not yet abandoned their bourgeois class ideology and their dreams of a restoration of the old regime. The Shakhty trial showed that the working class must be always on the alert in this connection and must give them no opportunity of developing their subversive plans. But it is naturally a mistake in this proletarian control and this healthy mistrust of our class enemies start developing in certain instances into hostility towards the experts as such and if great numbers of our technical staffs are exposed to this hostile sentiment. This is altogether wrong, and it would be a great drawback to our cause if this state of affairs were to continue. We have, however, every reason to assume that even now there is an unmistakable improvement in the position, inasmuch as such exaggerations as occurred after the Shakhty trial are less and less to be observed.

All organizations that are in touch with the technical staffs, are beginning to understand that without a healthy relationship and without the honest cooperation of the technical staffs with the Soviet authorities, we shall not be able to realize the gigantic plan of the reconstruction of our industry, which is not only completely indispensable to us but which is also the very best guarantee for our economy and for the development of socialism. Without technical staffs, the technical equipment of our industry is an impossibility. At the same time, however, all the necessary steps must naturally be taken to train new cadres of Red engineers. This side of the question deserves more attention than has ever been paid to it before. This has been told quite frankly by the plenum of the CC to all quarters engaged in the matter in question or occupied in training new cadres of qualified technicians from among the ranks of the proletariat. It is, however, absolutely evident that, at any rate until sufficient such cadres exist, we must make use of the material we have inherited. Added to this, the technical staffs comprise many individuals who are completely at one with the Soviet authorities and who are inspired with the same tasks which constitute the aim of the

working class. It is obvious that our attitude towards these engineers must be radically changed. These engineers must be supported in every possible way, as we cannot do without technical science, even though provided by men who formerly worked under the capitalistic system. We must make use of everything and everybody for the purpose of introducing progressive technics into our industry, which is still so backward in a technical sense.

In construction, in rationalization, and in production, foreign technical methods must find application in our economy to an immeasurably greater degree than heretofore.

Before closing, I should like to give the following summary definition of the ensuing twelve months. In many respects the year 1928/29 will resemble the preceding year. At the same time, our Party and all our Soviet and economic organs must have consideration for certain definite rules in their practical work. Last year, we learned to pay increased attention to the task of grain-procurement. We have increased our efforts towards industrializing agriculture and placing it upon a cooperative basis. Our principle of self-criticism revealed a whole series of noxious germ-foci and showed up many shortcomings, in overcoming which we have achieved considerable progress in the interest of our future work.

In spite of all anomalies, therefore, and in spite of the lack of proportion and of manifold shortcomings, we can enter upon the new economic year with the advantage of a greatly enhanced experience and a wider knowledge and better understanding of the task of overcoming both shortcomings and difficulties. If we bear in mind, moreover, that in the course of the last year our Party has removed a whole number of harmful tendencies—I refer to the Trotskyist Opposition, which attempted to shatter the Party and the working class, but which only succeeded in making us the more united and inseparable—we have every reason to affirm that we shall be able to cope with the difficulties we are still destined to meet on the road of socialistic development. (*Applause*)

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BUKHARIN CRITICIZES CURRENT ECONOMIC  
POLICY AND CALLS FOR MODERATION  
NOTES OF AN ECONOMIST  
30 September 1928

*Bukharin published his "Notes of an Economist" on 30 September 1928 to point out that the Supreme Council of the National Economy's (Vesenkha) movement toward increased industrialization was incompatible with the cornerstone of Soviet economic policy, the equilibrium between industry and agriculture. Under the Aesopian guise of attacking Trotsky to avoid criticism for opposing Communist Party policy and fractionalism, he challenged the assumptions and interpretations of Vesenkha about economic and financial data and the existing economic situation. He argued Vesenkha's policy was a reaction to immediate, temporary problems. He argued peasants were not hoarding enormous quantities of grain, rather they were producing little grain. He also argued the high investment in heavy industry was creating a "mad" demand for industrial goods without the resources to meet that demand.*

## NOTES OF AN ECONOMIST

## (AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ECONOMIC YEAR)

A new economic year is approaching. And it is perfectly natural that every thoughtful worker—especially worker-communists—should feel the need to summarize, to outline certain perspectives, to see the general picture of our economic development as a whole. Look at the letters from the workers and at the notes submitted during various meetings, and listen to the remarks of rank-and-file proletarians. What enormous cultural-political growth! What serious questions are now swarming in the minds of the masses! What a burning demand to probe the “roots of things”! What dissatisfaction with the common and worn-out coinage of trite and empty phrases, elementary wooden phrases that always sound the same! We must acknowledge that we in general, and our press in particular, are largely responsible for this “scissors” between the demands of the masses and the “spiritual food” that is served up to them (often in a cold or haphazardly warmed-over state). Have we given a vigorous enough response to the urgent and “unhealthy” questions that are occupying a great many minds? Have we responded to various doubts with an adequate explanation? Have we dealt satisfactorily with the matter of providing serious information about our economy? Have we familiarized the masses adequately, the *worker* masses in particular, with the most complex problems of economic management? No, we have not; a thousand times no! Here we have an enormous defect that must be rectified before we can speak of serious efforts to attract the masses into active socialist construction.

The issue obviously concerns more than propaganda. Trying to draw lessons from our own past, and constantly criticizing ourselves, we must come to the conclusion that we ourselves have not been sufficiently aware of the really *novel conditions of the reconstruction period*. It is for precisely this reason that we have “lagged behind”: we raised the problem of our specialists only after the Shakhty affair; we began to deal practically with the problem of *sovkhozy* and *kolkhozy* only after the crisis in grain procurements and the associated disturbances, etc. In brief, we have acted largely in accordance with the good old Russian proverb “Unless it thunders, the peasant doesn’t cross himself.”

When we made the transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy, we rebuilt our ranks in the boldest and most decisive manner. This enormous regrouping of forces, together with the speedy propagation of such slogans as “Learn to trade”, was the precondition for our economic successes.

Obviously, the transition to the *reconstruction period* does not entail the same change of principle in economic policy as occurred in 1921. Nevertheless, it has enormous significance, which can be measured, so to speak, by another yardstick. There is a tremendous difference, let us say, between simply *repairing* a bridge and *building* a new one: the latter requires knowledge of advanced mathematics, of the strength of materials, and a thousand other bits of wisdom. The same applies throughout our *entire* economy. The reconstruction period has posed a number of highly complicated *technical tasks* (the planning of new factories, new technology, and new branches of industry), a number of highly complicated *organizational-economic tasks* (a new system of labor organization within enterprises, questions of industrial standards and location, the forms of the whole economic apparatus, etc.), several extremely difficult tasks of *general-economic leadership* (the combination in new circumstances of the basic elements of the economy, questions of socialist accumulation, economic questions in relation to the class struggle, the *new* conditions of that struggle, etc.), and, finally, several problems having to do with the human apparatus (attracting the masses into the rationalization process, on the one hand, and the problem of skilled cadres, on the other). The outstanding technological achievements of the capitalist world (especially in Germany and the United States) and the growth of world production make the problems of our domestic economy even more acute. Moreover, we



have yet to accomplish the necessary regrouping of our forces; more accurately, we have yet to do so either to the extent or with the speed and energy demanded by the objective course of events.

The past year has provided a balance for the entire *three-year* period of reconstruction in the development of our economy. The country has accomplished an enormous leap forward. Now it has become laughable to read the memorized discourses of our fugitive Brutskus, Zagorsky, and other "luminaries" of foreign science, who have caught hold of a couple of newspaper sensations from information "made in Riga" and, having assumed pompous airs, are endeavoring with great gusto to prove the "crash of the Soviet economy", the "crash of communism", the "crash of Bolshevism", and other "crashes", all focusing on the theme of what the Chamberlains think about when they cannot sleep. Meanwhile, it is clear to any unprejudiced observer who has retained the least capacity for objective judgment that the economy of the USSR, whatever its twists and turns, is rushing ahead in almost every important respect, that the very zigzags of this movement, which appear as sudden and unique "crises", are in fact anything but harbingers of that "crash of the Bolshevik system" that is so dear to white hearts.

In several of the most important branches of production, especially in industry, we have already accomplished significant technological advances in recent years: our *oil* industry, whose black rig is firmly established in the Baku region, has experienced a real technological revolution, with new equipment almost on the American level; our *machine-building* industry, the basic lever for the further transformation and industrial remaking of our country, has moved ahead with great strides; as a specialized branch of this industry, *agricultural machine-building* has reached three times the prewar level of output; a whole new branch—the *electrotechnical* industry—has sprung up; the foundations have been created for our *chemical* industry, nitrogen being extracted from the air for the first time in our country; and *electrification*, together with the construction of power stations, is making one advance after another. The economic and technological revolution is spreading even into the countryside, where it lends powerful support to and helps to develop peasant cooperative societies. About 30,000 *tractors* have already been sent out into the fields and steppes of our country; and tractor columns, like fighting detachments of the technological revolution, no longer are such a rare sight in the most backward, truly barbaric parts of our Union. For the first time the blades of tractor-drawn ploughs have cut the virgin soil of the Salskian, Ukrainian, Volga, and Kazakh steppes, the wild grasses singing their songs for the last time.

Just look at the dry figures, which in their own austere language speak to us of the continuing revolution in our Union.

*The fixed capital of the whole state-cooperative sector* of the national economy of the USSR has grown in three years (from 1925/26 to 1927/28) by four billion rubles in 1925/26 prices (by 14 percent).

*The fixed capital of state and cooperative industry* during the same years and in the same prices grew from 6.3 billion rubles to 8.8 billion rubles, or by 2.5 billion (39-40 percent), the rate of growth reaching an enormous 15 percent last year.

These figures speak of real accumulation, i.e., of *expanded reproduction*. If we take the *entire* sum of capital investments, i.e., including the replacement of worn-out components of "capital", then we come up with the following figures.

*The entire socialized sector*: here the figure for annual investment rose from 2 billion to 3.4 billion rubles in constant prices.

*State and cooperative industry*: here the corresponding figures are 890 million rubles in the year 1925/26 and 1.5-1.6 billion in 1927/28.

It is also interesting to note the systematic growth of completely *new industrial construction*. As a portion of the total resources assigned to industry, the share used for such

construction is rising steadily, from 12 percent in 1925/26 to 21 percent in 1926/27 and 23 percent in 1927/28. The relative importance of industry within the national economy as a whole, and of the production of the means of production within the industrial sector, is growing with extraordinary speed. In these circumstances it is characteristic that almost *one-half* of peasant incomes, according to recent studies, come from *industrial* sources (industry, construction work, forestry work, and so on). All these facts demonstrate how quickly the process of industrializing the country is advancing and how clearly the process of *socialization* is developing at the same time. The figures dealing with displacement of the private trader and handicraftsman are well known. The country's commodity turnover, especially between town and country, is growing. The budget is growing. From year to year the working class is becoming more numerous. The material and cultural living standards of the workers are rising, and so on.

But at the same time, the growth of our economy and the indisputable growth of *socialism* are accompanied by unique "crises". Notwithstanding the *decisive* difference between the laws of our development and those of capitalist society, these crises "repeat" those of capitalism as if in a concave mirror: in both cases there is a disproportion between production and consumption. In our case this relation is turned "upside down" (they have overproduction whereas we have a goods famine; there demand on the part of the masses fall short of supply whereas here demand is in excess of supply). In both cases enormous sums of "capital" are invested and are connected with specific crises (under capitalism) and "difficulties" (in our country). But with us even this relationship is turned "upside down" (they have overaccumulation; we have a shortage of capital). In both cases there are disproportions among the different spheres of production, a *metals famine* being typical for us. With us there is also *unemployment* at the same time as the number of employed workers systematically grows. In our country even the agrarian "crisis" is turned "upside down" (an inadequate supply of grain). In brief, the past year, in particular, has confronted us with the problem of "*our crises*", which are occurring in the initial stages of a transitional economy, in a backward country that finds itself in a hostile encirclement and whose population is predominantly petit bourgeois.

As we know, Marx described a theory of *capitalist crises*. He saw these crises arising from the general lack of planning ("anarchy") in capitalist production, from the impossibility under capitalism of maintaining correct *proportions* among the different elements of the reproduction process, including the relation between production and consumption. In other words, Marx saw crises arising from the *impossibility under capitalism of "balancing" the different elements of production*. That does not mean, of course, that Marx ignored the *problem of classes and the class struggle*. According to Marx, the level of mass consumption and the value of labor power itself include the moment of class struggle. Within the mechanics of the developing contradictions between production and consumption, between the growth of production and the relations of distribution, this struggle of classes *assumed the guise of economic categories* and was already *included*. The well-known bourgeois economist Professor Tugan-Baranovsky attempted to separate classes and the class struggle from economic relations. In his "social theory of distribution" he emphasized *only* the moment of "class struggle", *throwing its economic determinants overboard*; and in his theory of crises, by rejecting the moment of mass consumption, he thus also rejected the moment of class struggle. The only proper theory, however, is that of Marx—not the bourgeois theory of *Tugan-Baranovsky*. Therefore, the question of *our "crises"* can, and must, also be approached with the methodology of Marx, not with Tugan-Baranovsky's "social theory of distribution", even though the latter "is based" superficially upon the "class" principle. On the other hand, it would be ridiculous to condemn, let us say, the reproduction schemes in volume II of *Kapital* for ignoring the problem of classes; to do so would be to understand neither the theory of class struggle nor the Marxist theory of reproduction.

In the transition period (i.e., the transition from capitalism to socialism) classes still exist, and from time to time the class struggle becomes even more acute. Yet the society of the transition period represents a certain *unity*, albeit a contradictory unity. For this reason we can also draw up "schemes of reproduction" for this society (and do so, for that matter, with more justification than ever before), ascertaining by analogy to volume II of *Kapital* the conditions for correct coordination of the different spheres of production and consumption and for the various spheres of production among themselves. In other words, we can establish the conditions of a *moving economic equilibrium*. Essentially this is what it means to work out a *national economic plan* that approaches ever closer a balance of the entire national economy. Being consciously set out, such a plan simultaneously serves as a prediction (a prognosis) and a directive.

Let us now pose a further question: If crises in our country have the character, as it were, of capitalist crises "turned inside out", if in our case the effective demand of the masses runs ahead of production, *does it not follow that a "goods famine: is the general law of our development?* Are we not condemned to either periodic or intermittent "crises" on a *reverse* basis, on the basis of a *different* relation between production and consumption? May not these "critical" difficulties represent an *iron law* of our development?

In this formulation of the question, which one encounters in our economic literature, a certain flaw is incorporated in advance. Here two completely different things are confused: on the one hand, a lag in the developing productive forces, at any given moment, behind the requirements ("demand"—in the broadest sense of the word), which grow even more quickly; on the other hand, a specific, acute, "crisis" form of that lag, in the form of a *goods famine* (with reference to *effective demand*). The first phenomenon only reflects the fact that society is really making the transition to socialism, that the growth of consumption is the *immediate* driving force of economic development, that production has become a *means*, etc. The *moments of a crisis character*, which *disrupt the course of reproduction* are something entirely different. They can originate only in *disruption* of the conditions for economic equilibrium, i.e., they can result only from an *incorrect combination of the elements of reproduction (including the element of consumption)*. The "distorted" character of "crises"—compared with capitalist society—as determined by a relationship between mass consumption and production that is really new in principle. This relationship is not one of *developing antagonism*. On the contrary, production is always catching up with mass consumption, which outstrips it and is the basic stimulus for the entire development. Thus, there is no base here for a "law crises", for a law of *inevitable* crises. But there *may* still be "crises" here, arising from the *relative anarchy*, i.e., *relative planlessness* of the economy of the transition period.

Relative *planlessness*—or the *relative planning*—of the economy of the transition period has its basis in the existence of small farms and the market form of linkage, i.e., in significant elements of spontaneity. Hence, the plan itself has a special nature; it is not at all the more or less "completed" plan of a developed socialist society. In this plan there are many elements of forecasting what is *spontaneous and unpredictable* (for example, an estimate of the harvest, of grain coming to market, of the marketed volume of peasant products in general, and therefore of prices, etc.), which in turn become the starting point for one directive or another. It is for this very reason that an "ideal" plan is impossible in our country, that to a *certain* there can be errors. But an error, even an *inevitable* error, does not cease to be an error just because it can be explained. That is the first point. The second point is that the most serious disruptions of basic proportions (as with the grain economy in our case, of which more below), together with the corresponding miscalculations, *are by no means inevitable*. The third point is that although any good plan is not all-powerful, a bad "plan" and bad economic maneuvering in general can ruin even good work.

Long ago, in a polemic with the Trotskyists (see the collection *On the Question of Trotskyism*) we had occasion to show that *one must not overestimate the planning principle*

and fail to see very important elements of *spontaneity*. Even then we had to chew over the basic truth that the concept of proportionality among the branches of industry, taken "by itself and without reference to the peasant market," is a *senseless* concept, and for this very reason the strength of our plan is *relative* and its structure is *unique*. In our polemic with E. A. Preobrazhensky (see "On the Question of the Laws of the Transition Period"), we had to explain that one cannot analyze the laws of the transition period by abstracting from the economic policy of the proletarian state, because here an enormous part of the economy is the *state* economy (with the attached cooperative sector), the most important economic organizations are state organizations, etc. For this reason, despite the relative character of our planning, its role is truly *enormous*; major errors of economic leadership, causing disruption of the basic economic proportions within the country, might thus bring to life as well a regrouping of class forces that is extremely unfavorable for the proletariat. A disruption of *political* within the country is the reverse side of disruption of the necessary *economic* relations.

From the fact that a "goods famine" is not an absolute law of development in the transitional economy, that "critical" disruptions of the basic economic proportions are not inevitable, the following conclusion results:

*In order to attain the most favorable (or most crisis-free) course of social reproduction possible, together with systematic growth of socialism and, therefore, the most advantageous possible relation of class forces within the country for the proletariat, it is necessary to attain the best possible combination of the basic elements of the national economy (to "balance" them, to arrange them in the most useful manner, actively influencing the course of economic life and the class struggle).*

Every denial of this most important and most essential task represents *capitulation in face of petit bourgeois spontaneity* and embodiment of the famous historical slogans of petit bourgeois lassitude: "perhaps", "probably", and "somehow". It is ridiculous even to point out this axiom. But such are the conservatism and routine of our bureaucratic apparatus that *one must* "point out", for that apparatus quite often remains a nesting place of the amazing ideology that declares: There will always be difficulties—come sit where it is warm!

## II

The reconstruction period requires the economic leadership to think current problems of policy through most thoroughly. Here we once again confront, above all else, the "cursed" question of the *relationship between town and country*. And once again the old "recipes", which are supposed to save us from all evil and misfortune, are warmed over: The Trotskyist ventriloquists, those gardeners who would pull up plants in order to make them "grow more quickly", and the petit bourgeois knights of the sturdy proprietor, who grive and snivel over a "forced attack on the *kulak*"—all of these people are reactivated on the basis of difficulties with the grain procurements; all of them have come to life and renewed the production of their panaceas—for the *n*th time!—with all of their wishes, demands, warnings, and threats. Let us, too, consider this "problem of problems" and once again critically put our own line to the test.

Within the limits and bounds of capitalism it is not difficult to distinguish three basic types of relationship. The *first* type is that of the most backward, semiserf *village* economy, with peasant-paupers, starvation rents, merciless exploitation of the peasant, and a weak absorptive capacity on the part of the domestic market. (Prerevolutionary Russia is an example.) The *second* type entails fewer remains of serfdom, the serf-owning landlord is already in large measure a capitalist, and there are a more prosperous peasantry, a greater absorptive capacity of the peasant market, etc. The *third* type—the "American" type—involves almost total absence of feudal relations, "free" land, absence of absolute rent in the early stages of development, the well-to-do farmer, and an enormous domestic market for industry. And what is the result? It is not difficult to see that the *might and sweep* of

industrial development, the might and sweep of the growing productive forces, reached their maximum precisely in the *United States*.

When the Trotskyists saw the problem as one of pumping out the maximum flow of resources (take all that is "technically attainable"; take more than tsarism took, etc.), they wanted to line up the USSR "*behind*" the old Russia in this historical sequence, whereas what is needed is to put the USSR "*behind*" the *United States of America*. For if the United States realized the most rapid possible movement of the productive forces as a whole within the limits of capitalism, then we must advance even more rapidly on a socialist basis, on the basis of a resolute struggle against all capitalist elements and in close alliance with the decisive masses of the peasantry. In their naivete the ideologists of Trotskyism suggest that a maximum yearly transfusion from the peasant economy into industry will generally ensure a maximum rate of industrial development. But that is clearly not the case. The highest rate can be sustained only by such coordination as allows industry to develop on the basis of a rapidly growing agriculture. It is precisely then that industry yields its record figures of development. But this pattern presupposes the possibility of rapid and real accumulation in agriculture, and consequently involves anything but the policy of Trotskyism. The transition period opens a new epoch in the relationship between town and country, an epoch that puts an end to the systematic backwardness of the countryside, to the "idiocy of rural life," and lays the foundation for a course toward eliminating the antithesis between town and country, with industry turning its own "face to the countryside" and industrializing agriculture, leading it from the historical background to the front of the stage of economic history. What the Trotskyists fail to comprehend is that *the development of industry depends on the development of agriculture*.

On the other hand, the petit bourgeois knights, who "defend" agriculture against all levies for the benefit of industry, adopt essentially the view that the small farm, with its wretched technology, its "family" structure, and its narrow cultural horizon, should be perpetuated. Deeply conservative in essence and viewing the private farmstead as the alpha and omega of economics and agricultural technique, these ideologists of the "small proprietor" are defending routine and individualism in an epoch that has written revolutionary transformation and collectivism on its banner, and their purpose is to clear the way for double-dyed kulak elements. If the Trotskyists do not understand that the development of agriculture, then the ideologists of petit bourgeois conservatism do not understand that *the development of agriculture depends on industry*, that agriculture, without the tractor, chemical fertilizers, and electrification, is condemned to mark time. They do not understand that it is precisely industry that represents the lever of radical change in agriculture, that without the leading role of industry it will be impossible to eliminate rural narrowness, backwardness, barbarism, and poverty.

Having disposed of these two wings of "social thought", we must now resolve the concrete question of the relation between industry and agriculture here, in the USSR, at the present time. The basic facts, which strike the eye of every observer, are as follows: with a general growth in the turnover between town and country we have a goods famine, or an inability (a marked inability) to cover rural demand, and what would therefore appear to be a lag of industry behind agriculture; on the other hand, we have difficulties with the grain, an inadequate supply of grain in comparison with demand, or an apparent lag on the part of agriculture; and, finally, we have an enormous growth of agricultural production and an enormous growth of capital construction, with a simultaneous and truly significant commodity deficit. All these "paradoxes" of our economic life must be resolved. The basic directives of our policy depend upon their resolution.

In his declaration to the Comintern ("The July Plenum and the Danger from the Right")—a document that is without precedent for its slander and hysterics—Trotsky attempted

to *argue* in certain passages, recovering momentarily from his permanent squealing. The most important sections of the argument were the following:

1. That agriculture's backwardness is the cause of all our difficulties is obviously beyond dispute.
2. In terms of type, present-day agriculture is infinitely backward, even by comparison with our very backward industry.
3. In spite of the fact that in technical-productive terms our industry is incomparably more advanced than agriculture, it still has not grown into a leading and transforming role, or a genuinely socialist role in relation to the countryside, but instead cannot even satisfy current market demands for commodities, and is thus *delaying* agriculture's development.
4. To raise agriculture up (as if one could raise it down!—N.B.) is possible only through industry. There are no other levers.... To merge these two questions together—the question of the general historical lag of the country behind the town and that of the town's lag behind the market demands of the present-day countryside—is to surrender the town's hegemony over the countryside.

From this reasoning several conclusions are drawn: since the Twelfth Congress (!) the party has followed a *rightist policy*, a policy of insufficient industrialization, the consequence of being a loss of tempo that has given rise to the crisis in grain procurements; in February—asserts L.D. Trotsky—the party acknowledged the backwardness of industry, but now (since the July plenum and the termination of extraordinary measures) the party is reverting to the old ways, etc. As a *general* conclusion, industrialization must be forced *beyond* the rate that currently prevails (there is no space here to discuss the author's other "conclusions").

These arguments are startling: they loudly contradict the "music of socialism" the author of the permanent revolution heard in the first control figures—and the control figures appeared, as everyone knows, *long after* the Twelfth Congress. But what is most surprising in these arguments is the total lack of any analysis of the dynamic of development. The author has no interest either in the question of the basic funds of industry compared with those of agriculture, in the question of the magnitude of industrial compared with agricultural production, or in the question of changes in these relationships. In the meantime, the actual facts cannot be ignored even by people who are thrice-stunned by bourgeois lies concerning the USSR.

The facts are represented in the following figures:

*A. Growth of basic funds (as a percentage change over previous year)*

I	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28
State industry	+8.0	+10.7	+13.1
<b>Electrical construction</b>	<u>+21.3</u>	<u>+44.1</u>	<u>+44.0</u>
State industry + electrical construction	+8.6	+12.4	+15.1
II			
Socialized sector as a whole (state industry + electrical construction + transport + housing + cooperation, etc.)	+3.5	+5.5	7.6
III			
Agriculture	+4.6	+4.3	+4.7
Private agriculture	+4.5	+4.0	+4.3

*B. Expansion of gross production (as a percentage change over previous year)*

I	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28
All industry (prewar prices)	+39.3	+13.7	+13.4
Census industry	+45.2	+15.1	+14.3
<i>Vesenkha</i> industry (in factory prices of 1 October 1926)	+19.6	+23.1	

II			
Agriculture (less forestry, fishing, and hunting, in prewar prices)	+20.6	+3.9	+3.0
Grain production	+32.4	+3.8	-1.9

*C. Growth of commodity production (as a percentage change over previous year)*

I	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28
All industry (prewar prices)	+8.5	+13.5	+13.9
Census industry	+45.2	+15.0	+15.1
<i>Vesenkha</i> industry (in factory prices of 1 October 1926)	+15.1	+17.6	

II			
Agriculture (less forestry, fishing, and hunting, in prewar prices)	+11.3	+8.1	+8.9
Grain production	+30.8	+10.2	+6.8

These record figures for industry demonstrate that more is at issue than simply the “technical-productive type” of industry, which is higher than our “type” of peasant economy (this sacred truth hardly needs to be recalled); *it is not only the “type” but also the concrete dynamic of development that causes the gigantic superiority of industry* and of the socialized sector in general. These *record* figures for industry also demonstrate that the *root* of an explanation as to why our industry does not cover peasant demand cannot be found in a supposedly low *rate* of development (with *given* means, resources, and opportunities). The rate of expansion in our industry *exceeds all precedents* in comparison with the capitalist countries (even the commodity production of industry grows much more quickly than commodity production in agriculture). This picture indicates that the issue has nothing to do with an industrial lag behind agriculture. In short, these figures prove the need to look for some other, less elementary, but more *realistic* explanation.

It is characteristic not merely that Trotsky and the Trotskyists “have no interest” in the above facts (although they were interested in similar facts, from a “musical” point of view, in 1925) but also that they “do not notice” other facts of great significance. Trotsky offers the semblance of an argument—*the inability to cover rural demand*. But he does not in the least trouble himself with the question of the nature of this demand, of the structure of demand for industrial commodities in general, etc. In the meantime, these questions, as we shall now discover, have decisive significance.

*In the first place*, why is it that “superindustrializers” of the Trotskyist variety identify *rural* demand with *agricultural* demand, particularly with demand originating in the *grain economy*—or with a demand that is based on corresponding movements in agricultural or even in just grain *production*? (It is only possible to speak of a “lag” or the “absence of a lag” of industry in relation to agriculture, and to identify the “lag” with unsatisfied rural demand, if one assumes such an identity.) Why is no attempt made, *no attempt whatever*, to analyze the structure of *rural demand*?

The fact is that in the "Control Figures" for 1927/28 we read: "According to the most recent studies, the sum of these incomes (incomes not of a specifically agricultural character—N.B.) turns out to be *almost equal to the sum of incomes from the realization of agricultural products*. In 1927/28 the income from realization of agricultural production (outside the village) consisted of 2.634 million *chervonets* rubles, whereas income from non-agricultural occupations (outside of the village) was 2.4 million rubles.

In reality, therefore, *almost half of the income of the peasantry* (and consequently *almost half of rural demand*) is the result not of agriculture, but of other earnings, of earnings connected, for the most part, with *industry itself* (construction work, etc.). Hence, *to reach a conclusion concerning the lag behind agriculture on the basis of the single fact that rural demand is not covered would be absurd*.

Secondly, it would be doubly absurd to reach such a conclusion if one were to connect it (as the gentlemen critics do) with the crisis in grain procurements, i.e., with problems of the *grain economy*. By now it is clear even to the smallest child that opposition tales of "horribly great" stocks of grain in the villages and all the idle rumors about the 900 million *puds* have been shattered, like sparkling bubbles vanishing forever. *No one* believes these old wives' tales any longer. On the contrary, it is becoming more and more clear that on the whole, we are producing *little grain*, and that our calculations have frequently confused a growth in rural incomes, or in *general incomes*, with incomes resulting from *grain*. That is to say, in referring to rural incomes, we have incorrectly judged *movements in the production of bread grains*.

Even according to the preliminary data of the "Control Figures" for 1927/28, data that, it turned out, *overestimated grain*, a *reduction* was noted in the gross yield of bread grains. According to these data, the yield of bread grains for 1926/27 was 3.779 million rubles in prewar prices and 3.708 million rubles in 1927/28; by comparison with the previous year, 1926/27 saw a growth of 3.8 percent, compared with *a reduction of 1.9 percent* in 1927/28 (in reality, the reduction was even greater). In *chernovets* calculations *both years* show a reduction: by 15.9 percent in 1926/27, and a further reduction of 0.6 percent in 1927/28.

Thus, *along with a stormy growth of industry, a significant increase in population, and an upsurge in the needs of this population, the quantity of grain in the country has not grown*. Is it not clear that a carefree attitude toward the *grain problem*, in such circumstances as these, would be a real crime? And is it not clear that a Trotskyist formulation of the question and a Trotskyist "solution" would lead directly to a real, not just an illusory, crash?

The grain-procurement crisis was by no means an expression of an *abundance grain* together with a famine of industrial commodities. This "explanation" cannot withstand any criticism. The crisis *was prepared*, in conditions of fragmented peasant farms, by stability or even a regression in the grain economy. It *became manifest* under the following conditions: (1) a growing disproportion between the price for grain, on the one hand, and technical crops, on the other; (2) a growth in supplementary incomes from non-agricultural labor; (3) an inadequate rise in tax rates for the *kulak* farms; (4) an inadequate supply of the villages with industrial commodities; (5) a growing economic influence of the *kulak* stratum in the countryside.

Essentially this crisis was linked to an improper pricing policy and an enormous discrepancy between the price of grain and other agricultural products. The result has been a reallocation of the productive forces *away from* the grain economy, or their (relative) *flight* from the sphere of grain production. It goes without saying that this process has been most clearly revealed in the *producing regions*. A striking (although not typical) example of improper maneuvering with prices occurred in the *North Caucasus*. Here the gross yield of wheat per *desiatin* was 69.9 *puds* in 1925/26; 37.9 *puds* in 1926/27; and 29.8 *puds* in 1927/28. In addition, the yield of 69.9 *puds* was accompanied by a price of 1 ruble, 15 kopeks, paid



out by the procurement organs, whereas the yield of 37.9 *puds* saw a price of 1 ruble, 2 kopeks. If one subtracts the grain put aside as seed, the result was that for each *desiatin* in 1925/26, the peasant earned 72 rubles; in 1926/27, 32 rubles; and in 1927/28, 24 rubles. Even if one allows for the fact that these figures are not completely accurate, they nevertheless characterize a definite tendency with sufficient clarity. Of course, this is an exceptional example and does not allow us to judge the general state of things. But it does indicate great lapses both in the area of our general planning (an erroneous estimate of grain in the USSR as a whole) and in the area of our regional maneuvering.

If the process of marking time (and even of regression) appeared most distinctly in the grain economy of the producing regions, it could not fail to be reflected as well, in the final analysis, in the consuming regions: failure to supply these regions with bread must lead to a growing tendency toward a natural economy [of a regional self-sufficiency].

At this point let us say a few words concerning the law of prices. Following the example of E. A. Preobrazhensky, the ideologists of Trotskyism imagine that the law of socialist accumulation must progressively weaken the law of value, which is the law of equilibrium for *commodity* production. This is not the place to examine in detail the full absurdity of this position. Let us point out here that the very counterposing of the law of value, as a law of accumulation, to the law of socialist accumulation, as the replacement and successor of the law, is *absurd* for one very good reason: because even under capitalism there was a law of accumulation, which acted on the *basis* of the law of value. Thus, the law of value may be transformed, given our circumstances, into anything we please, except a law of accumulation. The law of accumulation itself presupposes the existence of some other law, on the basis of which it "acts". Whether this is the law of labor expenditures or some other law is not important in the present context. But one thing is clear: if any branch of production regularly fails to recover its production costs plus a certain increment, that corresponds to a portion of the surplus labor and can serve as the source for expanded reproduction, then that branch of production either stands still or *regresses*. This law is also "suited" to the grain economy. If related branches of agricultural production do better, a process of *reallocating* the productive forces occurs. If that process does not occur, then, in our circumstances, a general process of *naturalization of agriculture* results. To think that the growth of a planned economy makes it possible for the left leg to do whatever it wants (simply because the law of value withers away) is to misunderstand even the ABCs of economic science. These reflections give us a sufficient basis for defining the limits of "pumping over". The *opponents of industrialization* protest against alienating even a part of the surplus product, i.e., against any "pumping over" at all. But in that case the rate of industrialization slows down. The *Trotskyists* define the volume of "pumping over" by what is "technically attainable" (i.e., *they even go beyond the limits* of the surplus product). It is clear that there could then be no talk either of the development of agriculture or of the grain branch, which is imperative for industry's own development. *Here* the truth lies somewhere in between.

But the development (and I emphasize development, i.e., expanded reproduction) of the agricultural economy in general (including both the production of materials and the grain economy) is necessary also from the viewpoint of export and import. We must pay for imports of equipment. The same applies to imports of materials. It would be an outrage if we were to reorient ourselves in such a way as to renounce exports forever simply because we have had to reduce them now on account of the grain crisis. It is enough that we temporarily depend on the outside world for imports of machinery; it would be *unthinkable* to depend simultaneously on foreign sources for equipment, materials, and grain. Relying on our agricultural base and using its production to pay for imported equipment with "agricultural currency" (which does not, of course, exclude the need to strengthen industrial

exports), *developing our own heavy industry*, and gradually emancipating ourselves from dependence in terms of equipment, we must increasingly stand on our own feet (which obviously does not exclude the need to continue making use of international economic connections).

*In the third place*, why is it that the Trotskyists pass over *nonrural demand* in silence? Is it because we have really covered the demand of the working-class population? Is it because the productive demand of *industry itself* is fully covered in our country? Is it because we have covered the demand for industrial commodities (metal, fuel, building materials, etc.) posed by *other branches of the socialized economy* (by transport, housing construction, etc.)? The point is that one must understand the enormous significance of these conditions in interpreting the roots of the goods famine and the course of our reproduction.

It is true that in this sphere we do not have convincing statistical information: our economic organs still have not understood the *absolutely urgent necessity* of thoroughly and thoughtfully studying the *structure of demand* for industrial commodities, even though the significance of such a study, from the point of view of an analysis of *reproduction*, is absolutely exceptional. At my request several comrades have prepared exceedingly rough and at best approximate calculations. According to these calculations, which give an idea not so much of accurate proportions as of the order of magnitudes that are of interest to us, the situation looks like this:

	Percentage of total demand for industrial commodities
1. Demand for industrial commodities from within industry (for current production and capital construction)	37-39
2. Demand from other branches of the socialized economy	15-16
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Total demand of the whole socialized economy (excluding wages)	52-55
3. Demand of people living on wages	15-16
4. Other forms of urban demand	ca. 5
5. Peasant demand	23-25
6. Exports of industrial commodities	2-2.5

In these circumstances the demand being created by socialized capital construction (*including the wages* of construction workers) probably represents 16-17 percent of the total demand for industrial commodities.

Thus, these approximate calculations of the structure of demand in the forthcoming year, 1928/29, show that the *whole* of rural demand represents only one-fifth or one-quarter of the total demand for industrial commodities.

As for the other components of demand (i.e., three-quarters or even four-fifths of the total!), *here, too, there is a "lag"!* Industry itself, in particular, is developing furiously, at record rates, and creates a furious demand for industrial commodities that it *cannot* satisfy. Comrade Trotsky's argument that industry is lagging behind the growth of rural demand and the growth of agriculture appears convincing only at first glance. On more attentive analysis, it turns out that industry is "lagging" behind itself! What does it mean to say that "industry is lagging behind itself? How should this formula

be understood? What does it mean if that *in its own development, industry encounters the limits of its development*. That is the conclusion superindustrializer Trotsky evades or slurs over with discussions of the rural demand for industrial commodities, considered in isolation from the total demand for industrial commodities. The fact that industry "runs into" its own limits means: (1) that we have obviously not adopted a sufficiently correct relationship among the various branches within industry (for example, the obvious lag of metallurgy); (2) that we have obviously not adopted a sufficiently correct relationship between the growth of current industrial production and the growth of capital construction (a problem that applies not just to industry but to the socialized sector as a whole). If there are not bricks, and if they *cannot* be produced beyond a certain volume in the current season (for technical reasons), then we *must not* draw up construction programs *in excess* of that limit and thus create demand that cannot be covered. For no matter how much construction activities are forced, factories and housing facilities cannot be manufactured from air (we shall return to this question when discussing the problem of capital expenditures). Finally, the fact that industry "runs into" its own limits means: (3) that the limits of development are obviously established by the *production* of materials: by the production of cotton, leather, wool, flax, etc., none of which can be extracted from the air. As everyone knows, these items are essentially products of *agriculture*. When they are in short supply, they cause an inadequate development of the gross production of industry, which in turn cannot cover the entire demand of either the urban or the rural population. If, consequently, we face a shortage of materials, plus a shortage of grain (which, among other things, means a "shortage" of exports and of imported commodities) and a shortage of construction materials, then one must truly be a jester in order to demand a "superindustrializing" program.

In drawing up some general conclusions, one must say:

1. *In its basic funds, in its gross and its commodity production, industry's rate of development greatly exceeds that of agriculture.*

2. *The grain economy, which has been placed in extremely unprofitable conditions, is threatening to fall behind even the minimum rate that is necessary.*

3. *Roughly one-half of demand on the part of the rural population is non-agricultural demand, which in large measure is created by the development of heavy industry and the socialized economy.*

4. *Any further rise in the rates of industrial development will be determined by agricultural materials and the limits on exports.*

5. *It is obvious, moreover, that the allocation of resources within industry (and with respect to capital construction, within the entire socialized sector) must be accomplished through a comprehensive accounting of all the factors that contribute to "more or less crisis-free development" (from the resolution of the Fifteenth Congress) and more appropriate coordination of branches of industry and branches of the socialized sector.*

From the whole complex of emerging problems the two that stand out are the problems of *capital construction* and of the *grain economy*. With respect to the latter question, in its decisions—especially its recent decisions—the party has underlined this question's enormous importance: hence the rectification of pricing policy, the posing of the question of *sovkhozy* and *kolkhozy*, and the need for enormous practical efforts in this sphere. It is obvious that *if there were no* threatening lag in the grain economy, no internal confusion, no drop in the commodity portion of the output, etc., then it would perhaps be more expedient to invest the money assigned to *sovkhozy* in ferrous metallurgy, let us say, which represents one of the "narrow points" in our industry. But not even the "superindustrializers" have decided to launch an assault on the *sovkhozy*. Why not? Because the lag in the grain economy is perfectly obvious. The "purely production" point of view, i.e., the point of view of "an increase in production" (Lenin), corresponds here to the point of view of "class

transformation", of a gradual replacement of capitalist elements in agriculture through the growing collectivization of individual poor and middle-level peasant farms and through the consolidation and socialization of agricultural production. This is a new and enormous problem, which by no means implies a disparaging attitude toward the individual farm of a working peasant. On the contrary, it must be resolved through a *growth* on the part of individual farms (that is precisely how Lenin saw the question). Precisely because of its novelty, this problem requires special attention and special efforts in the form, to a certain extent, of large capital construction in agriculture, requiring both *new technology* (use of tractors, mechanization, use of chemicals) and *skilled cadres*. A growth of the individual peasant farm, of the grain farm in particular, a limitation of the *kulak* farm, the construction of *sovkhozy* and *kolkhozy*, given a correct pricing policy and the spread of cooperation among the masses of the peasantry—these are all factors that are needed in order to correct the serious economic disproportion that has found expression in the stability and even regression of *bread grain production and in the weak development of agriculture as a whole*. In general and on the whole, we must remember, when drawing up our plans, *the directive of the Fifteenth Congress*:

*It is incorrect to start with a demand for the maximum pumping over of resources from the sphere of peasant economy into the sphere of industry, for this demand signifies not only a political rupture with the peasantry but also an undermining of industry's own raw material base, an undermining of its domestic market, an undermining of exports and the disruption of equilibrium in the whole economic system. On the other hand, it would be incorrect to repudiate the attraction of resources from the countryside into industrial construction: at the present time such repudiation would mean a slowing down of the rate of development and a disruption of equilibrium to the detriment of the industrialization of the country.*

### III

The focus of all our plan calculations and all our economic policy must be our concern for the constantly developing *industrialization of the country*. The party will struggle against anyone who thinks of diverting us from this course. From every point of view (development of productive forces, development of agriculture, growth in the relative importance of socialism, strengthening of the link between town and country, strengthening of our international economic role and of our defense capacity, growth of mass consumption, etc.), industrialization of the USSR is a *law* for us. In this connection we must constantly keep in mind the fact that our socialist industrialization must differ from capitalist industrialization because it is accomplished by the *proletariat* for the purposes of *socialism*, because its effect upon the peasant farm must be *different* and *distinct*, and because it must have a different and distinct "attitude" toward agriculture as a whole. Capitalism brought a *depreciated role* for agriculture. Socialist industrialization, instead of being a parasitic process in relation to the countryside, is a means toward its great *transformation and development*. (Under capitalism elements of parasitism were always present, despite the development of agriculture under the influence of industry.) This industrialization of the country also means industrialization of agriculture, and it thus *prepares* the ground for elimination of the antithesis between town and country.

It is understandable that the process of industrialization cannot advance with the same degree of smoothness at every stage of development. It is also understandable that it confronts us with the most difficult problems: in a semiimpoverished country we must gather together and productively employ enormous sums of "capital", turning them into new technology, new buildings, etc. For this reason the problem of *capital construction* comes to the foreground. Here we encounter the most difficult and complicated tasks, which can be

solved neither by shouts, by "intuition", nor by any similar means. Here we need a thoughtful study of the problem; here there is no room for any kind of dilettantism; here we need a collective analysis of the question; here we need *accounting*.

We must strive, if possible, for a more rapid rate of industrialization. Does that assertion mean that we must invest *everything* in capital construction? The question is absurd in itself. But this absurd question hides another that is quite "meaningful", namely, the question of limits of accumulation and of the upper limit of the sum of capital investment.

When putting together the program of capital construction, it is necessary, above all, to keep in view the party's directive concerning *reserves* (in currency, gold, grain, and *commodities*). Recently it has become "fashionable" to keep quiet about the policy of reserves:

It is slippery to tread  
An unfamiliar path  
And best to keep quiet  
About things nearby.

Although "silence" is golden and we are short of gold, still we cannot play at silence in this matter. Not only do we have no reserves but interruptions in supply; queues have become a "way of life", greatly disorganizing our *productive* life.

We are speaking of the fact that to some extent errors of planned leadership are inevitable, that we have great difficulties, that the international situation is tense. Can we run our economy in these circumstances *without reserves*? A policy whose constant companion was a lack of reserves would smell of adventurism. For this very reason, in recent years the party has regarded the problem of reserves would smell of adventurism. For this very reason, in recent years the party has regarded the problem of reserves as one of paramount importance. But until now this directive has obviously not been fulfilled properly. *Here we must bring about a decisive change; the party does not pass its resolutions for amusement*. At present there is absolutely no basis for revising the resolutions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses concerning reserves. On the contrary, the whole situation dictates to us *fulfillment* of these decisions. We have been especially interested in the question of how matters stand in fulfillment of this directive in assembling our perspective drafts. Take, for example, the recent drafts that we have in the way of a projected five year plan for industry. I have the impression that while drafting the control figures of the five year plan in Vesenkha, they forgot even to think about the policy of reserves. Thus, it is apparent from an account in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn'* that the five year plan has made excessive demands on the budget and caused it to become "unreal". "Unreality" is a "rather" essential defect.

It is understandable that the question of reserves is closely connected with the question of *productive* consumption (including capital construction) and with the question of *personal* consumption (the personal consumption of the masses). Everyone knows that in our case the string is already pulled taut. *To pull it even tighter, to intensify the goods famine still further, is impermissible*. In this regard the directive of the Fifteenth Congress was perfectly correct: "We must not, at the present time, begin with a one-sided *interest in accumulation* (as Comrade Trotsky demands) or with a one-sided *interest in consumption*."

Unfortunately, on the question of the goods famine and of the five year perspectives for industry, we confront the same picture as in the question of reserves. The account in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn'*, speaking of the industrial five year plan that has been submitted, says that *a balance between supply and demand is lacking* (see the speech by Comrade Mezhlauk). When a plan is drafted during a period of crisis in supplies and is not analyzed from the viewpoint of a balance between supply and demand, that is not an "external" oversight or a

"formal" blunder—it is a profound *internal flaw*. *The intensity of the goods famine must be decisively alleviated, not as a distant perspective, but in the coming years. The first steps in this direction must be taken at once.*

It is also necessary to raise the question of the *material elements* of capital construction. In order for the country's industrialization to become a feature of real life rather than remain on paper, in order that capital construction should be a reality rather than a bureaucratic "game with figures" (Lenin), we must guarantee not simply the corresponding sum of *money* that represents a demand for construction materials, etc., but also an equivalent *supply* of the latter. What we need is their natural, physical being, their simple existence—not their future, but rather their current "existence", for not even Boehm-Bauwerk thought that "today's" factories could be built with "bricks of the future". It often happens in our country, however, that a strange and peculiar viewpoint of "monetary fetishism" prevails, holding that money is everything. In the meantime, if we do not have one or another material in the quantity we require (making allowance for economies in usage), and if production of such material requires a period of time that extends beyond the limit in which productive consumption was to occur, then no amount of money will rescue us. We can beat our breasts, take an oath, swear by industrialization, and damn our enemies and all our adversaries; but none of this will improve matters by a single iota. We can hope that "perhaps we'll get by!"; we can play at odds-and-evens, "make plans", etc., but alas, objective relationships continue to creep out into the light of day.

And just how do these matters stand in our country for the coming year? A report gives the following table:

Balance of Construction Materials for the Year 1928/29

Materials	Capacity	Production	Deficit or surplus	%
Cement (in 1,000s of bls.)	15,100	13,460	-1,640	-10.8
Bricks (millions of units)	2,677	2,445	-232	-8.7
Alabaster (1,000s of tons)	335	281	-54	
Lime (1,000s of tons)	734	700	-34	
Chalk (1,000s of tons)	250	252	+2	
Fireproof material (1,000s of tons)	758	683	-45	
Sawed lumber (1,000s of [?])	10,368	10,191	-177	
Window glass (1,000s of tons)	184.8	158.2	-32	-17.4
Girders (1,000s of tons)	208.8	147	-61.8	-29.7
Wire (1,000s of tons)	153.7	122	-35.3	-22.4
Iron and steel forms (1,000s of tons)	1,246.6	958	-288.6	-23.2

These data show that even if certain measures were taken in the case of bricks and cement (and 8.8 percent and 10.8 percent are still more than "adequate" deficits), nevertheless the deficit in glass, girders and channels, wire, and iron forms and steel would remain exceptionally large. Unfortunately, the author of the article from which these figures were taken does not explain just what increase in the physical volume of construction would bring about these deficits. But if these calculations are accurate, then a rather complex task faces us: how to build, in fact, when 20 percent of the metal needed for construction is missing? Would it not be better to have more accurate accounting and programs based on *real* girders and iron, rather than imagined materials made of ether?

It is interesting to observe the state of *ferrous metallurgy*, which is responsible for cast iron, rails, beams, channels, sheet iron, roofing iron, galvanized iron, tin, iron and cast-iron

pipes, rolled metal, etc. In this regard the "Control Figures for the Balance of Ferrous Metals in 1928/29" give us the following picture of development for three years:

	1926/27	1927/28	1928/29
	% of needs met	% of needs met	% of needs met
1. Transport	95.1	91.0	87.0
2. Commissariats and institutions	97.5	96.0	78.5
3. Metal industry	91.5	87.4	77.2
4. Local metal industry	75.2	87.2	66.0
5. Other nonmetal industries	81.3	81.8	77.5
6. Municipal services and construction	79.4	73.6	57.7
7. Handicraft industry	62.4	67.8	48.5
8. Individual use	<u>68.2</u>	<u>60.5</u>	<u>56.6</u>
Total	82.3	80.0	71.0

Thus, the deficit (a deficit!!) is rapidly growing (growing!) for all of *the main categories of users*.

In order to understand how such a paradox is possible, how the deficit might grow in our country all along the line—in both personal and productive consumption—and how it might become so very acute in 1928/29, we must examine the projected figures for the growth of capital construction.

What directive was given on this matter by the Fifteenth Congress?

On the question of the rate of development it is necessary... to keep in view the extreme complexity of the task. Here we must not adopt a maximum rate of accumulation for the *coming year* or for a period of several years, but must instead begin with a relationship that will guarantee the most rapid rate of development over the *long run*....

In the area of the relationship between the development of *heavy and light industry*, it is similarly necessary to begin with an optimum combination of the two moments. Keeping in mind the correctness of a shift in the center of gravity to the production of means of production, it is also necessary to take into account the danger of tying up too much state capital in large-scale construction, where it is realized on the market only after several years; on the other hand, it is necessary to keep in mind that a more rapid turnover in light industry (the production of articles of prime necessity) allows its capital funds to be used for heavy industrial construction while light industry develops as well.

The Fifteenth Congress, as we see, was very careful. On the question of rate [of development], it spoke out directly *against* violent acceleration in the initial years followed by an inevitable decline. And how has *this* party directive been implemented in the course of our work? Unfortunately, we do not have new material dealing with proposed capital construction in the socialized sector as a whole. But here are the figures of projected capital construction in industry (i.e., about 35 percent of the total socialized construction).

In the five year plan that is currently being worked out (*and which, happily, has not been accepted by the presidium of Vesenkha*) the growth of capital investments as a percentage of the preceding year represents: 1929/30 they would give an increase of almost 40 percent, only in order that this figure would fall to 7, then to -1, and ultimately to -8. Is it not clear that this is a projection without any *purpose*? What premises underlie such an acrobatic *salto mortale* in an area so serious as capital construction? To these questions there can be no satisfactory answers whatever. These fantastic leaps are enough to satisfy the most ardent demand for "commodities" of *bad* quality.

Should we not demand that here, too, on the question of rate [of development], *the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress should be fulfilled exactly*?

The point is that an excessive strain on capital expenditures (1) will not be accompanied by *real* construction of the same magnitude, (2) will inevitably lead, after a short interval, to breaking off the work already begun, (3) will react most unfavorably on other branches of production, (4) will intensify the goods famine in every area, and (5) *will lower the rate of development*, in the final analysis.

Under conditions of stable or semistable prices, such a state of affairs also has a negative influence on the *monetary system*. But that is a special theme, even though it is one of *very great importance*.

Every communist understands the need to move ahead as quickly as *possible*. It is also understandable that we are most reluctant to lower the rate we have *already achieved*—a rate, we must remember, that was achieved at the price of an enormous strain upon the budget, the absence of accumulated reserves, a reduced share for consumption, etc. We are moving with *enormous* strain. And we must realize that in order to *maintain* this rate (not to inflate it!) and at the same time to (1) ease the goods famine, (2) improve our reserves, and (3) ensure a more crisis-free development, several decisive measures must be taken. These measures must guarantee greater effectiveness in construction and *greater productivity in all of our production units, with significantly greater productivity in new enterprises that are just entering the production process*. Effectiveness and productivity must go far beyond the demands currently being made in this area.

Concrete investigations by Rabkrin have revealed a tremendous number of unproductive expenditures and outlays. These *faux frais* [improper expenses], which are connected with a number of organizational questions, must be reduced to a minimum. We must be brutal in our effort to lower the index of construction materials. We must be brutal in shortening the period of construction (what they build in America in two months takes us about two years!). We must make significant changes in the *type* of construction (buildings are too heavy, etc.). We must practice much greater economy in our use of materials (we use one and one-half to two times more material, for example, than we require). All the actions taken under this heading can yield *gigantic* savings if we take into consideration the fact that capital construction in industry represents only one-third of total construction in the socialized sector (1.25-1.30 billion rubles went to industry, excluding electrical construction, from a total sum in 1927/28 of 3.4 billion rubles).

The sums that are saved must go: (1) to reducing the strain in the market, which is injurious to industry, the entire socialized economy, the workers, the peasants (as we saw in our earlier analysis of the structure of demand), and our monetary system alike; (2) to the formation of *reserves*; and (3) to maintenance of the *real* rates already reached.

At the same time, it is imperative to increase the productivity of our enterprises in every way possible and to lower the costs of production (or to guarantee real mass production). The latest inventions, the most important technological achievements of all kinds, serious work in the sphere of rationalization, mass involvement, the development and application of *science*, whose role must be expanded *several times over*—all of these things must be at the center of our attention. We must put an end to Russian provincialism: we must follow each advance of scientific-technical thought in Europe and America and implement every genuine step forward; we must apply science to our statistical accounting; we must put an end—the sooner the better—to all confusion, irregularity, etc., in our system of economic administration. We must learn to be *cultured administrators in the complicated conditions of the reconstruction period*.

This task can be completed only once we have understood that *we did not reconstruct our own ranks in the manner required by the reconstruction period*.

We must activate and mobilize all possible economic factors that work for socialism. This goal presupposes a highly complex combination of personal, group, mass, social, and state initiatives. We have overcentralized everything to *an excessive degree*. We must ask ourselves: Should we not take a few steps in the direction of the Leninist commune-state?



To do so would by no means amount to "letting go of the reins". On the contrary, the basic leadership and the most important questions must be decided more resolutely, more strictly (*but with greater thoughtfulness*) "at the center". Organs at the lower level must act within the strict confines of these decisions, answering for their own range of questions, etc. In a number of areas hypercentralization brings us to the point where we deprive ourselves of *additional forces, means, resources, and opportunities*. Because of a number of bureaucratic barriers, we are unable to utilize this whole mass of opportunities. We should act with much greater flexibility and success, with much greater maneuverability, if we began with each separate state enterprise and applied ourselves more to the real, concrete conditions, thus avoiding the thousand follies, big and small, that in the final analysis, cost us a great deal.

The grain procurement crisis has signaled great dangers. In this context, economics turns into a question of classes.

These dangers still have not been overcome, and considerable work will be needed in order to leave them behind. Within the country, forces hostile to us are on the loose: the *kulaks* in the villages, and remnants of the old as well as new bourgeois groups in the cities. The pores of our gigantic apparatus also harbor elements of bureaucratic degeneration, involving total indifference to the interests of the masses, their existence, their life, their material and cultural interests. If the active ideologists of the petite and moyenne bourgeoisie (the opponents of industrialization, the opponents of *sovkhozy*, *kolkhozy*, etc.) are stretching out their tentacles and quietly attempting to shake our political line, there are also the officials "at your service" who are willing to produce any kind of plan, even to work out a superindustrialist plan, only to laugh at us tomorrow in their own "closed circle" and walk hand in hand with our opponents on the day after tomorrow. The working class, however, has a great many "trumps" in hand. In its struggle with class enemies, who are increasing their political activity, the proletariat relies on the poor peasants and organizes their forces against the *kulak*. Developing bold self-criticism within its own ranks, the proletariat will overcome its own shortcomings all the more successfully. We are growing. We can grow, and we will grow, with fewer disturbances if we become more cultured and learn to be better administrators. It was precisely of this need that Comrade Lenin spoke in his final days.

Day, 301-329.



STALIN MOVES TOWARD RAPID  
INDUSTRIALIZATION, COLLECTIVIZATION,  
AND AGAINST RIGHT DEVIATION  
19 November 1928

*In Stalin's report of the Politburo to the Plenum of the Party Central Committee (Members of the Central Control Commission also attended), which met from 16 to 24 November 1928, there was no clear indication of the rift between Stalin and Bukharin. Both individuals and their supporters apparently did not wish to divulge to the Central Committee the disagreements which occurred at Politburo sessions. Bukharin and Tomsky tendered their resignations, but a compromise finally was reached. Bukharin and company apparently moderated Stalin's desire to increase the rate of industrialization, accelerate formation of collective and*

*state farms, and rely on "emergency measures" for grain procurement. Nevertheless, bold administrative actions were taking precedence over delicate adjustments in financial and price policies that fostered industrialization and coercion of the peasantry. Another outcome of the Politburo sessions was a statement against Right Deviation in the Party.*

#### INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE CPSU(B)

I shall deal, comrades, with three main questions raised in the theses of the Politburo.

Firstly, the industrialization of the country and the fact that the key factor in industrialization is the development of the production of the means of production, while ensuring the greatest possible speed of this development.

Next, the fact that the rate of development of our agriculture lags extremely behind the rate of development of our industry, and that because of this the most burning question in our home policy today is that of agriculture, and especially the grain problem, the question how to improve, to reconstruct agriculture on a new technical basis.

And, thirdly and lastly, the deviations from the line of the Party, the struggle on two fronts, and the fact that our chief danger at the present moment is the Right danger, the Right deviation.

#### I

#### THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY

Our theses proceed from the premise that a fast rate of development of industry in general, and of the production of the means of production in particular, is the underlying principle of, and the key to, the industrialization of the country, the underlying principle of, and the key to, the transformation of our entire national economy along the lines of socialist development.

But what does a fast rate of development of industry involve? It involves the maximum capital investment in industry. And that leads to a state of tension in all our plans, budgetary and non-budgetary. And, indeed, the characteristic feature of our control figures in the past three years, in the period of reconstruction, is that they have been compiled and carried out at a high tension. Take our control figures, examine our budget estimates, talk with our Party comrades—both those who work in the Party organizations and those who direct our Soviet, economic and cooperative affairs—and you will invariably find this one characteristic feature everywhere, namely, the state of tension in our plans.

The question arises: is this state of tension in our plans really necessary for us? Cannot we do without it? Is it not possible to conduct the work at a slower pace, in a more "restful" atmosphere? Is not the fast rate of industrial development that we have adopted due to the restless character of the members of the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars?

Of course not! The members of the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars are calm and sober people. Abstractly speaking, that is, if we disregarded the external and internal situation, we could, of course, conduct the work at a slower speed. But the point is that, firstly, we cannot disregard the external and internal situation, and, secondly, if we take the surrounding situation as our starting-point, it has to be admitted that it is precisely this situation that dictates a fast rate of development in our industry.

Permit me to pass to an examination of this situation, of these conditions of an external and internal order that dictate a fast rate of industrial development.

*External conditions:* We have assumed power in a country whose technical equipment is terribly backward. Along with a few big industrial units more or less based upon modern technology, we have hundreds and thousands of mills and factories the technical equipment of which is beneath all criticism from the point of view of modern achievements. All

the same time we have around us a number of capitalist countries whose industrial technique is far more developed and up-to-date than that of our country. Look at the capitalist countries and you will see that their technology is not only advancing, but advancing by leaps and bounds, outstripping the old forms of industrial technique. And so we find that, on the one hand, we in our country have the most advanced system, the Soviet system, and the most advanced type of state power in the world, Soviet power, while, on the other hand, our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and of Soviet power, is extremely backward technically. Do you think that we can achieve the final victory of socialism in our country so long as this contradiction exists?

What has to be done to end this contradiction? To end it, we must overtake and outstrip the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We have overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. That is good. But it is not enough. In order to secure the final victory of socialism in our country, we must also overtake and outstrip these countries technically and economically. Either we do this, or we shall be forced to the wall.

This applies not only to the building of socialism. It applies also to upholding the independence of our country in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement. The independence of our country cannot be upheld unless we have an adequate industrial basis for defense. And such an industrial basis cannot be created if our industry is not more highly developed technically.

That is why a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary and imperative.

The technical and economic backwardness of our country was not invented by us. This backwardness is age-old and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country. This backwardness was felt to be an evil both earlier, before the revolution, and later, after the revolution. When Peter the Great, having to deal with the more highly developed countries of the West, feverishly built mills and factories to supply the army and strengthen the country's defenses, that was in its way an attempt to break out of the grip of this backwardness. It is quite understandable, however, that none of the old classes, neither the feudal aristocracy nor the bourgeoisie, could solve the problem of putting an end to the backwardness of our country. More than that, not only were these classes unable to solve this problem, they were not even able to formulate the task in any satisfactory way. The age-old backwardness of our country can be ended only on the lines of successful socialist proletariat, which has established its dictatorship and has charge of the direction of the country.

It would be foolish to console ourselves with the thought that, since the backwardness of our country was not invented by us and was not bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country, we cannot be, and do not have to be, responsible for it. That is not true, comrades. Since we have come to power and taken upon ourselves the task of transforming the country on the basis of socialism, we are responsible, and have to be responsible, for everything, the bad as well as the good. And just because we are responsible for everything, we must put an end to our technical and economic backwardness. We must do so without fail if we really want to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. And only we Bolsheviks can do it. But precisely in order to accomplish this task, we must systematically achieve a fast rate of development of our industry. And that we are already achieving a fast rate of industrial development is now clear to everyone.

The question of overtaking and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically is for us Bolsheviks neither new nor unexpected. It was raised in our country as early as in 1917, before the October Revolution. It was raised by Lenin as early as in September 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, during the imperialist war, in his pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It*.

Here is what Lenin said on this score:

"The result of the revolution has been that the *political* system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries. But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *economically as well*.... Perish or drive full-steam ahead. That is the alternative with which history has confronted us" (Vol. XXI, p. 191).

You see how bluntly Lenin put the question of ending our technical and economic backwardness.

Lenin wrote all this on the eve of the October Revolution, in the period before the proletariat had taken power, when the Bolsheviks had as yet neither state power, nor a socialized industry, nor a widely ramified cooperative network embracing millions of peasants, or collective farms, nor state farms. Today, when we already have something substantial with which to end completely our technical and economic backwardness, we might paraphrase Lenin's words roughly as follows:

"We have overtaken and *outstripped* the advanced capitalist countries *politically* by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, our socialized industry, transport, credit system, etc., the cooperatives, collective farms, etc., in order to overtake and *outstrip* the advanced capitalist countries *economically* as well."

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely as it does now if we had such a highly developed industry and such a highly developed technology as Germany, say, and if the relative importance of industry in the entire national economy were as high in our country as it is in Germany, for example. *If that were the case*, we could develop our industry at a slower rate without fearing to fall behind the capitalist countries and knowing that we could outstrip them at one stroke. But then we should not be so seriously backward technically and economically as we are now. The whole point is that we are behind Germany in this respect and are still far from having overtaken her technically and economically.

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely if we were not the *only* country but *one of the countries* of the dictatorship of the proletariat, if there were a proletarian dictatorship not only in our country but in other, more advanced countries as well, Germany and France, say.

*If that were the case*, the capitalist encirclement could not be so serious a danger as it is now, the question of the economic independence of our country would naturally recede into the background, we could integrate ourselves into the system of more developed proletarian states, we could receive from them machines for making our industry and agriculture more productive, supplying them in turn with raw materials and foodstuffs, and we could, consequently, expand our industry at a slower rate. But you know very well that that is not yet the case and that we are still the *only* country of the proletarian dictatorship and are surrounded by capitalist countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically and economically.

That is why Lenin raised the question of overtaking and outstripping the economically advanced countries as one of life and death for our development.

Such are the *external* conditions dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

*Internal conditions.* But besides the external conditions, there are also internal conditions which dictate a fast rate of development of our industry as the main foundation of our entire national economy. I am referring to the extreme backwardness of our agriculture, of its technical and cultural level. I am referring to the existence in our country of an overwhelming preponderance of small commodity producers, with their scattered and utterly backward production, compared with which our large-scale socialist industry is like an island in the midst of the sea, an island whose base is expanding daily, but which is nevertheless an island in the midst of the sea.

We are in the habit of saying that industry is the main foundation of our entire national economy, including agriculture, that it is the key to the reconstruction of our backward and scattered system of agriculture on a collectivist basis. That is perfectly true. From that position we must not retreat for a single moment. But it must also be remembered that, while industry is the main foundation, agriculture constitutes the basis for industrial development, both as a market which absorbs the products of industry and as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs, as well as a source of export reserves essential in order to import machinery for the needs of our national economy. Can we advance industry while leaving agriculture in a state of complete technical backwardness, without providing an agricultural base for industry, without reconstructing agriculture and bringing it up to the level of industry? No, we cannot.

Hence the task of supplying agriculture with the maximum amount of instruments and means of production essential in order to accelerate and promote its reconstruction on a new technical basis. But for the accomplishment of this task a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary. Of course, the reconstruction of a disunited and scattered agriculture is an incomparably more difficult matter than the reconstruction of a united and centralized socialist industry. But that is the task that confronts us, and we must accomplish it. And it cannot be accomplished except by a fast rate of industrial development.

We cannot go on indefinitely, that is, for too long a period, basing the Soviet regime and socialist construction on two *different* foundations, the foundation of the most large-scale and united socialist industry and the foundation of the most scattered and backward, small commodity economy of the peasants. We must gradually, but systematically and persistently, place our agriculture on a new technical basis, the basis of large-scale production, and bring it up to the level of socialist industry. Either we accomplish this task, in which case the final victory of socialism in our country will be assured, or we turn away from it and do not accomplish it—in which case a return to capitalism may become inevitable.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

"As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the infernal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country." (Vol. XXVI, p.46).

As you see, when Lenin speaks of the electrification of the country he means not the isolated construction of individual power stations, but the gradual "placing of the economy, *including agriculture*, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," which is one way or another, directly or indirectly, is connected with electrification.

Lenin delivered this speech at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920, on the very eve of the introduction of NEP, when he was substantiating the so-called plan of electrification, that is, the GOELRO plan. Some comrades argue on these grounds that the views expressed in this quotation have become inappropriate under present conditions. Why, we ask? Because, they say, much water has flown under the bridges since then. It is, of course true that much water has flown under the bridges since then. We now have a developed socialist industry, we have collective farms on a mass scale, we have old and new state farms, we have a wide network of well-developed cooperative organizations, we have machine-hiring stations at the service of the peasant farms, we now practice the contract system as a new form of the bond, and we can put into operation all these and a number of other levers for gradually placing agriculture on a new technical basis. All this is

true. But it is also true that, in spite of all this, we are still a small-peasant country where small-scale production predominates. And that is the fundamental thing. Lenin's thesis remains valid that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism," and that, consequently, the danger of the restoration of capitalism is no empty phrase.

Lenin says the same thing, but in a sharper form, in the plan of his pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind*, which was written *after* the introduction of NEP (March-April 1921):

"If we have electrification in 10-20 years, then the individualism of the small tiller, and freedom *for him* to trade locally are not a whit terrible. If we do not have electrification, a return to capitalism will be inevitable *anyhow*."

And further on he says:

"Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed); otherwise, 20-40 years of the torments of whiteguard terrorism" (Vol. XXVI, p. 313).

You see how bluntly Lenin puts the question: either electrification, that is, the "placing of the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," or a return to capitalism.

That is how Lenin understood the question of "correct relations with the peasantry."

It is not a matter of coddling the peasant and regarding this as establishing correct relations with him, for coddling will not carry you very far. It is a matter of helping the peasant to place his husbandry "on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production;" for that is the principal way to rid the peasant of his poverty.

And it is impossible to place the economy of the country on a new technical basis unless our industry and, in the first place, the production of means of production, are developed at a fast rate.

Such are the internal conditions dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

It is these external and internal conditions which are the cause of the control figures of our national economy being under such tension.

That explains, too, why our economic plans, both budgetary and non-budgetary, are marked by a state of tension, by substantial investments in capital development, the object of which is to maintain a fast rate of industrial development.

It may be asked where this is said in the theses, in what passage of the theses. (*A voice*: "Yes, where is it said?") Evidence of this in the theses is the sum-total of capital investments in industry for 1928/29. After all, our theses are called theses on the control figures. That is so, is it not, comrades? (*A voice*: "Yes.") Well, the theses say that in 1928/29 we shall be investing 1,650 million rubles in capital construction in industry. In other words, this year we shall be investing in industry 330,000,000 rubles more than last year.

It follows, therefore, that we are not only maintaining the rate of industrial development, but are going a step farther by investing more in industry than last year, that is, by expanding capital construction in industry both absolutely and relatively.

That is the crux of the theses on the control figures of the national economy. Yet certain comrades failed to observe this staring fact. They criticized the theses on the control figures right and left as regards petty details, but the most important thing they failed to observe.

## II

### THE GRAIN PROBLEM

I have spoken so far of the first main question in the theses, the rate of development of industry. Now let us consider the second main question, the grain problem. A characteristic feature of the theses is that they lay stress on the problem of the development of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular. Are these theses right in doing

so? I think they are. Already at the July plenum it was said that the weakest spot in the development of our national economy is the *excessive* backwardness of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular.

When, in speaking of our agriculture lagging behind our industry, people complain about it, they are, of course, not talking seriously. Agriculture always has lagged and always will lag behind industry. That is particularly true in our conditions, where industry is concentrated to a maximum degree, while agriculture is scattered to a maximum degree. Naturally, a united industry will develop faster than a scattered agriculture. That, incidentally, gives rise to the leading position of industry in relation to agriculture. Consequently, the customary lag of agriculture behind industry does not give sufficient grounds for raising the grain problem.

The problem of agriculture, and of grain farming in particular, makes its appearance only when the customary lag of agriculture behind industry turns into an *excessive* lag in the rate of its development. The characteristic feature of the present state of our national economy is that we are faced by the fact of an *excessive* lag in the rate of development of grain farming behind the rate of development of industry, while at the same time the demand for marketable grain on the part of the growing towns and industrial areas is increasing by leaps and bounds. The task then is not to *lower* the rate of development of industry to the level of the development of grain farming (which would upset everything and reverse the course of development), but to bring the rate of development of grain farming into line with the rate of development of industry and to *raise* the rate of development of grain farming to a level that will guarantee rapid progress of the entire national economy, both industry and agriculture.

Either we accomplish this task, and thereby solve the grain problem, or we do not accomplish it, and then a rupture between the socialist town and the small-peasant countryside will be inevitable.

That is how the matter stands, comrades. That is the essence of the grain problem.

Does this not mean that what we have now is "stagnation" in the development of agriculture or even its "retrogression"? That is what Frumkin actually asserts in his second letter, which at his request we distributed today to the members of the CC and CCC. He says explicitly in this letter that there is "stagnation" in our agriculture. "We cannot and must not," he says, "talk in the press about retrogression, but within the Party we ought not to hide the fact that this lag is equivalent to retrogression."

Is this assertion of Frumkin's correct? It is, of course, incorrect! We, the members of the Politburo, absolutely disagree with this assertion, and the Politburo theses are totally at variance with such an opinion of the state of grain farming.

In point of fact, what is retrogression, and how would it manifest itself in agriculture? It would obviously be bound to manifest itself in a backward, downward movement of agriculture, a movement away from the new forms of farming to the old, medieval forms. It would be bound to manifest itself by the peasants abandoning, for instance, the three-field system for the long-fallow system, the steel plough and machines for the wooden plough, clean and selected seed for unsifted and low-grade seed, modern methods of farming for interior methods, and so on and so forth. But do we observe anything of the kind? Does not everyone know that tens and hundreds of thousands of peasant farms are annually abandoning the three-field for the four-field and multifield system, low-grade seed for selected seed, the wooden plough for the steel plough and machines, inferior methods of farming for superior methods? Is this retrogression?

Frumkin has a habit of hanging on to the coat tails of some member or other of the Politburo in order to substantiate his own point of view. It is quite likely that in this instance, too, he will get hold of Bukharin's coat tails in order to show that Bukharin in his article, "Notes of an Economist", says "the same thing". Bukharin in his article raised the

abstract, theoretical question of the possibility or danger of retrogression. In the abstract, such a formulation of the question is quite possible and legitimate. But what does Frumkin do? He turns the abstract question of the possibility of the retrogression of agriculture into a *fact*. And this he calls an analysis of the state of grain-farming! Is it not ludicrous, com-  
rades?

It would be a fine Soviet government indeed if, in the eleventh year of its existence, it had brought agriculture into a state of retrogression! Why, a government like that would deserve not to be supported, but to be sent packing. And the workers would have sent such a government packing long ago, if it had reduced agriculture to a state of retrogression. Retrogression is a tune all sorts of bourgeois experts are harping on; they dream of our agriculture retrogressing. Trotsky at one time harped on the theme of retrogression. I did not expect to see Frumkin taking this dubious line.

On what did Frumkin base his assertion about retrogression? First of all, on the fact that the grain crop area this year is less than it was last year. What is this fact due to? To the policy of the Soviet Government, perhaps? Of course not. It is due to the perishing of the winter crops in the steppe area of the Ukraine and partially in the North Caucasus, and to the drought in the summer of this year in the same area of the Ukraine. Had it not been for these unfavorable weather conditions, upon which agriculture is wholly and entirely dependent, our grain crop area this year would have been at least 1,000,000 desiatins larger than it was last year.

He bases his assertion, further, on the fact that our gross production of grain this year is only slightly (70,000,000 puds) greater, and that of wheat and rye 200,000,000 puds less, than last year. And what is all this due to? Again to the drought and to the frosts which killed the winter crops. Had it not been for these unfavorable weather conditions, our gross production of grain this year would have exceeded last year's by 300,000,000 puds. How can one ignore such factors as drought, frost, etc., which are of decisive significance for the harvest in this or that region?

We are now making it our task to enlarge the crop area by seven percent, to raise crop yields by three percent, and to increase the gross production of grain by, I think, ten percent. There need be no doubt that we shall do everything in our power to accomplish these tasks. But in spite of all our measures, it is not out of the question that we may again come up against a partial crop failure, frosts or drought in this or that region, in which case it is possible that these circumstances may cause the gross grain output to fall short of our plans or even of this year's gross output. Will that mean that agriculture is "retrogressing", that the policy of the Soviet Government is to blame for this "retrogression", that we have "robbed" the peasant of economic incentive, that we have "deprived" him of economic prospects?

Several years ago Trotsky fell into the same error, declaring that "a little rain" was of no significance to agriculture. Rykov controverted him, and had the support of the overwhelming majority of the members of the CC. Now Frumkin is falling into the same error, ignoring weather conditions, which are of decisive importance for agriculture, and trying to make the policy of our Party responsible for everything.

What ways and means are necessary to accelerate the rate of development of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular?

There are three such ways, or channels:

- a) by increasing crop yields and enlarging the area sown by the individual poor and middle peasants;
- b) by further development of collective farms;
- c) by enlarging the old and establishing new state farms.

All this was already mentioned in the resolution of the July plenum. The theses repeat what was said at the July plenum, but put the matter more concretely, and state it in terms



of figures in the shape of definite investments. Here, too, Frumkin finds something to cavil at. He thinks that, since individual farming is put in the first place and the collective farms and state farms in the second and third, this can only mean that his viewpoint has triumphed. That is ridiculous, comrades. It is clear that if we approach the matter from the point of view of the relative importance of each form of agriculture, individual farming must be put in the first place, because it provides nearly six times as much marketable grain as the collective farms and state farms. But if we approach the matter from the point of view of the type of farming, of which form of economy is most akin to our purpose, first place must be given to the collective farms and state farms, which represent a higher type of agriculture than individual peasant farming. Is it really necessary to show that both points of view are equally acceptable to us?

What is required in order that our work should proceed along these three channels, in order that the rate of development of agriculture, and primarily of grain farming, should be raised in practice?

It is necessary, first of all, to direct the attention of our Party cadres to agriculture and focus it on concrete aspects of the grain problem. We must put aside abstract phrases and talking about agriculture *in general* and get down, at last, to working out *practical* measures for the furtherance of grain farming adapted to the diverse conditions in the different areas. It is time to pass from words to deeds and to tackle at last the concrete question *how* to raise crop yields and to enlarge the crop areas of the individual poor- and middle-peasant farms, *how* to improve and develop further the collective farms and state farms, *how* to organize the rendering of assistance by the collective farms and state farms to the peasants by way of supplying them with better seed and better breeds of cattle, *how* to organize assistance for the peasants in the shape of machines and other implements through machine-hiring stations, *how* to extend and improve the contract system and agricultural co-operation in general, and so on and so forth. (A voice: "That is empiricism.") Such empiricism is absolutely essential, for otherwise we run the risk of drowning the very serious matter of solving the grain problem in empty talk about agriculture in general.

The Central Committee has set itself the task of arranging for concrete reports on agricultural development by our principal workers in the Council of People's Commissars and the Politburo who are responsible for the chief grain regions. At this plenum you are to hear a report by Comrade Andreev on the ways of solving the grain problem in the North Caucasus. I think that we shall next have to hear similar reports in succession from the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth region, the Volga region, Siberia, etc. This is absolutely necessary in order to turn the Party's attention to the grain problem and to get our Party's workers at last to formulate concretely the questions connected with the grain problem.

It is necessary, in the second place, to ensure that our Party workers in the countryside make a strict distinction in their practical work between the middle peasant and the kulak, do lump them together and do not hit the middle peasant when it is the kulak that has to be struck at. It is high time to put a stop to these errors, if they may be called such. Take, for instance, the question of the individual tax. We have the decision of the Politburo, and the corresponding law, about levying an individual tax on not more than 2-3 percent of the households, that is, on the wealthiest section of the kulaks. But what actually happens? There are a number of districts where 10, 12, and even more percent of the households are taxed, with the result that the middle section of the peasantry is affected. Is it not time to put a stop to this crime?

Yet, instead of indicating concrete measures for putting a stop to these and similar outrages, our dear "critics" indulge in word play, proposing that the words "the wealthiest section of the kulaks" be replaced by the words "the most powerful section of the kulaks" or "the uppermost section of the kulaks." As if it were not one and the same thing! It has been shown that the kulaks constitute about five percent of the peasantry. It has been

shown that the law requires the individual tax to be levied on only 2-3 percent of the households, that is, on the wealthiest section of the kulaks. It has been shown that in practice this law is being violated in a number of areas. Yet, instead of indicating concrete measures for putting a stop to this, the "critics" indulge in verbal criticism and refuse to understand that this does not alter things one iota. Sheer hair-splitters! (*A voice*: "They propose that the individual tax should be levied on all kulaks.") Well then, they should demand the repeal of the law imposing an individual tax on 2-3 percent. Yet I have not heard that anybody has demanded the repeal of the individual tax law. It is said that individual taxation is arbitrarily extended in order to supplement the local budget. But you must not supplement the local budget by breaking the law, by infringing Party directives. Our Party exists, it has not been liquidated yet. The Soviet Government exists, it has not been liquidated yet. And if you have not enough funds for your local budget, then you must ask to have your local budget reconsidered, and not break the law or disregard Party instructions.

It is necessary, next, to give further incentives to individual poor- and middle-peasant farming. Undoubtedly, the increase in grain prices already introduced, practical enforcement of revolutionary law, practical assistance to the poor- and middle-peasant farms in the shape of the contract system, and so on, will considerably increase the peasant's economic incentive. Frumkin thinks that we have killed or nearly killed the peasant's incentive by robbing him of economic prospects. That, of course, is nonsense. If it were true, it would be incomprehensible what the bond, the alliance between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry, actually rests on. It cannot be thought, surely, that this alliance rests on sentiment. It must be realized, after all, that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an alliance on a business basis, an alliance of the interests of two classes, a class alliance of the interests of two classes, a class alliance of the workers and the main mass of the peasantry aiming at mutual advantage. It is obvious that if we had killed or nearly killed the peasant's economic incentive by depriving him of economic prospects, there would be no bond, no alliance between the working class and the peasantry. Clearly, what is at issue here is not the "creation" or "release" of the economic incentive of the poor- and middle-peasant masses, but the strengthening and further development of this incentive, to the mutual advantage of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry. And that is precisely what the theses on the control figures of the national economy indicate.

It is necessary, lastly, to increase the supply of goods to the countryside. I have in mind both consumer goods and, especially, production goods (machines, fertilizers, etc.) capable of increasing the output of agricultural produce. It cannot be said that everything in this respect is as it should be. You know that symptoms of a goods shortage are still far from having been eliminated, and will probably not be eliminated so soon. The illusion exists in certain Party circles that we can put an end to the goods shortage at once. That, unfortunately, is not true. It should be borne in mind that the symptoms of a goods shortage are connected, firstly, with the growing prosperity of the workers and peasants and the gigantic increase of effective demand for goods, production of which is growing year by year but which are not enough to satisfy the whole demand, and, secondly, with the present period of the reconstruction of industry.

The reconstruction of industry involves the transfer of funds from the sphere of producing means of consumption to the sphere of producing means of production. Without this there can be no serious reconstruction of industry, especially in our Soviet conditions. But what does this mean? It means that money is being invested in the building of new plants, and that the number of towns and new consumers is growing, while the new plants can put out additional commodities in quantity only after three or four years. It is easy to realize that this is not conducive to putting an end to the goods shortage.

Does this mean that we must fold our arms and acknowledge that we are impotent to cope with the symptoms of a goods shortage? No, it does not. The fact is that we can and should adopt concrete measures to mitigate, to moderate the goods shortage. That is something we can and should do at once. For this, we must speed up the expansion of those branches of industry which directly contribute to the promotion of agricultural production (the Stalingrad Tractor Works, the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Works, the Voronezh Seed Sorter Factory, etc., etc.). For this, further, we must as far as possible expand those branches of industry which contribute to an increase in output of goods in short supply (cloth, glass, nails, etc.). And so on and so forth.

Kubiak said that the control figures of the national economy propose to assign less funds this year to individual peasant farming than last year. That, I think, is untrue. Kubiak apparently loses sight of the fact that this year we are giving the peasants credit under the contract system to the sum of about 300,000,000 rubles (nearly 100,000,000 rubles more than last year). If this is taken into account, and it must be taken into account, it will be seen that this year we are assigning more for the development of individual peasant farming than last year. As to the old and new state farms and collective farms, we are investing in them this year about 300,000,000 rubles (some 150,000,000 more than last year).

Special attention needs to be paid to the collective farms, the state farms and the contract system. These things should not be regarded only as means of increasing our stocks of marketable grain. They are at the same time *a new form of bond* between the working class and the main mass of peasantry.

Enough has already been said about the contract system and I shall not dwell upon it any further. Everyone realizes that the application of this system on a mass scale makes it easier to unite the efforts of the individual peasant farms, introduces an element of permanency in the relations between the state and the peasantry, and so strengthens the bond between town and country.

I should like to draw your attention to the collective farms, and especially to the state farms, as levers which facilitate the reconstruction of agriculture on a new technical basis, causing a revolution in the minds of the peasants and helping them to shake off conservatism, routine. The appearance of tractors, large agricultural machines and tractor columns in our grain regions cannot but have its effect on the surrounding peasant farms. Assistance rendered the surrounding peasants in the way of seed, machines and tractors will undoubtedly be appreciated by the peasants and taken as a sign of the power and strength of the Soviet state, which is trying to lead them on to the high road of a substantial improvement of agriculture. We have not taken this circumstance into account until now and, perhaps, still do not sufficiently do so. But I think that this is the chief thing that the collective farms and state farms are contributing and could contribute at the present moment towards solving the grain problem and the strengthening of the bond in its new forms.

Such, in general, are the ways and means that we must adopt in our work of solving the grain problem.

### III

#### COMBATING DEVIATIONS AND CONCILIATION TOWARDS THEM

Let us pass now to the third main question of our theses, that of deviations from the Leninist line.

The social basis of the deviations is the fact that small-scale production predominates in our country, the fact that small-scale production gives rise to capitalist elements, the fact that our Party is surrounded by petty-bourgeois elemental forces, and, lastly, the fact that certain of our Party organizations have been infected by these elemental forces.

There, in the main, lies the social basis of the deviations.

All these deviations are of a petty-bourgeois character.

What is the Right deviation, which is the one chiefly in question here? In what direction does it tend to go? It tends towards adaptation to bourgeois ideology, towards adaptation of our policy to the tastes and requirements of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

What threat does the Right deviation hold out, if it should triumph in our Party? It would mean the ideological rout of our Party, a free rein for the capitalist elements, the growth of chances for the restoration of capitalism, or, as Lenin called it, for a "return to capitalism."

Where is the tendency towards a Right deviation chiefly lodged? In our Soviet, economic, cooperative and trade-union apparatuses, and in the Party apparatus as well, especially in its lower links in the countryside.

Are there spokesmen of the Right deviation among our Party members? There certainly are. Rykov mentioned the example of Shatunovsky, who declared against the building of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station. There can be no question but that Shatunovsky was guilty of a Right deviation, a deviation towards open opportunism. All the same, I think that Shatunovsky is not a typical illustration of the Right deviation, of its physiognomy. I think that in this respect the palm should go to Frumkin. (*Laughter*) I am referring to his first letter (June 1928) and then to his second letter, which was distributed here to the members of the CC and CCC (November 1928).

Let us examine both these letters. Let us take the "basic propositions" of the first letter.

1) "*The sentiment in the countryside, apart from a small section of the poor peasants, is opposed to us.*" Is that true? It is obviously untrue. If it were true, the bond would not even be a memory. But since June (the letter was written in June) nearly six months have passed, yet anyone, unless he is blind, can see that the bond between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry continues and is growing stronger. Why does Frumkin write such nonsense? In order to scare the Party and make it give way to the Right deviation.

2) "*The line taken lately has led to the main mass of the middle peasants being without hope, without prospects.*" Is that true? It is quite untrue. It is obvious that if in the spring of this year the main mass of the middle peasants had been without economic hope or prospects they would not have enlarged the spring crop area as they did in all the principal grain-growing regions. The spring sowing takes place in April-May. Well, Frumkin's letter was written in June. In our country, under the Soviet regime, who is the chief purchaser of cereals? The state and the cooperatives, which are linked with the state. It is obvious that if the mass of middle peasants had been without economic prospects, if they were in a state of "estrangement" from the Soviet Government, they would not have enlarged the spring crop area for the benefit of the state, as the principal purchaser of grain. Frumkin is talking obvious nonsense. Here again he is trying to scare the Party with the "horrors" of hopeless prospects in order to make it give way to his, Frumkin's, view.

3) "*We must return to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses.*" That the Fifteenth Congress has simply been tacked on here without rhyme or reason, of that there can be no doubt. The crux here is not in the Fifteenth Congress, but in the slogan: Back to the Fourteenth Congress. And what does that mean? It means renouncing "intensification of the offensive against the kulak" (see Fifteenth Congress resolution). I say this not in order to deprecate the Fourteenth Congress. I say it because, in calling for a return to the Fourteenth Congress, Frumkin is rejecting the step forward which the Party made between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses, and, in rejecting it, he is trying to pull the Party back. The July Plenum of the Central Committee pronounced its opinion on this question. It stated plainly in its resolution that people who try to evade the Fifteenth Congress decision—"to develop further the offensive against the kulaks"—are "an expression of bourgeois tendencies in our country." I must tell Frumkin plainly that when the Politburo formulated this item of the resolution of the July plenum, it had him and his first letter in mind.

4) "*Maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives.*" We have always to the best of our ability and resources rendered the maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering, or even not entering, collectives. There is nothing new in this. What is new in the Fifteenth Congress decisions compared with those of the Fourteenth Congress is not this but that the Fifteenth Congress made the utmost development of the collective-farm movement one of the cardinal tasks of the day. When Frumkin speaks of maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives, he is in point of fact turning away from, evading, the task set the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of developing the collective-farm movement to the utmost. In point of fact, Frumkin is against developing the work of strengthening the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of collective farms.

5. "*State farms should not be expanded by shock or supershock tactics.*" Frumkin cannot but know that we are only *beginning* to work seriously to expand the old state farms and to create new ones. Frumkin cannot but know that we are assigning for this purpose far less money than we ought to assign if we had any reserves for it. The words "by shock or supershock tactics" were put here to strike people with "horror" and to conceal his own disinclination for any serious expansion of the state farms. Frumkin, in point of fact, is here expressing his opposition to strengthening the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of the state farms.

Now gather all these propositions of Frumkin's together, and you get a bouquet characteristic of the Right deviation.

Let us pass to Frumkin's second letter. In what way does the second letter differ from the first? In that it aggravates the errors of the first letter. The first said that middle-peasant farming was without prospects. The second speaks of the "retrogression" of agriculture. The first letter said that we must return to the Fourteenth Congress in the sense of relaxing the offensive against the kulak. The second letter, however, says that "we must not hamper production on the kulak farms." The first letter said nothing about industry. But the second letter develops a "new" theory to the effect that less should be assigned for industrial construction. Incidentally, there are two points on which the two letters agree: concerning the collective farms and concerning the state farms. In both letters Frumkin pronounces against the development of collective farms and state farms. It is clear that the second letter aggravates the errors of the first.

Against the theory of "retrogression" I have already spoken. There can be no doubt that this theory is the invention of bourgeois experts, who are always ready to raise a cry that the Soviet regime is doomed. Frumkin has allowed himself to be scared by the bourgeois experts who have their roost around the People's Commissariat for Finance, and now he is himself trying to scare the Party so as to make it give way to the Right deviation. Enough has been said, too, about the collective farms and state farms. So there is no need to repeat it. Let us examine the two remaining points: about kulak farming and about capital investment in industry.

*Kulak farming.* Frumkin says that "*we must not hamper production on the kulak farms.*" What does that mean? It means not preventing the kulaks from developing their exploiting economy. But what does not preventing the kulaks from developing their exploiting economy mean? It means allowing a free rein to capitalism in the countryside, allowing it freedom, liberty. We get the old slogan of the French liberals: "*laissez faire, laissez passer,*" that is, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from doing its business, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from moving freely.

This slogan was put forward by the old French liberals at the time of the French bourgeois revolution, at the time of the struggle against the feudal regime, which was fettering the bourgeoisie and not allowing it to develop. It follows, then, that we must now go over from the *socialist* slogan: do not hamper the development of capitalism in the countryside. Why, are we really thinking of turning from Bolsheviks into bourgeois liberals?

What can there be in common between this bourgeois-liberal slogan of Frumkin's and the line of the Party?

(Frumkin. "Comrade Stalin, read the other points also.") I shall read the whole point: "We must not hamper production on the kulak farms either, *while at the same time combating their enslaving exploitation.*" My dear Frumkin, do you really think the second part of the sentence improves matters and does not make them worse? What does combating enslaving exploitation mean? Why, the slogan of combating enslaving exploitation is a slogan of the bourgeois revolution, directed against feudal-serf or semifeudal methods of exploitation. We did indeed put forward this slogan when we were advancing towards the bourgeois revolution, differentiating between the enslaving form of exploitation, which we were striving to abolish, and the non-enslaving, so-called "progressive" form of exploitation, which we could not at that time restrict or abolish, inasmuch as the bourgeois system remained in force. But at that time we were advancing towards a bourgeois-democratic republic. Now, however, if I am not mistaken, we have a socialist revolution, which is heading, and cannot but head, for the abolition of all forms of exploitation, including "progressive" forms. Really, do you want us to turn back from the socialist revolution, which we are developing and advancing, and revert to the slogans of the bourgeois revolution? How can one bring oneself to talk such nonsense?

Further, what does not hampering kulak economy mean? It means giving the kulak a free hand. And what does giving the kulak a free hand mean? It means giving him power. When the French bourgeois liberals demanded that the feudal government should not hamper the development of the bourgeoisie, they expressed it concretely in the demand that the bourgeoisie should be given power. And they were right. In order to be able to develop properly, the bourgeoisie must have power. Consequently, to be consistent, you should say: admit the kulak to power. For it must be understood, after all, that you cannot but restrict the development of kulak economy if you take power away from the kulaks and concentrate it in the hands of the working class. Those are the conclusions that suggest themselves on reading Frumkin's second letter.

*Capital construction in industry.* When we discussed the control figures we had three figures before us: the Supreme Council of the National Economy asked for 825,000,000 rubles; the State Planning Commission was willing to give 750,000,000 rubles; the People's Commissariat for Finance would give only 650,000,000 rubles. What decision on this did the Central Committee of our Party adopt? It fixed the figure at 800,000,000 rubles, that is, exactly 150,000,000 rubles more than the People's Commissariat for Finance proposed. That the People's Commissariat for Finance offered less is, of course, not surprising: the stinginess of the People's Commissariat for Finance is generally known; it has to be stingy. But that is not the point just now. The point is that Frumkin defends the figure of 650,000,000 rubles not out of stinginess, but because of his new-fangled theory of "feasibility", asserting in his second letter and in a special article in the periodical of the People's Commissariat for Finance that *we shall certainly do injury to our economy if we assign to the Supreme Council of the National Economy more than 650,000,000 rubles for capital construction.* And what does that mean? It means that Frumkin is against maintaining the present rate of development of industry, evidently failing to realize that if it were slackened this really would do injury to our entire national economy.

Now combine these two points in Frumkin's second letter, the point concerning kulak farming and the point concerning capital construction in industry, add the theory of "retrogression", and you get the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

You want to know what the Right deviation is and what it looks like? Read Frumkin's two letters, study them, and you will understand.

So much for the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

But the theses speak not only of the Right deviation. They speak also of the so-called "Left" deviation. What is the "Left" deviation? Is there really a so-called "Left" deviation in the Party? Are there in our Party, as our theses say, antimiddle-peasant trends, superindustrialization trends and so on? Yes, there are. What do they amount to? They amount to a deviation towards Trotskyism. That was said already by the July plenum. I am referring to the July plenum's resolution on grain procurement policy, which speaks of a struggle on two fronts: against those who want to hark back from the Fifteenth Congress—the Rights, and against those who want to convert the emergency measures into a permanent policy of the Party—the "Lefts", the trend towards Trotskyism.

Clearly, there are elements of Trotskyism and a trend towards the Trotskyist ideology within our Party. About four thousand persons, I think, voted against our platform during the discussion which preceded the Fifteenth Party Congress. (A voice: "Ten thousand.") I think that if ten thousand voted against, then twice ten thousand Party members who sympathize with Trotskyism did not vote at all, because they did not attend the meetings. These are the Trotskyist elements who have not left the Party, and who, it must be supposed, have not yet rid themselves of the Trotskyist ideology. Furthermore, I think that a section of the Trotskyists who later broke away from the Trotskyist organization and returned to the Party have not yet succeeded in shaking off the Trotskyist ideology and are also, presumably, not averse to disseminating their views among Party members. Lastly, there is the fact that we have a certain recrudescence of the Trotskyist ideology in some of our Party organizations. Combine all this, and you get all the necessary elements for a deviation towards Trotskyism in the Party.

And that is understandable: with the existence of petty-bourgeois elemental forces, and the pressure that these forces exert on our Party, there cannot but be Trotskyist trends in it. It is one thing to arrest Trotskyist cadres or expel them from the Party. It is another thing to put an end to the Trotskyist ideology. That will be more difficult. And we say that wherever there is a Right deviation, there is bound to be also a "Left" deviation. The "Left" deviation is the shadow of the Right deviation. Lenin used to say, referring to the Otzovists, that the "Lefts" are Mensheviks, only turned inside-out. That is quite true. The same thing must be said of the present "Lefts". People who deviate towards Trotskyism are in fact also Rights, only turned inside-out, Rights who cloak themselves with "Left" phrases.

Hence the fight on two fronts—both against the Right deviation and against the "Left" deviation.

It may be said: if the "Left" deviation is in essence the same thing as the Right opportunist deviation, then what is the difference between them, and where do you actually get two fronts? Indeed, if a victory of the Rights means increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism, and a victory of the "Lefts" would lead to the same result, what difference is there between them, and why are some called Rights and others "Lefts"? And if there is a difference between them, what is it? Is it not true that the two deviations have the same social roots, that they are both petty-bourgeois deviations? Is it not true that both these deviations, if they were to triumph, would lead to one and the same result? What, then, is the difference between them?

The difference is in their platforms, their demands, their approach and their methods.

If, for example, the Rights say: *It was a mistake to build the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station,* and the "Lefts", on the contrary, declare: *What is the use of one Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, let us have a Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station every year* (Laughter), it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

If the Rights say: *Let the kulak alone, allow him to develop freely,* and the "Lefts", on the contrary, declare: *"Strike not only at the kulak, but also at the middle peasant, because he is just as much a private owner as the kulak,"* it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

If the Rights say: "*Difficulties have arisen, is it not time to quit?*" and the "Lefts", on the contrary, declare: "*What are difficulties to us, a fig for your difficulties—full speed ahead!*" (*Laughter*), it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

There you have a picture of the specific platform and the specific methods of the "Lefts". This, in fact, explains why the "Lefts" sometimes succeed in luring a part of the workers over to their side with the help of high-sounding "Left" phrases and by posing as the most determined opponents of the Rights, although all the world knows that they, the "Lefts", have the same social roots as the Rights, and that they do not infrequently join in an agreement, a bloc, with the Rights in order to fight the Leninist line.

That is why it is obligatory for us, Leninists, to wage a fight on two fronts—both against the Right deviation and against the "Left" deviation.

But if the Trotskyist trend represents a "Left" deviation, does not this mean that the "Lefts" are more to the Left than Leninism? No, it does not. Leninism is the *most Left* (without quotation marks) trend in the world labor movement. We Leninists belonged to the Second International down to the outbreak of the imperialist war as the extreme Left group of the Social-Democrats. We did not remain in the Second International precisely because, being the extreme Left group, we did not want to be in the same party as the petty-bourgeois traitors to Marxism, the social-pacifists and social-chauvinists.

It was these tactics and this ideology that subsequently became the basis of all the Bolshevik parties of the world. In our Party, we Leninists are the *sole* Lefts without quotation marks. Consequently, we Leninists are neither "Lefts" nor Rights in our own Party. We are a party of Marxist-Leninists. And within our Party we combat not only those whom we call openly opportunist deviators, but also those who pretend to be "Lefter" than Marxism, "Lefter" than Leninism, and who camouflage their Right, opportunist nature with high-sounding "Left" phrases.

Everybody realizes that when people who have not yet rid themselves of Trotskyist trends are called "Lefts", it is meant ironically. Lenin referred to the "Left Communists" as Lefts sometimes with and sometimes without quotation marks. But everyone realizes that Lenin called them Lefts ironically, thereby emphasizing that they were Lefts only in words, in appearance, but that in reality they represented petty-bourgeois Right trends.

In what possible sense can the Trotskyist elements be called Lefts (without quotation marks), if only yesterday they joined in a united anti-Leninist bloc with openly opportunist elements and linked themselves directly and immediately with the anti-Soviet strata of the country? Is it not a fact that only yesterday we had an open bloc of the "Lefts" and the Rights against the Leninist Party, and that that bloc undoubtedly had the support of the bourgeois elements? And does not this show that they, the "Lefts" and the Rights, could not have joined together in a united bloc if they did not have common social roots, if they were not of a common opportunist nature? The Trotskyist bloc fell to pieces a year ago. Some of the Rights, such as Shatunovsky, left the bloc. Consequently, the Right members of the bloc will now come forward as Rights, while the "Lefts" will camouflage their Rightism with "Left" phrases. But what guarantee is there that the "Lefts" and the Rights will not find each other again? (*Laughter*) Obviously, there is not, and cannot be, any guarantee of that.

But if we uphold the slogan of a fight on two fronts, does this mean that we are proclaiming the necessity of *Centrism* in our Party? What does a fight on two fronts mean? Is this not Centrism? You know that that is exactly how the Trotskyists depict matters: there are the "Lefts", that is, "we", the Trotskyists, the "real Leninists"; there are the "Rights", that is, all the rest; and, lastly, there are the "Centrists", who vacillate between the "Lefts" and the Rights. Can that be considered a correct view of our Party? Obviously not. Only people who have become confused in all their concepts and who have long ago broken with Marxism can say that. It can be said only by people who fail to see and to understand the



*difference in principle* the Social-Democratic party of the prewar period, which was the party of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests, and the Communist Party, which is the *monolithic* party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Centrism must not be regarded as a spatial concept: the Rights, say, sitting on one side, the "Lefts" on the other, and the Centrists in between. Centrism is a political concept. Its ideology is one of adaptation, of subordination of interests of the proletariat to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie *within one common party*. This ideology is alien and abhorrent to Leninism.

Centrism is a phenomenon that was natural in the Second International of the period before the war. There were Rights (the majority), Lefts (without quotation marks), and Centrists, whose whole policy consisted in embellishing the opportunism of the Rights with Left phrases and subordinating the Lefts to the Rights.

What, at that time, was the policy of the Lefts, of whom the Bolsheviks constituted the core? It was one of determinedly fighting the Centrists, of fighting for a split with the Rights (especially after the outbreak of the imperialist war) and of organizing a new, revolutionary International consisting of genuinely Left, genuinely proletarian elements.

Why was it possible that there could arise at that time such an alignment of forces within the Second International and such a policy of the Bolsheviks within it? Because the Second International was at that time the party of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests serving the interests of the petty-bourgeois social-pacifists, social-chauvinists. Because the Bolsheviks could not at that time but concentrate their fire on the Centrists, who were trying to subordinate the proletarian elements to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. Because the Bolsheviks were obliged at that time to advocate the idea of a split, for otherwise the proletarians could not have organized their own monolithic revolutionary Marxist party.

Can it be asserted that there is a similar alignment of forces in our Communist Party, and that the same policy must be practiced in it as was practiced by the Bolsheviks in the parties of the Second International of the period before the war? Obviously not. It cannot, because it would signify a failure to understand the *difference in principle* between Social-Democracy, as the party of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements, and the *monolithic* Communist Party of the revolutionary proletariat. They (the Social-Democrats) had one underlying class basis for the party. We (the Communists) have an entirely different underlying basis. With them (the Social-Democrats) Centrism was a natural phenomenon, because the party of a bloc of heterogeneous interests cannot get along without Centrists, and the Bolsheviks were obliged to work for a split. With us (the Communists) Centrism is purposeless and incompatible with the Leninist Party principle, since the Communist Party is the *monolithic* party of the proletariat, and not the party of a bloc of heterogeneous class elements.

And since the prevailing force in our Party is the most Left of the trends in the world labor movement (the Leninists), a splitting policy in our Party has not and cannot have any justification from the standpoint of Leninism. (A voice: "Is a split possible in our Party, or not?") The point is not whether a split is possible; the point is that a splitting policy in our monolithic Leninist Party cannot be justified from the standpoint of Leninism.

Whoever fails to understand this difference in principle is going against Leninism and is breaking with Leninism.

That is why I think that only people who have taken leave of their senses and have lost every shred of Marxism can seriously assert that the policy of our Party, the policy of waging a fight on two fronts, is a Centrist policy.

Lenin always waged a fight on two fronts in our Party—both against the "Lefts" and against outright Menshevik deviations. Study Lenin's pamphlet, "*Left-Wing*" Communism, an *Infantile Disorder*, study the history of our Party, and you will realize that our Party

grew and gained strength in a struggle against both deviations—the Right and the “Left”. The fight against the Otzovists and the “Left” Communists, on the one hand, and the fight against the openly opportunist deviation before, during and after the October Revolution, on the other hand—such were the phases that our Party passed through in its development. Everyone is familiar with the words of Lenin that we must wage a fight both against open opportunists and against “Left” doctrinaires.

Does this mean that Lenin was a Centrist, and that he pursued a Centrist policy? It obviously does not.

That being the case, what do our Right and “Left” deviators represent?

As to the Right deviation, it is not, of course, the opportunism of the prewar Social Democrats. A deviation towards opportunism is not yet opportunism. We are familiar with the explanation Lenin gave of the concept of deviation. A deviation to the Right is something which has not yet taken the shape of opportunism and which can be corrected. Consequently, a deviation to the Right must not be identified with out-and-out opportunism.

As to the “Left” deviation, it is something diametrically opposite to what the extreme Lefts in the prewar Second International, that is, the Bolsheviks, represented. Not only are the “Left” deviators not Lefts without quotation marks, they are essentially Right deviators, with the difference, however, that they unconsciously camouflage their true nature by means of “Left” phrases. It would be a crime against the Party not to perceive the vast difference between the “Left” deviators and genuine Leninists, who are the *only* Lefts (without quotation marks) in our Party. (*A voice*: “What about the legalization of deviations?”) If waging an open fight against deviations is legalization, then it must be confessed that Lenin “legalized” them long ago.

These deviators, both Rights and “Lefts”, are recruited from the most diverse elements of the non-proletarian strata, elements who reflect the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces on the Party and the degeneration of certain sections of the Party. Former members of other parties; people in the Party with Trotskyist trends; remnants of former groups in the Party; Party members in the state, economic, cooperative and trade-union apparatuses who are becoming (or have become) bureaucratized and are linking themselves with the outright bourgeois elements in these apparatuses; well-to-do Party members in our rural organizations who are merging with the kulaks, and so on and so forth—such is the nutritive medium for deviations from the Leninist line. It is obvious that these elements are incapable of absorbing anything genuinely Left and Leninist. They are only capable of nourishing the openly opportunist deviation, or the so-called “Left” deviation, which masks its opportunism with Left phrases.

That is why a fight on two fronts is the only correct policy for the Party.

Further. Are the theses correct in saying that our *chief method* of fighting the Right deviation should be that of a full-scale ideological struggle? I think they are. It would be well to recall the experience of the fight against Trotskyism. With what did we begin the fight against Trotskyism? Was it, perhaps, with organizational penalties? Of course not! We began it with an ideological struggle. We waged it from 1918 to 1925. Already in 1924 our Party and the Fifth Congress of the Comintern passed a resolution on Trotskyism defining it as a petty-bourgeois deviation. Nevertheless, Trotsky continued to be a member of our Central Committee and Politburo. Is that a fact, or not? It is a fact. Consequently, we “tolerated” Trotsky and the Trotskyists on the Central Committee. Why did we allow them to remain in leading Party bodies? Because at that time the Trotskyists, despite their disagreements with the Party, obeyed the decisions of the Central Committee and remained loyal. When did we begin to apply organizational penalties at all extensively? Only after the Trotskyists had organized themselves into a faction, set up their factional center, turned their faction into a new party and began to summon people to anti-Soviet demonstrations.

I think that we must pursue the same course in the fight against the Right deviation. The Right deviation cannot as yet be regarded as something which has taken definite shape and crystallized, although it is gaining ground in the Party. It is only in the process of taking shape and crystallizing. Do the Right deviators have a faction? I do not think so. Can it be said that they do not submit to the decisions of our Party? I think we have no grounds yet for accusing them of this. Can it be affirmed that the Right deviators will certainly organize themselves into a faction? I doubt it. Hence the conclusion that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation *at this stage* should be that of a full-scale ideological struggle. This is all the more correct as there is an opposite tendency among some of the members of our Party—a tendency to begin the fight against the Right deviation not with an ideological struggle, but with organizational penalties. They say bluntly: Give us ten or twenty of these Rights and we'll make mincemeat of them in a trice and so put an end to the Right deviation. I think, comrades, that such sentiments are wrong and dangerous. Precisely in order to avoid being carried away by such sentiments, and in order to put the fight against the Right deviation on correct lines, it must be said plainly and resolutely that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation *at this stage* is an ideological struggle.

Does that mean that we rule out all organizational penalties? No, it does not. But it does undoubtedly mean that organizational penalties must play a subordinate role, and if there are not instances of infringement of Party decisions by Right deviators, we must not expel them from leading organizations or institutions. (*A voice*: "What about the Moscow experience?")

I do not think that there were any Rights among the leading Moscow comrades. There was in Moscow an incorrect attitude towards Right sentiments. More accurately, it could be said that there was a conciliatory tendency there. But I cannot say that there was a Right deviation in the Moscow Committee. (*A voice*: "But was there an organizational struggle?")

There was an organizational struggle, although it played a minor role. There was such a struggle because new elections are being held in Moscow on the basis of self-criticism, and district meetings of aktivs have the right to replace their secretaries. (*Laughter*) (*A voice*: "Were new elections of our secretaries announced?") Nobody has forbidden new elections of secretaries. There is the June appeal of the Central Committee, which expressly says that development of self-criticism may become an empty phrase if the lower organizations are not assured the right to replace any secretary, or any committee. What objection can you raise to such an appeal? (*A voice*: "Before the Party Conference?") Yes, even before the Party Conference.

I see an incredulous smile on the faces of some comrades. That will not do, comrades. I see that some of you have an irrepressible desire to remove certain spokesmen of the Right deviation from their posts as quickly as possible. But that, dear comrades, is no solution of the problem. Of course, it is easier to remove people from their posts than to conduct a broad and intelligent campaign explaining the Right deviation, the Right danger, and how to combat it. But what is easiest must not be considered the best. Be so good as to organize a broad explanatory campaign against the Right danger, be so good as not to grudge the time for it, and then you will see that the broader and deeper the campaign, the worse it will be for the Right deviation. That is why I think that the central point of our fight against the Right deviation must be an ideological struggle.

As to the Moscow Committee, I do not know that anything can be added to what Uglanov said in his reply to the discussion at the plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the CPSU(B). He said plainly:

"If we recall a little history, if we recall how I fought Zinoviev in Leningrad in 1921, it will be seen that at that time the "affray" was somewhat fiercer. We were the victors then because we were in the right. We have been beaten now because we are in the wrong. It will be a good lesson."

It follows that Uglanov has been waging a fight now just as at one time he waged a fight against Zinoviev. Against whom, may it be asked, has he been waging his present fight? Evidently, against the policy of the CC. Against whom else could he have waged it? On what basis could he have waged this fight? Obviously, on the basis of conciliation towards the Right deviation.

The theses, therefore, quite rightly stress, as one of the immediate tasks of our Party, the necessity of waging a fight against conciliation towards deviations from the Leninist line, especially against conciliation towards the Right deviation.

Finally, a last point. The theses say that we must particularly stress the necessity at this time of fighting the Right deviation. What does that mean? It means that at this moment the Right danger is the chief danger in our Party. A fight against Trotskyist trends, and a concentrated fight at that, has been going on already for some ten years. This fight has resulted in the rout of the main Trotskyist cadres. It cannot be said that the fight against the openly opportunist trend has been waged of late with equal intensity. It has not been waged with special intensity because the Right deviation is still in a period of formation and crystallization, growing and gaining strength because of the strengthening of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which have been fostered by our grain procurement difficulties. The chief blow must therefore be aimed at the Right deviation.

In conclusion, I should like, comrades, to mention one more fact, which has not been mentioned here and which, in my opinion, is of no little significance. We, the members of the Politburo, have laid before you our theses on the control figures. In my speech, I upheld these theses as unquestionably correct. I do not say that certain corrections may not be made in the theses. But that they are in the main correct and assure the proper carrying out of the Leninist line, of that there can be no doubt whatever. Well, I must tell you that we in the Politburo adopted these theses unanimously. I think that this fact is of some significance in the view of rumors which are now and again spread in our ranks by diverse ill-wishers, opponents and enemies of our Party. I have in mind the rumors to the effect that in the Politburo we have a Right deviation, a "Left" deviation, conciliation and the devil knows what besides. Let these theses serve as one more proof, the hundredth or hundred and first, that we in the Politburo are all united.

I should like this plenum to adopt these theses, in principle, with equal unanimity. (*Applause*)

Stalin, *Works*, XI, 255-302.



#### PARTY APPROVES RESOLUTION TO ENLIST WRITERS AND ARTISTS IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

28 December 1928

*The Party Central Committee entered the literary and artistic field in the summer of 1928 when it called for preventing deviations from proletarian-class ideology and for war against bourgeois ideology and culture. It urged a conference on these matters. The conference, which met on 22 December 1928, drafted a resolution which the Party Central Committee approved on 28 December 1928.*

# ON THE SERVING OF THE MASS READER WITH LITERATURE RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

1. The current period of socialist construction greatly increases the significance of the mass book as an instrument for the organization of the masses and of Communist education, and for the raising of their cultural level. At the same time the publication and distribution of the mass book is greatly lagging, especially in quality, behind the demands of socialist construction and the demands of the wide masses. It is necessary to strengthen decisively the work of all organizations, not only the publishing houses, but all state, social, cooperative, and especially Party organizations in the field of serving the mass reader.

2. Realizing that the subject matter of the mass book is not satisfactory in this respect, it is necessary: (a) to give special attention to the publication of books popularizing the Marxist-Leninist history of the Communist Party and the revolutionary movement; (b) to strengthen the publication of mass literature on production, raising the level of technical knowledge of the workers and peasants; (c) to develop the publication of the popular scientific book, linking it up with the socialist reconstruction and adapting it to the demands of self-education; (d) to broaden the publication of belles-lettres, especially those works which develop present-day political themes and which are directed against bourgeois influences, philistinism, decadence, etc.; (e) to guarantee the greatest possible accessibility of the mass book (in its form and expression) for a wide reading audience.

The Central Committee considers it necessary to a greater extent than heretofore to see to it that mass literature be an instrument for the mobilization of the masses around the basic political and economic tasks (in the first instance, the industrialization of the country and the rationalization of production, the raising of the productiveness of agriculture and of its socialist rebuilding); for the active class education of the workers and of the wide masses of toilers in the fight against bourgeois and *petit-bourgeois* influences and survivals; for aiding the masses in conquering the achievements of science and technique; for the propaganda of Leninism and the struggle against its distortions.

3. With the aim of this common task, it is resolved: (a) To oblige the publishing houses to increase the percentage of the mass book in their general publishing plans for the year 1929, and during January to offer their editorial plans for the mass book to consideration in the press and in Party and social organizations. (b) To oblige the publishing houses to draw into this work in the capacity of authors the most qualified Communists (in the form of tasks imposed by Party organizations), and also specialists in science, technique, and art (through the ITS and the SNR and the writers' organizations); to employ competitions in the writing of brochures by authors from the working class and the peasantry, giving the most promising of them methodological and editorial aid; to empower the APPO NK to include in the form of an experiment in the plan of work of certain institutions of higher learning for the year 1929, seminars for the training of popularizers. (c) To propose to the cultural sections of the unions that they set up through a library network systematic study of reader demand and interest, and that they organize in libraries circles of worker and peasant critics.

To propose to the publishing houses that they use preliminary reports on the themes of books, and preliminary reading of manuscripts to worker and peasant audiences; and that they organize the study and use by authors of readers' letters, notes presented at mass meetings, and the letters of workers and peasants to the newspapers.

(Points 4, 5, and 6 concern the reduction in the cost of the mass book, and the improvement of the library network.)

Brown, Appendix B, 241-242.



LITVINOV ON SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS  
AND THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT  
29 December 1928

*For several years the Soviet government unsuccessfully attempted to conclude a nonaggression pact with Poland. The Kellogg-Briand pact, officially referred to as the Treaty of Paris, offered the Soviet government an opportunity to reach some kind of arrangement with Poland. By signing the pact months earlier the Soviet Union continued its policy of working with the world community and demonstrating its strong desire for peace meanwhile maintaining freedom to criticize the League of Nations and capitalist countries.*

M. LITVINOV  
NOTE TO POLISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW PROPOSING  
A PROTOCOL TO BRING THE TREATY OF PARIS ON THE  
RENUNCIATION OF WAR INTO FORCE

On 24 August 1926 the Soviet Government, through its plenipotentiary representative in Warsaw, communicated to the Government of the Polish Republic a draft nonaggression treaty. This proposal followed from the negotiations which, at the invitation of the Soviet Government, had been held between the two States, and in accordance with which it put forward the proposals for disarmament, first at the Moscow conference which it convened as early as 1922 and later in the League of Nations Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

While regarding general disarmament as the most effective guarantee of the maintenance of peace, the Soviet Government considers that nonaggression treaties may help substantially in preventing armed conflicts between States.

The Soviet Government is compelled to observe that although negotiations for the conclusion of such a treaty were begun with the Polish Government some years ago, they have made no progress, despite the most serious efforts of the Soviet Government to reach agreement.

Since it attaches considerable importance to the signing of a nonaggression treaty for the consolidation and development of Soviet-Polish relations and for strengthening general peace, the Soviet Government regrets the fruitlessness of its efforts, and for its part again declares its unchanging readiness to sign a nonaggression treaty with the Government of the Polish Republic.

While negotiations for a nonaggression treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union remained fruitless, the Polish Government, when invited to take part in the Kellogg pact, i.e. in a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed this treaty with other States on 27 August 1928 in Paris; to this treaty the Government of the Soviet Union subsequently also adhered.

On receiving the invitation to adhere to the Paris treaty (Kellogg pact) the Soviet Government, in a note to the French Government, referred to the absence from the pact of the obligation to disarm, which is the most substantial element in guaranteeing peace, to the inadequate and imprecise formulation of the clause prohibiting war, and to the presence of other factors which weakened the significance of the treaty. The Soviet Government is still of the opinion that this pact does not provide those guarantees for the preservation of peace which would result from the pacts of nonaggression and nonparticipation in hostile groupings which it proposes.

Since, however, the Soviet Government observed that the Paris treaty (Kellogg pact) imposes on its signatories certain obligations of a peaceful character, it immediately adhered to the pact and, treating all its actions in the sphere of securing peace with great

seriousness, it would like to see the treaty enter into force as quickly as possible, particularly as between the Soviet Union and its nearest neighbors.

Unfortunately, the entry into force of the Paris treaty depends, according to article 3, on its ratification by the fourteen designated States. In the four months which have elapsed since the treaty was signed, not one of these fourteen States has ratified it, a circumstance which induces fears that the treaty may for a long time to come remain an instrument which is not even formally binding on anyone. Apparently the only way by which the treaty can be put into effect earlier between individual States is by their signing a special supplementary instrument.

Since it regards the securing of peace in eastern Europe as a matter of first-rate importance, and since, of the States on the western frontier of the Soviet Union, Poland has signed the Paris treaty, the Soviet Government decided to propose to the Polish Government the signature of the attached protocol, under which the Paris treaty for the renunciation of war would enter into force between the Soviet Union and Poland immediately after its ratification by these two States, regardless of the provisions of article 3 of the treaty. By signing the said protocol the Polish Government would of course be assuming a moral obligation to effect as quickly as possible, in the manner laid down, the simultaneous ratification both of the Paris treaty and of the protocol itself. As to the USSR, its adherence to the Paris treaty has already been ratified by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets.

In drawing your attention, Mr. Minister, to article 4 of the protocol, which makes provision for its signature by any other State which has adhered to the Paris treaty, or to the extent to which it has adhered to the treaty, the Soviet Government expresses the firm conviction that the realization of its proposal at the present time within the framework of the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland would in a considerable degree assist in the strengthening of peace in eastern Europe.

I should point out that in making the present proposal the Soviet Government is not withdrawing its earlier proposal to the Polish Government for a nonaggression pact, the conclusion of which in the future would serve to strengthen still further good-neighborly relations between the USSR and the Polish Republic.

The Soviet Government hopes to find support for its present proposal on the part of the Polish Government, bearing in mind that the latter, having already signed the multilateral Paris treaty, of which the USSR is also a signatory, can have no objection to its coming into force as quickly as possible between the two States.

At the same time the Soviet Government informs the Polish Government that it is simultaneously making a similar proposal to the Lithuanian Government, as the only Baltic country which has so far signed the Paris treaty. It has not yet addressed such a proposal to Finland, Estonia, or Latvia only because these States have not yet formally adhered to the Paris treaty. The Soviet Government, however, reserves the right to do so once they have effected their adherence.

Degras, 356-358.



## DOCUMENTS BY MAIN TOPICS

Communist International	371	Law Codes and Legal Issues	374
Economic Policies, Industry, Industrial Workers	371	Military Affairs	374
Education, Culture, Arts, Cultural Policy	372	Nationalities	374
Foreign Policy and International Relations	373	Politics and the Communist Party	374
		Religious Issues	375
		Social Issues	375

### COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Letter to Comintern on Party Opposition and the Economic Situation in Soviet Russia. 13 January 1926	1
Trotskyist and Zinovievist Opposition. Declaration of the Thirteen. 14 July 1926	49
Party Removes Zinoviev, Lashevich, and Others From Party Leadership Positions. 23 July 1926	62
Fifteenth Party Conference of the CPSU—Reports and Debates. 26 October-3 November 1926. Zinoviev's Speech	118
Stalin's Speech on Perspectives of the Revolution in China. 30 December 1926	161
Litvinov on Worsening Anglo-Soviet Relations. 27 February 1927	170
Litvinov on the Peking Raid. 6 April 1927	176
Stalin, Questions of the Chinese Revolution. 21 April 1927	179
Great Britain Severs Diplomatic Relations With USSR. 26 May 1927	204
Stalin on the War Scare of 1927, China Question and the Zinoviev- Trotskyist Opposition. 28 July 1927	211
Party Central Committee Censures and Warns Trotsky and Zinoviev of Expulsion. 9 August 1927	231
Fifteenth Party Congress Resolutions. 7-19 December 1927 On the Central Committee Report. 7 December 1927	254
Opposition Appeals to Comintern. January 1928	276
New Rift in Party Leadership. Secret Meeting Between Bukharin and Kamenev. 11 July 1928	301
Stalin on the Comintern, "Emergency Measures," and the Shakhty Affair. 13 July 1928	304
Comintern Manifesto on the New Program. 1 September 1928	314

### ECONOMIC POLICIES, INDUSTRY, INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

Letter to Comintern on Party Opposition and the Economic Situation in Soviet Russia. 13 January 1926	1
---	---



Party Resolution. Toward Strengthening of Socialist Elements in the National Economy. 25 February 1926	5
Stalin Proclaims Beginning of New, Second Period of NEP. 13 April 1926	12
Many Obstacles to Greater Participation of Women in Soviet Life. 30 May 1926	41
Trotskyist and Zinovievist Opposition. Declaration of the Thirteen. 14 July 1926	49
Fifteenth Party Conference of the CPSU—Reports and Debates. 26 October-3 November 1926	68
National Census of 1926. 17 December 1926	157
Obolensky-Osinsky's Speech to the World Economic Conference. Geneva, 4-23 May 1927	190
Mikoian, The Raid on the Trade Delegation of the Soviet Union in London. May 1927	197
Obolensky-Osinsky Speech on the Results of the World Economic Conference. Geneva, 23 May 1927	202
Fifteenth Party Congress Resolutions. 7-19 December 1927	254
Opposition Appeals to Comintern. January 1928	276
Stalin on his Visit to Siberia and "Emergency Measures." 15 January-6 February 1928	277
From the Eight-Hour to Seven-Hour Working Day. Decree. 17 January 1928	281
Stalin's Speech on Respite in Party Conflict, Success of "Emergency Measures," and the Shakhty Affair. 13 April 1928	286
New Rift in Party Leadership. Secret Meeting Between Bukharin and Kamenev. 11 July 1928	301
Stalin on the Comintern, "Emergency Measures," and the Shakhty Affair. 13 July 1928	304
Stalin on the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station. 31 August 1928	313
Kuibyshev Calls for Rapid Industrialization and Attempts to Mollify the Technical Intelligentsia. 19 September 1928	321
Bukharin Criticizes Current Economic Policy and Calls for Moderation. Notes of an Economist. 30 September 1928	330
Stalin Moves Toward Rapid Industrialization, Collectivization, and Against Right Deviation. 19 November 1928	348

## EDUCATION, CULTURE, ARTS, CULTURAL POLICY

Fifteenth Party Conference of the CPSU—Reports and Debates. 26 October-3 November 1926. Rykov's Concluding Speech	95
Krupskaia, Criteria for Children's Books. 23 December 1926	159
Maiakovsky on Artistic Freedom Versus Control. February 1927	168
Eisenstein's Films Battleship Potemkin and October. April 1927	174
Lunacharsky on the State of Educational and Cultural Development Since the October Revolution. 15 October 1927	240
Artists and Proletarian Realism. Declaration of the Association of Artists of the Revolution. February 1928	282
Stalin on the Comintern, "Emergency Measures," and the Shakhty Affair. 13 July 1928	304

Pravda Reports on the Celebration of the Centenary of Leo Tolstoy's Birth. 10 September 1928	319
Party Approves Resolution to Enlist Writers and Artists in Socialist Construction. 28 December 1928	367

## FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Chicherin, Soviet Government Agrees to Participate in League of Nations Commission. 16 January 1926	4
Treaty of Berlin. 24 April 1926	25
Litvinov on the International Situation of the USSR. 24 April 1926	28
Nonaggression Treaty With Lithuania. 28 September 1926	66
Stalin's Speech on Perspectives of the Revolution in China. 30 December 1926	161
Litvinov on Worsening Anglo-Soviet Relations. 27 February 1927	170
Litvinov on the Peking Raid. 6 April 1927	176
Exchange of Notes Regarding Settlement of Existing Conflict With Switzerland. 14 April 1927	178
Stalin, Questions of the Chinese Revolution. 21 April 1927	179
Secret Soviet-German Military Agreement Regarding Poison-Gas Experiments. 23 April 1927. <i>Translated by Dr. Edmund Remys</i>	183
Voroshilov's Speech to the Fourth Congress of Soviets on the State of the Red Army. 25 April 1927	184
Obolensky-Osinsky Speech to the World Economic Conference. Geneva, 4-23 May 1927	190
The Arcos Raid. 12 May 1927. Litvinov, Protest Note of the Soviet Government to the British Government. 17 May 1927	194
Mikoian, The Raid on the Trade Delegation of the Soviet Union in London. May 1927	197
The German Government Reevaluates Secret Military Relationship with the Soviet Government. Berlin, 18 May 1927. <i>Translated by Dr. Edmund Remys</i>	200
Obolensky-Osinsky Speech on the Results of the World Economic Conference. Geneva, 23 May 1927	202
Great Britain Severs Diplomatic Relations With USSR. 26 May 1927	204
Soviet Response to the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations. M. Litvinov's Note to British Charge d'Affaires. Moscow, 28 May 1927	206
Litvinov, Soviet Envoy to Poland, Assassinated. 7 June 1927	207
The GPU Uncovers British Espionage and Conspiracy With Russian Emigrés. 9 June 1927	208
Stalin on the War Scare of 1927, China Question and the Zinoviev- Trotskyist Opposition. 28 July 1927	211
Litvinov on Total Disarmament. Geneva, 30 November 1927	249
Litvinov on Partial Disarmament. Geneva, 23 March 1928	283
Litvinov on Soviet-Polish Relations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 29 December 1928	369

**LAW CODES AND LEGAL ISSUES**

Party Resolution after the First General Soviet Elections Since End of the Civil War. 20 July 1926	53
RSFSR Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship. 19 November 1926	131
The GPU Uncovers British Espionage and Conspiracy With Russian Emigrés. 9 June 1927	208
Stalin on his Visit to Siberia and "Emergency Measures." 15 January-6 February 1928	277
From the Eight-Hour to Seven-Hour Working Day. Decree. 17 January 1928	281
Stalin's Speech on Respite in Party Conflict, Success of "Emergency Measures," and the Shakhty Affair. 13 April 1928	286

**MILITARY AFFAIRS**

Party Resolution after the First General Soviet Elections Since End of the Civil War. 20 July 1926	53
Secret Soviet-German Military Agreement Regarding Poison-Gas Experiments. 23 April 1927.	183
Voroshilov's Speech to the Fourth Congress of Soviets on the State of the Red Army. 25 April 1927	184
The German Government Reevaluates Secret Military Relationship with the Soviet Government. Berlin, 18 May 1927.	200
Litvinov on Total Disarmament. Geneva, 30 November 1927	249
Stalin on his Visit to Siberia and "Emergency Measures." 15 January-6 February 1928	277
Litvinov on Partial Disarmament. Geneva, 23 March 1928	283

**NATIONALITIES**

Stalin on Ukrainization. 26 April 1926	38
National Census of 1926. 17 December 1926	157
Voroshilov's Speech to the Fourth Congress of Soviets on the State of the Red Army. 25 April 1927	184
N. Semashko States that Soviet Health Services Meet Social, Political, and Medical Needs of Women and Children. 6 October 1927	236
Lunacharsky on the State of Educational and Cultural Development Since the October Revolution. 15 October 1927	240
Stalin on the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station. 31 August 1928	313

**POLITICS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY**

Letter to Comintern on Party Opposition and the Economic Situation in Soviet Russia. 13 January 1926	1
Party Resolution. Toward Strengthening of Socialist Elements in the National Economy. 25 February 1926	5
Stalin on Ukrainization. 26 April 1926	38
Many Obstacles to Greater Participation of Women in Soviet Life. 30 May 1926	41

Letter from Stalin on the Lashevich Affair and the Move Against Zinoviev. 25 June 1926	47
Trotskyist and Zinovievist Opposition. Declaration of the Thirteen. 14 July 1926	49
Party Resolution after the First General Soviet Elections Since End of the Civil War. 20 July 1926	53
Party Removes Zinoviev, Lashevich, and Others From Party Leadership Positions. 23 July 1926	62
Fifteenth Party Conference of the CPSU—Reports and Debates. 26 October-3 November 1926	68
National Census of 1926. 17 December 1926	157
Stalin, Questions of the Chinese Revolution. 21 April 1927	179
Stalin on the War Scare of 1927, China Question and the Zinoviev- Trotskyist Opposition. 28 July 1927	211
Party Central Committee Censures and Warns Trotsky and Zinoviev of Expulsion. 9 August 1927	231
The October Party Enrollment of 1927. 13 October 1927	238
Trotsky on Opposition Demonstrations During the Anniversary of the October Revolution. 7 November 1927	247
Fifteenth Party Congress Resolutions. On the Central Committee Report. 7 December 1927	254
Opposition Appeals to Comintern. January 1928	276
Stalin's Speech on Respite in Party Conflict, Success of "Emergency Measures," and the Shakhty Affair. 13 April 1928	286
New Rift in Party Leadership. Secret Meeting Between Bukharin and Kamenev. 11 July 1928	301
Stalin on the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station. 31 August 1928	313
Kuibyshev Calls for Rapid Industrialization and Attempts to Mollify the Technical Intelligentsia. 19 September 1928	321
Bukharin Criticizes Current Economic Policy and Calls for Moderation. Notes of an Economist. 30 September 1928	330
Stalin Moves Toward Rapid Industrialization, Collectivization, and Against Right Deviation. 19 November 1928	348
Party Approves Resolution to Enlist Writers and Artists in Socialist Construction. 28 December 1928	367

## RELIGIOUS ISSUES

RSFSR Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship. 19 November 1926	131
Metropolitan Sergei's Epistle. The Russian Orthodox Church Reaches Accommodation with the Soviet State. 29 July 1927	228

## SOCIAL ISSUES

Party Resolution. Toward Strengthening of Socialist Elements in the National Economy. 25 February 1926	5
---	---

Many Obstacles to Greater Participation of Women in Soviet Life. 30 May 1926	41
Fifteenth Party Conference of the CPSU—Reports and Debates. 26 October-3 November 1926. Rykov's Report	69
RSFSR Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship. 19 November 1926	131
Krupskaia, Criteria for Children's Books. 23 December 1926	159
N. Semashko States that Soviet Health Services Meet Social, Political, and Medical Needs of Women and Children. 6 October 1927	236
Lunacharsky on the State of Educational and Cultural Development Since the October Revolution. 15 October 1927	240
Stalin on his Visit to Siberia and "Emergency Measures." 15 January- 6 February 1928	277

## GLOSSARY

The glossary is intended to assist those unfamiliar with Russian terminology of the period covered in this volume. Many specific institutions are identified in headnotes to documents in which they are mentioned.

**active**—see **aktiv**.

**agitprop**—Russian acronym for agitation and propaganda. Special organizations established for this purpose were part of many Soviet governmental and party organizations.

**aktiv**—most active members of a Communist Party organization.

**All-Russian**—term often used to denote an institution which pertained to the entire RSFSR (Russian republic), such as in "All-Russian Congress of Soviets" or "All-Russian Cheka." Used especially after implementation of constitution creating the RSFSR in 1918.

**artel**—artisan or agricultural cooperative.

**CC (TsK)**—Central Committee (of the Communist Party).

**CCC**—Central Control Commission (of the Communist Party).

**CEC (TsIK)**—Central Executive Committee (executive of the Congress of Soviets). See also VTsIK.

**CP**—Communist Party

**CPSU(B)**—Central Executive Committee (executive of the Congress of Soviets). See also VTsIK.

**Cheka**—The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage; the political police until 1922.

**chervonets**—unit of currency introduced in 1922 as part of effort to stabilize the currency; coexisted for a period with the ruble.

**Comintern**—Communist International.

**commissar** (sometimes commissioner, commissary)—used to denote revolutionary officials in 1917, became the official term for the main government department heads in the Soviet government, used until 1946, as in "People's Commissar of Agriculture." Equivalent of Minister (European) or Secretary (American).

**Constituent Assembly**—assembly elected by general popular vote with right to determine future of Russia. Elected in November 1917 and dispersed by Bolsheviks following first meeting in January 1918.

- Constitutional Democratic Party** (Constitutional Democrats, Kadets)—the major Russian liberal party.
- CPC**—See Council of People's Commissars.
- Council for Labor and Defense** (STO)—important council of the early Soviet government, responsible especially for coordinating economic and military issues.
- Council of People's Commissars** (Sovnarkom, CPC)—title of government established after the Bolshevik Revolution; in 1946 replaced by the term Council of Ministers.
- desiatina**—traditional Russian land measurement; one desiatina = 2.7 acres or 1.09 hectares.
- ECCI**—Executive Committee of the Communist International.
- duma**—(1) the State Duma, the parliament from 1905-1917 (especially if capitalized); (2) name of city councils before the revolution.
- Glavki** (sing. Glavk)—central administrative committees or directorates; used especially in economic departments. "Glav" at the beginning of a title usually suggests a central administrative department for that activity and is commonly translated as "chief" or "main."
- Glavlit**—Main Administration for Affairs of Literature and Publishing.
- Goelro**—State Commission for the Electrification of Russia.
- Gosplan**—State Planning Commission.
- GPU**—State Political Administration. Political police from 1922-1923.
- guberniia**—province, the main administrative subdivision of Russian empire and of the Soviet state until 1929.
- Gubkom**—Guberniia committee of the Communist Party.
- Izvestiia**—without a qualifier refers to the official newspaper of the Petrograd Soviet and then after the October Revolution of the Soviet government; many local soviet newspapers also tended to be named *Izvestiia*.
- IKKI**—Executive Committee of the Communist International.
- Kadets**—See Constitutional Democratic Party.
- kolkhoz**—collective farm.
- Komsomol**—Communist Youth League.
- kulak** (pl. kulaki, kulaks)—More prosperous peasant, generally able to hire labor; applied pejoratively by Communists to any peasant opposing their policies.
- Left SRs, Left Socialist Revolutionaries**—see Socialist Revolutionaries.
- Mensheviks**—main Russian Marxist party in opposition to Bolsheviks.
- Menshevik-Internationalists**—left wing of Mensheviks, often cooperated with Bolsheviks in 1917-1918.
- Narkompros**—People's Commissariat of Enlightenment, or, alternatively, of Education (translations vary).
- Narodnik** (pl. narodniki, narodniks)—Populist(s); agrarian socialist(s).
- NEP**—The New Economic Policy introduced in 1921; also the era of NEP, i.e., the 1920s.
- Nuclei**—local party organizations, the lowest level of party organization; party cell.
- Obkom**—Oblast committee of the Communist Party.
- oblast**—large administrative subdivision used in some regions instead of guberniia; roughly a province.
- obshchina**—traditional Russian peasant commune.
- OGPU**—Unified State Political Administration. New name for the political police introduced in 1923 along with formation of the Soviet Union.
- okrug**—large administrative unit, usually subdivision of an oblast, equivalent to an uезд in a guberniia. Certain other types of administrative units also were called okrug also, such as some military districts.
- Orgburo**—The Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; a key administrative body of the party.

- Party**—used, with or without capitalization, to mean the Communist Party, as in “the party intends to....”
- People’s Commissariat**—the chief administrative departments of the Soviet government; see commissar, above.
- Politburo**—Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; effectively the key leadership body.
- Politprosvet**—Political Educational Committee (of Narkompros).
- pood**—See pud.
- Pravda**—central official paper of the Communist Party; some local Bolshevik papers used the title also.
- Proletcult** (Proletkult)—Union of Proletarian Cultural-Educational Associations.
- pud** (pood)—Russian measure of weight, equaling 36.11 lbs. or 16.38 kilograms.
- Rabkrin**—Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate.
- Rada**—lit., Ukrainian equivalent of “soviet.” Originally in political sense referred to the Ukrainian Central Rada set up in Kiev during the revolution and which proclaimed itself the government for Ukraine after the Bolshevik Revolution; later part of the Ukrainian language term for the Ukrainian Soviet government and local governments.
- Raikom**—raion committee of the Communist Party.
- raion**—smaller administrative subdistrict in some rural areas; also in some larger cities.
- Revolutionary Tribunals**—special courts set up to expedite revolutionary justice and to deal with important political cases; there also were special revolutionary tribunals for press and other purposes.
- RILU**—Red International of Labor Unions
- RKP(b)**—Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the party name from the name change of March, 1918 to 1925.
- RSDRP**—Russian Social Democratic Labor Party; without further clarification can refer to either the Bolsheviks or Mensheviks, or, less frequently, to smaller groups.
- RSDRP(b)**—Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks), the usual designation for the Bolsheviks before change of party name in 1918.
- RSFSR**—Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic; official name of the new state under constitution of 1918. Later terms were reversed—Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic. Middle word translated variously as Federal, Federative or Federated.
- Selkom**—village committee of the Communist Party.
- Smena vekh** (Smenovekh, smenavekhov and other forms of the term)—a movement, especially among Russian emigres and former liberal and conservative opponents of the regime, for reconciliation with the Soviet regime on the basis that it was the upholder of Russia’s national independence. Used by Communist Party leaders pejoratively. Lit.: “Change of Landmarks.”
- Smychka**—the policy of a close relationship between town and countryside, of workers and peasants.
- SNK**—Russian initials for Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom); used infrequently in translations.
- Socialist Revolutionaries**—peasant oriented revolutionary party, largest party in 1917 and in Constituent Assembly. The left wing emerged in late 1917 as a virtual separate party, the Left SRs, and cooperated with the Bolsheviks during the first months after the October Revolution.
- Soviet**—council in Russian. Used both as a short form name of the government (or for reference to its institutions, policies, etc.), and to refer to a variety of other institutions which use that term in their title, i.e., call themselves a council.
- Soviet of People’s Commissars**—alternative translation of Council of People’s Commissars (soviet = council).

- Sovnarkom**—Commonly used abbreviation for Council of People's Commissars, based on first syllable of each word (in Russian). See Council of People's Commissars.
- SRs**—See Socialist Revolutionaries.
- STO**—Soviet for Labor and Defense. See Council for Labor and Defense.
- subbotnik**—special days of voluntary work without pay for the good of society, which later became largely mandatory; lit., "saturdays."
- Tsektran**—Central Committee for Transportation.
- TsIK**—Central Executive Committee (executive of the Congress of Soviets).
- TsK (CC)**—Central Committee (of the Communist Party).
- uezd (uyezd)**—administrative subdivision of a *guberniia*.
- verst (versta)**—0.66 mile.
- Vesenka**—Supreme Council of the National Economy; also called VSNKh, Veseniche and Supreme Economic Council.
- volost**—rural administrative units within the *uezd*.
- VSNKh**—Supreme Council of the National Economy; also called *Vesenka* and Supreme Economic Council.
- VTsIK**—All-Russian Central Executive Committee, although often referred to simply as the Central Executive Committee, TsIK or CC.
- White Guards**—term used to refer to the Civil War opponents of the Bolsheviks, the "Whites," and at this period used to smear opponents, social groups, or political tendencies.
- YCL**—see Komsomol.
- zemstvo**—pre-revolutionary elected local and regional government institutions, especially in rural areas, with limited powers; abolished by Bolsheviks.
- Zhenotdel**—Women's Department of the Communist Party.

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## INDEXES

The indexes contain page references to the documents and to the headnotes, but not to the Preface or Introduction. They tend to be inclusive rather than exclusive, especially for personal names and geographic places. Some minor persons and places mentioned only in passing, especially foreign ones are omitted. The subject index includes numerous cross references. Although there are headings for subjects and institutions such as Communist Party, Economy, Foreign Policy, such topics in fact pervade the documents and the collection.

### INDEX OF PERSONAL NAMES

- |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| Amery, 172   | Chamberlain, Austen, 170-171, 173, 185, 196, 204-205 | Eastman, Max, 380                                  |
| Andreev, 302, 356  | Chang Chung-Chang, 162                               | Efremov, 169                                       |
| Arens, 178   | Chang Hsu-liang, 167                                 | Eisenstein, Sergei, 174-175, 372                   |
| Artiukhina, Aleksandra, 41   | Chang Tso-lin, 36, 162, 176, 213, 216                | Engels, F., 124, 126-129                           |
| Babushkin, I.V., 101, 119  | Chaplin, 168   | Evans, 187   |
| Bagdatiev, 223, 225, 227-228   | Chaplygin, 188                                       | Feng Yu-hsiang, 163                                |
| Baltrusaitis, Jurgis, 67   | Chen, 176-177  | Fischer, Major, 184                                |
| Beethoven, 320   | Chernykh, 176-178                                    | Fischer, Ruth, 232-235                             |
| Belinsky, G.A., 51, 63-65  | Chernyshev, I.S., 65                                 | Frumkin, 354-357, 359-361                          |
| Biliukov, 209  | Chiang Kai-shek, 161, 179-181, 216, 219              | Ganetsky, 107                                      |
| Birkenhead, Lord, 172  | Chicherin, Georgii, 4, 67-68, 173, 373               | Gessler, German Defense Minister, 200              |
| Bliakhin, 169  | Christ, 230-231                                      | Gorky, Maxim, 319                                  |
| Blok, 119  | Chubar, 39-41, 79, 209                               | Grinko, 39-41                                      |
| Blomberg, 201-202  | Churchill, Winston, 32, 172, 209, 214                | Griunstein, 248                                    |
| Briand, 369  | Clemenceau, Georges, 231, 234-235                    | Guralsky-Vuiovich, 49, 64                          |
| Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count, 201-202   | Cook, A.T., 172                                      | Gurevich, 209                                      |
| Brockway, 214  | Cooper, Hugh, 313                                    | Heye, General, Chief of Army Command, 184, 200-204 |
| Bruce, 208   | Curzon, Lord, 171                                    | Hoare, Samuel, 172                                 |
| Brutskus, 332  | Darwin, 315  | Horne, Robert, 195                                 |
| Bubnov, 121  | Davison, William, 172                                | Iagoda, 302  |
| Budeny, 249  | Denikin, General A.I., 25, 96, 162, 209, 312         | Iaroslavsky, 119                                   |
| Bukharin, N.I., 1, 47-48, 68-69, 79, 94-95, 102, 104, 113, 119-120, 123, 130, 209, 211, 301-304, 330, 348, 354, 371-372, 375, 379, 381 | Dirksen, von, 184                                    | Itsenko, 277                                       |
| Burbury, 185   | Divilkovsky, 178                                     | Iudenich, General N.N., 162                        |
| Catherine II, 189  | Dostoevsky, 174                                      | Iuriev, 188  |
|  | Dzerzhinsky, F., 49, 85                              |  |

- Ivan the Terrible, 14  
 Ivanov, 129  
 Jouhaux, 192, 203-204  
 Kaganovich, L., 38-39, 302  
 Kalinin, M.I., 303  
 Kamenev, L.B., 1, 12, 49, 69, 90-91, 94, 99, 102, 108-109, 111, 116, 118, 129, 172, 232, 248-249, 301-304, 371-372, 375  
 Kapp, 224  
 Karakhan, L.M., 36  
 Kautsky, Karl, 92, 120  
 Kellogg, 369  
 Kerensky, A.F., 25, 33  
 Khinchuk, 195, 198, 205  
 Khlevniuk, 49, 380-381  
 Khudiakov, 195  
 Khvilevoi, 40  
 King, 185-186  
 Knox, General, 186  
 Koepke, 201  
 Kolchak, Admiral A.V., 25, 96, 162, 209, 312  
 Komarov, 302  
 Kornilov, General L.G., 224-225  
 Korsch, 64  
 Kosiom, 119  
 Krasin, L.B., 173, 195  
 Kmasnov, 298  
 Kmestinsky, N.N., 26, 178, 201  
 Krupskaia, N. 159-160, 372, 376, 380  
 Krzhizhanovsky, G.M., 74, 79  
 Kubiak, 358  
 Kuibyshev, V.V., 73, 113, 119, 125, 313, 321, 372, 375  
 Kuleshov, L.V., 169  
 Lansbury, 214  
 Lashevich, 47-52, 62-63, 65, 126, 232, 371, 375  
 Lashuk, 248  
 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 2, 13, 16, 19, 22, 48-49, 51-52, 54, 56, 62-65, 69, 79, 92-93, 100, 102-103, 105-108, 114, 117, 119-121, 123-124, 126-127, 129-131, 159, 161-162, 164, 217, 222-225, 228, 233, 238, 241, 246, 248, 258, 260, 264, 266, 269, 271, 276-277, 280-283, 290, 294-296, 298, 308, 311, 342-343, 345, 348, 350-353, 359, 362-365  
 Litvinov, M., 28, 31, 38, 170, 176, 194, 201, 204, 206-207, 249-250, 283-284, 369, 371, 373-374  
 Lloyd George, David, 32  
 Locker-Lampson, Commander, 172  
 Lockhart, Bruce, 208  
 Lomov, 119  
 Loucheur, 192  
 Lozovsky, 110-111  
 Lunachamsky, A.V., 98, 240-241, 319-320, 372, 374, 376  
 MacDonald, 33, 164, 317  
 Maiakovsky, V., 168, 170, 372, 380  
 Maislin, 85  
 Maliota, 277  
 Mamontov, 298, 312  
 Marx, Karl, 69, 124, 126-129, 333  
 Maslow, 232, 234-235, 258  
 Maxton, 214  
 Maxwell, 379  
 Medvedev, 64  
 Messing, 209  
 Mezhlauk, 344  
 Miasnikov, 63  
 Miff, 161, 164-165, 167  
 Mikhailov, 63  
 Mikoian, A., 85, 194, 197, 372-373  
 Miliutin, V. p., 69, 91, 129  
 Miller, 195  
 Moiseenko, 101-102, 108  
 Molotov, V., 47-48, 302-303, 380-381  
 Mumalov, 248-249, 276  
 Nevenson, 277  
 Obolensky-Osinsky, N., 190, 202, 372-373  
 Okunev, 20  
 Oldenbung, S.F., 246  
 Opansky, 209  
 Oudenbijk, Dutch Minister, 177  
 Paton, 206  
 Peter the Great, 14  
 Peters, 185  
 Petliura (Petlura), 209  
 Petrov, 161  
 Petrovsky, 41, 209  
 Piatakov, 49, 85-86, 94  
 Pilsudski, Marshal, 213, 315  
 Plekhanov, G.B., 319  
 Poincame, 113  
 Politis, 285  
 Preobrazhensky, E.A., 69, 72, 82, 84, 86, 92-93, 113-114, 122, 248, 277, 302, 335, 340  
 Preston, 206  
 Pmokofiev, Sergei, 319  
 Pugachev, 23  
 Purcell, 124  
 Radek, K., 182, 276-277  
 Rifes, 161, 165-166  
 Rakovsky, K.G., 276-277  
 Ransome, 130  
 Razin, Stenka, 23  
 Riasanov, 246  
 Riffi, 317  
 Riley, Sidney George, 208-209

- Riutin, 106  
 Rothschild, 199  
 Rozengolts, 194, 205-206  
 Ruben, 109  
 Ruchimovich, 94  
 Rudzutak, 49  
 Russell, Walter, 379  
 Rykov, A.I., 1, 47-48, 68-69, 73, 92, 95, 104, 113-115, 117, 125, 185, 209, 241, 301-303, 355, 359, 372, 376  
 Sablin, Yu., 209  
 Sacco, 255, 315-316  
 Sakulin, P.N., 320  
 Scarborough, 172  
 Schimansky, 118  
 Schubert, 201-202  
 Semashko, Nikolai, 236-237, 374, 376  
 Serebriakov, 36, 277  
 Sergei, Metropolitan, 228-229, 375  
 Shapiro, B.G., 65  
 Shatunovsky, 359, 363  
 Shatsky, 320  
 Shugaev, 63  
 Shumsky, 38-41  
 Shustova, 237  
 Shvedchikov, 169  
 Shvernik, 13, 102, 112  
 Shklovsky, Viktor, 169, 174  
 Sinkler, Anton, 321  
 Skrypnik N.A., 40  
 Slizevicius, Mykolas, 66, 68  
 Smilga, 233, 248, 276-277  
 Smirnov, I.N., 277  
 Smirnov, V.M., 85  
 Sokolnikov, G.I., 94, 113  
 Sol, 169  
 Sompem, 321  
 Souvarine, 64, 258  
 Stalin, J.V., 1, 12, 25, 38, 41, 47-49, 68-69, 100, 103, 105-108, 110, 113-114, 116, 125-127, 129-131, 161, 179, 183, 209, 211, 228, 277-278, 281, 286, 298, 301-304, 313, 348, 361, 367, 371-376, 380-381  
 Stechkin, 188  
 Steinberg: See Riley  
 Stein, 110  
 Stendhal, 174  
 Stetsky, 302  
 Stolypin, P., 226  
 Stresemann, Gustav, 26, 200, 202  
 Stura, 124  
 Sun Chuan-fang, 162-163  
 Svemdllov, Ya.M., 120  
 Tang Ping-tshan, 161, 165, 167  
 Thomas, 124  
 Thomsen, Colonel, 184  
 Tikhon, Patriarch, 228-229  
 Tolstoy, Leo N., 175, 319-320  
 Centenary of, 319, 373  
 Tomsy, M.P., 1, 68-69, 89, 114-115, 117, 302-303, 313, 348  
 Trainin, 169  
 Tmetiakov, Sergei, 175  
 Trillser, 302  
 Trotsky, L.D., 47-49, 69, 84, 90-91, 108, 111, 114-117, 122, 129, 211, 227, 231-235, 247-249, 254, 258, 261, 266, 276-277, 303, 330, 336-338, 341-342, 344, 355, 365, 371, 375, 380  
 Truba, 209  
 Tsikhon, 249  
 Tugan-Baranovsky, 333  
 Tupolev, 188  
 Ugarov, 302  
 Uglanov, 302, 366-367  
 Unschlicht, 201  
 Urbahns, 94, 118  
 Ustrialov, 233, 266  
 Ustrialov-Menshevik, 266  
 Vaganian, 277  
 Valentinov, 277  
 Vanzetti, 255, 315-316  
 Vasileva, M.W., 65  
 Vemtov, Dziga, 174-175  
 Vinter, A., 313  
 Vlasov, N.M., 65  
 Voikov, P.L., 207-208, 210-211, 213  
 Volgin, Boris, 248  
 Volgina, K.A., 65  
 Volominsky, 321  
 Vomoshilov, K.E., 101, 126, 184-185, 189, 303, 373-374  
 Vomovsky, 5, 178-179, 251  
 Watford, 172  
 Webem, 94  
 Worthington-Evans, Laming, 172, 185  
 Wrangel, General P.N., 162  
 Wright, 321  
 Wu Pei-fu, 162-163  
 Yeltsin, 277  
 Yevdokimov, 13  
 Zagorsky, 332  
 Zagumenny, 279  
 Zatonsky, 40  
 Zhatsek, 63  
 Zhifronovich, 114  
 Zinoviev, G.E., 1, 12, 24, 47-49, 62-65, 69, 85, 107, 110-111, 116, 118, 120, 131, 170-171, 211, 227, 231-235, 248, 254, 302-303, 366-367, 371, 375  
 Zweig, Stefan, 319-320

## INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- Absenteeism, 20-21, 90, 265  
 Adolescents, 160  
 Adoption, 3, 5, 21, 24, 31, 38, 50, 61-62,  
     64-65, 69, 131-132, 144-146, 157,  
     180, 188, 213-214, 227, 233, 250,  
     261, 274-275, 286, 294-295, 310,  
     317, 342, 349, 367  
 Afghan, 37-38  
 Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop), 47,  
     55, 63, 102, 111, 121, 215, 218,  
     222, 224, 232, 376  
 Agriculture, 1, 6-14, 17-19, 22-23, 25, 36,  
     45, 50-51, 53, 57, 59-60, 69-72, 79-  
     85, 87-88, 90-93, 97, 99, 105, 125,  
     189-191, 210, 240, 256-258, 261-  
     264, 267-275, 278, 280-281, 291-  
     292, 304, 308-312, 321-326, 330,  
     332, 336-343, 349, 351-358, 360,  
     368, 376  
 Alabaster, 345  
 Alashardinzes, 55  
 Alimony, 136-144, 146  
 American, 18, 25, 33, 88, 162-163, 174,  
     189, 200, 297, 304, 313-316, 332,  
     335, 376  
 Amsterdam Trade Union Federation, 3  
 Anglo-American, 304  
 Anglo-French, 25  
 Anglo-Russian, 205  
 Anglo-Soviet, 170-173, 196-197, 206,  
     211, 371, 373  
 Animal, 160, 263  
 Arcos Raid, 194, 204, 207, 373  
 Armaments, 185, 212  
 Armed Forces, 186-187, 250  
 Armenian, 158  
 Article 107 (of the Criminal Code), 278-  
     279, 294-295  
 Artillery, 127, 187, 317  
 Artistic Freedom, 168, 372  
 Artists, 145, 282-283, 367, 372-373, 375  
 Arts, 18, 40, 67, 145, 168-170, 174-175,  
     240, 242, 246-247, 282-283, 289,  
     296, 319-320, 367-368, 371-373,  
     375, 379, 381  
     Cinema: See Film  
     Music: See Music  
     Painting, 247, 282-283  
     Radio, 174, 245-246, 275  
     Theater, 168-169, 247  
 Assassinations, 207, 229-230, 373  
 Auls, 46  
 Australian, 200  
 Austrian, 199, 320  
 Avant-Garde, 379, 381  
 Aviation, 185, 187-188, 256  
 Aviation Industry, 85, 101-102, 188, 232  
  
 Barracks, 189  
 Bashkir, 157-158  
 Battleship Potemkin, 174-175, 372  
 Bigamy, 133-134  
 Birth, 126, 138-140, 153-155, 157, 319,  
     373  
 Bolshevik (October) Revolution (1917),  
     16, 33, 50, 66, 70-73, 76-78, 82,  
     103, 174, 180, 182, 210, 212, 238,  
     240-243, 247-248, 259, 277, 281-  
     282, 300, 350-351, 365, 372, 374-  
     378  
 Bolshevism, 25, 107, 126, 221, 287, 289,  
     332  
 Books, 108, 153-154, 157, 159-160, 177,  
     299, 368, 372, 376, 379  
 Bourgeoisie, 6, 55-57, 66, 93, 164, 212-  
     213, 232-233, 297, 316, 329, 360  
 British, 15, 28, 32-33, 35, 67, 170-174,  
     176, 185, 189-190, 194-200, 204-  
     210, 212-214, 255, 304, 317, 373-  
     374, 380  
 British Conservative, 172, 198, 206, 212-  
     213  
 British Dominions, 190  
 British Empire, 170-171, 173, 204-205,  
     207  
 British Labor, 214  
 Budget, 5, 7, 12, 16-17, 59, 72-73, 78, 90,  
     98, 125, 189, 242, 256, 264, 327,  
     333, 344, 347, 349, 357  
 Bureaucratism, 49-51, 59, 61, 65, 77, 80,  
     85, 96, 109  
 Bumiat Mongolian, 158  
  
 Cantonese, 162-163  
 Capital, 2, 5-8, 10-12, 14-15, 22, 37, 55,  
     64, 71-75, 85-87, 93-95, 97, 110,  
     114-115, 123, 129, 191-193, 199,  
     211, 217, 224, 254, 256-257, 261,

- 263-264, 266-268, 271-272, 289,  
297-298, 300-301, 306, 312, 314,  
318-319, 327, 332-333, 336, 341-  
347, 349, 353, 360-361
- Capitalism, 1-2, 14, 55, 69, 93-96, 103-  
105, 110, 115, 123-124, 126-130,  
179-180, 190, 202, 211-212, 250,  
254-255, 257-258, 260, 268, 271,  
280, 302, 304-307, 314, 316-320,  
328, 333-336, 340, 343, 352-353,  
359-360, 362
- Stabilization of, 1-2, 69, 110-111, 123-  
124, 254, 255
- Census, 157, 238-239, 338, 372, 374-375
- Centrism, 363-365
- Chemical, 185-189, 199, 251-252, 256,  
263, 299, 325, 327, 332, 336
- Chemistry, 79, 187-188
- Chervonets, 72, 264, 339, 376
- Children, 20, 43, 45-46, 131-132, 135,  
137-149, 150, 153-154, 156, 159-  
160, 169, 229, 236-237, 242-243,  
247-248, 275, 339, 372, 374, 376
- China Question, 35-36, 161-167, 176-183,  
192, 206, 211, 215-228, 315-317,  
371, 373, 375
- Chinese, 35-37, 161-167, 176-183, 198,  
210, 212, 215-224, 226-227, 233,  
255, 305, 314-315, 317-318, 371,  
373, 375
- Chinese Eastern Railway, 36-37
- Chinese Revolution, 35, 161-163, 165-  
166, 176, 179-183, 212, 215-218,  
222, 226-227, 233, 255, 318, 371,  
373, 375
- Church, 228-231, 296, 375
- Chuvash, 157-158
- Cinema: See Film
- Civil Code, 134-136, 138, 142-143, 145-  
146
- Civil War, 16, 21, 53, 71, 77, 95-96, 157,  
162, 166, 180, 184, 297-298, 306,  
374-375, 379
- Classes, 6, 11, 77, 82, 111, 114, 159, 191,  
193, 203-204, 219, 222, 242, 260,  
290, 294, 297, 310-311, 316, 333-  
334, 348, 350, 357
- Clubs, 41, 45-46, 209, 242, 245, 283
- Coal, 289
- Collective, 52, 70, 81, 83, 93, 111, 142,  
153, 159-160, 254, 256, 264, 269,  
272, 278-281, 292, 309, 311, 323,  
325-326, 344, 348, 351-352, 355-  
356, 358, 360, 377
- Collectivization, 125, 263-264, 270, 275,  
280, 343, 348, 372, 375
- Combine, 55-56, 261, 309, 361-362
- Commerce, 6-12, 76-77, 86-88, 97, 263-  
267, 272
- Communist International Manifesto, 314,  
371
- Communications, 84, 188
- Communism, 44, 46, 101, 103, 123, 126,  
128, 218, 222, 224, 226, 242, 257,  
302-303, 306-307, 325, 331-332,  
352-353, 364, 379, 381
- Communist, 1, 3, 5, 12, 19-20, 39-41, 44-  
45, 47-49, 53-57, 60, 62, 64, 68-69,  
82, 91-92, 100, 102, 106-107, 109-  
110, 113, 116-120, 124, 126-128,  
157-158, 161, 163-165, 167-168,  
170-171, 176, 179-183, 185, 194,  
205, 209, 211-212, 216-221, 223-  
225, 227, 231, 235, 238, 240, 246-  
250, 254-255, 258, 276-278, 281,  
286-287, 299, 301, 304, 306-308,  
312, 314, 316-318, 321, 330, 347,  
363-365, 368, 371, 374, 376-381
- Communist Manifesto, 126-128
- Communist Parties, 40, 64, 109-110, 171,  
212, 215, 224, 255, 276-277, 306-  
307
- Concessions, 15, 35, 37, 58, 82, 162-163,  
193, 203, 297-298, 302, 304, 311
- Congress, 1-3, 10-11, 14, 23-25, 48, 50,  
56, 60-65, 70, 81, 93, 98, 103, 112,  
114, 116, 120-126, 129-130, 184-  
186, 189, 232-234, 236-238, 240,  
248, 254-259, 261, 265-267, 271,  
274, 276-277, 281, 286-287, 292,  
294-295, 303-307, 314, 317, 337,  
342-344, 346, 352, 359-360, 362,  
365, 371-376, 379
- Conservative, 32, 172, 194, 198-200, 204,  
206, 212-213, 233, 255, 312, 329,  
336, 378
- Constitution, 30, 59-60, 148, 173, 376,  
378
- Construction, 1-3, 6-7, 11, 13, 15, 18-19,  
22, 24-25, 43, 45, 52, 54, 56-57,  
60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 74-77, 79, 81,  
89, 92, 94-97, 99, 174, 184-185,

- 188, 196, 199, 231, 246, 254, 256,  
258-259, 261, 263-271, 273-275,  
280, 282-283, 287, 290-291, 307-  
308, 311, 313, 323, 326, 328, 330-  
333, 336-337, 339, 341-347, 352-  
353, 360-361, 367-368, 373, 375
- Construction Materials
  - Bricks, 342, 345
  - Cement, 53, 77, 345
  - Girders, 345
- Control Figures, 69-70, 74, 337, 339, 344,  
346, 349, 353, 357-358, 361, 367
- Correctional Labor Code, 143
- Counter-Revolution, 376
- Countryside, 13, 39, 69, 85, 175, 180,  
217, 238, 254, 256-257, 260-262,  
265, 267-269, 271, 279-281, 291-  
296, 301, 309, 311, 321, 332, 336-  
337, 339, 343, 352, 354, 356-357,  
359-360, 378
- Court Practice*, 132-136, 138-141, 145
- Courts, 45, 135-138, 141-143, 150, 238,  
378
- Creches, 43, 46, 236-238
- Crime, 18-22, 208-210, 249
- Crimean, 157-158
- Criminal Code, 133-134, 139-140, 143-  
144, 278-279
- Critics, 288, 339, 356-357, 368
- Crops, 17, 256, 264, 273, 296, 308, 310,  
355-356, 359
- Cultural, 50, 55-56, 89, 98, 121, 130-131,  
159, 240-241, 246-247, 252, 254,  
257-258, 265, 270, 272, 274-275,  
283, 290-291, 326, 333, 336, 348,  
351, 368, 371-372, 374, 376
- Cultural Work, 131, 274-275
- Culture, 17, 38-40, 59, 169, 172, 215,  
217, 240-242, 244, 247, 258, 265,  
283, 289-290, 319-320, 367, 371-  
372
- Currency, 8-9, 11, 17, 72, 89, 264-265,  
347
- Czechoslovak, 3
- Dadist, 55
- Daily Telegraph*, 172, 186
- Decrees, 132, 139, 141-142, 145-146,  
152, 154, 156-157, 172, 189, 281-  
282, 372, 374
- Defense, 7, 49, 54, 58, 62-63, 69, 86, 90,  
94, 100, 115, 117, 142, 150, 185,  
187-189, 200-202, 233-235, 256,  
260, 263, 306, 314, 318, 343, 350,  
377, 379
- Democracy, 23-25, 49-52, 54-56, 61, 65,  
109, 116, 118, 123, 126, 129, 236,  
258, 270, 316-317
- Democracy, Soviet, 54-56, 61, 109
- Dictatorship, 1, 3, 6, 14, 22-24, 53-56, 61,  
63-64, 66, 74, 90-92, 100, 103,  
107-110, 117, 120, 122, 164, 179-  
181, 210-212, 214, 218-219, 224,  
232-233, 240, 254-255, 258-260,  
267-268, 271, 276-277, 287, 294-  
295, 307, 315, 318-319, 350-351
- Die Fahne*, 276
- Disarmament, 4-5, 29, 193, 201, 249-253,  
255, 283-286, 305, 316, 369, 373-  
374
  - Partial, 252, 283-285, 373-374
  - Total, 249, 283-285, 373-374
- Disarmament Conference, 4-5, 29, 250-  
251, 253, 255, 284, 286
  - Preparatory Commission, 4-5, 29, 47,  
58, 60, 182, 212, 244, 249-253,  
283-285, 369
- Divorce, 40, 132-133, 136-137, 152, 156
- Dnepem Hydroelectric Power Station  
(Dnepmostroi), 72, 313, 326, 359,  
362, 372, 374-375
- Dutch, 177, 200
- Education, 43-46, 59, 69, 98, 135, 137,  
141, 145-148, 151, 157, 159, 215,  
240-245, 251, 265, 274-275, 312,  
368, 371-372, 377
- Education, Vocational, 240, 244
- Egyptian, 210
- Eight-Hour Working Day, 191, 193, 255,  
281, 372, 374
- Ekonomicheskaja Zhizn*, 344
- Election, 44, 53-61, 64, 120-121, 165, 171
- Election Campaign, 44, 53-58, 60-61, 121
- Elections, 44, 50, 53-54, 56-61, 225-226,  
270, 274, 366, 374-375
- Elections, First General, 53, 374-375
- Electrical, 71, 76, 199, 263, 337, 347
- Electrification of Russia, 313, 377
- Emergency Measures, 277-278, 286, 294,  
301-304, 307-308, 310, 349, 362,  
371-372, 374-376



- Emigres, 178, 207-208, 228, 230, 373-374
- English, 32-33, 35, 127, 130, 186, 188, 194-195, 233
- Estonian, 210
- European, 30-31, 35, 52, 95-96, 107, 127-128, 174, 176, 179, 183-184, 187, 189, 199, 212, 234, 241, 247, 252, 256, 297, 314-315, 320, 376
- Exports, 5, 7, 17, 19, 32, 35, 69, 106, 198, 257, 262-264, 327, 340-343
- Factionalism, Fractions (Schism), 24, 48-52, 62-68, 90, 100, 117, 119-121, 231-236, 248
- Family, 20, 41, 45, 131-132, 135-136, 142, 149, 155, 175, 236-237, 336, 374-376, 379
- Fascism, 314, 319
- Father, 137-140, 144, 153-155, 229, 231
- February Revolution (1917), 107, 164, 175, 209
- Ferrous Metals, 346
- Fertilizers, 263-264, 269, 291-292, 323-324, 326, 336, 357
- Fifth Symphony, 320
- Film, 168, 174-175, 240, 246
- Finance, 69, 72-73, 79, 83, 86, 98, 133, 270, 360-361
- Financial Department, 78
- Finn, 210
- Finnish-Soviet, 208
- First World War, 41, 157, 231
- Five Year Plan, 254-266, 344
- Foreign Affairs, 4, 28-29, 38, 66-67, 173, 176, 189, 206, 284, 380
- Foreign Policy, 29, 34, 38, 172, 191, 200, 297, 371, 373, 379
- Foreign Trade, 6-7, 12, 16-17, 35, 87, 89, 113, 185, 193-194, 197, 199, 256, 259, 262, 298
- Fractions: See Factionalism
- Freedom, 24, 39, 163, 168, 171, 193, 232, 314, 316, 353, 360, 369, 372
- French, 15, 23, 127-128, 178, 188, 203, 209, 231, 317, 360-361, 369
- French Press, 203
- Friends of Russia, 321
- Fuel, 8-9, 14, 71, 76-77, 96-97, 328, 341
- Futurists, 168
- Gas, 184, 201, 315
- General Strike (Britain), 124, 170, 318
- Geneva Conference, 190, 202, 204, 372-373, 380
- Genoa Conference, 29, 251
- Georgian, 158
- German, 3, 25-27, 30-31, 40, 69, 118, 127, 157-158, 183-184, 188, 198-202, 255, 313, 318, 321, 373-374
- German Revolution, 255
- Goods Famine, 6, 8, 11, 14, 81, 88, 257, 262, 291, 323, 333-336, 341-342, 347, 357-358
- Grain, 6, 11, 13, 19, 112, 256, 260, 262-263, 277-280, 286, 291-296, 301, 303-304, 307-312, 321-322, 325, 328, 330-331, 333-340, 342-344, 348-349, 353-359, 362, 367
- Great Powers, 191-192, 304-305
- Guardian, 131-132, 136, 139-142, 145-152, 155, 170, 183, 185-186, 202, 209, 247, 298, 374-376, 379
- Handicraft, 346
- Health, 139, 141, 147-149, 151, 156, 169, 172, 236-237, 374, 376
- Illiteracy: See Literacy
- Imperialism, 15, 35, 161-164, 167, 179-181, 210, 212, 215-216, 221, 233, 235, 305-306, 314-319
- Oppressed Colonial Peoples, 314
- Imperialist, 34, 36, 52, 91, 95, 106, 123, 162, 164, 178, 180-181, 183, 188, 191, 193, 211-212, 216-217, 226, 234, 250, 254-255, 281, 304-307, 314-319, 350, 363-364
- Imports, 15, 17, 69, 82, 89, 106, 112, 197-198, 257, 324, 340
- Indian, 15
- Indonesian, 255
- Industrial, 1, 5-7, 9, 11, 14-15, 18-19, 21, 24, 32, 34, 39, 42, 44, 58-59, 69, 71, 73-74, 76-78, 81-82, 84, 87-88, 96-97, 104, 108, 115, 121, 128, 130, 165, 190-191, 193, 200, 238, 251, 256-257, 261-263, 266, 268, 271, 278, 282, 297, 311, 316-319, 322-324, 326-328, 330-333, 336-344, 346, 349-350, 352-354, 360, 371
- Industrialization, 5-7, 11-18, 21-22, 25,

- 50, 70, 74-77, 80-81, 84-85, 89, 91,  
93, 96-98, 113, 115, 125, 175, 240,  
244, 254, 256-258, 261-263, 265,  
278-279, 313, 321, 323-326, 330,  
337, 340, 343-345, 348-349, 368,  
372, 375
- Industry, 2-3, 6-25, 33-34, 39, 41-45, 50-  
51, 53-54, 63-64, 70-74, 76, 78, 80-  
82, 84-87, 89-97, 112-113, 115,  
121-122, 125, 130, 161, 168, 184,  
187-188, 190-191, 198-200, 207,  
214, 216, 232, 240, 251-252, 256,  
259-263, 265-269, 271-273, 279-  
282, 289-291, 293, 296-297, 299-  
300, 304, 308, 310-313, 321-333,  
335-344, 346-347, 349-354, 357-  
358, 360-361, 371
- Inner-Party, 23-25, 49, 100, 116-117, 125,  
236, 286
- Insurance, 8, 84, 136, 142, 274
- Intelligentsia, 286, 304, 311-313, 321,  
372, 375
- International Press Correspondence*, 4,  
12, 47, 61, 66, 91, 95, 99, 117, 131,  
200, 210, 236, 238, 247, 330
- International Relations: See Foreign  
Policy
- Intervention, 103-106, 108, 127, 130-131,  
162, 193-194, 212, 214, 234-235,  
283, 295, 297-298, 301, 305-306
- Iron, 7, 56, 65, 190, 236, 315, 318, 324,  
326, 334, 345
- Italian, 172, 321
- Izvestiia*, 168, 170, 172, 231, 377, 380
- Japanese, 37, 162-163, 315
- Justice, 45, 66, 132, 139, 144-146, 148,  
378
- Kadets: See Constitutional Democrats
- Kalmyk, 157-158
- Kamelian, 157-158
- Kazakh, 157-158, 332
- Kellogg-Briand Pact, 369, 373
- Kino-Pravda*, 174
- Kirghiz, 157-158
- Kishlaks, 46
- Kolkhozes, 264, 272-273, 275, 280
- Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, 20
- Kulak, 3, 10-11, 51, 64, 83, 85, 101, 111-  
115, 123-125, 233, 257-258, 261-  
262, 264, 266, 270-274, 278-279,  
292-293, 295-296, 303, 309, 311,  
325, 335-336, 339, 343, 348, 356,  
359-362, 377
- Labor, 8, 10, 12, 20-21, 32, 36, 41-43, 52,  
63-65, 79, 86, 89-90, 94, 110, 115,  
125-126, 128, 133-136, 141, 143,  
150, 153-154, 164, 171-172, 191,  
194, 213-214, 224, 231, 253, 256,  
263, 265-266, 269, 272, 274, 280-  
283, 285, 300, 305-306, 311, 314,  
316-317, 328, 331, 333, 339-340,  
363-364, 377-379
- Labor Truth, 63
- Land, 8, 14-16, 70, 74, 82-84, 86, 90,  
135, 143, 148, 165-167, 193, 205,  
211-212, 217, 230, 247, 251, 256,  
259-260, 264, 267-274, 281, 292,  
315, 335, 377
- Land Code, 135, 143, 148
- Lashevich Affair, 47-49, 232, 375
- Latvian, 35, 40
- Lausanne Conference, 5, 178
- Civil Law, 380
- Laws, 86-87, 127, 130-138, 140-145, 147-  
149, 151-156, 188, 192, 197, 229,  
274, 278-279, 295, 300-301, 315-  
316, 333, 335, 374-376, 379
- Codes, 131-136, 138-146, 148-152,  
155-156, 198, 274, 278-279, 374-  
376, 379
- Collection of, 8-9, 11, 132-134, 137-  
138, 140-141, 143-145, 147-149,  
151-155, 168, 170, 190, 200, 301,  
334
- Lef, 168, 176, 380
- Left Communists, 102, 119-120, 363, 365
- Left Opposition, 1, 24, 61, 116
- Left-Wing, 69, 218, 222, 224, 226, 364
- Left-Wing Communism, 218, 222, 224,  
226, 364
- Leftist, 215
- Lefts, 180, 182, 219, 362-365
- Lenin Enrollment, 238
- Leninism, 40, 62, 65, 117, 215, 217-218,  
221-224, 226, 259, 266, 294-295,  
309, 363-364, 368
- Leninist, 61, 65-66, 93, 106-107, 109,  
113, 120, 123, 228, 232, 254, 256,  
258-259, 271, 311, 347, 358, 363-  
365, 367

- Literacy, 240-242, 245  
 Literature, 159-160, 168, 174-175, 246-247, 319-321, 367-368  
 Lithuanian, 66-68, 170, 253, 370  
 Locarno Agreements, 25, 27-28, 30-31  
 Locarno Conference, 28  
*London Times*, 36  
  
 Magyar, 40  
 Marriage, 131-137, 139, 142, 149, 152, 154-156, 374-376, 379  
 Marxism, 105, 130, 220, 222, 246, 303, 363-364  
 Marxist, 3, 40, 101, 130, 159, 215, 246, 295, 311, 319, 333, 364, 377  
 Metal (Metallurgy), 14, 42, 87, 96-97, 199, 283, 323-324, 327, 341, 345-346  
 Middle Eastern, 28  
 Militarism, 179, 181, 250, 284-285, 316  
 Military Affairs, 164, 371, 374  
 Military Attache, 176-177  
 Military Technique, 187, 316  
 Mother, 145, 147  
  
 Narodnik, 377: See also Populist  
 National Republics, 45, 55, 60  
 Nationalities, 37-39, 128, 157, 242-243, 371, 374  
 Navies, 250, 314  
 Navy, 53, 58, 60, 187-188, 193, 256, 275  
 Negroes, 318  
 Neo-Menshevism, 55  
 New Economic Policy (NEP), 1-2, 6, 10, 12-14, 55, 62, 66, 101, 107, 123, 168, 174, 232, 260, 267, 290, 294, 296, 301, 319, 31, 352-353, 372, 377  
 Nep-man, 55, 101, 112-113, 115  
 New Opposition: See Left Opposition  
 Norwegian, 199  
*Novaia Rossiia*, 55  
*Novyi Lef*, 176, 380  
  
 October Enrollment, 238, 258, 375  
 Opposition, 1-2, 6, 12-13, 24, 29, 47-49, 52, 58, 61-65, 68-69, 74, 80, 82, 84-86, 88-95, 98-101, 109, 114-122, 126, 179, 182-183, 194, 199, 211, 214-218, 220-222, 224-228, 231-236, 247-249, 251, 254, 258-262, 264, 266-269, 271, 276, 281-282, 286-287, 291, 295, 307, 324, 330, 339, 360, 371-375, 377  
 Opposition, United, 49, 68, 74, 90  
     Declamation of the Six, 99-100  
     Declamation of the Thirteen, 49, 371-372, 375  
 Otvovists, 362, 365  
  
 Pan-Europe, 255  
 Paris Commune, 110  
 Parliamentarism, 56  
 Party Apparatus, 47, 51, 115-116, 359  
 Party Conflict, 286, 372, 374-375  
 Party Unity, 49, 69, 117-118, 234  
 Party-splitting, 64  
 Parents, 133, 137-149, 153-154  
 Patrons: See Guardian  
 Peace, 4, 26-32, 34-35, 38, 66-68, 118-120, 171, 173-174, 178, 186-189, 191, 193, 196, 200, 204, 207-208, 214, 234-235, 250-255, 279, 283, 287, 297, 305, 314-318, 324, 369-370, 379  
 Peace Treaties, 28, 67-68, 120, 200  
     Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, 32, 171-173, 194-193, 205-206  
     Nonaggression Treaty with Lithuania, 66-67  
     Polish-Romanian Agreement, 30, 34  
     Treaty of Berlin, 25  
     Treaty of Paris: See Kellogg-Briand Pact  
     Treaty of Rapallo: See Rapallo Treaty  
     Treaty of Versailles, 183, 315  
 Peasant, 1-6, 8-11, 13, 17-23, 34, 36, 41, 43-47, 50-51, 53-61, 64, 66, 70, 72-73, 79, 81, 83-85, 88-89, 91-93, 95, 99, 104, 108-109, 111, 113, 115, 121-122, 124-125, 135, 143-144, 148, 153, 163, 165-167, 174, 179-183, 185, 189, 191, 193, 210, 214, 216-217, 219-221, 223-224, 226-227, 237-238, 240-241, 244-245, 253-254, 256-258, 260-262, 264-275, 277-282, 288-290, 292-296, 303, 305, 307-311, 314-315, 317-321, 323-325, 330-336, 338-341, 343, 347-348, 351-360, 362, 368, 377-378  
     Middle, 2-3, 5, 10, 53, 60, 83, 124-125, 359

- Poor, 3, 5, 10, 53, 60, 114, 124-125  
 Peasant Committees, 165-166, 180-182  
 Peasant Leagues, 165-166  
 Peasant Question, 121, 124, 165, 167, 323  
 Peasant Relief Committees, 57-58  
 Peasant Soviets, 165  
*The Peasant Woman*, 45-46  
 Peasant Women, 41, 43-47, 237-238, 270, 272  
 Pedagogical, 159, 380  
 Peking Raid, 176, 371, 373  
 Petliurists, 55  
 Pioneer, 247  
*Plough and Harrow*, 121  
 Poison Gas, 183, 373-374  
 Polish, 3, 33-34, 68, 207-209, 369-370  
 Polish-Romanian, 30, 34  
 Polish-Russian, 33  
 Populist, 377  
*Pravda*, 20, 108, 115, 121, 123, 130, 168, 174, 179, 288, 302-303, 319, 321, 325, 373, 378, 380  
 Press, 1, 4, 12, 19-20, 29, 31, 38, 40, 45, 47, 57-58, 60-61, 66, 70, 73, 81, 91, 95, 99, 112, 117, 119, 131, 163, 170-173, 183, 185, 194, 196-198, 200, 203, 210, 214, 236, 238, 240, 246-247, 288, 294, 307, 330-331, 354, 368, 378-381  
 Principles of Communism, 128, 218  
 Prices, 5-12, 17, 23, 81, 84, 87-89, 93, 112-113, 262, 271, 292-293, 307, 309, 323, 332, 339-343, 347, 357  
 Proletarian, 1, 3, 6, 10, 24, 45, 50-51, 53-57, 59-61, 63, 66, 74, 88, 90, 100, 106-109, 113, 115-117, 120-121, 124, 127-128, 130, 164, 168, 179-180, 210-212, 214, 218, 232, 240, 246, 254-260, 265-269, 271, 277, 282-283, 311, 314-320, 322, 329, 335, 351, 353, 364, 372, 378-379, 381  
 Proletarian Realism, 282, 372  
 Proletarian Revolution, 3, 51, 56, 106, 116, 120, 124, 127-128, 164, 212, 282-283, 317-319  
 Proletariat, 1-3, 10, 12, 14, 22-24, 39-40, 50-52, 54-56, 58, 60-64, 66, 70, 77, 90-92, 99-111, 114-115, 117, 120-122, 124-125, 127-128, 161-162, 164-167, 179-182, 211, 215, 217-222, 224-226, 232-234, 247, 254-255, 257-262, 265, 267-268, 271, 274, 276-277, 282-283, 287, 290-291, 294-295, 307, 316-318, 320, 326, 329, 335, 343, 348, 350-351, 364  
 Public Welfare, 142, 147  
 Punishment, 112, 114, 295  
 Rapallo Treaty, 25-26, 30-31, 183  
 Religious Issues, 371, 375  
 Republics, 1, 26-28, 37, 173, 187, 307, 316  
 Reserves, 7, 9, 12, 15-19, 21-22, 25, 89, 182, 185-188, 197, 208, 251, 256-257, 280, 283-285, 311, 344, 347, 352, 360, 370  
 Revolution of 1848, 128  
 Revolutionaries, 162, 164-167, 277, 320, 377-379  
 Revolutionary, 1, 23, 40, 54, 56, 64-65, 78, 91, 103, 107, 110-111, 120, 126-127, 132, 137, 145, 162-167, 172, 179-183, 189, 208, 211-224, 226-227, 233, 247, 254-255, 259, 266, 276-277, 282-283, 297, 305, 308-311, 314, 316-319, 336, 357, 364, 368, 376, 378  
 Right, 12, 14, 20, 30, 40, 49, 51-52, 55, 57-60, 64, 70, 75, 96-98, 101, 104-105, 107-109, 111-112, 115-118, 122-123, 126, 129, 131, 135-138, 141-142, 144-146, 149, 151, 155, 159, 163-166, 169, 171, 177, 181-182, 191, 193, 195-199, 204, 208, 218, 225, 228-232, 241, 247, 253, 273-274, 284-285, 293, 299-300, 302-303, 313, 323, 327, 336, 348-349, 353, 359-363, 365-367, 370, 372, 375-376  
 Right Deviation, 232, 348-349, 359-363, 365-367, 372, 375  
 Rightism, 363  
*Rul*, 186  
*Russian Review*, 38, 380  
 Russification, 38  
 Sabotage, 279, 297, 376  
 Sailors, 314, 318  
 Salskian Steppe, 332  
 Scandinavian, 28, 35

- Schools, 159-160, 241-245, 274-275, 312
- Science, 75, 129, 160, 242, 246, 265, 309, 314-315, 330, 332, 340, 347, 368
- Scientists, 145, 246
- Self-criticism, 286-291, 302, 330, 348, 366
- Seven-Hour Working Day, 257, 267, 281-282, 372, 374
- Shakhty Affair, 286, 289, 296-302, 304, 311-313, 321, 329, 331, 371-372, 374-375
- Shakhty Trial, 286, 329
- Shanghai Cavaignacs, 183
- Smenovekh, 55, 258, 378
- Smychka (Alliance), 12, 23, 50, 88, 323, 378
- Social Democracy, 69, 118, 123, 126, 129, 306-307, 316-317, 364
- Social Democrat*, 106-107
- Socialism, 1-3, 6, 13, 24-25, 49-50, 52, 56, 66, 69, 91, 93, 103-108, 111, 113-115, 123-124, 126-131, 189, 191, 202, 210, 222, 241-242, 246, 255, 257-260, 265-271, 280, 297-298, 302, 304, 307, 311-312, 314, 323, 329, 333-335, 337, 343, 347, 350, 352, 379, 381
- Socialism In One Country, 2, 16, 103, 107, 123, 126-131, 266
- Socialist, 1-3, 5-6, 11-17, 19, 21-22, 24-28, 52, 56, 60, 63-64, 66-67, 69-70, 72, 74, 77, 89, 91-95, 99-100, 102-109, 112, 114-115, 120, 124, 126, 128, 130, 153-155, 164, 172, 180, 187, 191-197, 203, 206, 214, 216-217, 231-232, 235, 243, 250, 254-261, 264-265, 267-269, 271, 273, 275, 280-282, 290-291, 297, 306-308, 310-315, 318, 323-326, 329, 331, 334, 336-337, 340, 343, 349-352, 354, 360-361, 367-368, 372-375, 377-379
- Socialist Accumulation, 5-6, 8, 10-12, 15-19, 22, 25, 71-73, 84-86, 89, 92-93, 112-113, 115, 125, 143, 256, 260-261, 263, 268, 291, 318, 327, 331-332, 336, 340, 344, 346
- Socialist Elements, 5, 372, 374-375
- Socialized, 86, 264, 271-272, 280, 332, 337-338, 341-342, 346-347, 351
- Soldiers, 58, 176-177, 182, 213, 226, 248, 277, 282, 314, 317-318
- South American, 314
- Soviet, 1-6, 8-12, 15, 17-18, 21-22, 25-42, 44-46, 49, 51, 53-64, 66-70, 74-76, 78, 86, 90-91, 95-98, 100, 102-106, 109, 114, 116, 119-121, 123-124, 126, 129-130, 133, 143, 145, 148, 151-157, 159, 162, 164-166, 168, 170-174, 176-179, 183-188, 190-200, 202-210, 212-215, 217-218, 221-222, 225-226, 228-237, 239-244, 246-247, 249-259, 266-267, 272-273, 275-280, 282-285, 287-289, 292-298, 300-301, 306-307, 309-312, 314-319, 321-322, 324-325, 328-330, 332, 349-350, 352, 355, 357-360, 369-381
- Congress of Soviets, 184-186, 254, 267, 274, 352, 373-374, 376, 379
- Congress, Fourth, 184-186, 189, 314, 373-374
- Congress, Fifth, 304-305, 314, 365
- Congress, Eighth, 294, 352
- Soviet Union Review*, 174, 178, 380
- Sport, 187, 317
- State Power, 1, 6, 60, 120-121
- Strike, 48, 52, 114, 124, 163, 167, 170, 183, 191, 193, 217, 219, 255, 261, 307, 318, 336, 360, 362
- Swiss, 4-5, 178, 190, 251
- Syrian, 317
- Tatam, 157-158
- Taxation, 8, 10, 17, 23, 69-70, 83-84, 86-87, 89, 93, 98-99, 112-114, 262, 272, 285, 309, 357
- Terror, 209, 277, 314-316
- Textiles, 283, 310-311, 321
- Thermidom, 233-235, 259, 266
- Trade, 1, 3, 6-7, 9, 11-13, 16-17, 20-21, 32, 34-35, 39, 41, 43-45, 51, 53, 55-60, 66, 69, 72-74, 79, 85, 87-89, 113, 120, 125, 131, 147, 170-171, 173, 177, 182, 185, 188, 192-200, 204-207, 216, 219-220, 224, 239, 254, 256-259, 262, 264-267, 269, 272, 275, 298, 300, 310, 317, 324, 328, 331, 353, 372-373
- Board of, 32, 195
- Trade Union Committees, 43-44
- Trade Unions, 3, 20, 39, 41, 43-45, 51, 53, 55-60, 69, 79, 89, 125, 131, 182, 219-220, 224, 275, 300, 317, 328

- Transcaucasian, 122, 187
- Trans-Siberian Railway, 186
- Transportation, 8, 77, 199, 263, 379
- Treaty of Paris: See Kellogg-Briand Pact
- Tmotskyism, 116-117, 232, 325-326, 334, 336, 340, 362, 365
- Trotskyist, 49, 224, 330, 334-341, 362-363, 365, 367, 371-372, 375
- Tmotskyite, 258-259, 266
- Tsar, 82, 238, 244
- Tsarism, 33-34, 73, 107, 237, 336
- Tsamist, 5, 15-16, 34, 41, 70, 73, 91, 96, 188-189, 244, 247
- Turkish, 37
- Ukrainian, 38-41, 158, 187, 209, 243, 313, 332, 378
- Ukrainization, 38-40, 374
- Ultraleft, 64, 92, 94, 228
- Ultramight, 64
- Unemployment, 2, 20, 34, 41-43, 89-90, 136, 157, 190-193, 199, 257-258, 262, 268, 281, 316, 333
- United Front, 1, 161, 176
- Uzbek, 158
- Village, 2-3, 9-11, 46-47, 50-51, 53-54, 57-61, 66, 70, 82-83, 92-93, 99, 109, 114, 121, 124-125, 147-148, 150-154, 237-238, 240, 257-262, 265-275, 288, 320, 335, 339, 378
- Wages, 5, 8, 10-12, 21, 52, 85, 87, 89, 99, 105, 113, 125, 141-143, 190-191, 193, 256, 281, 293, 326, 328, 341
- War, 2, 4, 15-16, 21, 27, 30-33, 41, 47, 53, 65, 70-71, 77, 89, 91, 95-96, 106-107, 120, 123, 127, 157, 162, 166, 172, 175-176, 178, 180, 182-193, 204, 207, 210-214, 226, 230-231, 233-235, 242, 246, 250-253, 257, 260, 281, 284-285, 291, 297-298, 302-306, 308, 314-321, 325, 331, 350-351, 363-364, 367, 369-371, 373-375, 379
- War Communism, 123, 257, 302-303, 325, 331
- War Industry, 188, 251
- War Scare of 1927, 211, 260, 321, 371, 373, 375
- Washington Conference, 251
- West, 38, 43, 103, 174, 187, 247, 297, 307, 320, 350, 380-381
- White, 33, 75, 187, 206, 209-210, 238-240, 306, 314, 318, 332, 379
- White Guards, 186, 208, 379
- White Russian, 187, 209
- Whites, 379
- Wholesale, 8-9, 11, 17, 43, 85, 88, 171, 280
- Women, 41, 44, 237
- Women, Medical Needs of, 236, 374, 376
- Work, 1, 3-5, 12-14, 17, 21-26, 39-48, 50, 52-66, 69, 71, 73-76, 78-80, 87, 89, 92-94, 96-98, 100, 105, 107-109, 111, 117-119, 121, 124-125, 128, 131, 136, 141, 154, 159-160, 163, 165, 167-169, 174-175, 180-181, 183, 185, 187-188, 190, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201-202, 204, 208, 210, 212-213, 218, 229-233, 237-240, 244-247, 250, 252-255, 258-259, 263-267, 269-272, 274-277, 281-295, 299-301, 304, 307, 309, 311-312, 315-317, 322, 326, 328-330, 333-334, 339, 346-349, 356, 358, 360, 364, 368, 372, 374, 376, 379
- Workers, 2, 8, 12-13, 15, 17-23, 25, 34, 37, 39, 41-62, 65-66, 68, 70, 72-73, 76, 79, 81, 85, 88, 90, 92-93, 95, 97-99, 104-106, 108-109, 113, 116, 118, 122-123, 127-128, 131, 151-153, 163, 167, 170, 179-183, 185-186, 188, 191-194, 199, 203-204, 210, 213-214, 216, 219-221, 223-227, 232-233, 238-241, 243-245, 249, 252-253, 255-256, 258, 260-261, 265-266, 270, 273-276, 279, 281-282, 287-288, 290, 293, 295, 299-300, 302, 305-306, 308, 310, 314-318, 329, 331, 333, 341, 347, 355-357, 363, 368, 371, 378
- Industrial, 193, 318, 371
- Timber, 274
- Workers Opposition, 13, 48
- Working Women, 41, 43-45, 47, 237
- World Economic Conference, 190, 196, 202, 204, 372-373, 380
- Zarya Vostoka*, 122, 124
- Zinoviev Letter, 170-171
- Zinoviev-Trotskyist Opposition, 211
- Zinovievist Opposition, 49, 371-372, 375
- Zinovievites, 49

## INDEX OF INSTITUTIONS

- Academy of Sciences, 246, 321
- Air Fleet, Air Force, 169, 172, 185, 187-189, 208, 251, 256, 287, 315-316, 332, 342
- All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers: See VAPP
- Arcos, 194-195, 197-199, 204-207, 213, 373
- Artists, Association of, 282, 372
- Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, 153-155
- Boehm-Bauwerk, 345
- Bolshevik, 19, 25, 34, 51, 65, 85, 91, 100-102, 107, 116, 121, 126, 182, 220-221, 223, 225-226, 233-234, 249, 254, 259, 266-267, 276-277, 287, 290, 294, 296, 299, 312, 315, 332, 350-351, 360, 363-365, 376-379
- Bolshevik Party, 51, 65, 100, 102, 116, 121, 220, 233-234, 259, 276, 287
- Bolshoi Theater, 209, 319
- British Foreign Office, 32, 185
- British Government, 33, 35, 170-174, 194-197, 200, 206-210, 213, 373, 380
- British Parliament, 173
- British Secret Service, 208
- British Socialists, 172
- Canton Government, 36, 164-166
- Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, 188
- Central Executive Committee, 1, 28, 38, 47-48, 66-67, 132, 143, 145, 147, 150-155, 161, 171-172, 209, 240, 248, 276, 282, 294-295, 306, 314, 370, 376-377, 379
- Leadership, 5, 12, 49, 62, 68, 211, 231, 248, 281, 301, 371-372, 375
- Central Statistical Administration, 82, 134, 145, 157, 241, 322
- Chinese Communist Party, 163, 166-167, 181, 220
- Chinese Communists, 164-167, 179, 223-224, 227
- Chinese Government, 36, 164
- Communist Academy, 82, 116, 246, 321
- Comunist International, 1, 3-4, 41, 47-48, 52, 64, 110, 118, 131, 161, 167, 170-171, 205, 211, 215-220, 222, 227, 231-232, 234-236, 255, 259, 276-277, 302-307, 314, 317-318, 336, 365, 371-372, 374-377, 379
- Fourth Congress, 314
- Fifth Congress, 305, 314
- Sixth Congress, 276-277, 304-307, 314, 317
- Communist International, Executive Committee (ECCI), 3, 48, 63-64, 232-233, 377
- Commissariats,
- Agriculture, 376
- Education (Enlightenment), 159, 312, 377
- Finance, 72, 360-361
- Foreign Affairs, 28-29, 38, 173
- Interior, 132
- Justice, 132
- Labor, 42
- Means of Communication (Transport), 12, 188, 242, 312
- Trade, 89
- Communal Bank, 73
- Communist Party, 1, 3-6, 12, 39-41, 48-49, 53-56, 62-65, 68-69, 100, 116, 118-120, 124, 157, 164-165, 167-168, 176, 179-183, 185, 194, 205, 209, 211, 215, 219-221, 223, 231-232, 234-235, 238, 248, 254, 276-278, 281, 286-287, 301, 304, 308, 321, 330, 349, 364, 366-368, 371-373, 375-381
- Central Committee, 1-6, 9, 11-14, 19, 24, 38-40, 45-49, 51-53, 62-66, 80-81, 84, 88, 94, 99-101, 103, 112, 116-118, 120, 122, 125, 176, 179-181, 183, 202, 211, 220, 223, 228, 231-236, 239-240, 246, 248, 254-259, 266-267, 270, 272-275, 278, 286-287, 291, 294, 300-304, 307, 309, 313, 322, 325, 329, 348, 354-356, 359, 361, 365-368, 371, 375-380
- Central Control Commission, 49-50, 53, 62, 64-66, 101, 116, 118, 122, 231-236, 239, 248, 259, 286-287, 294, 301, 348, 354, 359, 366, 376
- Conference, 10-11, 51, 60, 68, 232, 257-258, 271, 366, 371-372, 375-376

- Conference, Fourteenth, 10-11, 60, 257, 261, 271
- Conference, Fifteenth, 68, 258, 371-372, 375-376
- Congress, 1-3, 10-11, 14, 23-24, 56, 60-65, 70, 81, 93, 98, 103, 112, 114, 116, 120-121, 123-126, 129-130, 232-234, 236, 248, 254, 256, 258, 261, 271, 276-277, 362, 371-372, 375
- Congress, Seventh, 1, 2, 15, 26, 45, 48, 55, 67, 75, 80, 105-106, 141, 161, 166, 168, 184, 197, 206, 212, 220, 228, 234, 240, 248-249, 252, 254, 277, 279, 302, 310, 331-332, 337, 341, 346-347, 355, 369
- Congress, Eighth, 120
- Congress, Ninth, 120
- Congress, Tenth, 48, 62-65, 233-234, 236
- Congress, Eleventh, 62, 258
- Congress, Twelfth, 337
- Congress, Thirteenth, 125, 258
- Congress, Fourteenth, 1, 10-11, 14, 24-25, 50, 56, 60-62, 64, 70, 81, 93, 98, 103, 114, 116, 121, 123-126, 130, 232, 239, 254, 256, 261, 271, 359-360
- Congress, Fifteenth, 248, 254-259, 265, 276-277, 281, 286-287, 292, 295, 342-344, 346, 359-360, 362, 371-372, 375
- Congress Resolutions, 254, 371-372, 375
- Communist Youth League (YCL), 45, 209, 247, 377, 379 20, 175, 239-240, 258, 265, 270, 288, 377, 379-380
- Conservative Government, 32, 194, 204, 206, 212-213
- Conservative Party, 172, 212-213
- Constituent Assembly, 225-226, 376, 378
- Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), 377
- Cooperative, 2-3, 5, 7-8, 11-12, 16, 18-20, 22, 41, 43-44, 46, 51, 55-60, 73, 83, 85, 87-88, 91-93, 95, 105, 125, 130, 143, 240-241, 244, 256-258, 262, 264-266, 268-273, 275, 281, 308-309, 311, 326, 330, 332, 335, 349, 351-352, 359, 365, 368, 376
- Council of Labor and Defense (STO), 86, 115
- Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), 39-40, 98, 119-120, 132, 147, 152, 209, 282, 349, 356, 377-379
- English Government, 33
- Federation of Organizations of Soviet Writers, 168
- Federation of Writers, 321
- Foreign Office, 32, 170, 185, 200, 205, 380
- French Government, 178, 231, 369
- German Communist Party, 69, 118
- German Foreign Office, 200
- German Government, 25-27, 30-31, 183, 198, 200, 373-374
- Glavlit, 377
- Glavpolitprosvet, 159
- GOELRO, 352, 377
- Gosplan, 188, 377
- GPU, 20, 79, 208-210, 248, 276, 303, 373-374, 376-377
- Great Britain, Labor Government, 32, 164
- Great Britain, Labor Party, 194, 317, 378
- Institute of Red Professors, 321
- Kemal Government, 37
- Kerensky Government, 33
- Komsomol: See Communist Youth League
- Kuomintang Party, 36, 161, 163, 165-167, 176, 179-183, 211, 216-217, 219-224, 226-227, 317
- League of Nations, 3-5, 25-31, 66, 68, 167, 178, 186, 196, 202, 204, 209, 247, 250-251, 255, 283-285, 305, 315-317, 369, 373, 377, 380
- Left Socialist Revolutionaries, 114, 119, 221, 377-378
- Lenin Institute, 246
- Leningrad Party Organization, 3, 12, 304, 321
- Leningrad Soviet, 25
- MacDonald Government, 33, 164
- Marx-Engels Institute, 246
- Menshevik, 55, 57, 164, 225-226, 259, 267, 277, 362, 364, 377-78
- Menshevik-Internationalists, 377



- Miliukov-Kerensky Provisional Government, 222, 225  
 Mutual Aid Society, 148, 274  
 Narkompros, 377-378  
 Organizational Bureau, 303, 377  
 Parliament, 32, 170, 173, 225-226, 377  
 Patriarchate, Moscow, 228, 230  
 Political Bureau (Politburo), 9, 12-13, 38-40, 47-49, 62-65, 69, 90, 117, 122, 129, 211, 248, 286, 302, 348-349, 354, 356, 359, 365, 367, 378  
 Proletkult, 378  
 Putilov Works, 81, 120, 232, 266, 326  
 Rabkrin, 347, 378  
 Red Army, 19, 163-164, 166, 177, 200-202, 275  
 Red International of Labor Unions (RILU), 64, 110, 125, 378  
 Red Navy, 275  
 Russian Orthodox Church, 228-231, 375  
 Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), 120, 378  
 Second International, 3, 92, 101, 217, 224, 316-317, 363-365  
 Secretariat, 29, 39-40, 48, 285  
 Social Democrat, 1, 106-107, 110-113, 115-118, 121-123, 129-130, 232, 258, 306, 316-319, 325, 355, 363-364, 378  
 Socialist Revolutionary-Menshevik, 164  
 Socialist Revolutionaries, 55, 57, 114, 119, 164, 221, 225-226, 277, 377-379  
 Sotsvos, 159  
 Sovkino, 168-170  
 Sovnarkom: See Council of Peoples' Commissars  
 Stalingrad Tractor Works, 358  
 State Bank (GOSBANK), 151, 188  
 State Planning Commission (GOSPLAN), 69, 74, 96-97, 188, 246, 361, 377  
 State Political Administration: See GPU  
 State Publishing House, 159  
 Supreme Council of the National Economy (Vesenkha), 72, 75, 78-79, 86, 94, 188, 312, 321, 324, 330, 338, 344, 346, 361, 379  
 Supreme Court, 132-147, 149  
 Swiss Government, 4-5, 178, 190  
 Third International, 205  
 Trade Union Council, 44, 120  
 Tsektran, 379  
 TsIK: See Central Executive Committee  
 Unified State Political Administration: See GPU  
 United States of Europe, 307  
 VAPP, 168  
 Voronezh Seed Sorter Factory, 358  
 War Office, 185-186  
 Wuhan Kuomintang, 219, 221-223  
 Zhenotdel, 379

## INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC AND PLACE NAMES

- |                          |                            |                            |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Afghanistan, 37, 297     | Bashkiria, 87              | 218-219, 221               |
| Africa, 211, 305         | Belgium, 35                | Caucasus, 46, 269, 273,    |
| Amsterdam, 3, 316        | Belorussia, 158            | 307, 339, 355-356          |
| Ankuochun, 177           | Berlin, 25-27, 29-30, 103, | Central Asia, 37, 97, 269, |
| Armenia, 213             | 118, 178, 184, 186,        | 273                        |
| Austria, 120, 194, 199,  | 200-201, 373-374           | Central Black Earth, 356   |
| 211, 255, 315            | Black Sea, 188             | China, 28, 35-37, 161-167, |
| Azerbaijan, 158, 213     | Briansk, 63, 266           | 176, 178-179, 181-         |
| Baku, 332                | Bronitska, 84              | 183, 186, 191-193,         |
| Balkans, 316             | Brussels, 317              | 196, 204, 206-207,         |
| Baltic, 28, 34, 188-189, | Cambridge, 380             | 211-213, 215-218,          |
| 315, 370                 | Canton, 36, 162-167, 216,  | 220-221, 226-227,          |
|                          |                            | 233, 254, 304-305,         |

- 314-316, 371, 373,  
 375  
 Cologne, 127  
 Czechoslovakia, 35, 321  
  
 Dagestan, 157-158  
 Denmark, 199  
 Dnieper, 72, 97, 359, 362  
 Don, 22, 30, 49, 99, 124,  
 278-279, 302-303  
 Don Basin (Donbas), 43,  
 76, 97, 286, 300  
 Dubrovka, 210  
  
 Eastern Europe, 34-35,  
 190, 253, 370  
 Egypt, 164, 317  
 Elbe, 191  
 Emba, 97  
 England, 32-33, 74, 80,  
 106, 124, 128, 162,  
 171, 186, 190-191,  
 194, 197, 207, 233,  
 321, 381  
 Estonia, 34, 321, 370  
 Europe, 31, 33-35, 40, 43,  
 75, 95, 107, 127-  
 128, 172, 183, 188,  
 190-191, 193, 196,  
 207-208, 213, 253,  
 255, 307, 318, 320,  
 347, 370  
  
 Far East, 35, 37, 233  
 Finland, 33, 35, 370  
  
 Geneva, 4-5, 29-30, 190,  
 202, 204, 249, 255,  
 283, 372-374, 380  
 Georgia, 213  
 German Volga, 157-158  
 Germany, 4, 15, 25-31, 94,  
 106, 120, 178, 183,  
 190-191, 194, 199-  
 200, 205, 211, 224,  
 234, 305, 318, 331,  
 351  
 Grafenwoerth, 201  
 Great Britain, 15, 18, 25,  
 28, 164, 170-174,  
 185, 194, 196-200,  
 204-208, 210-211,  
 213, 297, 304-305,  
 314-316, 318, 371,  
 373  
  
 Harbin, 36  
 Holland, 35  
 Hong Kong, 36  
 Huandun Province, 36  
 Hunan, 219  
 Hungary, 39  
 Hupeh, 163, 219  
  
 Iaroslav, 75, 233  
 India, 14-15, 164, 172,  
 305, 317-318  
 Indonesia, 211, 254  
 Ireland, 217  
 Italy, 5, 28, 31-32, 106,  
 172, 186, 211, 305,  
 316, 321  
 Ivanovo-Voznesensk, 43,  
 237  
  
 Japan, 28, 37, 162, 211,  
 298, 304-305, 314-  
 316  
  
 Kazakhstan, 46, 87, 187,  
 322  
 Kazan, 200-201  
 Kharkov, 209, 231, 247  
 Khomel, 63  
 Khutyn, 231  
 Kiev, 189, 378  
 Kingisep, 121  
 Komi, 157-158  
 Kovno, 66-67  
 Kremlin, 172, 209, 302  
 Kutais, 124  
  
 Latvia, 34-35, 39, 370  
 Leipzig, 200  
 Leningrad, 3, 12, 23-25,  
 45, 75, 97, 119-121,  
 189, 206, 209-210,  
 240, 247-249, 302,  
 304, 313, 321, 325-  
 326, 366, 379  
 Lithuania, 35, 66-68, 253,  
 373  
 Lodz, 34  
 London, 32, 36, 103, 172,  
 194-195, 197, 199,  
 207, 213, 255, 372-  
 373, 379-380  
  
 Manchester, 198  
 Manchuria, 36-37, 186,  
 298  
 Mariisk, 157-158  
 Mexico, 314  
 Minsk, 189, 209  
 Moscow, 29, 36, 38, 40-  
 45, 49, 63-64, 67-  
 68, 75-76, 84, 103,  
 119-121, 168, 172,  
 176, 183-185, 194,  
 198, 201-202, 206-  
 207, 209, 228, 230-  
 231, 247-248, 251,  
 253, 276, 300, 302,  
 314, 319, 366, 369,  
 373, 380  
 Mukden, 36  
  
 Nanchang, 180  
 Nanking, 181  
 New York, 379-380  
 Nicaragua, 314, 316  
 Nizhnii Novgorod, 228,  
 231  
 North Africa, 211  
 Norway, 35, 184  
  
 Odessa, 63-64  
 Oiratsk, 158  
 Omsk, 63  
 Orenburg, 87, 184, 201  
  
 Pacific Ocean, 314  
 Paris, 37, 110, 248, 369-  
 370  
 Peking, 36, 176-178, 207,  
 212-213, 216, 371,  
 373  
 Persia, 170, 297, 321  
 Petrograd, 119, 223, 225,  
 377  
 Piatogorsk, 63  
 Poland, 33-34, 66, 68, 187,  
 189-190, 207-208,  
 213, 253, 369-370,  
 373  
 Prussia, 31

- Riga, 332  
 Rostov, 75, 358  
 Rumania, 315  
  
 Saint Petersburg, 302  
 Sakhalin, 37  
 Samara, 231  
 Sarajevo, 213  
 Saratov, 63, 119, 121  
 Saxony, 31  
 Shanghai, 167, 179-183,  
     207, 21  
 Siberia, 97, 186, 277-279,  
     322, 356, 372, 374,  
     376  
 Side, 2, 40, 51, 55, 58, 66,  
     89, 93, 100, 162-  
     163, 192-193, 201,  
     207, 221, 225, 247,  
     249, 252, 268, 277,  
     311, 313, 317, 324,  
     329, 335, 363-364  
 Simbirsk, 96  
 Sochi, 48  
 South America, 211, 305,  
     318  
 Spain, 321  
  
 Stalingrad, 81  
 Stockholm, 48  
 Svir, 97  
 Sweden, 35  
 Switzerland, 4-5, 29, 35,  
     178, 373  
  
 Taganrog, 75  
 Tientsin, 220  
 Tiflis, 122  
 Tsaritsyn, 313  
 Tula, 43  
 Turkestan, 46, 88, 97  
 Turkey, 29, 37, 284, 297  
 Turkmenistan, 187  
 Tver, 231  
  
 Ukraine, 38-40, 46, 97,  
     209, 213, 243, 302,  
     307, 355-356, 378  
 United Kingdom: See  
     Great Britain  
 United States of America,  
     18, 33, 74, 95, 162,  
     172, 186, 190-191,  
     194, 199, 211, 245,  
     298, 304-305, 307,  
     314-316, 318, 321,  
     331, 336, 347  
 Urga, 186  
 Urta-Tugai Island, 38  
  
 Viatka, 231  
 Vienna, 318  
 Vladivostok, 63, 206  
 Volga, 97, 157-158, 322,  
     332, 356  
 Volga-Don, 97  
 Vologda, 231  
 Votsk, 157-158  
  
 Warsaw, 208-209, 211,  
     213, 230, 253, 369  
 Washington, D.C., 191,  
     251, 380  
 Wuhan, 180-182, 219-223,  
     227  
  
 Yangtse, 180, 216, 219  
 Yugo-Slavia, 35  
  
 Zhdanovichi, 209  
 Zvenigorod, 231

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